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“Cut off my finger if there is a MP in Indonesia today who got elected  
without doing buying votes!”
—One-time DPR member (Interview, 20 April 2014)
1.1  Background: Why are neW democracies 
VulneraBle to Vote Buying?
As the third and fourth waves of democratisation have swept the world 
since the 1970s (Huntington, 1991), elections have truly become a global 
norm: more than 90% of countries in the world now elect their leaders 
through competitive multiparty elections (Van Ham and Lindberg, 2015; 
Global Commission, 2012). However, as many of the newly democratis-
ing regimes only achieved barely minimal standards of electoral competi-
tion, the early optimism about the rise of democracy has significantly 
waned in much of the global democratic world. A lot of the erstwhile 
enthusiasts soon turned into sceptics, given that electoral democratisation 
hasn’t automatically transformed into liberal form of democracy but beset 
by the curtailment of civil liberties and the feeble establishment of the rule 
of law (Diamond, 2002; Rose and Shin, 2001).
No less important, while almost all nations in the world currently hold 
multiparty elections, not all of them were able to improve the quality of its 
elections, that is, the degree to which elections are free and fair (Van Ham 
and Lindberg, 2015). If the de jure multiparty elections are plagued by a 
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wide range of election fraud and electoral malpractice, the quality of 
democracy becomes problematic at best. Vote buying—the exchange of 
material benefits for or at least in the expectation of votes—is among elec-
toral manipulation that has become a key component of electoral mobili-
sation in many young democracies (Jensen and Justesen, 2014). Ironically, 
instead of diminishing vote buying, the transition stages from authoritar-
ian regimes to democracy may encourage such a distinctly non-democratic 
practice. In transitional democracies where democratic institutions (i.e. 
political parties) are still weak, the design of electoral and political institu-
tion consequently provides strong incentives for politicians to launch such 
strategies. These include competitive elections and multiparty system (van 
de Walle, 2007; Muno, 2010), electoral rules (Scheiner, 2007), decen-
tralisation (García-Guadilla and Pérez, 2002), and credibility on decision- 
making process (Keefer, 2005).
Indonesia is no exception. Soon after Suharto’s authoritarian New 
Order regime came to an end in 1998, Indonesia’s party system entered a 
new, post-authoritarian era. Political parties, of which there were previ-
ously only three because of heavy government regulations, could now 
form freely. Consequently, a highly competitive multiparty system 
emerged, which coincided with the simultaneous introduction of multi- 
level elections from legislative to direct presidential ballots. In the wake of 
this unprecedented development, almost all political parties were neo-
phytes with no political credibility (Vlaicu, 2016). Ideological divisions 
among political parties were also not salient. Thus, voters were often 
unable to differentiate political parties regarding policy positions or plat-
forms. Meanwhile, post-Suharto’s electoral system that generated 
‘candidate- centred’ elections (voters can choose candidates over parties) 
failed to mitigate such problems. Under these circumstances, candidates 
were forced to generate a personal vote and candidate-centred campaigns 
rather than building a party vote and party-centred campaigns. Thus, in 
order to stand out from competitors within their own parties, candidates 
were unhesitating to buy votes, as happened in numerous transitions dur-
ing the third and fourth waves of democratisation.
It is increasingly clear that an unprecedented wave of institutional changes 
in Indonesia since 1998 has created more room for clientelistic strategies. 
The changes in political and electoral systems, even with the best of long-
term goals to create free and fair elections as well as appropriate channels of 
accountability (Shair-Rosenfield, 2012: 1), crystallise one of basic questions 
guiding this book: what effects have political and  institutional factors had on 
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the nature of patronage politics in Indonesia? How well do institutional 
arrangements explain the scope, patterns, determinants, targeting mecha-
nisms, and effectiveness of vote buying as a form of patronage distribu-
tion? This book aims to answer these questions posed by the connection 
shared between these twin issues of change: the changes in the political 
institutions after the authoritarian regime, especially in the electoral arena, 
and the changes in the nature and mechanics of vote buying.
However, given the burgeoning of scholarly writings on the impact of 
electoral systems on clientelism, the analytical focus of this book is on vote 
buying by arguing that particular contextual factors—especially the adop-
tion of open-list proportional voting system as a result of the electoral 
reforms after the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian rule—matter greatly in 
explaining the ubiquity of vote buying in Indonesia. This book presents—
in much more length—a wide-ranging study of the dynamics of vote buy-
ing in Indonesia’s young democracy, exploring the nature, extent, 
determinants, targeting, and effectiveness of this practice. Despite vote 
buying becoming central feature to electoral campaigns in Southeast Asian 
countries, particularly in Indonesia, where this practice has gained promi-
nence in its post-Suharto’s electoral politics, most influential studies on 
clientelism have emerged from other world regions. This book therefore 
aims to fill the gap in the scholarship reference on electoral clientelism in 
Indonesia and to situate my findings about the country within the context 
of wider academic literature on the field.
1.2  Vote Buying in indonesia’s Post-authoritarian 
rule
As noted above, vote buying appears to be endemic in many recently 
established democracies (Jensen and Justesen, 2014; Keefer, 2005). For 
instance, using the 2005 Round 3 Afrobarometer survey, Andrews and 
Inman (2009) found massive evidence of vote buying in seven democratic 
countries in Africa,1 and the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP) released findings of the 2010 Americas Barometer surveys 
showing high levels of—and interesting variations in—vote-buying 
 behaviour across the Latin American and Caribbean regions (Faughnan 




and Zechmeister, 2011).2 Similarly, politicians in Asian countries often opt 
to target poor citizens with offers of money, goods, or other forms of 
compensation for their vote in elections. In the Philippines, for instance, 
vote buying has long been a major feature of the country’s elections, with 
an estimated 22% of its total electorate having been offered money or 
goods in exchange for their votes during the May 2013 elections (Pulse 
Asia, 2013).
One country in Asia that has attracted particular attention in terms of 
its vote-buying practices is Indonesia. It is difficult to find an analysis, 
either in the mass media or in the academic literature, of Indonesia’s cur-
rent electoral politics that doesn’t mention vote buying, locally known as 
‘money politics’ (politik uang). Despite its prominence, this issue surpris-
ingly hasn’t received much systematic and comprehensive scholarly atten-
tion. The few examples of scholarly works on this topic are based on 
qualitative approaches (e.g. Choi, 2007; Hidayat, 2007; Hadiz, 2010; 
Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). Although they have significantly contrib-
uted to our understanding about vote buying, this qualitative literature is 
unable to measure vote buying’s scope, pattern, and effects on electoral 
outcomes (Gonzalez-Ocantos et  al., 2012: 203). Equally, much of the 
existing literature on vote buying has relied on anecdotal evidence, often 
drawing from unproven rumours and claims (Corstange, 2012: 483). 
Consequently, little is known about how many voters actually sell their 
votes in Indonesia and whether cash handouts have discernible effects on 
turnout or vote choice. This book deals with these key questions that have 
haunted scholars of Indonesian studies for the last 15 years.3
Indonesia is a compelling case study to illuminate the dynamics of vote 
buying in post-authoritarian societies. This is because of its significance as 
the third largest democracy in the world and because it belongs to a group 
of Southeast Asian nations that report offers of vote buying in higher 
numbers than most other countries (Schaffer, 2007; Amick, 2016). 
2 Among 22 countries across the region, according to the LAPOP, the Dominican Republic 
came out on top, with 22% of respondents claiming that they have been offered material 
benefits in exchange for their votes. Argentina was second, with 18% of those surveyed 
reporting having been offered money for their votes either sometimes or often; Panama fol-
lowed with 17.8%. This big project involved a total of 37,642 individuals selected randomly 
to represent a population of eligible voters in 22 countries in the Latin American region.
3 In addition, much has been written about Indonesian voting behaviour from the perspec-
tive of sociological context, party identification, and rational choice (e.g. King, 2003; Ananta 
et al., 2004; Mujani et al., 2012; Liddle and Mujani, 2007).
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Indeed, my study finds that vote buying is so widespread that it has become 
central to election campaigning in Indonesia (see Chap. 2). In addition to 
establishing the extent and effects of vote buying, this book also addresses 
broader questions in the comparative literature on clientelism, such as 
those regarding the determinants and targeting mechanisms of vote buy-
ing. Using survey data from Indonesia’s legislative  elections  in 2014, I 
examine a large number of variables generally believed to be the determi-
nants of vote buying at the individual level (such as income, civic engage-
ment, and political attitudes). Surprisingly, my results suggest that, among 
other things, partisanship (i.e. strong emotional attachment to a particular 
political party) is a highly significant predictor of vote buying. Party iden-
tifiers were three times more likely to be targets of such practice than non- 
party identifiers.
This finding is striking, given that strong party supporters should be 
expected to vote for their party without material incentives. But this result 
is only one piece of the evidence in a jigsaw puzzle I put together through 
this book. This finding cannot establish definitively whether voter parti-
sanship attracts handouts or whether the reverse is true: that these benefits 
cause people to identify with the party that hands out cash (see also Stokes 
et al., 2013: 54). Despite such a potential endogeneity problem—which I 
discuss later in this book—my finding challenges one strand of scholarship 
that suggests that partisanship encourages voters to voluntarily help their 
parties during campaigns (e.g. Dalton, 2016; Verba and Nie, 1972). 
Further complicating this picture is the fact that the aggregate level of 
political partisanship—as expressed in levels of party identification—is 
comparatively low in Indonesia, constituting only 15% of my survey 
respondents during the 2014 election. Given these conditions of low par-
tisanship, one major problem for candidates and parties arises: how feasi-
ble is it for candidates in Indonesia to win only by targeting partisans?
The issue of partisanship is in fact at the heart of the scholarly debate 
about the logic of vote buying (Dunning and Stokes, 2008; Cox, 2010; 
Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012). Efforts at vote buying incur high costs, caused 
by both the need to establish a structure of vote brokers to deliver benefits 
to the voters and, of course, the requirement to raise the cash for distribu-
tion. With limited resources in hand, and in an environment in which 
ballot secrecy is protected, candidates are concerned with the effectiveness 
of vote buying in determining voting outcomes. As a result, they focus on 
the distribution of electoral incentives to some voters but exclude others 
(Stokes et al., 2013). The literature identifies two contrasting strategies in 
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how they do so: the core-voter model and the swing-voter approach. The 
first posits that parties provide to core supporters in order to mobilise 
them to turn out on election day (Nichter, 2008; Stokes et  al., 2013; 
Aspinall et  al., 2015). The second sees vote buying as a strategy that 
attempts to sway uncommitted voters (Stokes, 2005). What types of vot-
ers, then, do Indonesian politicians target?
While the results of my voter surveys seem to provide evidence for 
the core-voter prediction in Indonesia, and my survey of politicians 
and brokers finds ample evidence of strong intentions among political 
actors to target partisan, loyalist voters, the picture is in fact complex. 
The data clearly show that although such voters are more likely to be 
targeted, in fact, overall they only make up a tiny proportion of the 
electorate in Indonesia. How can politicians rely on targeting only 
party loyalists to win in an election, given the limited number of such 
voters? As the election draws nearer, how do they make choices on how 
to spend their money once they have exhausted party loyalists? This 
challenge becomes even more complicated as, under open-list propor-
tional representation (hereafter: PR) systems such as that used in 
Indonesia, candidates from the same party have to compete for votes 
between themselves to gain a seat. The small number of party loyalists 
is thus highly contested among co- partisans desperately seeking per-
sonal votes.
Moreover, while party loyalists are more likely to be targeted in relative 
terms, in absolute terms the data show that vote buying in Indonesia 
mostly occurs among non-partisans. If candidates and brokers express 
such a strong desire to target loyalists, why do they largely end up distrib-
uting so much cash and goods to so many uncommitted voters, and what 
sort of people get targeted for those payments? Hence, the puzzle under-
lying this book revolves around the question of how politicians and bro-
kers decide which voters to target—voters who they might deem ‘loyal’ 
but who are in fact emotionally unattached to any party or candidate. In 
addition, the principal-agent problems inherent in vote buying—with 
agents leaking money provided by their principals—are also common in 
Indonesia. Regardless of such challenges, this book shows that candidates 
still pursue this electoral strategy with enthusiasm, with the result that as 
many as a third of voters across Indonesia are exposed to vote buying.
Why is vote buying so widespread despite targeting being imprecise 
and leakage high? In the context of the secret ballot, as in Indonesia, 
how can parties and candidates be sure that their investment has an 
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effect on voting behaviour? It is fair to assume that without a traceable 
effect of vote  buying, parties and candidates wouldn’t engage in it—
either in Indonesia or anywhere else. Indeed, despite all the problems 
of inefficient delivery, my study finds cash handouts are surprisingly 
effective in producing higher turnout and vote share. In particular, I 
show that it is particularly the small margin candidates need under an 
open party list system that makes vote buying effective, its high cost 
notwithstanding. I show that, despite all its inefficiency, vote buying 
has an effectiveness ratio that is more than enough to make the differ-
ence in the tight races that occur between candidates on a single-party 
list. This helps explain the underlying logic behind candidates’ insis-
tence on running vote-buying campaigns.
Overall, therefore, this book aims to explore the dynamics of vote 
buying in Indonesian electoral politics and how post-Suharto’s institu-
tional arrangements explain the prevalence of vote buying. In doing so, 
I present systematic answers to many of the key questions that have 
arisen in the literature on clientelism. These questions concern the 
scope, patterns, determinants, targeting mechanisms, and effectiveness 
of vote buying. My primary research question is: what logic determines 
the patterns of vote buying in Indonesia? Developing an answer will 
require answering a set of subsidiary questions. These include, first, 
how prevalent is vote buying in Indonesia? Here, I aim to identify vari-
ous forms and the intensity of this practice in Indonesia. Second, in 
order to explain the ubiquity of vote buying, I tackle questions such as 
what kinds of voters are most likely to ‘sell’ votes, what factors explain 
why some individuals are more likely than others to be targeted for 
vote buying, and how are they targeted? A third set of questions focus 
on the impacts of vote buying. In particular, I ask: how effective is vote 
buying in boosting greater turnout or vote share?
The rest of this introduction first reviews the literature on vote buy-
ing, and particularly the debate on whether it mainly targets core or 
swing voters. It then proceeds by introducing my main arguments, which 
the book chapters substantiate. The subsequent section presents 
Indonesia’s institutional framework, explaining how it has helped shape 
vote buying during elections. This section helps distinguish the 
Indonesian case from the conventional patterns identified in literature 
that largely stems from Latin American cases. The chapter then explains 
the research methodology used and concludes by offering an overview 
of the chapter structure.
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1.3  literature reVieW
1.3.1  Electoral Clientelism: Vote Buying
Following Nichter (2010), this study distinguishes electoral clientelism 
from the broader category of clientelism. Nichter (2010: 2) defines elec-
toral clientelism as the distribution of material rewards to voters “exclu-
sively during electoral campaigns.” This runs contrary to the generic, 
classic definition of clientelism which typically involves ongoing relation-
ships where politicians (or indeed, other social leaders) provide assistance 
and benefits not only during elections (Scott, 1969; Bobonis et al., 2017; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Hicken (2011: 290–294) lists a number 
of crucial aspects of clientelism, describing it as a form of relationship 
based on material exchange and involving contingency, hierarchy, and 
iteration. Muno (2010) adds two important elements, insisting that clien-
telism is personal and voluntary.
Accordingly, if we stick to such key features of clientelism, not all pay-
ments made during elections are part of clientelist relationships. Hicken 
(2011: 295) reminds us that some instances of vote buying that scholars 
have documented around the world actually don’t fit neatly into the clas-
sical category of clientelism. In many instances, vote buying is a one-off 
interaction rather than an example of an ongoing, or iterative, and mutu-
ally beneficial relationship of exchange (Kramon, 2011; Aspinall, 2014). 
In this study, therefore, vote buying can take the form of clientelist or 
non-clientelist exchanges. In order to capture both clientelist and non- 
clientelist forms of vote buying, I follow Schaffer and Schedler (2007) in 
viewing vote buying as an act which doesn’t need to involve an element of 
clientelism. Hence, I simply define vote buying as a last-minute effort to 
influence a voters’ decision in an election, typically taking place days, or 
even just a few hours, before a poll, by providing the voter with cash, 
goods, or some other material benefit.
1.3.2  Targeting Strategies
As indicated earlier, given the budgetary constraints candidates face, the 
question of how they determine the targets of their vote-buying strategies 
has become a key theme in the literature. Much scholarly theorising on 
vote buying involves two competing camps, that is, the core-voter versus 
swing-voter schools. The former holds that when they distribute cash 
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 payments or goods, parties tend to target their own core voters in order to 
motivate them to vote and thus increase their turnout (e.g. Nichter, 2008; 
Stokes et al., 2013). This form of vote buying is often referred to as ‘turn-
out buying.’ The second school suggests the opposite. According to this 
camp, parties will not waste their limited budgets on core supporters, but 
instead expend it on swing voters or weakly opposed voters (e.g. Lindbeck 
and Weibull, 1987; Stokes, 2005). This argument is based on the underly-
ing assumption that a core voter is already committed to support the party 
and hence needs no further incentive to vote for it.
In this study, I examine these two dominant streams to explain how 
Indonesian politicians and their intermediaries distribute benefits to 
voters. Cox and McCubbins (1986) were among the first to outline the 
core- voter hypothesis. They contend that in many settings, political 
parties tend to allocate distributive benefits primarily to their core vot-
ers. The driving factor in the core-voter model is the assumption of risk 
aversion on the part of politicians. Core voters are seen as being more 
responsive than swing voters because politicians are in “frequent and 
intensive contact with them and have relatively precise and accurate 
ideas about how they will react” (Cox and McCubbins, 1986: 379). In 
their model, risk-averse politicians are unlikely to target swing voters 
and supporters of their opponents because these two groups of the 
electorate are riskier bets. Cox and McCubbins coined the term main-
tenance buying to reflect the fact that channelling benefits to core sup-
porters is a rational strategy for a party seeking to maintain a long-term 
relationship with supporters. Gans-Morse et al. (2014: 4), on the other 
hand, called it a rewarding loyalist strategy to lock in core voters who 
might otherwise defect.
Focusing on the individual level, Nichter’s (2008) study developed a 
strong rationale for Cox and McCubbins’ argument, but with a slightly 
different focus and argument. While Cox and McCubbins (1986) empha-
sised the role of risk aversion in this strategy, Nichter (2008) argued that 
passive supporters are substantially more likely to receive electoral incen-
tives due to the primary goal of vote buying being voter mobilisation (as 
opposed to persuasion). In his model, vote-maximising politicians don’t 
try to change voters’ preferences, but—and he uses the term turnout buy-
ing—their goal is to increase turnout among their supporters, some of 
whom may not be sufficiently militant to go to the ballot box at all costs. 
In addition, Nichter (2008) argues that turnout buying is much easier to 
monitor for parties and their intermediaries.
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A study by Diaz-Cayeros and his colleagues (2012) also found empiri-
cal support for the core-voter hypothesis. In their work, however, the 
focus is on the endogeneity of partisan loyalties to material benefits. They 
argue that parties, especially in Mexico where their study was developed, 
tend to target loyal supporters to maintain their electoral coalitions over 
time. They argue that party machines still find it in their interest to target 
party loyalists, particularly in the presence of fear that if ignored the loyal-
ists might defect. Finally, Stokes and her collaborators (2013) brought a 
different emphasis to the debate by arguing that this party loyalist strategy 
is used neither for systematically buying votes nor for purchasing turnout, 
but it is simply a manifestation of rent-seeking behaviour by electoral bro-
kers. They argue that broker predation is the driving force behind the 
tendency of targeting party loyalists, as this strategy allows brokers both to 
get a higher profit margin from the funds given to them and to consoli-
date their position in their own patronage networks.
In contrast to such views, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) proposed the 
swing-voter thesis. The main proponents of this strand suggest that dis-
tributive benefits will be more likely to be targeted at swing voters because 
it is these voters who determine the outcome of an election (Lindbeck and 
Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005). Parties need 
to address the short-term interests of voters outside of their ideological 
and social core constituency to expand their base at election time (Diaz- 
Cayeros et al., 2012). Core voters, by contrast, remain supportive of their 
party even if material benefits are cut off (Stokes, 2005). Therefore, the 
rationale behind the swing-voter strategy is simple: swing voters’ electoral 
decisions might be affected by gifts, while core voters are unlikely to be. 
In the swing-voter logic, to reward loyalists who are close to the party or 
candidate is to waste limited resources. In the same vein, the swing-voter 
hypothesis also predicts that politicians will not reward opposition sup-
porters who are too ideologically distant from them to be persuaded by 
gifts to change their electoral choice.
In some of her earlier work, Stokes (2005)—in drawing from Dixit and 
Londregan (1996)—argued that parties avoid investing in core voters 
because the latter cannot credibly threaten to defect from the party. “Such a 
threat would lack credibility: the party knows that the loyal voter, even with-
out rewards, is better off cooperating forever than defecting forever” (2005: 
320). In her 2005 model, party machines predominantly favour swing vot-
ers, or even those swing voters who are slightly opposed to their party 
because only these swing voters can credibly threaten to vote with their 
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conscience if they aren’t swayed by the offer of material inducement. 
Alternatively, a typical element of the swing-voter hypothesis is the logic 
of vote maximisation, in which favouring swing voters over core voters 
increases the prospect of electoral victory. As Diaz-Cayeros and his col-
leagues (2012: 3) put it, for the swing-voter hypothesis, “swing voters 
are often equated with the closeness or margin of the victory.” This is 
largely because in order to win elections, parties cannot exclusively rely 
on their loyalist voters, but they also need to persuade swing voters who 
are indifferent to the rival parties. Hence, investing a large amount in 
gifts to swing voters, in this view, can be decisive in determining elec-
toral outcomes.
So how does Indonesia fit into this debate between proponents of the 
core-voter and swing-voter models of vote buying? Or does Indonesia 
take a different path altogether? It is worth noting that despite stark dif-
ferences between the swing-voter and core-voter arguments, both camps 
typically assume that it is the party that is doing the vote buying (Aspinall 
et al., 2015, 2017; Kramon, 2013). The problem with this sort of analysis 
in the context of Indonesia’s democratic transition is that, although politi-
cal parties still count in legislative elections, it isn’t parties but candidates 
with networks of informal brokers who play the key role in organising 
grassroots electioneering and, therefore, vote buying. Candidates not only 
campaign for their party but also against candidates of the same party. As 
I will show below, this circumstance has significant implications for the 
patterns of vote buying and the targeting mechanisms used.
In addition, many scholars of vote buying have assumed that the key 
parameter parties use to identify recipients when distributing benefits is 
voters’ ideological or partisan proximity to the machine or to its oppo-
nents (Dunning and Stokes, 2008: 3). The Indonesia context, however, 
makes this assumption problematic. As noted above, the number of party 
loyalists is comparatively low, and party organisation isn’t well organised. 
Many of the parties are also not clearly ideologically differentiated from 
their rivals. Thus, the Indonesian case displays significant differences from 
the context in which much of the literature on vote buying was developed. 
This book, therefore, attempts to go beyond just testing the two domi-
nant positions—and beyond locating Indonesia in terms of a ‘choice’ in 
the swing versus loyalist targeting debate. It aims to do justice to 
Indonesia’s complex electoral dynamics and—in turn—use the findings to 
inform the comparative debate on vote buying.
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1.4  the argument in Brief
This book argues that Indonesia’s open-list proportional voting system—
as a result of the post-Suharto’s electoral reforms—plays a crucial role in 
explaining the ubiquity of vote buying. Under this system, candidates 
must compete against their party peers for personal votes, and they only 
need to win a small slice of the votes to defeat their internal rivals. This 
means that despite vote buying’s inefficiency and small effects, in close 
contests such as in Indonesia, vote buying can still make a difference to a 
candidate’s odds of victory. Even if offers of money influence the vote 
choice of ‘only’ 10% of voters, this figure is high enough for many candi-
dates to clinch a win.
This book demonstrates the centrality of vote buying to election cam-
paigns in contemporary Indonesia. It shows that such practices aren’t only 
prominent in national legislative elections but in local executive elections as 
well. Based on survey responses on all measures of vote buying, as will be 
thoroughly discussed in Chap. 2, the estimated proportion of people 
engaging in this activity lies between 25% and 33% of voters. These figures, 
however, define a range, rather than an accurate point-estimate, of vote 
buying incidents in Indonesian electoral politics. In the legislative election 
in 2014, there were around 187 million registered domestic voters. Hence, 
the range of between 25% and 33% would mean an estimated 47 million to 
62 million voters nationwide were offered material benefits in return for 
their vote. If we rely on the highest estimate, one out of three voting-age 
Indonesians was personally exposed to vote buying, making Indonesia the 
site of the third largest reported frequency of vote buying in the world, as 
measured in recent surveys. High levels of patronage distribution are also 
pervasive in  local executive contests. My local elections dataset measures 
vote buying in terms of its acceptability among voters rather than its fre-
quency; we can also use this measure as a proxy for those likely targeted by 
the practice. Utilising a rich vein of voter data from 2006 to 2015, I show 
that the acceptance level of vote buying is comparatively high, with four 
out of ten Indonesians finding it acceptable for politicians or their brokers 
to distribute cash or gifts as part of campaigning in local elections.
Given that vote buying is so widespread in Indonesia, it is crucial to 
identify the determinants of the practice. Specifically, whom do candidates 
target with their vote-buying efforts? I show that the consistent findings of 
multivariate analysis based on pre- and post-legislative election  nationwide 
surveys suggest that party-based partisanship (or party identification) is 
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among the strongest predictors of vote buying. Put differently, my study 
found that the closer the ties of a voter to a political party, the more likely 
he/she was to receive offers of vote buying. On the surface, the underlying 
rationale seems to be simple, as suggested by many proponents of the core-
voter school: by targeting party loyalists, candidates and brokers reduce the 
risks of vote buying; such voters are the most reliable and have the greatest 
electoral potential. Clearly, the results from my individual data are in line 
with expectations from the literature on the core-voter model, suggesting 
that party loyalists are an attractive target of electoral clientelism in Indonesia.
But a closer look at the data in the framework of the specific Indonesian 
context raises more complex issues and questions. First, in the context of an 
open-list proportional representation system, where  voters have at least 
some influence on the order in which a candidate within the same party is 
elected,  such as that in Indonesia, partisan voters are highly contested 
among co-partisans (i.e. candidates of the same party). In a voting environ-
ment where securing seats doesn’t so much depend on defeating candidates 
from different political parties but on winning against internal party com-
petitors (Selb and Lutz, 2015: 335), the candidates need to translate a vot-
er’s partisanship—their support for their party—into a personal vote. The 
link to clientelist strategies is clear: in order to outdo their fellow intraparty 
candidates, candidates need to differentiate themselves and one way to do 
so is by buying votes (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016: 13). Thus, as the main 
actors of vote buying, candidates focus on party loyalists because they are 
the real battleground in open-list systems—adding an important nuance to 
typical core-voter arguments such as risk aversion and turnout mobilisation.
Second, if it is true that party loyalists are more likely to be targeted for 
vote buying, how feasible is it for candidates to win only by targeting such 
partisans? It is important to note that the number of partisan voters in 
Indonesia is comparatively small. Only 15% of my national survey respon-
dents admitted being close to any political party during the run-up to the 
2014 election. Equally, the number of voters who voted for the same party 
in the 2014 and 2009 elections was only 22% of the total electorate. 
Conversely, the number of non-partisans, defined as those who don’t feel 
close to any political party, is extremely large by any standard (85%). Given 
such limited mass partisanship, candidates can quickly exhaust the supply of 
voters if they decide to target only party loyalists with their vote-buying 
efforts. Indeed, as noted above, my voter surveys showed that the vast major-
ity of vote buying—in absolute terms—happens among uncommitted voters. 
Thus, despite actors’ insistence that they are targeting partisan voters, the 
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reality is that they are mostly paying out benefits to non- partisans. This out-
come appears to be a flow-on effect of the small number of voters with close 
emotional links to parties.
In its focus on understanding candidates’ strategy of selecting targets of 
vote buying, this study offers an additional explanation to the scholarly 
debate between core- versus swing-voter models by combining an empha-
sis on the core-voter strategy with an emphasis on personal networks, such 
as are widely used by candidates in Indonesia. By doing so, this study 
captures the gap between the declared efforts and intent of candidates and 
brokers to target partisan voters, and the reality that most benefits are 
distributed to voters who don’t in fact feel close to any party but who are 
instead embedded in personal clientelistic networks which are linked, 
often through long chains of personal connections, to the candidate. 
These networks, which include but often vastly exceed the constituency of 
deeply committed party loyalists, function as the primary target area of 
brokers and candidates, explaining how both core and swing voters receive 
benefits. This explanation contrasts with the assumptions that typically 
underlie both the swing- and core-voter models. In these models, particu-
laristic rewards are distributed in a highly targeted way to specific types of 
voters guided by the partisan preferences of the recipients to the machine 
or its opponents (Dunning and Stokes, 2008: 3). In my analysis, personal 
connections are key. While my argument differs from the dominant litera-
ture on vote buying, it complements earlier works on the significance of 
personal networks in facilitating clientelistic practices.4
This study calls the strategy used by Indonesian candidates a ‘personal 
loyalist’ strategy, insofar that it targets persons not on the basis of their 
partisan affiliations but as identified through personal networks. Though 
candidates using this approach will still target partisan voters (who will 
typically be connected to them through party or other personal networks), 
such voters have been personalised in the sense that what counts for the 
candidate isn’t only their loyalty to the party but also their loyalty to the 
individual candidate within the party. The reliance on personal networks 
rather than party loyalties and linkages can be expected to be most preva-
4 Among others, James Scott’s (1972) “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in 
Southeast Asia” is one excellent, classic work on clientelism that emphasised the importance 
of personal networks. The recent study by Cruz (2014) also finds that those with larger social 
networks (defined as more friendship and family ties) in the Philippines are more likely to be 
targeted for vote buying. Similarly, Wantchekon (2003) shows that in Benin, clientelistic 
goods are often distributed through personal networks.
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lent in settings where political parties are largely absent in election cam-
paigns and where partisan ties are weak. In Indonesia, the adoption of an 
open-list PR system in the beginning of its transition to democracy played 
a significant role in encouraging the development of such a context. The 
open-list system shapes candidates’ strategies in three ways: (1) they are 
forced to compete against internal competitors for personal votes; (2) they 
must rely on personal networks rather than the party structure; and (3) 
they only need to win a small slice of the voters to defeat their co-partisan 
rivals. With limited resources in hand and dealing with large constituen-
cies, they are more likely to invest in areas that have traditionally been 
viewed as their party’s strongholds—which they think would provide the 
largest pool for their personal votes too. But given that party constituents 
are limited and highly contested among co-partisans, every candidate 
seeks to personalise their party constituents in the attempt to get the most 
intraparty votes. Although voters might have a sense of loyalty to a party, 
under open-list PR systems, they still can vote for different candidates 
within that party, meaning that their personal choice of a candidate is 
highly consequential for determining which candidate wins. Even voters 
who simply vote for a party without indicating any preference for an indi-
vidual candidate, while helping to boost the chances of that party gaining 
a seat, will have no direct impact on determining an individual candidate’s 
personal prospects of victory, since the open-list system requires parties to 
allocate the seat only to the candidate who receives the most personal 
votes. Accordingly, candidates define their so-called base voters not only 
on the basis of past voting record but also on the basis of personal connec-
tions. Such personal connections typically include a candidate’s birthplace, 
kinship, ethnic and religious networks, or even simply in terms of receipt 
of past patronage. Moreover, candidates tap into informal brokerage net-
works. In short, where personalised electoral systems focus the competi-
tion on intraparty contests, candidates try to personalise their party’s 
captive voters, prioritising personal connections mediated by brokers.
In its implementation, however, this personal loyalist strategy runs into 
various difficulties. First, most candidates and brokers tend to overesti-
mate the number of partisan, loyalist voters. This is in part because they 
view past voting patterns for parties as a predictor of partisan voting 
behaviour in the current campaign. The latter works in some cases (i.e. 
some parties do have clearly defined strongholds), but overall there are 
strong fluctuations in Indonesians’ voting behaviour. Second, loyalty is an 
amorphous concept in the Indonesian context. It has multiple dimensions 
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which include partisan terms but also include kinship, religion, and ethnic 
ties as well as patronage loyalties. Accordingly, candidates and brokers 
typically misidentify non-partisans as loyalist supporters because they mis-
interpret personal connections as partisan leanings. This confusion over 
which ‘loyal’ voters to pursue makes brokers dispense benefits to swing 
voters they falsely believe to be core voters. Third, brokers have strong 
incentives to shirk due to principal-agent problems between candidates 
and brokers (Aspinall, 2014). Many candidates pour cash handouts en 
masse but invest little effort in monitoring and disciplining brokers. Lastly, 
in addition to the brokers’ rent-seeking behaviour, the problem of target-
ing could partly be a story about agency loss between voters and brokers, 
and between voters and politicians. Many of the people who are selected 
through personal networks are in fact not even loyal to the candidate.
But if vote buying is often so misdirected and susceptible to broker 
predation, why do candidates invest so heavily in it? Recall that vote buy-
ing is ubiquitous in Indonesia. If such clientelist exchange is truly ineffi-
cient, how can it have an impact on electoral outcomes? In the comparative 
literature on vote buying, measuring the effect of vote buying on voting 
behaviour has two main dimensions: (1) it is assessed whether cash hand-
outs are effective at producing higher turnout and (2) it is measured 
whether they have an impact on determining voting choice. Despite the 
misdirected targeting and the unreliability of brokers, my study demon-
strates that vote buying has a significant effect on voter turnout. My voter 
survey reveals that respondents who experienced a vote-buying attempt 
were more likely to vote (81%) than those who didn’t (74%), and this dif-
ference is statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.017).
Similarly, my study shows that the estimated effect of cash handouts on 
vote choice is up to 10%, meaning that 10% of voters cast their vote as a direct 
response to a gift of cash or goods. In this seemingly low number, however, 
lies the key to vote buying’s attractiveness. As elaborated in more detail 
below, in a highly competitive open-list system like Indonesia’s, where candi-
dates only need small margins to beat co-partisans, that 10% can be a decid-
ing factor in an election. Utilising official election statistics to assess the 
competitiveness of the 2014 legislative elections, the average winning margin 
for candidates when defeating party rivals was only 1.65%. Therefore, many 
candidates enthusiastically pursued vote buying because such a strategy could 
be a potential game changer. My dataset of electoral district surveys also 
shows that as electoral races grew tighter (marked by smaller margins of vic-
tory), the more likely a voter was exposed to vote buying, and vice versa.
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Note that chasing a slim margin of victory isn’t the only explanation for 
why vote buying is so widespread, given there are many competitive elec-
tions in many countries where the vote margins are small, and still politi-
cians don’t buy votes. There are two more plausible interpretations for 
why politicians might still prefer vote buying, even if such investment only 
produces low returns, and even if they aren’t in a particularly close race. 
The first is some sort of prisoner’s dilemma-type coordination failure 
(Chap. 7). Candidates would stand to gain more if they don’t engage in 
vote buying. But the consequences and risk that if they don’t and others 
do, mean that they will lose the game. While participating in vote trading 
may be inefficient, and may not result in victory, not buying votes is a 
guaranteed losing strategy (Hicken et al., 2018). Second, judged by its 
objective effectiveness in mobilising votes, vote buying isn’t a quite reliable 
strategy although it relatively still is more efficient than all the other fea-
sible alternatives. As will be discussed in Chap. 7, the narrative among 
candidates and brokers is that vote buying is perceived to be more signifi-
cant in driving votes, relative to other mobilisation tactics.
This finding further strengthens the conclusion that vote-buying pat-
terns in Indonesia differ from both the core- and swing-voter models. 
Core voters, in the sense of party supporters, are indeed primary targets of 
vote buying but, in total numbers, uncommitted voters receive most of the 
benefits, whether intentionally or not. This is largely because of the insti-
tutional context that shapes the dynamics of vote buying in Indonesia. The 
conventional literature on the swing- versus core-targeting model is framed 
by a context that is quite different from that in Indonesia. The difference 
is particularly evident in the electoral system (Indonesia has an extreme 
version of an open party list system) and, correspondingly, the degree of 
party identification (which is extraordinarily low in Indonesia). This drift 
towards a more candidate-centred electoral system has personalised voting 
and vote buying and has undermined parties’ role in elections and eroded 
party loyalty among voters. Given that the high levels of vote buying in 
Indonesia are closely linked to the institutional setting that produced 
them, I suggest that vote buying will continue to be pervasive as long as 
the existing electoral framework and related socio-political settings persist. 
Instead of diminishing incentive for vote buying, in an  environment where 
parties are weak and voters determine the fate of individual candidates, the 
adoption of an open-list voting system in Indonesia is creating a situation 
where vote buying has become rampant, and such practice then leads to 
serious failures of representation and accountability in the country.
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1.5  the institutional frameWork: Party system 
and electoral rules
As noted above, candidates’ decisions to launch vote buying need to be 
examined and explained in relation to the institutional and structural con-
text within which they operate. This section highlights such institutional 
frameworks, notably as they relate to the party system and the open-list 
electoral system. Both have tended to encourage vote buying.
1.5.1  Political Parties and Party System
As indicated above, Indonesia’s party system has entered a new chapter 
after the resignation of Suharto in 1998. Post-Suharto period has also 
experienced simultaneous multi-level elections from legislative elections to 
direct presidential elections. All legislative elections ranging from those for 
the national legislature known as the People’s Representative Council 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and the Regional People’s Representative 
Councils (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD)—both at the pro-
vincial and municipal/district levels—and the upper (but in practice only 
advisory) chamber known as the Regional Representative Council (Dewan 
Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) occur simultaneously. Up to and including 
2014, they preceded the presidential election by approximately three 
months (Allen, 2015).5 All legislative elections at different levels are held 
in multimember constituencies divided into multiple electoral districts 
known as daerah pemilihan (electoral districts). In 2014, there were 77 
national districts that varied in size between 3 and 10 seats (the electoral 
system will be explained in more detail in the next section).
Early in the post-Suharto period, there was an explosive growth of 
parties. The political elite has since then tried to reduce the number of 
political parties over time through various registration requirements, 
which have been gradually tightened. In 2014, only 12 national parties 
were allowed to compete in the national legislative election (down from 
38 in 2009, 24 in 2004, and 48 in 1999). Further, the elite has closed the 
door to independent candidacies in legislative polls—persons who aren’t 
nominated by these nationally registered parties aren’t allowed to run.6 
These limitations notwithstanding, the number of national parliamentary 
5 From 2019 onwards, legislative and presidential elections will be held at the same time.
6 The only exception is Aceh where—as a result of the 2005 Helsinki peace accord—can-
didates for provincial and district seats are able to compete through local parties.
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parties remains significant by international standards and contributes to 
the competitiveness of the party system.
Political parties in the post-authoritarian Indonesia are diverse and can 
be classified into various categories in terms of their religio-ideological 
orientation and political purpose. Perhaps the oldest binary category 
developed by Indonesian scholars is that of secular parties on the one hand 
and Islamic parties on the other (Liddle and Mujani, 2010). Among the 
12 national parties in 2014, 5 parties can be viewed as Islamic, while the 
rest can be categorised as ‘secular.’7 Within these categories, parties aren’t 
homogenous, and there is a range of ideology and policy platforms. Islamic 
parties, for instance, can be defined as those that either explicitly claim 
Islam as their party ideology, or which don’t do so but still draw most of 
their support from long-established Islamic organisations. Secular parties, 
likewise, have a range of historic and cultural differences.
Alternatively, but relatedly, Indonesian parties can be divided by their 
being part of a socio-cultural cleavage (‘aliran’), or by their catch-all orienta-
tion (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016: 16–17; Mietzner, 2013). The former 
includes those which had their roots in the Islamic community or, by con-
trast, in historically developed nationalist groups. For example, Partai 
Amanat National (PAN, National Mandate Party) benefits from its close 
links to the largest modernist Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah, and its 
once solid base among religious-minded urban middle classes. Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB; National Awakening Party) is associated with 
the biggest Islamic organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and draws on sup-
port especially among underprivileged traditionalist Islamic communities in 
rural Java. Despite profiting from close ties and associations with Islamic 
organisations, these two parties present themselves as pluralist. At the more 
conservative end of the spectrum, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous 
Justice Party) came out of the Tarbiyah, Muslim Brotherhood-inspired 
campus movement and draws its strongest support in major urban centres. 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party) was 
formed as a result of Suharto’s fusion of Islamic political parties in 1973 and 
has maintained an Islamist stance on important policy issues. On the other 
hand, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P, Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle) describes itself as ‘nationalist,’ promoting 
pluralism and protection for minority groups. It therefore has particularly 
7 It is important to note, however, that all ‘secular’ parties reject the term ‘secular’—given 




found acceptance among abangan, socio-economically lower-class nominal 
Muslims, and in areas with predominantly non-Muslim populations.
Contrary to the aliran-based parties, catch-all parties seek to maximise 
votes by attracting “as wide a variety of social interests as possible” 
(Gunther and Diamond, 2001: 26). This leads the catch-all parties not to 
appeal to any particular social group or constituency. The most-cited 
example is Golkar, the political machine of the Suharto regime. It claims 
to serve the interests of the entire nation and styles itself as “a non-aliran, 
non-sectarian and non-ideological party” (Hatta, 2000 quoted by Tomsa, 
2008: 96). Furthermore, Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016: 17) mention the 
important and growing subcategory of ‘presidentialist parties,’ in which 
parties only serve as a political machine for their founders seeking presi-
dential office (Samuels and Shugart, 2010; Ufen, 2006). The examples 
include Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party, Prabowo 
Subianto’s Gerindra (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Great Indonesia Movement 
Party), Wiranto’s Hanura (Hati Nurani Rakyat, People’s Conscience 
Party), and Surya Paloh’s NasDem (Nasional Demokrat, National 
Democrat) Party. The presidentialist parties rely heavily on personalist 
appeals of their main figures—but this is often coupled with patronage 
delivery and populist policies to attract voters.
While presidentialist parties have often been described as lacking ideo-
logical commitment, this absence isn’t a monopoly of the presidentialist 
parties. Ideological divisions among political parties are generally not 
strong—with the exception of the schism between those who want a stron-
ger role for Islam in state organisation and those who don’t.8 On most 
other issues, party positions are near-arbitrary, and shaped by vested rather 
than ideological interests. Thus, voters are often unable to differentiate 
political parties regarding policy positions or platforms. Given that parties 
tend not to compete on programmatic grounds, parties and office- seeking 
politicians are viewed primarily as personal distributors of private rather 
than public goods (Mueller, 2011). Confronted by these challenges, almost 
all politicians (at least those running for legislative seats) I encountered 
tried to focus voters’ attention on personalities, instead of party, as a voting 
cue. To be fair, some parties or candidates attempted to go through the 
motions of presenting programmatic promises in the 2014 elections, but 
their pledges commonly lacked credibility (Keefer, 2007). Instead, they 
typically quickly resorted to various clientelistic strategies to appeal to voters.




Another institutional factor that characterises political parties in 
Indonesia and contributes to the widespread practice of patronage politics 
is the weakening of the parties’ roots in society as evidenced in the general 
decline of party loyalty. As will be discussed more comprehensively in 
Chap. 5, party affiliation has decreased significantly over the past 15 years 
from about 86% of voters who felt close with any party in 1999 to only 
15% in 2014—a low figure by international standards. These statistics cor-
respond with the declining trend of party membership in Indonesia from 
2004 to 2014 recorded by two polling institutes I am affiliated with, 
Indonesia Survey Institute (LSI) and Indikator Politik Indonesia. As 
shown in Fig. 1.1, the trend reports just how steep the decline has been in 
Indonesia from around 10% in August 2004 to roughly 1.5% in mid-2014.9
9 The chart is based on the combination of those who reported being active and inactive 
members of a political party. During legislative elections, candidates typically ask their sup-
porters to register to be party members in order to get benefits they offer such as a free 
ambulance service and ‘grief money’ [uang duka—i.e. life insurance] for the family should 
the holder pass away (Ace Hasan Sy, interview, 14 April 2014). Accordingly, party member-













































































































































































































Fig. 1.1 Trend of party membership in Indonesia, 2004–2014 (%). Sources: A 
series of surveys from April 2004 to September 2012 belong to LSI; while surveys 
in December 2013, August 2014, and October 2014 owned by Saiful Mujani 
Research and Consulting (SMRC); Surveys in January 2014, February 2014, April 
2014, May 2014, and June 2014 by Indikator
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Of course, the decline of party membership isn’t unique to Indonesia, 
and nor is the current level of party membership extraordinarily small by 
international comparison (Mietzner, 2013: 44–45). But the decline in 
both party identification and membership reinforces the notion that 
Indonesian elections are getting more candidate-centred, and provides 
another incentive for candidates to engage in private clientelist exchanges.
Some scholars maintain that the sharp decline of party identification and 
party membership correlates with electoral volatility, which denotes the 
extent of voters’ inclination to switch their support between elections 
(Mujani et al., 2012; Mietzner, 2013; Tomsa, 2014). This electoral volatil-
ity, while not high compared to other new democracies, is significant. In 
1999, the top five parties accounted for more than 80% of the vote, and 
PDI-P won the election gaining 33.74%. In 2004, the share of the five big-
gest parties dropped sharply to just 66%, and Golkar came out as the cham-
pion with ‘only’ 21.58%. The declining trend continued in 2009 with the 
top five parties at just 61%, and the winner Democrats received only 
20.85%. In 2014, the share of the main parties increased somewhat to 
62%, but the victorious PDI-P got only 18.95%. Thus, the socio- political 
and institutional settings of the party system—with its increased focus on 
catch-all appeals as well as highly competitive interactions between no less 
than a dozen parties and thousands of their candidates—have fuelled 
increasing personalisation and loosening ties between parties and voters.
1.5.2  Electoral Rules and Its Implications
Indonesia’s electoral institutions have also affected the extent of patronage 
politics, especially in terms of candidates’ choice of strategy. It is well 
established in the comparative literature that electoral system design can 
have a large impact on candidate strategies. As Hicken explains (2007a: 
49), “all else being equal, where electoral systems limit voters to a single 
choice among parties, as in closed-list proportional representation sys-
tems, candidates are more likely to rely on party-centred strategies.” And 
indeed, when, in 1999, Indonesia adopted a fully closed-list system, com-
petition took place primarily between parties. Voters cast a ballot for a 
fixed list, with the candidate ranking determined by the party. Candidates 
were therefore predominantly concerned with their positions on party lists 
because those positions would determine their electoral prospects. A uni-
versally recognised term to illustrate the significance of candidates’ list 
positions was nomor topi (lit. ‘hat number’), describing those who occu-
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pied high positions on the list and thus had a higher chance of winning. In 
contrast, lower-ranked candidates were called nomor sepatu, (lit. ‘shoe 
number’), denoting rankings at the bottom of the list. There were numer-
ous reports of wealthy candidates purchasing winnable slots on party lists 
by bribing party leaders.10
Partly in response to these internal bribery dynamics, Indonesia in 
2004 applied a semi-open proportional system, enshrined in Election Law 
No. 12/2003. Although voters were allowed for the first time to express 
their preference for a particular candidate, the law still allowed for heavy 
party control of candidates (Sherlock, 2009). In order to get elected out-
side their order of the party list, lower-ranked candidates had to receive an 
individual vote equal to or above the full party quota required to secure a 
seat in their respective electoral district (Allen, 2015). If they didn’t 
achieve this, the seat would go to the candidate placed highest on the 
party list (Sherlock, 2009: 6). Given the difficulty of meeting this require-
ment, only 2 out of 550 members of parliament were elected by achieving 
an individual vote which reached the quota; the rest entered the legislature 
via the party list.
As shown in Table 1.1, under the 2004 election law, party votes and 
highly ranked slots on the lists counted a great deal in determining which 
candidates were elected. Again, this is largely because most candidates 
were unable to achieve the individual quota, handing the seat to those 
who attained highest positions on their party lists (Sherlock, 2009). 
Regardless of this limitation, Allen (2015: 76) called 2004 an ‘important 
10 Even some scholars indicated that some parties simply auctioned their winnable posi-
tions off to the highest bidder (e.g. Rich, 2013: 75).
Table 1.1 Party list position of elected national parliamentarians
Position on ticket The 2004–2009 DPR The 2009–2014 DPR The 2014–2019 DPR
Total % Total    % Total     %
1 405 73.6 360 64.4 348 62.14
2 104 19 104 18.6 95 16.96
3 32 5.8 40 7.2 25 4.46
Equal or >4 9 1.6 55 9.8 92 16.44
Source: Assorted Indonesian Electoral Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) documents relating 
to the 2004, 2009, and 2014 legislative elections
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moment of transition’ since for the first time Indonesia introduced 
optional preference voting. Despite the difficulties candidates had in 
achieving the requirement of a full quota, the semi-open PR system began 
to drive candidates to get elected on the basis of personal vote.
In reaction to the low numbers of candidates being elected in 2004 on 
a full quota, the law was changed to reduce the quota for the 2009 elec-
tions. Instead of having to obtain a full seat quota, candidates only had to 
achieve 30% of it to secure a seat independent of the party list (Butt, 2016: 
8; Sherlock, 2009: 6). However, the Constitutional Court annulled the 
rule and introduced a fully open-list proportional system. According to 
the Court’s verdict, seats won by a party had to be handed to that party’s 
candidates who obtained the most individual votes. This new electoral 
system, introduced by the Constitutional Court, had strong repercussions 
for candidates and their strategies. In general, fully open-list PR systems 
provide a strong motivation for politicians to build personal appeals and 
networks since their victory (Hicken, 2007a; Allen, 2015). Indonesia was 
no exception in this regard. Since 2009, many candidates have campaigned 
for personal votes without relying heavily on their positions on the party 
list, and an increasing proportion of lower-placed candidates have suc-
ceeded in being elected (see Table 1.1).
Given the short time between the Court’s decision and the 2009 
elections, however, candidates at that time didn’t have enough time to 
fully switch to a personality-centred campaign strategy. By contrast, in 
the 2014 elections—which also applied a fully open-list PR system—
they had sufficient time to adjust to the system and prepare their strate-
gies (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016: 13). In this context, it is important 
to note two patterns emerging under the fully open party list regime: 
first, despite the open-list system making elections more candidate-
centric, all candidates are still concerned with party votes in their con-
stituencies. As Aspinall argued (2014: 549), “the number of seats that 
each party wins in a district is in proportion to the combined votes for 
the party and all its individual candidates there.” Accordingly, each 
candidate has an interest in enhancing (or at least stabilising) the par-
ty’s overall vote and thus the number of expected seats. Doing so 
increases his or her prospect of winning one of those seats (Samuels, 
1999: 495). Second, it is generally rare for each party to win more than 
two seats in any given electoral district. With many candidates believ-
ing—rightly or wrongly—that they can forecast the number of seats 
their party will win in a specific area, the focus of competition moves 
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from an interparty contest to rivalry between candidates of one party 
over its expected number of seats (Richard Sualang, interview, 26 April 
2014). As a result, the pressure to collect personal votes among co- 
partisans increases the incentives for individual candidates to differenti-
ate themselves from rivals on their own party list, including by buying 
votes and establishing a personal campaign team.
Preference ballots generally increase the degree to which candidates are 
elected on the basis of individual votes (Carey and Shugart, 1995: 417). 
Indonesia has become a particularly prominent example of this trend. To 
gauge the extent to which Indonesian elections are candidate-centric, I 
compare total party votes and candidate votes between the 2004, 2009, 
and 2014 elections. Although in 2004 the electoral system had a more 
restricted open-list system in 2004 compared to 2009 and 2014, voters 
equally had the option of indicating a preference for individual candidates 
in all of these last three elections (Sherlock, 2004, 2009; Butt, 2016).11 
The Electoral Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU), the body 
that organises elections in Indonesia, itself had no official results for the 
total share of votes collected by all candidates across political parties com-
peting in 2004,12 but Kevin Evans (2004) manually collected the data by 
comparing the share of votes for both the party and candidates relative to 
those who voted for parties only. On average, 46% of voters cast their 
votes by marking both the party and a candidate, though the proportion 
of personal votes varied across the 24 parties competing in 2004.13 
Similarly, a nationwide survey conducted by the International Republican 
Institute (May–June 2008) estimated that of those respondents who were 
aware that in 2004, besides voting for a party, a voter could also vote for 
an individual candidate, 47.2% reported voting for party and candidate 
from the same party, a total of 35.4% said they voted for the party only, 
and 17.4% had forgotten what they did. A survey organised by the 
International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES) provides a slightly 
11 Another difference is that the electoral law for the 2004 elections stipulated that although 
voters were allowed to cast a vote for an individual candidate, they also had to vote for the 
candidate’s party. In 2009 and 2014, in contrast, a vote would still be valid even if the voter 
opted to choose a candidate alone without voting for their party; the personal vote would 
then be counted for the candidate’s party as well.
12 Ferry Kurnia, Personal Communication, 3 October 2016.
13 For example, Evans (2004: 201) estimated that candidates from PAN and PKS received 
more individual votes (59% each), compared to PDI-P which ‘only’ collected 49% of per-
sonal votes in total.
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higher estimate: 52% of Indonesians during the 2004 legislative elections 
indicated a preference vote for individual candidates (Wall, 2004 quoted 
by Sherlock, 2009: 8).
In 2009, when a fully open-list system applied, according to the KPU’s 
estimate, those who voted for candidates only or both the party and a 
candidate from the same party totalled 69% of all 104,099,785 votes. The 
LSI’s exit poll after the 2009 election, in which 3685 respondents were 
interviewed immediately after they exited the polling stations, showed that 
38.1% of respondents reported having voted for a candidate only, while 
34.7% voted for both a party and a candidate from the same party, produc-
ing a total of around 72.8% who reported using their ballot to mark a 
preference for individual candidates.14 In 2014, with a similar electoral 
system, the KPU estimated that 70% of the 124,972,491 voters marked 
their ballots for individual candidates and 30% for party only. Clearly, then, 
over the period of 2004–2014, there has been an increasing trend among 
voters to vote on the basis of personal candidate preference rather than in 
response to political party appeals. This increase was particularly evident in 
the switch from the 2004 semi-open regime list to the 2009 open-list 
system, but continued in 2014.
The LSI’s post-election survey conducted in June 2014 offered a more 
detailed picture of voters’ greater inclination to vote for candidates over 
parties. In the national DPR election, 44.5% of respondents admitted 
marking the name of ‘candidate only’ and 22.5% voted for ‘the party and 
a candidate from that party.’ In the provincial and district DPRD elec-
tions, the ‘candidate only’ vote was even higher, at 47.5% and 52.1%, 
respectively (see Table 1.2). It is therefore reasonable to argue that smaller 
constituencies incentivise candidates to campaign more on the basis of 
their individual profiles than do larger constituencies. I will elaborate on 
this point in later chapters.
Obviously, a number of caveats are in order. Although candidates across 
parties uniformly chased personal votes relying on what Hicken (2007a: 
48) termed ‘name and fame,’ this doesn’t necessarily mean that the influ-
ence of political ideology and major political figures has disappeared. 
While trying to expand their electoral bases, most candidates sought to 
maintain support from their party’s existing religio-political and social 
14 These data were not initially included in the LSI’s exit poll report in 2009 (http://www.
lsi.or.id/riset/357/efek-kampanye-terbuka-menjelang-pemilu-legislatif-2009) but were 
processed for this study.
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constituencies. For example, PKB candidates, especially those running in 
East Java districts, often produced posters, banners, and stickers that featured 
a  Nahdlatul  Ulama—the largest traditionalist Muslim organisation—logo 
and photos of influential ulama, in an obvious effort to highlight their roots 
in the traditionalist Islamic community (Fealy, 2014). Similarly, many candi-
dates from PAN deliberately targeted the Muhammadiyah constituency, 
especially in its strongholds like Aceh and West Sumatra. In contrast, many 
PDI-P candidates presented themselves as ‘nationalist’ and sent their pluralist 
messages out to areas inhabited by less religiously observant Muslims and 
minorities. In short, many candidates presented themselves within the frame-
work of their parties’ popular images (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). 
Similarly, many candidates still tried to ride the coat-tails of their party’s 
national leaders. Among presidentialised parties, for example, Gerindra can-
didates often produced publicity material that promoted their names and 
photos alongside those of Prabowo Subianto. Even candidates from the 
more socially rooted PDI-P enthusiastically  displayed photographs of Joko 
Widodo (Jokowi) or Megawati in their advertising materials in 2014.
There is, then, clear evidence that the structural and institutional set-
tings—as well as changes within them—are relevant to the patterns of 
electoral competition and vote buying in Indonesia. Compared to closed 
proportional systems, an open-list system provides more opportunities for 
candidates to determine electoral outcomes—and more incentives to 
engage in personal campaigning and patronage-based approaches. 
Declining party attachments and increasing intraparty competition like-
wise favours clientelist exchanges. The sharp decline of both party identi-
Table 1.2 Personal votes in national, provincial, and district legislative elections 
(%): The 2014 legislative election
How voters to cast the ballot DPR election Provincial DPRD District DPRD
Party only 27.3 23.7 16.8
Candidate only 44.5 47.5 52.1
Party and candidate from same party 22.5 21.0 23.1
Multiple party and multiple candidate 0.1 0.1 0.1
Intentionally invalidate/Didn’t cast 0.1 0.2 0.2
Refused 1.9 2.7 2.0
Forgot 3.6 4.7 5.6
Source: LSI post-election national survey conducted in June 2014
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fication and party membership over time have further strengthened the 
move from the party-centric party system of early post-Suharto Indonesia 
to a more candidate-centred regime, with fundamental consequences for 
electoral strategizing.
1.6  design and methods
In this study, I employ mixed methods by combining quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. For the study’s main basis, I use survey data to test 
several hypotheses and conduct statistical analysis. I used qualitative meth-
ods to flesh out and explain the survey findings. While the scope of research 
and analysis focuses primarily on the national level, I also pay considerable 
attention to the dynamics of vote buying at sub-national levels. This sec-
tion sets the scene for the interplay between quantitative and qualitative 
that informs my study and explains how I selected case studies at the sub- 
national level.
1.6.1  Approaches and Methods
1.6.1.1  Quantitative Approaches
This study draws data from six different surveys as the primary sources of 
my quantitative research. Most notably, with regard to establishing the 
level of vote buying in Indonesia’s population, some scholars argue that 
survey data provide a more sound basis for analysing clientelism than many 
other approaches because it allows researchers to examine the extent to 
which vote buying is pervasive and draw inferences about causation 
(Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012: 203). Survey methods allow us to test 
competing theories about the determinant factors of clientelist strategies.
But survey methods have their problems. Many scholars argue that 
quantitative methods are problematic because they miss a lot of the 
nuance. In addition, using surveys to study vote buying presents structural 
challenges since many individuals exposed to such practices may not admit 
to their behaviours (Brusco et al., 2004: 69). In most parts of the world, 
vote buying isn’t morally legitimate and thus attracts a negative social 
stigma (Hicken, 2007b; Gonzalez-Ocantos et  al., 2012; Corstange, 
2012). There is, then, a potential social desirability issue in interviewing 
and surveying respondents on this topic.
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In response to this problem, the first challenge in establishing the extent 
of vote buying in Indonesia is to minimise potential respondents’ fear of 
expressing socially undesirable attitudes or admitting to stigmatised behav-
iours like vote buying. In order to do so, I used a number of survey items 
of varying degrees of directness (see Chap. 2). My own survey didn’t only 
rely on a direct question but also used a neighbourhood question by treat-
ing respondents as an ‘observer’ to assess the prevalence of vote-buying 
incidents in their community. More importantly, I employed a list experi-
ment, an increasingly influential mode of quantitative research in studies 
of clientelism designed to reduce bias in survey questions.
Hence, this study is expected to offer strong empirical evidence of the 
extent and patterns of vote buying that is generally absent from the more 
anecdotal accounts that predominate in previous works on Indonesia’s 
clientelism and electoral politics. This study therefore aims to fill a signifi-
cant gap in the literature by providing original survey data on vote buying 
in Indonesia. Using probability-based samples, my surveys include voter- 
level, candidate-level, and broker-level data.
As an executive director of a Jakarta-based polling organisation, I have 
extensive experience in organising surveys through face-to-face interviews 
in Indonesia. Given the sensitive nature of some questions, notably on 
vote buying, it was essential to secure trust from respondents. At the out-
set, my interviewers made clear that the survey institute was independent 
and non-partisan, and that they weren’t affiliated with either any govern-
ment institution or a particular party. The six surveys that form the quan-
titative foundation of this study are the following:
 1. National pre- and post-election surveys of voters: I conducted both 
pre- and post-election surveys.15 These surveys asked respondents a 
variety of questions relating to vote buying, such as how prevalent it 
was; how effective and costly it was; which kinds of voters were sus-
ceptible to such exchanges; and how candidates and brokers moni-
tored compliance. My first pre-election survey was administered 
during 18–30 January 2014; the second one was conducted from 
15 As will be further explained in Appendix A, I organised three pre-legislative election 
surveys. The first of the pre-election surveys involved 2039 individuals selected randomly to 
represent the population of eligible voters in Indonesia. The second pre-election survey 
interviewed 2050 respondents across Indonesia. The last pre-election survey covered 1220 




26 February to 6 March 2014; and the third one was organised 
from 19 March to 24 March 2014, around two weeks before the 
election. My post-election survey was run between 22 and 26 April 
2014, immediately after the legislative election which was held on 9 
April, benefitting from voters’ recent interactions with candidates 
and brokers. Some measures of vote buying employed in this study 
were generated from the ‘Money Politics in Southeast Asia’ Project.16 
In addition to these four surveys, I was also able to draw on the 
results of massive, multi-year national surveys conducted by the 
Indonesia Survey Institute (LSI), Indikator Politik Indonesia, and 
Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting’s (SMRC) in order to incor-
porate trend data—notably with regard to the aggregate levels of 
party identification and party membership. I have been deeply 
involved with LSI and Indikator, and I have been granted permis-
sion to use SMRC’s historical data.
 2. List experiment: Survey findings, however, must be treated with 
some caution due to the risk of a social desirability bias. To produce 
more valid estimates of the extent of vote buying and reduce possi-
ble errors that may be caused by such bias, this study employed 
survey experiments, embedded within my two nationally representa-
tive surveys of the electorate, by splitting the sample into random 
halves: a treatment and a control group. The results of the list exper-
iment allow for comparisons with direct and neighbourhood mea-
sures to investigate how prevalent vote buying is.
 3. Pre-election legislative electoral district surveys of voters: I was also 
able to draw upon massive pre-election electoral district surveys in 
the lead up to the legislative election (mostly in 2013 and 2014) 
conducted by Indikator and SMRC in 73 out of 77 electoral dis-
tricts across Indonesia. The total number of respondents involved in 
this massive project was 71,940 respondents. In this study, I used 
these surveys for sub-national case selection (as will be discussed in 
the next sub-section) and for examining the possible relationship 
16 This multi-year project was a four-country study of money politics across Southeast Asia 
that included Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. My thanks to Edward Aspinall 
and other principal investigators of this project (i.e. Allen Hicken, Meredith Weiss, and Paul 




between electoral competitiveness and vote buying in each electoral 
district (see Chap. 7).
 4. Pre-election local executive election surveys of voters: My quantitative 
analysis is also based on extensive empirical data drawn from surveys 
administered in the lead up to local executive elections by the afore-
mentioned pollsters. These surveys canvassed voter attitudes in the 
lead up to elections for regional government heads (pilkada) at the 
provincial and district levels across Indonesia. The total number of 
surveys used in this study was 1163 with the total number of respon-
dents 725,890. Using several questions relating to vote buying that 
have been asked since 2006, my study can establish both longitudi-
nal trends and inter-regional variations in levels of vote buying.
 5. Local post-election surveys of candidates: In addition to drawing on 
the large national polls and multi-year surveys from local elections, 
I also designed and organised surveys with elected candidates in 
four selected provinces (for the selection of these provinces, see the 
following section). These surveys used face-to-face interviews to 
ask a set of questions relating to the use of clientelist strategies, 
recruitment of brokers, targeting strategies, and similar issues. The 
sample was determined through the multistage random sampling 
method by grouping the populations in each province based on 
zones. I divided each province into four different zones, using cri-
teria that varied depending on the geography, history, and condi-
tions of a particular region (see Appendix B). Each zone was a 
combination of provincial electoral districts. In each zone, a certain 
regency or city was picked randomly as sample by proportion. In 
total, the survey consists of 299 randomly selected elected candi-
dates for the DPRD at the provincial and the municipality/district 
level. As I elaborate in more detail in Appendix B, this rarely used 
approach enabled me to identify possible patterns in terms of can-
didate targeting strategies.
 6. Local post-election survey of brokers: I also conducted surveys through 
face-to-face interviews with randomly selected brokers in the four 
targeted provinces. Drawing a probability sample of the candidate 
survey is unproblematic, given the easy availability of the sampling 
frame. However, we don’t possess a ready-made sampling frame for 
low-level operatives from which one could generate a random sam-
ple. As explained further in Appendix B, the approach I chose in this 
context was that a sample was acquired and then estimated based on 
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information received from the randomly selected candidates during 
the field interview process. Both candidate and broker surveys were 
supplemented with qualitative observations and interviews—nota-
bly on the reasons behind the responses, providing a basis for the 
valid interpretations of the collected data. The questionnaire I 
designed aimed to uncover the modes of organisation of brokers, 
the mechanisms of vote buying (who was targeted, when, how, and 
why), and the extent to which the recipients of cash handouts voted 
for the candidate associated with the benefit. Such data allow me to 
gauge the dynamics of vote buying as they were shaped and driven 
by grassroots brokers.
1.6.1.2  Sub-national Case Selection
The selection of the four provinces for the sub-national surveys of candi-
dates and brokers was guided primarily by the findings of the wide- ranging 
electoral district surveys of voters conducted by Indikator and SMRC dur-
ing the run-up to the 2014 legislative election.17 I used these surveys to 
identify variations among provinces in voters’ exposure to vote buying and 
their levels of party identification (which as already touched on above, I 
found to be one of the strongest predictors of vote buying). I used these 
two variables to select cases. My measure of partisanship was based on an 
additive scale derived from two items: whether respondents felt close to a 
party and the strength of that feeling. Meanwhile, vote buying also used 
an additive scale from two items: the extent to which vote buying is 
reported as acceptable by respondents and the percentage of those who 
reported to have accepted an offer and voted for the giver.
I used a scatter plot to determine the case selection (Fig. 1.2), selecting 
one case from each quadrant. I selected Central Java where voters exhib-
ited relatively high levels of both partisanship and vote buying. My second 
case is North Sulawesi where partisanship is high, but the rate of vote buy-
ing is relatively low. The third case is East Java, where voters were more 
accepting of vote buying, but unlike Central Java, partisan ties were com-
paratively low. The last case is West Sumatra as a control as the province 
exhibits relatively low levels of both partisanship and vote buying.
17 Given many densely populated provinces consist of several electoral districts, I combine 




Importantly, these four cases represent the three most populated islands 
in Indonesia: Sumatra, Java, and Sulawesi. There is also significant varia-
tion among the four provinces in critical aspects. As I will discuss later, 
they vary in the type of political players who are most influential, bases of 
power, party dominance, socio-economic levels, relative presence of reli-
gious leaders, and ethnic composition. These similarities and differences 
make the four provinces a suitable kaleidoscope through which to view 
Indonesia’s electoral patterns and politico-cultural composition.
1.6.1.3  Qualitative Approaches
After conducting public opinion and targeted group surveys, I integrated 
my survey results and my large and complex datasets with the insights 
gleaned from extensive qualitative fieldwork, which lasted for 13 months. 
By doing so, I was able to capture—in the context of micro-level analy-
sis—variations, mechanisms, and motivations that characterise the actors 
and networks through which vote buying was distributed. In order to 
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Fig. 1.2 Province selection for MP and broker surveys. Source: Indikator and 
SMRC’s pre-legislative election surveys in 73 electoral districts during the run-up 
to the 2014 legislative election
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four provinces mentioned above, for the reasons already explained. The 
fieldwork relied on qualitative methods using the same methods across 
four cases that allowed me to develop in-country comparisons. I spent 
considerable time in several districts in the four provinces. The criteria for 
district selection were again primarily guided by statistical findings. For 
example, in East Java, I travelled to Bangkalan, Sampang, and Pamekasan 
because, according to my historical data, more people in these areas 
thought that vote buying was a normal business compared to other 
regencies.
The qualitative approach relied on four primary tools of investigation: 
interviews, focus group discussions (FGD), close observation and media 
analysis, and additional document collection. In conducting the inter-
views, I used a semi-structured format (Wengraf, 2001; Galletta, 2013). 
That is, I had certain core topics that I wanted to address in each inter-
view, but I was also flexible in responding to specific cases brought up by 
each of the informants. Because I had already conducted the main surveys 
and produced preliminary analysis prior to the bulk of my qualitative 
research, I was able to zero in on issues of particular interest identified 
through the quantitative research. For example, given the quantitative 
result that party loyalists were more likely to be targeted by vote buying, I 
endeavoured to corroborate and explore this finding in greater detail by 
asking my interviewees about it. For instance, despite vote buying seeming 
to target party loyalists, little is known about the definition of loyalty in 
the Indonesian context, where party-based partisan ties are low by inter-
national standards. Thus, I asked my respondents about the meaning of 
partisanship in the context in which a lot of connections between voters 
and candidates aren’t mediated by political parties but by informal broker-
age networks. And, of course, I had many other questions to ask in terms 
of the techniques and problems of vote buying, such as: how do politicians 
engage in vote buying operations? How do brokers identify their voters, 
and how do they try to persuade them to be responsive if given rewards? 
And how do they attempt to rely on their ‘loyalists’ if they aren’t 
given benefits?
In general, the interviews turned out to be highly effective because 
despite its illegality, many interviewees talked about vote buying openly, 
with little obvious sense of embarrassment or guilt. I guaranteed that I 
wouldn’t personally identify them in my research products if they men-
tioned sensitive matters, and in these circumstances, most were willing to 
disclose the methods they used to carry out vote buying and explained in 
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detail how they designed their strategies.18 In the following, I describe my 
qualitative methods more comprehensively.
 1. In-depth interviews and informal conversations with politicians: In the 
four case study areas, I interviewed 24 local candidates. In addition, I 
also interviewed 42 national politicians from the same four provinces 
and elsewhere, most of whom ran as candidates in the 2014 elections. 
Insights from candidates running for the national legislature were 
important since I had already gained a large amount of data from 
provincial and district candidates through the local politician surveys. 
By combining these data with material derived from interviews with 
national candidates, I could get a sense of how coordination occurs 
across different levels of competition. Interview questions dealt with 
the networks and processes through which vote buying was organised, 
notably questions such as: what is the effect of open-list PR systems on 
the nature of electoral competition? How do politicians build personal 
brokerage networks? How do they determine which voters to target? 
How do they define base voters? How do they align themselves with 
existing social networks? And how do they monitor their brokers?
 2. In-depth interviews with brokers: I also chose to interview seasoned 
brokers. The overall number of such interviews was 28. Given that 
my broker survey mentioned above wasn’t held in every district of 
the selected four provinces, I held in-depth interviews with a range 
of brokers who were representative in terms of district origins. 
Interview questions probed matters such as what their primary 
motivations for joining campaign teams were; whether they gener-
ally had prior personal contact with candidates; how politicians 
extract services from brokers; which voters provided the most elec-
toral returns after receiving benefits; how they developed a local 
following of voters; how payments were presented to voters—using 
language of gift giving or as a binding transaction; how they defined 
voter loyalty and base areas; how they diverted resources for their 
personal benefits; and what measures they used to minimise risk of 
wastage. In addition, I conducted in-depth interviews with several 
academics, journalists, non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
18 Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016) along with approximately 50 researchers involved in 
‘Money Politics and Clientelism’ project also had similar experiences. Many candidates they 




activists, and key bureaucrats about vote buying and its impact on 
electoral competition in Indonesia.
 3. Focus group discussions (FGD) with local politicians and political con-
sultants: FGDs are becoming an increasingly popular qualitative 
research method to collect data from people with similar back-
grounds or experiences by using the technique of an organised group 
interaction focused on a defined topic (Kitzinger, 1994). I organised 
two focus groups. The first was a group of local politicians from 
Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra, held on 23 September 2014. Around 
15 successful candidates from various backgrounds attended the 
event. I chaired the focus group using the Indonesian language and 
asked participants to reflect on their 2014 campaign, recruitment of 
brokers, and related matters. The second was a political consultant 
focus group, conducted on 15 September 2014. Given that the bro-
kers’ survey mainly targeted traditional grassroots brokers, I selected 
modern-type consultants based in Surabaya to attend the focus group 
in order to increase the diversity of the broker group I researched. Six 
participants attended and described their techniques of mobilising 
voters and the methods they used to monitor campaigns.
 4. Close observation: This type of collection data is commonly used in 
qualitative approach aimed to gain a direct, close, and intimate famil-
iarity with a particular social group for period of time, “collect 
(detailed, comprehensive) field notes, and track systematic patterns 
to make inferences about social phenomena” (Weiss and Hutchcroft, 
2012: 9). During my fieldwork conducted after the 2014  legislative 
election, around two months before the presidential election, I 
observed relevant events for the presidential campaign, including 
political gatherings, campaign rallies, broker meetings, and other 
important gatherings related to the campaign. Given the observa-
tions were conducted after the 2014 legislative election, and vote- 
buying attempts were more likely to take place in the parliamentary 
election rather than in the presidential election, as I will show in the 
next chapter, I didn’t have the opportunity to observe first-hand 
vote buying efforts. Virtually all local legislative candidates and their 
brokers I interviewed admitted that such practices were more com-
mon during the parliamentary elections. However, as noted above, 
they didn’t have any objections to discussing the vote-buying strate-
gies they had used during the legislative elections. Additionally, while 
conducting fieldwork in Central Java and East Java, I also got the 
strong sense that voters in these two provinces were more tolerant of 
such election-related bribery than those who lived in West Sumatra.
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 5. Media content analysis and additional document collection: My field-
work didn’t rely exclusively on relatively common tools such as inter-
views and direct observation, but I also collected local and national 
media reports on vote buying and analysed them qualitatively. Among 
other sources, the media provide a rich collection of information on 
the occurrence of vote buying, its location, its timing, and its targets. 
To ensure a broader range of coverage, I also used ‘triangulation of 
multiple sources’ by taking advantage of the increasing popularity of 
online news websites in Indonesia as sources of data on clientelist strat-
egies. In addition, I collected a number of official documents related 
to the subject under investigation. I also collected a large amount of 
official election statistics by the Indonesian Electoral Commission 
(KPU) and demographic data to enrich my quantitative findings.
1.7  the Book oVerVieW
This book presents the dynamics of vote buying in Indonesia’s young 
democracy, explaining how such exchange is practised and organised, how 
common and effective is it, and, particularly important, why candidates 
engage in it while these monetary incentives appear to influence only a 
limited number of people. My study addresses these central issues in the 
context of comparative studies of vote buying, arguing that although in 
relative terms, partisan voters are more likely to be targeted, in absolute 
terms, vote buying largely happens among undecided voters (given the 
relatively small number of party loyalists in Indonesia). Regardless of such 
a substantial amount of leakage, vote buying remains an attractive strategy 
for many candidates because the 10% range of vote-buying effects on vote 
choice is high enough to secure victory. Even so, the dynamics of electoral 
competition that entangle candidates in a prisoner’s dilemma make vote 
buying as a counter mechanism to neutralise the effects of their rival’s 
handouts. In addition, vote-buying strategies become relatively more 
effective in garnering votes than other electoral strategies.
Following this introduction, Chap. 2 discusses a central question of this 
study. It attempts to answer how extensive vote-buying distributions are in 
Indonesian elections. Especially with regard to vote buying, I present 
 estimates of these practices using various measures and techniques. This 
chapter compares the findings from Indonesia with the level of vote buy-
ing in other countries. The chapter focuses on vote buying in legislative 
elections but also pays attention to evidence of extensive vote buying 
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in local executive contests. Utilising a rich vein of data from 2006 to 2015, 
I identify inter-regional variation in levels of vote buying over time. The 
chapter concludes that vote buying has become an increasingly prominent 
feature of Indonesia’s electoral politics at both the national and local levels.
Chapter 3 identifies factors explaining why some individuals are more 
likely than others to be targeted with vote buying by political operatives. 
This chapter also provides a complete profile of the typical vote sellers. It 
rigorously tests the patterns of vote buying based on a survey done after 
the 2014 legislative election. The findings show that party identification is 
among the strongest predictors for explaining vote buying. Simply put, 
the closer the ties of an individual to a political party, the more likely he/
she is to be exposed to vote buying.
Chapter 4 then discusses the relationship between party-based partisan-
ship and vote buying in the context of the debate on whether vote buyers 
are more likely to target swing or party loyalist voters. It discusses the levels 
of party identification. Given the centrality of the finding that a high degree 
of party identification in a voter makes him or her more likely to be the 
target of vote buying, this chapter engages in further tests of this hypothesis 
with multiple sources of data. First, it reviews evidence from voter-level data 
which also indicates the greater likelihood of party loyalists being targeted. 
Moreover, the chapter presents evidence from a unique survey of politicians 
and brokers which is strongly suggestive of the party loyalist strategy. After 
interrogating the evidence, the chapter comes to the conclusion that despite 
the fact that in relative terms party loyalists are more likely to be targeted, in 
absolute terms vote buying mostly happens among non-partisans—largely 
because the number of voters with high levels of party identification is small.
Chapter 5 explains the gap between politicians’ intention of capturing 
party loyalists and the fact that it is undecided voters who most receive 
benefits. It offers an additional explanation to the conventionally more 
party-oriented literature by combining an emphasis on the core-voter 
argument with a stronger focus on candidates’ and brokers’ reliance on 
personal networks. I call this explanation the ‘personalist loyalist’ argu-
ment. I highlight that the concept of loyalty is ambiguous in the Indonesian 
context, leading many political actors to misidentify (and overestimate the 
number of) partisan voters. In this regard, institutional and structural con-
texts matter greatly in shaping the environment in which vote buying can 
thrive; thus, the chapter begins with a comparison between Indonesia and 
Latin American countries regarding institutional and contextual factors.
Chapter 6 puts flesh on the bones of my argument about the personal 
loyalist strategy. It demonstrates how personal networks feed the recruit-
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ment and organisation of brokers and help define targeting strategies in 
settings where party-based partisan ties are weak. The chapter then 
addresses many of the unanswered questions in the study of electoral cli-
entelism in Indonesia, such as those regarding the demographic profiles of 
brokers and the logistics of vote buying. Importantly, this chapter argues 
that the dual-track strategy employed by many candidates, in which they 
target both party loyalists and persons connected to them through per-
sonal networks strategy—not only suffers from misdirected targeting but 
is also jeopardised by agency loss, that is, leakage of the funds provided by 
candidates. The discussion shows that, despite reliance on brokerage net-
works, candidates typically develop weak monitoring and lack enforce-
ment methods, encouraging brokers to engage in rent-seeking behaviour.
Given the widespread leakage and failed targeting, it is crucial to inves-
tigate the effectiveness of vote buying. Chapter 7, therefore, begins with 
discussion of its impacts on both voter turnout and vote choice. It shows 
that despite targeting strategies being imperfect and despite the unreli-
ability of brokers, vote buying produces greater turnout. This chapter also 
shows that while receiving money influences the vote choice of ‘only’ 
approximately 10% of voters, this 10% matters immensely in Indonesia’s 
highly competitive election settings. It concludes that candidates find vote 
buying attractive because it serves as an effective mechanism to produce 
narrow winning margins. The prisoner’s dilemma types of situation also 
make such practice inevitable, especially in a context where vote buying is 
relatively more efficient than all the other feasible alternatives.
In the conclusion, I discuss the theoretical and policy implications of 
the findings and point to an agenda for future research. Overall, the com-
parative literature on vote buying and turnout buying has emerged in con-
texts different from that in Indonesia. This makes the dynamics of vote 
buying, especially its targeting, very distinctive.
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CHAPTER 2
The Prevalence of Vote Buying in Indonesia: 
Building an Index
How prevalent is patronage distribution in Indonesia? Although there has 
been a burst of scholarly and non-scholarly writings on the topic in the last 
few years,1 little is known about how many voters actually receive material 
incentives from politicians. This chapter offers a systematic answer to funda-
mental questions about the intensity of money politics in Indonesia that 
have vexed scholars for many years. It involves a complex study of patronage 
politics in Indonesian elections, which draws predominantly on surveys.2
1 Among others, Choi (2007), Aspinall (2014), Allen (2015), Aspinall and As’ad (2015), 
Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016), Aspinall et al. (2017), Amick (2016), and Tawakkal et al. (2017).
2 I used a number of nationwide surveys in this chapter, including an April 2009 survey by 
The Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) and a December 2013 survey by Saiful Mujani 
Research and Consulting (SMRC). The LSI survey took place from 20 to 27 April 2009, 
approximately one week after the legislative election. The sample was 2000 voting-age adults 
with a margin of error of ±2.4% at 95% confidence level. Meanwhile, the SMRC survey inter-
viewed 1210 respondents, who, like the respondents in the LSI poll, were selected with 
multistage random sampling, with an estimated margin of error of ±2.9% at 95% confidence 
level. This chapter also draws from a pre-election survey conducted during 19–24 March 
2014. The number in the sample was 1220 voting-age adults who were selected with multi-
stage random sampling proportionally distributed over the 34 provinces. The margin of error 
was around ±2.9% at 95% significance level. However, this chapter draws primarily from my 
post-legislative election survey conducted during 22–26 April 2014, around two weeks after 
the legislative election. I timed the surveys to take advantage of a simultaneous national and 
sub-national parliamentary election held on 9 April 2014, which would mean that citizens’ 
recent interactions with parties, candidates, and brokers were fresh in their minds. In addi-
tion to these national surveys, I also utilised a large amount of data drawn from 963 local 
surveys conducted by LSI and Indikator Politik along with SMRC from 2006 to 2015.
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In this chapter, to measure the intensity of vote buying, I use a vote- 
buying index as the main dependent variable of this study. I argue that 
vote buying is central to election campaigns in Indonesia. Drawing from a 
wide range of survey methods, I estimate that the proportion of voters 
participating in vote buying during the 2014 legislative election was 
between 25% and 33% (depending on the method and specific question 
used in the survey). For comparative purposes, I relate this figure of self- 
reported vote buying with rates from other countries in the world. It turns 
out that the range between 25% and 33% is comparatively high by interna-
tional standards, with Indonesia’s level of vote buying being the third 
largest in the world (at least as measured in surveys within the last decade). 
As vote buying is illegal in most countries, including Indonesia, it is plau-
sible to suspect that respondents directly asked about such exchanges are 
reluctant to provide truthful answers. However, despite this presumed 
desirability bias, my findings show that the list-experiment and the straight-
forward survey questions result in consistent estimates of the aggregate 
levels of vote buying. The chapter discusses this question extensively.
Finally, although this study puts greater weight on vote buying in 
national parliamentary elections, it also offers new insights into the under-
explored nature of such practices in different election settings. In the last 
part of this chapter, I present historical survey data, owned by my home 
institutions (LSI and Indikator Politik Indonesia), to identify inter- 
regional variation in levels of vote buying in executive elections at the local 
level. This chapter concludes that vote buying isn’t only widespread dur-
ing national legislative elections, but that it has also become a central fea-
ture of local executive elections, where the prize is the position of district 
head, mayor, or governor.
2.1  Dimensions anD measures
To operationalise vote buying as the dependent variable of this study, I 
created a series of questions about this individualised form of patronage 
distribution and asked subjects to respond on a various point Likert-type 
scale to capture attitudes and opinions with a range of answer choices. 
Given that vote buying is typically associated with negative stigma and 
thus is associated with social desirability bias, my research follows the 
methods developed by Brusco and her collaborators (2004: 69) to 
approach the targeted issue from several different directions. In the post- 
election survey (the one conducted from 22 to 26 April 2014), the ques-
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tions used seven measures of vote buying with different degrees of 
directness. This was done in the expectation that the response to any sin-
gle question wouldn’t provide a completely accurate picture of such 
exchanges. Further, I categorised these seven measures into two dimen-
sions: vote-buying operations in the nationwide legislative elections and 
vote-buying attempts in the national and local executive elections.
In the survey, the dimension of vote buying in the parliamentary elec-
tions consists of four measures. The first is a four-point scale of all experi-
ences with vote buying in legislative elections, without concretely 
mentioning the 2014 elections in the question (hereafter I referred to this 
a four-point scale of all vote-buying experience in legislative elections). 
The question asked: “During the last couple of years, related to the legisla-
tive election campaign of national parliamentary (DPR) candidates, how 
often have candidates or success team members offered you food, house-
hold items, and/or other goods in order to influence your vote in the 
election?” I asked respondents to respond on a four-point Likert-type 
scale (very often, quite often, rarely, and never), which I then recoded into 
two categories (very often, quite often, and rarely = 1, rare and never = 0). 
I worded the question in this way to gather all experiences of vote buying, 
including in the currently ongoing campaign. The strategy of not explic-
itly mentioning the date was intended to capture greater vote-buying 
reports. Given the survey was conducted when the election had just been 
held, I wanted to avoid making respondents feel they were being ‘inter-
rogated’ on what they had just done in the 2014 election, remembering 
the vote buying is actually illegal in Indonesia. In addition, as noted above, 
this measure used a four-point scale to increase variation in this variable of 
interest and was expected to collect greater vote-buying reports than a 
simple ‘yes-no’ question.
Similarly, my second measure of vote buying in legislative elections 
didn’t concretely mention the 2014 election. The prompt was as follows: 
“These situations sometimes occur during every election in Indonesia. 
Have you ever experienced these situations below?” The relevant prompt 
was “Being offered money or goods in order to vote for a certain political 
party/DPR candidate.” The possible responses were ‘no,’ ‘yes, only once 
or twice,’ to ‘yes, several times,’ and they were recoded to be a two-point 
scale (yes, only once/twice and yes, several times = 1, no = 0). The main 
difference to the question above is that while the first measure used a four- 
point scale, the second used a three-point scale of vote-buying experience 
(hereafter referred to as a three-point scale of all vote-buying experience in 
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legislative elections). We should expect a different outcome since different 
response options may generate different results. Additionally, the second 
measure was mixed with a number of other exposures to vote-buying 
offers in the different election settings that voters could point to, as will be 
discussed later.
The last two measures of vote buying in legislative elections are on a 
two-point scale, comprising a pair of questions that explicitly asked about 
these practices in the 2014 legislative elections. A key difference to the 
questions above is that respondents might have felt compelled to provide 
misleading answers in response to questions that directly asked about vote 
buying in 2014, because this event was still fresh in voters’ minds when 
the post-election survey was conducted and the questions were more spe-
cific. Though the question is appealing because it asks directly about the 
level of vote buying in 2014, it also might drive some respondents to 
respond in ways that don’t reflect their actual behaviour. The question 
doesn’t allow respondents to disguise their answers in terms of past elec-
tion events. Further, these last two measures are dichotomous scales that 
are different from the questions above, being a ‘yes-no’ question which 
provides a clearer, binary response, but in which bias is more likely.
In this study, the yes-no questions that explicitly mentioned the 2014 
elections asked about individual and neighbourhood vote-buying rates. 
Hence, the third measure inquired about vote buying directed at respon-
dents in 2014 (hereafter referred to as a two-point scale of individual vote 
buying in the 2014 legislative election). The question reads: “During the 
run-up to the April 9th 2014 legislative election, did candidates or success 
team members offer you money, food, household items, and/or other 
goods (excluding propaganda hats, shirts, and posters)?” The fourth 
focuses on vote-buying offers witnessed by respondents in their neigh-
bourhood (hereafter referred to as a two-point scale of neighbourhood 
vote buying in the 2014 elections). The question asked: “During the run-
up to the April 9th 2014 election, did you observe candidates or success 
team members offering people in your neighbourhood money, food, 
household items, and/or other goods (excluding propaganda hats, shirts, 
and posters)?” These yes-no questions were recoded to scale from 0 
 (indicating those who responded negatively to both such offers in 2014) 
to 1 (indicating those who responded positively to both questions).3
3 To measure vote buying, I prefer to use ‘being offered’ rather than ‘received’ material 
benefits. Of course, we cannot determine whether voters actually accepted electoral bribes. 
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Meanwhile, three questions focused on vote-buying attempts in 
national and sub-national executive elections, as a comparison with the 
above second measure of general vote-buying experiences in legislative 
elections. These measures of vote buying in the executive elections are on 
a three-point scale. The first question reads: “Have you ever experienced 
being offered money or goods in order to vote for certain presidential/
vice presidential candidates?” (hereafter referred to as a three-point scale 
of vote buying in presidential elections). The second question asks: “Have 
you ever experienced being offered money or goods in order to vote for a 
certain gubernatorial candidate?” (hereafter referred to as a three-point 
scale of vote buying in governor elections). The third question was: “Have 
you ever experienced being offered money or goods in order to vote for a 
certain regent/mayoral candidate?” (hereafter referred to as a three-point 
scale of vote buying in regency elections). In each case, possible responses 
were ‘no,’ ‘yes, only once/twice,’ and ‘yes, several times.’ These answers 
were subsequently recoded to be positioned on a two-point scale (‘yes, 
only once/twice’ and ‘yes, several times’ = 1, ‘no’ = 0).
In my analysis of the data, I combined those seven measures described 
above into an aggregate index of vote buying. As indicated above, to facili-
tate substantive interpretation of these findings, I recoded each of the 
vote-buying items from their original scale into dichotomous scales that 
took a value of 1 if the respondent was exposed to vote-buying attempts 
or experienced being offered such electoral bribes.
2.2  How Prevalent is vote Buying?
How widespread is vote buying in Indonesia judged from the measures I 
have chosen? In this section, I present the main descriptive results of my 
findings on vote buying, divided into two dimensions: legislative elections 
and executive elections.
To begin, I demonstrate the findings based on the first dimension of 
vote buying generated from responses to a battery of four questions that 
asked about respondents’ experiences of vote-buying attempts in legisla-
tive elections. Using a four-point scale, as explained above, responses to 
But such a question, as Jensen and Justesen (2014: 224) argued, allows us to measure which 
voters political machines tend to target. By using the word ‘being offered,’ I intended to 
avoid social desirability biases that may occur when asking questions about respondents’ own 
behaviour.
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the first question suggest that 33.1% of respondents reported that they 
had been offered electoral incentives ‘very often,’ ‘quite often,’ or ‘rarely.’ 
Although a substantial proportion of the sample (58%) reported having 
not been targeted at all, around one-third of the respondents admitting 
such an experience is a relatively high result (see international comparisons 
in Sect. 2.4 below), suggesting that such practices have become a conven-
tional strategy in electoral campaigning in Indonesia.
The second measure of vote buying in parliamentary elections pro-
duced similar results. Using a three-point continuous scale, this indicated 
that 29% of respondents reported being offered cash or goods ‘once or 
twice’ or ‘several times’ during legislative elections. Using similar word-
ing, surveys taken between 2009 and 2014 showed an increase in the rate 
of vote-buying offers during legislative elections.4 In the 2009 legislative 
elections, only 11.2% of respondents admitted being targeted for vote 
buying. The incidence increased in December 2013 (several months 
before the 2014 legislative elections) to 20.6% before rising again to 29% 
in April 2014 (Fig. 2.1).
Likewise, a descriptive overview of the third and the fourth measures of 
vote buying in legislative elections, which point to direct individual and 
neighbourhood vote buying in the 2014 legislative elections, result in 
consistent findings. Using a dichotomous scale, overall, 25% admitted 
having been personally targeted by such exchanges during the 2014 cam-
paigns (Fig.  2.2). The fourth measure, the neighbourhood measure, 
showed a higher result of 28.9% (Fig. 2.2).
Although the difference between the various measures is relatively small, 
ranging from 25% to 33% (see the first four rows of Table 2.1), one might 
question about the reasons for these differing results. One probable expla-
nation is that different survey response scales may result in different 
responses. As noted earlier, individual vote buying in the 2014 legislative 
election was framed in a straightforward question, asking for a yes-no 
response, while the first question on overall vote buying in legislative elec-
tions was on a four-point Likert-type scale in which those who responded 
affirmatively (‘very often,’ ‘quite often,’ and ‘rarely’) were categorised into 
4 Some of the April 2009 survey findings were reported at the LSI official website (http://
www.lsi.or.id/riset/370/Diskusi%20LSI%20Kualitas%20Pemilu%202009). But the data 
cited in this study weren’t included in the report and were processed for purposes of this 
analysis. Similarly, the data quoted from the SMRC 2013 survey were initially not included 
















April 2009 December 2013 April 2014
No Once,Twice or Several Times No Response
Fig. 2.1 Increasing rates of being targeted for vote buying, 2009–2014 (%). 
Source: The April 2009 data was drawn from LSI’s survey, the December 2013 
data was taken from SMRC’s survey, and the April 2014 numbers were drawn 
from my post-election survey
Fig. 2.2 Individual and neighbourhood vote buying in 2014 (%). Source: My 
post-election survey, 22–26 April 2014
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one category as recipients of vote-buying offers. Similarly, the second ques-
tion which asked all vote-buying experiences was on a three-point scale, 
providing an option for respondents to report rarity (i.e. ‘once or twice’) 
regarding the frequency of being offered vote buying. Perhaps, these 
greater ranges of responses captured more experiences than the sharply 
dichotomous scale. But why did the two-point scale used for neighbour-
hood estimates also result in higher numbers? As Kramon (2013: 70) 
points out, the neighbourhood measure is less obtrusive than direct, indi-
vidual measures, because it asks respondents about others’ actions. Another 
reason that neighbourhood vote-buying totals might be larger than self-
reported vote-buying totals is that if such practice is open and common, 
then a single act of vote buying may be observed by several individuals.
Another possible interpretation is that asking about general vote- 
buying experiences without specifically mentioning the 2014 elections 
would likely generate higher positive answers than questions that con-
cretely point to 2014. As noted above, mentioning the concrete event 
can make a psychological difference in that voters may feel pressured to 
provide truthful answers in response to sensitive questions about a recent 
act which, in a context like Indonesia, is unlawful. Again, given the tim-
ing of the survey, even when posed a question on vote buying that didn’t 
concretely mention 2014, respondents would have included their 2014 
Table 2.1 Relative frequency of responses to various measures of vote buying
Election types Variable name % ‘yes’ in 
total sample
Legislative elections 1.  A four-point scale of all vote-buying 
experience in legislative elections
33.1
2.  A three-point scale of all vote-buying 
experience in legislative elections
29
3.  A two-point scale of individual vote buying 
in the 2014 legislative election
25
4.  A two-point scale of neighbourhood vote 
buying in the 2014 legislative election
28.9
National and local 
executive elections
1.  A three-point scale of vote buying in the 
presidential elections
8.1
2.  A three-point scale of vote buying in the 
gubernatorial elections
11.3





experience in their answer. In fact, it was probably their main reference 
point. In short, mention of the 2014 elections apparently biased the 
responses of some respondents who were reluctant to report their recent 
illicit behaviours.
However, as will be explained in the following section, the results of the 
list-experiment, which is an increasingly influential technique aimed to 
minimise response bias in survey questions, show that the estimated per-
centage of people receiving money or gifts was around 27.4%. Thus, the 
25% of those who experienced vote-buying offers based on the estimate 
from a dichotomous scale of the vote-buying experience in the 2014 elec-
tion sounds about right. However, in order to give a sound estimate that 
reflects a number of different measures, this study suggests that between a 
quarter and a third of respondents reported having been targeted for vote 
buying in nationwide legislative elections.
Considering that the percentage difference in the final results between 
the first-placed and second-placed parties, PDI-P and Golkar, was only 
4.2%, this incidence level of vote buying is significant. Moreover, the per-
centage difference between PDI-P in the first place and Hanura in the 
tenth place was just 13.69%—well below the vote-buying levels (The 
Election Commission [KPU], 2014). And as I will show later, the margin 
of victory for individual candidates was considerably smaller than the mar-
gin between parties, making the prevalence of vote buying even more 
consequential.
Compared to the pre-election survey carried out in March 2014, which 
captured only half the campaign period, vote-buying incidents increased 
significantly from 10.7%. This increase suggests that vote buying was more 
concentrated in the days or hours before election day, or on election day 
itself. In the Indonesian context, this phenomenon is popularly known as 
serangan fajar (dawn attack), a term that reflects the fact that material 
benefits (especially cash) to compensate for votes are sometimes  distributed 
just after the dawn prayer on voting day. Candidates and brokers assume 
that the closer to voting day they hand things out, the more effective vote 
buying is in shaping electoral behaviour. These issues, however, aren’t 
unique to Indonesia. The pace of vote buying accelerates as the election 
date approaches in other countries too, such as in Taiwan (Wang and 
Kurzman, 2007) or the Philippines (Pulse Asia, 2013).
In order to provide a complete picture of vote-buying practices, those 
who reported having been offered benefits in the 2014 legislative elections 
were also asked to name the party or the party of the candidate involved 
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in the transaction. Respondents were allowed to mention more than one 
party, because they might have been approached by candidates from dif-
ferent political parties (see Chap. 7). In their answers, respondents identi-
fied all political parties which ran in the 2014 elections, with varying 
degrees of involvement. This survey finding corresponds with my qualita-
tive observations. “No party was innocent of vote trading. Even candi-
dates from Islamic parties engaged in such practices,” said a one-time 
national parliament member. “I dare you,” he continued, “cut off my 
finger if there is a single MP in Indonesia today who gets elected without 
buying votes!” (Interview, 20 April 2014). Although vote buying was also 
common among Islamic parties, the big four vote buyers were non-Islamic 
in character: of voters who admitted being offered money or a gift, 32.2% 
mentioned having received such offers from candidates from Golkar, fol-
lowed by PDI-P (26.5%), Gerindra (25%), and the Democratic Party 
(18.4%). Meanwhile, the most common item offered to voters was money 
(75.5% of all reported attempts), food products (12.8%) such as rice, 
sugar, and noodles, and household items (11.4%).
As noted earlier, the first three measures consisted of straightforward 
survey questions about whether individuals encountered offers of material 
rewards in return for their votes. The fourth measure, however, asked 
respondents to report whether they observed other people in their neigh-
bourhood or village experiencing such encounters in 2014. Arguably, this 
question may be less accurate since it is based on perceptions, which can be 
accurate or not. Nevertheless, asking questions about illegal practices by 
treating respondents as an ‘observer’ is less vulnerable to response bias 
because the question doesn’t require respondents to report on their own 
potentially illicit behaviour (Kramon, 2013: 70). The results of this fourth 
measure showed that 28.9% of respondents had witnessed or knew that such 
practices occurred in areas where they lived (see Fig. 2.2). These figures are 
only slightly larger than responses to the direct question (the third mea-
sure), in which 25% of respondents admitted being offered a vote-buying 
exchange in the 2014 election. The gap between the two is within the mar-
gin of error used in this survey and is therefore statistically insignificant.
The results from both the neighbourhood and individual measures are 
also consistent in terms of the perpetrators and items of vote buying. 
Among those who reported that their neighbourhood was being targeted, 
Golkar again topped the list of most frequently mentioned vote buyers 
(35.5%), followed by PDI-P (30.6%), Gerindra (26.8%), and the Democratic 
Party (20.6%), repeating the order in the individual vote- buying measure. 
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Similarly, as among respondents who individually observed vote buying, all 
political parties were mentioned by at least some respondents as engaging 
in vote-buying efforts in the neighbourhood measure. Money, food, and 
household items were also again the most frequent goods reported as 
being distributed in exchange for votes. Of those who witnessed their 
neighbourhood as having been targeted, 78.9% reported that people in 
their locations were given cash handouts, followed by food (12.8%), house-
hold goods (11.4%), and other items (14.8%). Note that the respondents 
were allowed to provide multiple answers.
In order to make a direct comparison of different election seasons, my 
2014 voter survey also asked a number of questions about the 2009 legisla-
tive election, using wording nearly identical to the individual and neigh-
bourhood items. The results confirm my earlier finding (based on 2009 and 
2013 surveys) that vote buying was more pervasive in 2014 than in 2009. 
Only 10.1% of respondents reported having individually been the target of 
such handouts in 2009. In terms of the background of vote buyers, the vote 
market was again dominated by non-Islamic parties such as Golkar, PDI-P, 
and Democratic Party. The most common items distributed to voters in 
2009 were also cash payments, foodstuffs, and household goods. When 
asked about the extent to which vote buying in 2009 happened in their 
neighbourhood, though statistically insignificant, affirmative responses to 
this inquiry were a little bit higher (12.9%) than responses to the questions 
asked about the individual experiences of survey respondents (10.1%).
Having discussed vote buying in the legislative elections, we are now in 
a position to explore the second dimension of this form of patronage 
exchange: vote buying in executive elections at the national and local level. 
Figure 2.3 demonstrates survey estimates of the proportion of voters who 
experienced being offered electoral incentives in such elections. In terms 
of presidential elections, my survey in April 2014 (around three months 
before the presidential elections)5 showed that only 8.1% of those sur-
veyed reported having received vote-buying offers either ‘once or twice’ 
or ‘several times.’6 In addition, according to the same April 2014 survey, 
vote-buying reports in the regency and gubernatorial elections were rela-
tively similar, standing at 13.6% and 11.3%, respectively. It is plausible to 
5 Unfortunately, this question wasn’t asked in our surveys that were closer to the 2014 
presidential elections, or after it.
6 Although this figure was much lower than in legislative elections, based on the LSI post-
election survey in April 2009, there has been a significant increase compared with 2009 when 
only 3.2% reported an acquaintance being offered such incentives.
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conclude, therefore, that vote-buying attempts were more prevalent dur-
ing parliamentary elections relative to presidential and sub-national execu-
tive elections (I will present additional data from an historical dataset on 
sub-national elections that confirms this finding at the end of this chapter).
These results are in line with the research of other scholars who 
argue that constituency size matters in explaining the different levels of 
vote buying in multiple election settings. Stokes (2007: 86), for exam-
ple, argues that vote buying decreases as constituency size grows, and 
vice versa. When the constituency is very large, as in presidential elec-
tions, it is difficult for politicians to buy the amount of votes necessary 
to make a nationwide difference. Presidential candidates instead rely 
more on the national media in attempting to reach out to a broad audi-
ence. By contrast, in direct local elections in smaller rural districts 
(kabupaten) and urban municipalities (kota), the cost of vote buying is 
less expensive and the practical challenges less daunting, thereby creat-


















or goods in order




or goods in order
to vote for a certain
regent/mayoral
candidate
No Yes, once or twice Yes, several times Don't know/no
answer
Fig. 2.3 Vote-buying offers at the national and local executive elections (%). 
Source: My post-election survey, 22–26 April 2014
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parliamentary elections—which comprise the national-level DPR, or 
People’s Legislative Council; 34 province-level DPRDs (Regional 
Legislative Councils); and DPRDs in 508 kabupaten/kota—vote buy-
ing is also widespread because the various electoral constituencies are 
manageable in size (being concomitantly smaller than the region-wide 
electorates in the relevant executive government head elections), and 
because candidates at different levels can coordinate their vote-buying 
efforts. Aspinall and Sukmadjati highlight the point that since “kabu-
paten and kota electoral districts are nested inside provincial electoral 
districts, which are in turn nested inside national electoral districts…. 
it is relatively easy for candidates running at different levels to coordi-
nate their efforts in the hope of maximising their individual chances of 
success” (2016: 14–15).7 This, in turn, increases the likelihood of vote 
buying in the legislative elections (see Chap. 6).
Another plausible explanation for why vote-buying efforts are more 
common in legislative elections is that the number of candidates running 
for national, provincial, and district parliaments is much larger than that of 
competitors in presidential and regional head elections (see Mujani et al., 
2012: 98). The number of seats contested in the 2014 legislative elections 
was 19,699, which were situated in the national, provincial, and district 
legislative assemblies. A total of 6608 candidates ran for the 560 seats in 
the DPR, around 10,000 candidates competed at the provincial level, and 
hundreds of thousands of candidates stood at kabupaten/kota level. In a 
single electoral district, there could be as many as 144 candidates compet-
ing at each level of legislative elections. In addition to the DPR and 
DPRDs, candidates also competed for the 136-seat Regional Representative 
Council (DPD).8 In the 2014 presidential elections, by contrast, there 
were only two presidential and vice presidential candidates in the race. 
Similarly, since 2005 (when direct local elections were introduced), there 
have never been more than 11 pairs of candidates in such a contest. Thus, 
the relatively limited number of candidates running for either presidential 
or local elections reduces the incentive for them to engage in vote buying 
if compared to their legislative counterparts running in massive, more 
competitive elections.
7 The exception to this general rule is Java where national and provincial electoral districts 
share the same boundaries. For further discussion, see Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016).
8 Detik.com, “200 Ribu Caleg yang Berebut 19 Ribu Kursi di 2014,” 9 January 2014, 
available at https://news.detik.com/berita/2462640/200-ribu-caleg-yang-berebut-19- 
ribu-kursi-di-2014, accessed 3 March 2016.
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2.3  tHe vote-Buying inDex
Having discussed the descriptive results, I can now develop an additive 
index of ‘vote buying,’ based on responses to the battery of seven ques-
tions summarised in the preceding section. The Cronbach’s alpha coeffi-
cient for the variables that make up the vote-buying index is 0.841, 
meaning that the variables have a high degree of internal consistency, and 
this suggests that the items in the test are highly correlated. As noted 
above, I differentiate vote buying into two dimensions: vote buying in 
parliamentary elections and vote buying in the presidential and local exec-
utive elections.
In order to establish that vote buying comprises these two dimensions, 
I use a confirmatory factor analysis. As shown in Table 2.2, the variables 
that make up the vote-buying index yield two components: (1) the four 
items related to vote buying in parliamentary elections constitute a single 
factor, and (2) the three items related to vote buying in the national and 
local executive elections produce another dimension. In other words, the 
variables that relate to vote-buying experiences in executive elections are 
Table 2.2 Factor analysis of vote buying (Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser 
normalisation)
Dimension
Vote buying in the 
legislative elections
Vote buying in the 
executive elections
A four-point scale of all vote-buying 
experience in legislative elections
0.745 0.216
A three-point scale of all vote-buying 
experience in legislative elections
0.792 0.368
A three-point scale of vote buying in the 
presidential elections
0.216 0.650
A three-point scale of vote buying in the 
gubernatorial elections
0.208 0.826
A three-point scale of vote buying in the 
regency/mayoral elections
0.256 0.761
A two-point scale of individual vote buying 
in the 2014 legislative election
0.744 0.200
A two-point scale of neighbourhood vote 
buying in the 2014 legislative election
0.584 0.151
Extraction method: Maximum likelihood
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empirically distinct from those that for legislative elections. This factor 
analysis reinforces the notion that the categorisation of vote buying based 
on the two distinct dimensions above is valid.
Hence, throughout this study, I apply the index of vote buying in sta-
tistical equations, including cross-tabulation, bivariate and multivariate 
analyses. I start this exercise by index-scoring the two dimensions of vote 
buying. First, the mean score of vote buying in parliamentary elections 
derived from the four measures mentioned above—which vary from 0 
(didn’t engage) to 1 (engaged) was 0.3145. Importantly, the bivariate 
statistical analysis reveals the correlation pattern between all vote-buying 
variables in the legislative elections (Table 2.3).
Second, the overall score of vote-buying offers in national and local 
executive elections—normalised to vary between 0 (didn’t engage) and 1 
(engaged)—was ‘only’ 0.1121. I also conducted a bivariate test with a 
Pearson correlation to look at the relationship between all three primary 
variables that constitute the dimension of vote buying in elections for 
presidential and regional heads (Table 2.4). Based on this bivariate test, 
the relationship between vote buying in presidential elections, vote- buying 
offers in the gubernatorial elections, and vote buying in the regency/may-
oral elections is substantial and statistically significant.
Table 2.3 Correlation between vote-buying variables in parliamentary elections
Four-point 









vote buying in 
2014
Two-point scale of 
neighbourhood vote 
buying in 2014
Four-point scale of 
all vote-buying 
experience
1 0.698*** 0.551*** 0.420***
Three-point scale of 
all vote-buying 
experience
0.698*** 1 0.643*** 0.474***
Two-point scale of 
individual vote 
buying in 2014
0.551*** 0.643*** 1 0.565***
Two-point scale of 
neighbourhood vote 
buying in 2014
0.420*** 0.474*** 0.565*** 1
***Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed)
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Recall again that the overall score of the vote-buying index is an addi-
tive scale based on responses to a battery of seven measures that make up 
the two dimensions of vote buying described above. The scale runs from 
0 (not exposed to vote buying) to 1 (exposed). The average of the vote- 
buying index is relatively high, with a score of 0.2103. There is, however, 
substantial component variation. At the low end, people who were exposed 
to vote-buying attempts during an election for national and regional gov-
ernment heads only make up a modest proportion of the total electorate, 
with a score of 0.1121. In particular, people were less likely to have experi-
ence of vote buying in presidential elections, with a score of 0.0841. At 
the top end, people were more likely to be targeted for vote buying in 
parliamentary elections, with a score of 0.3145. Therefore, as with the 
above descriptive analysis of the measures, it is safe to conclude from the 
index that among the two different election settings, vote buying is more 
common during parliamentary elections than during national and local 
executive elections. The reasons behind these different rates of vote buy-
ing have been already explained above: the effect of constituency size and 
the differences in competitiveness between these two types of elections.
Although the average of vote-buying occurrence in parliamentary 
elections is higher than in executive elections, the bivariate model sug-
gests that these two dimensions of vote buying have a positive correla-
tion and are statistically significant in the expected direction (Table 2.5). 
It can be inferred, therefore, that those who have traditionally benefited 
from clientelist exchanges in parliamentary elections are more likely to 
be targeted for vote buying in the national and sub-national executive 
elections as well. The correlation also exists the other way around. Those 
Table 2.4 Correlation between vote-buying variables in the national and local 
executive elections
Vote buying in 
presidential elections
Vote buying in 
governor elections
Vote buying in 
regency elections
Vote buying in 
presidential elections
1 0.613*** 0.568***
Vote buying in 
governor elections
0.613*** 1 0.708***
Vote buying in regency 
elections
0.568*** 0.708*** 1
***Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed)
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being exposed to vote-buying attempts in presidential and regional head 
elections are more likely to be the target of such exchanges in legislative 
elections.
What does this correlation suggest? Concretely, it implies that political 
machines are more likely over time to direct their vote-buying efforts 
more heavily towards a group of voters for whom vote buying is a more 
common, repeat experience. This finding is in line with the concept of 
base voters, according to which loyalist voters are locked into long-term 
political relationships with parties or politicians based on patronage ties 
(see Chap. 5). In many cases, political agents (or brokers) assume that 
such voters are more responsive to clientelist exchanges, which in turn 
triggers an increase in vote buying targeting this group. Furthermore, as I 
elaborate in more detail in the following chapters, the logic of various ele-
ments of Indonesia’s institutional framework, such as optional voting, 
open-list proportional system, and ballot secrecy, create strong incentives 
for candidates to target such voters because they are thought of as being 
more reciprocal, and thus a more predictable source of votes.
2.4  international ComParaBility
I have explained at length the ubiquity of vote buying in Indonesian elec-
tions. To put these numbers into perspective, it is important to compare 
the rate of self-reported vote buying, especially in parliamentary elections, 
with rates from other countries in the world. As indicated earlier, I used a 
number of questions in my surveys that are partially derived from and are 
comparable to similar questions that have been asked elsewhere. This 
allows me to make direct comparisons with vote-buying levels in other 
countries, as presented in Table 2.6.
Table 2.5 Correlation (Pearson’s r) between vote-buying variables in the parlia-
mentary elections and executive elections
Vote buying in 
legislative elections
Vote buying in the presidential 
and local executive elections
Vote buying in legislative 
elections
1 0.479***
Vote buying in the presidential 
and local executive elections
0.479*** 1
***Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed)
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Table 2.6 Estimated proportion of direct vote buying by country
Country % N Country % N Country % N
Uganda 2012 41 2400 Mexico 2010 17 1562 Cote d’Ivoire 
2013
7 1200
Benin 2012 37 1200 Paraguay 
2010
16 1502 Ghana 2012 7 2400
Indonesia 
2014a
33 1210 Burundi 2012 16 1199 Malaysia 2013 7 NA
Kenya 2011 32 2399 Colombia 
2010
15 1506 Nicaragua 2010 6 1540
Liberia 2012 28 1199 Cameroon 
2013
14 1200 Botswana 2012 6 1200
Swaziland 2013 27 1200 Malawi 2012 14 2407 Cape Verde 2011 6 1208
Mali 2012 26 1200 Tanzania 
2012
14 2400 Jamaica 2010 6 1504
Niger 2013 24 1200 Guatemala 
2010





23 1190 Brazil 2010 13 2482 Guyana 2010 6 1540
Dominican Rep 
2010
22 1500 Madagascar 
2013
13 1200 Uruguay 2010 6 1500
Burkina Faso 
2012
22 1200 Zambia 2012 13 1200 Chile 2010 6 1965





22 1200 Venezuela 
2010
12 1500 Mozambique 
2012
5 2400
Egypt 2013 20 1200 Guinea 2013 11 1200 Honduras 2009 4 1005
Nigeria 2012 19 2400 Senegal 2013 11 1200 Algeria 2013 3 1206
Zimbabwe 
2012
19 2400 El Salvador 
2010
10 1550 Lesotho 2012 2 1197
Argentina 2010 18 1410 Togo 2012 10 1200 Mauritius 2012 1 1200
Panama 2010 18 1536 Costa Rica 
2010
9 1500 Tunisia 2013 1 1200
Belize 2010 17 1504 Ecuador 2010 8 3000
Bolivia 2010 17 3018 Suriname 
2010
7 1516 Average 14.22
Sources: The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Americas Barometer 2010 and the 
Afrobarometer Round 5, 2011–2012. The data from Malaysia was taken from Meredith Weiss, “General 
Election 2013 Survey Results” (2013), while the rate of vote buying from the Philippines was taken from 
Pulse Asia, “On the 2013 Elections: Observations and Select Survey Results” (2013) (The data from 
Malaysia and Philippines were presented at “Workshop of Money Politics, Patronage and Electoral 
Dynamics,” Yogyakarta, 13–15 December 2013)
aDerived from the first measure of all vote-buying experience in legislative elections
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To that end, I use an estimate based on my first measure of all vote- 
buying experience (it will be recalled that this was responses to the ques-
tion: “During the last couple of years, related to the legislative election 
campaign of national parliamentary (DPR) candidates, how often have 
candidates or success team members offered you food, household items, 
and/or other goods in order to influence your vote in the election?”). 
This question was similar to questions asked by both LAPOP Americas 
Barometer and Afrobarometer. The data on vote-buying levels in Latin 
American and African countries presented in Table 2.6 are all taken from 
the two polling associations. While the wording of questions varied slightly 
in some of the studies, the questions were overall congruent. The LAPOP 
worded the question as follows: “In recent years and thinking about elec-
tion campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered 
you something like a favour, food, or any other benefits or thing in return 
for your vote?” Respondents could indicate that they ‘never,’ ‘sometimes,’ 
or ‘often’ have been offered electoral incentives in return for their vote. 
Responses were coded ‘yes,’ if they reported ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ having 
been the target of such practice.
The Afrobarometer asked the following question: “And during the last 
national election in [20xx], how often, if ever, did a candidate or someone 
from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift or money, in 
return for your vote?” Respondents responded on a five-point Likert-type 
scale, with responses ranging from ‘never,’ ‘once or twice,’ ‘a few times,’ 
‘often,’ and ‘no experience in the past year.’ The main difference is that I 
used a four-point scale in the first measure, while the LAPOP Americas 
Barometer and Afrobarometer employed a three-point scale and five-point 
scale, respectively. In the case of Malaysia and the Philippines, the fre-
quency of vote buying in both countries was based on a dichotomous 
scale: whether or not respondents had been offered material benefits dur-
ing the current/most recent elections.9
Turning to the comparison of vote-buying levels, Table 2.6 shows that 
there is a wide variation in the level of self-reported vote-buying transac-
tions across in the continents of Asia, Latin America, and Africa, in surveys 
taken over the last decade. The average level of vote buying around the 
world is 14.22%, with some countries scoring well below the global aver-
9 The question reads: “During the run-up to the 2013 elections, did any political party 
offer you money, food, household items, and/or other goods (excluding propaganda hats, 
shirts, and posters)?”
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age and some significantly above it. Vote-buying intensity is greatest in the 
cases of Uganda (41%), Benin (37%), Indonesia (33%), Kenya (32%), 
Liberia (28%), Swaziland (27%), Mali (26%) and Niger (24%). Remarkably, 
the level of vote buying in Indonesia, when we use the higher estimate 
(33%), is more than double the global average.
In contrast, vote-buying incidents were virtually non-existent in Lesotho 
(2%), Mauritius (1%), and Tunisia (1%). In general, consistent with the expec-
tations from prior findings, offers of vote buying in many African and Asian 
countries are reported in higher numbers than in Latin America (Schaffer, 
2007). Confirming this pattern, the study of De Jonge (2015)—which anal-
ysed survey data from ten elections in eight Latin American countries—also 
found that vote-buying incidence wasn’t as high as in other parts of the 
world.10 In contrast, it is clear that vote buying in Indonesia is comparatively 
prevalent, and that such practices are central in the country’s electoral politics.
2.5  little soCial DesiraBility Bias
Given that these data are entirely based on surveys, we must ask: how valid 
are estimates of vote buying based on direct individual measures estab-
lished through polls? As noted above, vote buying is illegal in most coun-
tries, including Indonesia, and usually linked to a negative social stigma 
(Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012; Hicken, 2007). Therefore, some scholars 
have expressed suspicions that respondents directly asked about such prac-
tices are unlikely to report accurate information due to the problem of 
social desirability (Gallego and Wantchekon, 2012; Corstange, 2012). In 
order to address this concern, survey-based experiments are suitable 
instruments to evaluate the credibility of individual survey items and con-
solidate their overall validity. This is particularly the case for clientelism 
research, which has attracted renewed scholarly interest in recent years.
In the following, therefore, I present my findings on the estimated pro-
portion of people receiving material benefits for their vote based on a list- 
experiment, embedded within two nationally representative surveys, 
conducted before and after the 2014 legislative elections. There were two 
underlying assumptions for conducting the list-experiment. First, we must 
assume that respondents give truthful answers to the sensitive item (Blair 
10 For my comparative overview, I chose the LAPOP Americas Barometer (2010) data—
which provides a higher aggregate estimate of such incentives in the case of South American 
countries—because it used a more comparable direct survey item.
 B. MUHTADI
65
and Imai, 2012: 56). Second, we must assume that “the inclusion of a 
sensitive item has no effect on respondents’ answers to control items” 
(Blair and Imai, 2012: 51).11
First of all, the list-experiment participants were divided into four ran-
dom halves: one control group and three treatment groups.12 Interviewers 
read the same question for each group. Respondents in each group were 
also provided with a show card for their response choices, which differed by 
group only in the number of response categories. These items were designed 
together with the project leaders of ‘Money Politics in Southeast Asia,’ 
while considering floor and ceiling effects that must be avoided.13 The open-
ing statement in the first list-experiment was the following question:
I am going to read you various activities, and I would like for you to tell me 
if they have been carried out by candidates or team success members during 
the run-up to the April 9th 2014 election? Please don’t tell me which ones, 
only how many? (one, two, or three campaign activities)
For the control group, I listed the following campaign activities:
 1. They put up campaign posters or signs in your neighbourhood/city.
 2. They visited your home.
 3. They placed campaign advertisements in television/newspaper/radio.
11 See also, Eric Kramon, “Vote Buying and Accountability in Democratic Africa,” PhD 
Dissertation at UCLA, 2013.
12 It must be noted that in the pre-election survey, the sample was only divided into two 
random halves: a treatment and a control group. Overall, although there is some modifica-
tion, the list-experiment that this study implemented was largely guided by Gonzalez-
Ocantos, Ezequiel, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, Javier Osorio and David 
W.  Nickerson, “Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from 
Nicaragua,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 56 (1), No. 1, January, 2012: 
pp.  202–217. My experimental survey is also inspired by Kramon (2013) and De Jonge 
(2015).
13 The possible presence of floor effects has long been central in the discussion among 
scholars. Blair and Imai (2012: 49–50) detect that floor effects may appear “if the control 
questions are so uncontroversial that uniformly negative responses are expected for many 
respondents.” Another possible ‘floor effect’ may result if respondents fear that answering ‘0’ 
reveals their honest (negative) preference (Ibid). There is some debate on this is, because on 
the other side of the coin, there may be ‘ceiling effects’ referring to a condition where all of 
the items would be acceptable to many participants. See Graeme Blair and Kosuke Imai 
(2012), “Statistical Analysis of List experiments,” Political Analysis 20(1), 47–77.
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Among those activities, how many had been carried out by candidates 
or brokers? Respondents could pick one, two, or three (all of them). I also 
provided an option for the scenario that ‘none’ of them had been carried 
out by candidates and their operatives. Meanwhile, each treatment group, 
which contained different sensitive issues, was presented a fourth different 
option, placed in the third response position.
 1. They coerced you to vote for them (first treatment group).
 2. They gave you a gift or did you a favour (second treatment group).
 3. They offered you a job (third treatment group).
Participants were then asked not to mention which items were true for 
them. They were only required to indicate how many of the items were 
true for them (see Kramon, 2013). Respondents could choose one, two, 
three, four, or all of them. Again, there was an optional answer for the 
scenario that ‘none’ of them had been carried out by candidates or their 
operatives. Following Gonzalez-Ocantos and his colleagues (2012) and 
De Jonge (2015), interviewees weren’t asked to tell the field surveyor 
which particular activities they had experienced so that the surveyor 
wouldn’t realise whether the respondent was reporting the sensitive item 
(receipt of cash or gifts) or not. The goal was to reduce social desirability 
bias (De Jonge, 2015).
Having previously shown the descriptive findings of the individual and 
neighbourhood measures, I now start the analysis and interpretation of the 
results from the list-experiment. The first column of Table 2.7 is the descrip-
tive analysis to estimate people’s experience of receiving handouts during 
campaigns. Table  2.7 shows the means for each experimental setting, 
namely one control group and three treatment groups. The list- experiment 
results found systematic differences in the means, providing a point estimate 
on the number of people reporting incidents of vote buying and coercion. 
Table 2.7 Descriptive analysis
Treatment n Mean
Control 272 1.393
Treatment I (coercion) 263 1.574
Treatment II (vote buying) 283 1.668
Treatment III (job offer) 267 1.416
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The mean number of three campaign activities that include campaign post-
ers or signs in the neighbourhood, party/candidate/broker visits, and cam-
paign advertisements in television/newspaper/radio, reported by 
respondents in the control group, is 1.393. The average number of items 
indicated by the first treatment group, where subjects had the added option 
of “being coerced to vote for any political party or candidate,” is 1.574. 
Subsequently, the mean number indicated by the second treatment group, 
where the subject had the choice of ‘receiving money or gifts or favors,’ is 
1.668. Finally, the average number of items by the third treatment group 
which provided the additional option of a job offer for voters is only 1.416.
Thus, an estimation of the percentage of people reporting the receipt 
of electoral incentives can be established by comparing the average num-
ber of items indicated by the respondents in each group. Table 2.8 shows 
the treatment minus control differences. As the average number of items 
indicated by the control group is 1.393 and the average number of items 
indicated by the first treatment group is 1.574, we can conclude that 
18.1% of respondents experienced coercion (1.574 − 1.393 = 0.181 and 
0.181 × 100 = 18.1%). Random assignment assures that the difference is 
owing to respondents admitting coercion during elections. This number is 
clearly statistically significant (sig. < 0.05). Meanwhile, the mean number 
shown by the second treatment group (vote buying) is 1.668, producing 
a result of 1.668 − 1.393 = 0.274 and 0.274 × 100 = 27.4%.
Hence, importantly for this study, the estimation of the proportion of 
respondents receiving electoral incentives according to the list-experiment 
is 27.4%, much higher than the proportion of those experiencing coercion 
(18.1%). The difference is highly significant (sig. < 0.05). By contrast, cli-
entelist exchange that took the form of a job offer to voters isn’t statisti-
cally significant, with only a 2.2% difference between the control and 







Respondents were coerced to vote (Treatment I − Control) 18.1 7.6 0.018
Respondents were given money or gifts (Treatment 
II − Control)
27.4 7.5 0.000
Respondents were offered a job (Treatment III − Control) 2.2 7.6 0.769
Source: This list-experiment was embedded within the post-election survey 22–26 April 2014
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treatment groups. It can be concluded, therefore, that the practice of 
offering a job in exchange for a vote is rare in Indonesian electoral politics.
Interestingly, the estimated percentage of respondents reporting the 
receipt of handouts in this April 2014 list-experiment nearly tripled in 
comparison to a similar survey-based experiment carried out in March 
2014, around one month before the election (see Table 2.9). Despite the 
sample being divided only into two random halves, the procedure of ran-
domisation was exactly the same. In the pre-election survey, I also used a 
wording that was nearly identical to items employed in the post-election 
survey-based experiment. Table 2.9 reports the comparison between the 
results of the list-experiment in pre- and post-election surveys. As explained 
earlier, the estimated percentage of people receiving money or gifts accord-
ing to the post-election survey-based experiment was 27.4%. Meanwhile, 
the mean number of campaign activities indicated by the control group 
with only four options in the pre-election experiment was 1.414, whereas 
the mean in the treatment group, where items had the additional option 
of picking the scenario of ‘receiving money or gifts,’ was 1.519. Hence, 
the intensity of vote buying that occurred about one month prior to the 
election was only 10.4% (Treatment − Control, 1.519 − 1.414 = 0.104, 
and 0.104 × 100 = 10.4%). The results from the pre- and post-election 
survey-based experiment are all statistically significant (sig. < 0.05).
The results thus far have found that that the estimates gathered from 
direct individual measures don’t differ much from what is found in the 
list-experiment. The estimates derived from each method are strikingly 
similar, suggesting that in Indonesia, direct survey questions about indi-
viduals’ experience receiving cash handouts aren’t subject to response bias. 
Table 2.9 Vote buying in both pre- and post-election survey-based experiments
Treatment March 2014 April 2014
n Mean n Mean
Control 556 1.414 273 1.398
Treatment 561 1.519 284 1.674




Source: The pre-election survey-based experiment was done during 19–24 March 2014, while the post- 
election experiment was conducted during 22–26 April 2014
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My finding contrasts with that of Gonzalez-Ocantos and his colleagues 
(2012), who found substantial bias in a similar survey item asked in 
Nicaragua. My findings also contrast with those put forward by Corstange 
(2012) in his study of the 2009 Lebanese parliamentary elections and De 
Jonge (2015) in the case of the 2009 Honduran election. Both studies 
suggested that vote buying is found to be much more pervasive if detected 
via the list-experiment. My study, by contrast, confirms earlier work by 
Amick (2016: 1), who found that relative to a list-experiment, “direct 
survey questions to [Indonesian] voters about accepting transfers from 
campaigns elicits mostly honest responses from respondents.”
Accordingly, my findings indicate that the difference between the direct 
individual and neighbourhood measures and the list-experiment isn’t sta-
tistically significant. My list-experiment estimates about 27.4% of respon-
dents actually sold their votes, compared to approximately 25% of 
respondents when asked directly about their personal experience of the 
2014 elections. In every category of the individual-level questions dis-
cussed above, the estimates were statistically similar to those recorded by 
the list-experiment. Even the neighbourhood measure only gives a slightly 
higher estimate (28.9%) than the list-experiment.
Hence, the direct individual measure is reliable enough to estimate 
attempts of vote buying. This conclusion is supported by the fact that in the 
pre-election nationwide survey (March 2014), I found almost exactly the 
same estimates in the list-experiment and direct measure. In that survey, the 
list-experiment estimated that approximately 10.4% of respondents accepted 
electoral handouts, compared to 10.7% of respondents who answered in the 
affirmative through direct questioning. All of this suggests that analysis 
based on traditional obtrusive measures of vote buying is a valid and reliable 
approach in the Indonesian case. Both direct individual and neighbourhood 
measures are found not to understate the degree of such practices.
One plausible explanation for this lack of social bias is that Indonesian 
voters seem to be comparatively open about witnessing (and receiving 
offers of) vote buying. This openness, in turn, appears to be related to vote 
buying being less stigmatised than it was in the past (see Chap. 6). Despite 
its formal illegality, vote buying has increasingly become a normal transac-
tion during election and is rarely prosecuted. In the eyes of many voters, 
an election is no longer viewed as a window of opportunity to express their 
political preferences, but rather as, borrowing Corstange’s term (2012: 
483), a ‘season of money.’ During my 13-month fieldwork at the height 
of the 2014 election, most politicians lamented the increased pressure on 
them to engage in vote buying, and they argued that such exchanges have 
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become a part of routine politics in Indonesia. They admitted that voters 
suspected that whoever was elected—regardless from which party he or 
she originated—was highly likely to quickly forget their constituents after 
the election. Elections, therefore, are mainly seen as a ‘temporary 
 opportunity’ for ordinary people to recapture material benefits that politi-
cians have stolen (Kerkvliet, 1991: 231). In the words of Schaffer and 
Schedler (2007: 26), recipients view offers as “amends for [politicians’] 
wrongdoings [committed against them] in the past.”
However, the initiative to ‘normalise’ vote buying doesn’t only come 
from voters demanding handouts. To please such voters, and to avoid com-
peting on programmatic grounds, many politicians happily present them-
selves as personal distributors of patronage, and they find moral justifications 
to defend this approach. For example, many Islamic politicians justify doing 
so by quoting religious scholars (kiai). For instance, one successful local 
candidate in Central Java relied on the advice given by an influential kiai. 
This kiai stated that if he didn’t distribute cash and lost as a result, all his 
other efforts to win office would be proven meaningless. The kiai report-
edly quoted an Arabic script, taken from one of the major textbooks (kitab) 
studied in Islamic boarding schools, that in his view allowed vote buying. 
The passage reads:  (Bribing voters is basi-
cally unlawful, but it could be permitted for fairness). Additionally, the 
kiai—who sat on the advisory board of the candidate’s moderate Islamic 
party—cited an Islamic jurisprudential premise, namely 
 (that without which an obligation cannot be ful-
filled is itself obligatory). Based on this proposition, the ultimate goal is the 
election of a good candidate motivated by a religious cause. If good candi-
dates are reluctant to spend money for vote buying—so the argument 
goes—and lose as a result, then parliament will be made up only of corrupt 
politicians (Interview, 12 August 2014). In this view, vote buying is simply 
an electoral strategy for winning and thus preventing corrupt politicians 
from taking office. Accordingly, it isn’t only justifiable but also necessary.
As a consequence of such efforts at ‘normalisation’ of vote buying, the 
stigma attached to it has weakened. During my research, most people talked 
about vote-buying practices in an open way, indicating that there is little 
social desirability bias. As Agun Gunandjar Sudarsa of Golkar put it, “vote 
buying has become public knowledge in Indonesia, [and is] seen as part of a 
tradition during elections. Indeed, it is illegal on paper, but I am sure the 
police will not pursue it. Otherwise, the prisons would be full” (Interview, 23 
April 2014). Terms such as ‘NPWP’ (Nomer Piro, Wani Piro, representing 
the question ‘what number on the ballot are you and how much do you dare 
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to give?’) or GOLPUT (Golongan Penerima Uang Tunai, roughly a ‘group 
of cash recipients’)14 circulated widely, pointing to the centrality of such cli-
entelist exchanges. The famous but unsuccessful incumbent candidate from 
Golkar, Nurul Arifin, stated that in a context where the scale of vote buying 
is so extensive, the only way to beat co-partisans is by outspending one’s 
internal party rival in terms of distributing cash to voters (Interview, 28 April 
2014). Thus, vote buying appeared, borrowing the words of an independent 
researcher, to be “more massive, vulgar and brutal in the 2014 elections” 
than ever before (Kompas.com, 21 April 2014).
Far from being increasingly socially stigmatised, then, vote buying in 
Indonesia is deeply ingrained in the society’s fabric. As a result, as argued 
by Benedict Kerkvliet (1991: 80), for the Philippines, voters see elections 
as a strategic transaction with power, showing that they too “as voters 
aren’t merely subjects of the seemingly powerful candidates or politicians.”
2.6  vote Buying in loCal exeCutive eleCtions
To further gauge the extent and social acceptability of vote buying in 
Indonesia, and to compare how such practices play out in different settings, 
it is important to assess whether different datasets are consistent with the 
primary data source used in this study. As noted earlier, the previous sections 
relied heavily on the 2014 post-election, nationwide survey. In the remain-
der of this chapter, I present a large amount of data drawn from 963 local 
surveys conducted by my home institutions LSI and Indikator as well as by 
SMRC between 2006 and 2015. Over the entire period, these three preemi-
nent polling organisations conducted surveys about regional executive elec-
tions (pilkada) in 34 provinces and 513 regencies/cities across Indonesia. 
Though not their primary focus, these surveys included common questions 
related to vote buying. The relevant question was: “As an effort to win the 
gubernatorial/regency/mayoral election, certain candidates or brokers typi-
cally give money or gifts for people to influence their vote. In your opinion, 
can the money/gift be considered acceptable or unacceptable?”15 This 
wording is unobtrusive in that it doesn’t inquire about whether vote buying 
took place or not. But, at least, it may serve to proxy the extent to which 
vote buying is viewed as acceptable in local executive elections.
14 In normal usage, NPWP is the acronym for ‘tax file number,’ while GOLPUT denotes 
those citizens who deliberately abstain from voting.
15 The wording of the question wasn’t always the same. The categories in italics changed 
according to the level of the territory in which the election took place (i.e. in a province, city, 
or district).
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My focus in analysing this dataset is on inter-regional variation in sub- 
national elections, which I couldn’t capture in the national surveys dis-
cussed thus far. Note that the population sizes at the district and provincial 
level are extremely varied, and the frequencies of the surveys were uneven, 
which could bias the sample to certain regencies/cities. In order to correct 
this non-random geographic sampling, the weighting scheme is carried 
out in two stages. In the first stage, the weighting is applied proportionally 
at the provincial level. In the second stage, the weighting is made within 
each province to adjust for the over- or under-sampling of voters from 
certain regencies/cities within provinces. By doing so, the sample is repre-
sentative at the regency/city level and enables me to generate district-level 
estimates. Put simply, the formula used to weight observations is:
 
W pij j j= π /  
In which πj = proportion of population in each regent/city j
pj = proportion of sample in each regency/city j
Table 2.10 shows the degree to which vote buying was reported as 
acceptable by respondents in these local executive election surveys through 
the period 2006–2015. The acceptability of vote buying at the local level 
is relatively high, with, overall, four out of ten Indonesians finding it 
acceptable for politicians or their brokers to distribute cash or gifts as part 
of their campaigning. Although 60.2% thought vote buying was unaccept-
able, the average percentage of respondents who said such practices was 
acceptable is high. Using similar data from Timor-Leste, for instance, 
‘only’ 32.7% of the electorate in the country thought that vote buying was 
acceptable.16
16 Lembaga Survei Timor-Leste (The Timor-Leste Survey Institute) and Lembaga Survei 
Indonesia (LSI), “Exit Poll: Eleisaun Parlamentar Timor-Leste,” 22 July 2017.
Table 2.10 Reported acceptance of vote buying, 2006–2015
Frequency %
Valid Acceptable 229,422 39.4
Unacceptable 350,275 60.2




My study found substantial differences between regions. Those who 
lived in Java were more likely to consider voting buying to be acceptable. 
The data show that 46.3% of respondents from Java didn’t have a problem 
accepting cash or gifts from would-be regional heads. This compared to 
‘only’ 31% of people from the outer islands who thought vote buying was 
acceptable. Further, Table  2.11 hints at some intriguing heterogeneity 
across regions. Relative to other outer island regions, people who lived in 
Sumatra were less accepting of vote buying in local executive elections.
There are interesting variations across provinces as well. The average per-
centage of Sumatrans who thought vote buying was acceptable is 28.1%. 
Some provinces scored significantly above the average, such as Lampung 
(40.4%), Bengkulu (38.6%), and South Sumatra (32.3%). Meanwhile, some 
provinces exhibited well below the regional average, such as West Sumatra 
(13.1%) and Riau Islands (16.4%). Given that the data are representative at 
the district level, we can assess further which regency or city in each province 
has the highest levels of vote-buying acceptability. In Aceh, for example, 
despite the province’s overall exhibiting acceptance levels well below the 
Sumatran average, the reported tolerance of vote buying was greatest in 
Pidie Jaya (70%), Aceh Singkil (50%), and East Aceh (36.7%).
There is also a wide variation in the degree of reported acceptance of 
vote buying in Java. Among all provinces in Java, voters who lived in 
Central Java were most likely to be tolerant of vote buying, with 50.9% of 
respondents considering vote buying as a normal practice during local 
elections. Following Central Java are Banten with 46.6% and East Java 
with 46.5%. At the other end of the spectrum, Jakarta is among those 
provinces in Java in which voters were less accepting of vote buying, with 
only 24.7% answering in the affirmative. Again, substantial heterogeneity 
was found within each province. Despite its notoriety as the province that 
is most tolerant of vote buying, Central Java wasn’t homogeneous. Voters 
Table 2.11 Reported acceptance of vote buying by region (%)
Region  Base Acceptable Unacceptable Don’t know
% within regions Java 55.10 46.30 53.40 0.30
Sumatra 23.10 28.10 71.60 0.40
Kalimantan 5.90 33.80 65.80 0.40
Sulawesi 7.90 33.10 66.60 0.30
Others 7.90 35.30 63.70 1.00
Total 39.40 60.20 0.40
Source: LSI, Indikator, and SMRC historical dataset on sub-national executive elections
 THE PREVALENCE OF VOTE BUYING IN INDONESIA: BUILDING AN INDEX 
74
who lived in cities (kota) such as Surakarta, Semarang, and Magelang, for 
instance, were less accepting of vote buying than those in regencies (kabu-
paten) in that province.
Further, in some cases, my datasets include information on the accept-
able price of the votes. Among those who thought vote buying was accept-
able, I asked a follow-up question: “How much cash would a candidate 
need to give for you to find it appropriate to vote for him/her?” As 
Table 2.12 shows, while responses were quite scattered, the most frequently 
given answer was ‘less than IDR 50,000’ (approx. US$4.40). Note that 
those who ‘don’t know’ or ‘refuse to answer’ aren’t included in the analysis.
Interestingly, expectations about the appropriate price of a vote in Java 
were much lower than in the outer islands. For instance, only 12.9% of 
respondents who live outside Java17 saw it as appropriate to vote for a can-
didate if given less than IDR 50,000, while a significant proportion of 
Javanese reported that small sums of money would be satisfactory. Only 
9.4% of respondents in Kalimantan would be happy if given less than IDR 
50,000 (Table 2.13).
As I will argue in Chap. 5, the smaller amount that a candidate must 
spend on ‘buying’ votes in Java should be largely read in terms of its spe-
cific moral economy of gift giving, which is centred around the concept of 
sangu. In Javanese, sangu means pocket money or food that is usually 
taken on a journey as supplies. Applied to the context of vote buying, it 
isn’t necessarily the size of the payments that counts, but rather its sym-
bolic appropriateness. As a one-time DPR member who ran in an electoral 
17 This is the number of the entirety of the outer islands calculated by adding together the 
rates of those who live in four regions (Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and others) thought 
the acceptable price of the votes was less than IDR 50,000 and then dividing this total by 
four.
Table 2.12 The price of a vote (%)
No. Price Frequency %
1. Less than IDR 50,000 12,951 38.7
2. IDR 50,000 to 100,000 8665 25.9
3. IDR 101,000 to 200,000 5315 15.9
4. More than IDR 200,000 6551 19.6
5. Total 33,481 100
Source: LSI, Indikator, and SMRC historical dataset on sub-national executive elections
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district in West Java put it: “If you are seeking people’s votes, you have to 
have good understandings. People who are going to vote for me would be 
unable to work on voting day. I compensate them for that. It isn’t expen-
sive, just souvenirs to ‘tie’ them so that they don’t run to cashed-up rivals” 
(Interview, 24 April 2014).
In addition to the cultural context, the price of vote buying is greater 
in local elections where the constituency size is smaller. This helps explain 
why average expectations of the price of votes in the outer islands were 
higher because constituencies there are smaller than on densely popu-
lated Java. The smaller the population of the district or city, the more a 
candidate has to spend to buy a vote. The price escalates in some 
resource-rich, but sparsely populated districts on Kalimantan or in the 
eastern part of Indonesia. For instance, my study found that 82.1% of 
voters in Tana Tidung (North Kalimantan) would consider more than 
IDR 200,000 (approx. US$17.80) an appropriate price for a vote. This 
is one of Indonesia’s most resource-rich districts, with significant pro-
duction of oil, natural gas, and coal, but its population is only about 
14,899, escalating the vote-buying rate for a single candidate to at least 
IDR 1,000,000 (approx. US$89) (Informal Communication with a 
national party leader, 21 May 2014).
Put in a nutshell, the market for votes is huge in Indonesia and vote 
buying has been pervasive not only in national legislative elections but also 
in local executive elections. One broker who worked for a winning candi-
date during the 2017 direct election for regency head in Batang, Central 
Java, acknowledged that distributing cash handouts was part of his chief 
strategy because voters saw elections as a ‘money harvest’ (Interview, 23 
January 2017). Prior to the first simultaneous local executive elections in 
Table 2.13 The price of votes by region (%)
Region Base (%) Less than IDR 
50,000
IDR 50,000 to 
100,000
IDR 101,000 to 
200,000
More than IDR 
200,000
Java 61.1 55.5 22.20 9.60 12.70
Sumatra 21.50 12.60 30.60 28.00 28.90
Kalimantan 9.90 9.40 34.80 23.80 32.00
Sulawesi 4.70 17.30 33.80 21.80 27.10
Others 2.80 12.30 25.00 22.10 40.60
Total 38.70 25.90 15.90 19.60
Source: LSI, Indikator, and SMRC historical dataset on sub-national executive elections
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December 2015, I interviewed a seasoned broker in East Java. He revealed 
two important indicators of the intensity of vote buying. First, because 
cash handouts are usually distributed in plain white envelopes, along with 
the name card of the candidate, the sales of envelopes in election times 
increase sharply.18 For example, based on the information he received, the 
sale of envelopes in Sumenep during the 2014 legislative elections rose by 
75%, in Sidoarjo by 65%, in Gresik by 60%, Mojokerto by 80%, Ponorogo 
by 70%, and Trenggalek by 80%. A second anecdotal indication of the 
prevalence of vote buying is a shortage of small banknotes as election day 
nears. According to the above broker, most candidates want to change 
money into smaller denomination banknotes at the bank because vote 
buying typically takes the form of small payments (usually around IDR 
10,000–20,000) (Interview, 5 December 2015).
Overall, as this section has shown, vote buying has been an integral part 
of Indonesian electoral politics, not only at the national level but also at 
the local level. Complementing the 2014 national voter survey discussed 
in previous sections, the sub-national election dataset confirms that vote 
buying has played a key role in mobilising electoral support. Using the 
massive dataset of local election surveys that covers the period 2006–2015, 
I have shown that the level of reported acceptance of vote buying is high, 
with four out of ten Indonesians not having a problem accepting cash or 
a gift from candidates for regional government heads. All of this suggests 
that vote buying has become one of the main instruments of electoral 
mobilisation in local government contests.
2.7  ConClusion
This chapter has explored the prevalence of vote buying in Indonesian 
election campaigns. Elaborated from a wide range of methods—whether 
individual, observational, or derived from the list-experiment—the 
results are mostly congruent with each other. The findings generated 
from the direct individual and neighbourhood measures as well as from 
the survey- based experiment are that 25% of Indonesian voters were 
exposed to vote buying in the 2014 legislative election when asked 
directly, 27.4% when asked via the list-experiment, and 28.9% when 
asked through the neighbourhood question. If we use the less obtrusive 
18 This observation is based on information he collected from big shops in each regency 
that sell envelopes on a large scale.
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measure without concretely mentioning the 2014 election (as discussed 
in detail above), the level of vote buying rises slightly to 33%. Hence, the 
estimated proportion of people engaging in vote buying in Indonesia lies 
between 25% and 33%, considering that the difference between one mea-
sure to another isn’t statistically distinguishable.
In the 2014 legislative election, there were around 187 million regis-
tered domestic voters. A range of between 25% and 33% would mean an 
estimated 47 million to 62 million voters nationwide were offered cash or 
other material benefits in return for their votes. If we rely on the highest 
estimate, one out of three Indonesian voters was personally exposed to 
vote buying. It is noteworthy, however, that these figures define a range, 
rather than a precise point estimate, of vote-buying incidents. In addition, 
vote buying wasn’t only a prominent feature of Indonesia’s national legis-
lative elections. My large dataset of local elections across the country 
found fewer than four out of ten Indonesians thought of vote buying to 
be an acceptable practice. However, my study found empirical evidence 
that such practice in general is ubiquitous in Indonesian electoral politics.
Such findings generate more questions. Most obviously, given that vote 
buying is common but not universal: which voters are targeted in vote- 
buying exchanges? The next chapter provides a comprehensive profile of 
the typical vote sellers and presents more rigorous analysis to predict the 
likelihood of a person being offered benefits in exchange for a vote. It 
does so by testing large number of variables that are generally believed to 
be the determinants of vote buying.
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CHAPTER 3
The Determinants of Vote Buying: 
The Profile of Typical Vote ‘Sellers’
In the preceding chapter, I showed how prevalent vote buying is in 
Indonesian elections, even by international standards. The findings offered 
a systematic confirmation of thus far largely anecdotal accounts of political 
clientelism in Indonesia. Despite the ubiquity of such practice and a recent 
surge in publications on the topic (e.g. Aspinall, 2014; Allen, 2015; 
Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016; Amick, 2016; Aspinall et al., 2017; Tawakkal 
et  al., 2017), surprisingly the question of what types of individuals are 
targeted by vote buying remains largely unexplored. Accordingly, this 
chapter focuses on the analysis of the individual-level determinants of tar-
geting of vote buying and provides a comprehensive profile of the typical 
vote ‘sellers.’ I examine a wide range of variables that are generally believed 
to be the determinants of such electoral strategies. The final part of this 
chapter identifies the most striking aspects of vote buying in the national 
legislative elections.
One of the key findings of this chapter is that voter identification with 
political parties is consistently and significantly linked to vote buying. The 
closer the ties of a voter to a political party, the more likely that voter is to 
receive offers of vote buying. My post-legislative election data also shows 
that, contrary to prior expectations, most of the variables associated with 
modernisation theory have little correlation with vote buying. The insig-
nificance of socio-economic factors indicates that the targeting of vote 
buying in the national parliamentary elections can be best explained in 
terms of party identification rather than the modernisation paradigm.
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3.1  PersPectives on electoral clientelism
In comparative studies on electoral clientelism, discussion of the determi-
nants of vote buying at the individual level typically focus on the issue of 
target selection. As discussed in Chap. 1, because they have limited bud-
gets, political machines aim to efficiently spend their resources on those 
voters most likely to respond positively to vote-buying attempts (i.e. vot-
ers who are most likely to commit their vote as a result of a vote-buying 
operation). Additionally, since ballot secrecy prevents candidates and bro-
kers from unequivocally verifying whether recipients of payments recipro-
cate with their votes, it is essential for them to identify those voters who 
aren’t only most likely to be influenced by vote buying but are also most 
reliable in delivering a vote.
Broadly, the literature on electoral clientelism has identified three fac-
tors explaining why some individuals are more likely than others to be 
targeted with vote buying: socio-economic and demographic factors; lev-
els of civic engagement; and citizens’ political attitudes. The first school of 
thought focuses on a quasi-determinist view of electoral clientelism that is 
congruent with arguments made by modernisation theorists. According to 
this camp, clientelism is best described as a pre-modern form of political 
and social relations, involving mostly lower class citizens (e.g. Lipset, 
1959; Scott, 1972). Thus, it is an intrinsic element of ‘third world’ poli-
tics, affecting countries that are relatively poor and have low rates of lit-
eracy. They aren’t ‘modern,’ say Andrews and Inman (2009: 6). Flowing 
from this conception of clientelism is the inverse argument that successful 
democratisation is only possible in polities with sufficiently high levels of 
economic development. Accordingly, as Hicken (2011: 299) explains, 
“clientelism appears to be more prevalent in developing countries, and 
within nations, noting that poorer voters appear to be more susceptible to 
clientelist offers than richer voters.”
Many scholars therefore draw a connection between different dimen-
sions of socio-economic modernisation and the prevalence of clientelist 
exchanges (e.g. Jensen and Justesen, 2014; Brusco et  al., 2004). Such 
scholars believe that poor people are more attracted by vote buying than 
wealthier citizens. Stokes (2007b: 618) introduces the model of a high 
discount rate, explaining that “poor people are risk-averse and hence value 
more highly a bag of goodies in hand today than the promise of redis-
tributive public policy tomorrow.” The poor discount future program-
matic benefits because future rewards are less certain and concrete than 
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the ones they can collect now (Stokes, 2007a: 94). The literature on elec-
toral clientelism has also emphasised the effects of education, proposing 
that low education makes citizens more vulnerable to vote buying 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).
Still within this modernisation paradigm, some scholars have suggested 
that variation in patterns of vote buying can result from different places of 
residence. For example, Hicken (2007a: 56) argues that vote buying is less 
likely in urban areas, partly due to the diminishing role in such settings of 
traditional patron-client networks through which a candidate can deliver 
material benefits. In addition, according to Hicken (2007a: 56), people 
who live in rural areas are more likely to be prone to vote buying because 
income and education levels are higher in urban areas and there are greater 
demands for public goods in urban areas, where residents are concerned 
about issues such as traffic congestion, public transportation, and garbage 
collection.
The focus of many authors advancing the economic modernisation 
approach has been on the conceptualisation of the argument and case 
studies that support it (Hicken, 2011; Scott, 1972; Jensen and Justesen, 
2014). Based on these studies, as Hicken (2011: 297) put it, “clientelism 
was bound to disappear as countries modernised both economically and 
democratically.” For that reason, vote buying appears to be endemic in 
many developing countries—and almost exclusively limited to them too. 
Although the assumptions put forward by the modernisation camp seem 
to be plausible, the developmentalist argument fails to explain why clien-
telist networks remain influential in relatively wealthy and highly educated 
nations, such as Japan (Kitschelt, 2007), Belgium (Kitschelt, 2007), 
Austria (Kitschelt, 2007), and Italy (Kitschelt, 2007). Such cases challenge 
the conclusions of the modernisation school within clientelism studies.
A second group trying to explain which voters get targeted most by 
vote buying has concentrated on civic engagement. In order to facilitate 
clientelistic exchange, many politicians make use of informal and formal 
organisations with large numbers of members. As a result, people who are 
involved in mass organisations are expected to be particularly exposed to 
vote buying. In the Philippines, Cruz (2014) argues that voters who are 
actively engaged in social networks are disproportionately targeted for 
vote buying. Gonzalez-Ocantos and his colleagues (2012: 212) found a 
similar conclusion, showing that Nicaraguans who actively engage in 
meetings held by civic associations are “far more likely to report vote buy-
ing than those who never attend.” This is partly because such social 
 THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE BUYING: THE PROFILE OF TYPICAL VOTE… 
84
 organisations provide norms of reciprocity that can be used to mobilise 
support through particularistic electoral mobilisation and to ensure that 
recipients of patronage actually reciprocate with their votes (Callahan, 
2005: 496).
Similarly, in the case of Thailand, Callahan (2005) suggests that civic 
associations are responsible for the emergence of new forms of electoral 
corruption and vote-buying practices at election times. As theoritised by 
Putnam (1993: 167), networks of civic engagement and norms of reci-
procity are highly correlated since the two are an important feature of 
social capital. In this concept, norms of reciprocity are one vital aspect of 
the social capital that can facilitate clientelist exchanges. Cultural norms of 
gift giving, according to this approach, create a social atmosphere condu-
cive to quid pro quo offers. This atmosphere, in turn, breeds a culture of 
mutual favours in which parties or candidates are happy to buy votes and 
voters are happy to ‘sell’ their vote in exchange for payment or other mate-
rial benefits. Finan and Schechter (2012), therefore, argue that vote buy-
ing is inherently self-enforcing due to the existence of social norms of 
reciprocity.
A third camp of scholars has emphasised a potential link between elec-
toral clientelism and political attitudes (e.g. Manzetti and Wilson, 2009; 
Banegas, 1998; Carreras and Irepoglu, 2013). Generally, political atti-
tudes include components such as party identification, efficacy, political 
interest, political information, political trust, political participation, and 
support for democracy (Verba et al., 1995). Regarding party identifica-
tion, scholars have offered no definitive conclusion on whether this com-
ponent of political attitudes predicts the likelihood of receiving offers of 
vote buying. On the contrary, this issue is hotly debated. As we have seen, 
some scholars argue that payment for votes targets swing, or ideologically 
indifferent, voters (meaning that strong party identification would be neg-
atively correlated with vote buying). As discussed thoroughly in Chap. 1, 
some even argue that providing money or private goods to those who are 
close to, or ideologically proximate to, any political party is wasteful 
(Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005). 
In contrast, other authors suggest that political parties tend to focus their 
vote-buying efforts on their partisan, loyal voters whose turnout can be 
maximised—which would mean that high levels of party identification 
should predict vote buying (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Nichter, 2008; 
Gans-Morse et al., 2014; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012; Stokes et al., 2013).
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Another dimension of political attitudes that might be relevant to polit-
ical clientelism is political efficacy, that is, the citizenry’s ability to influ-
ence government decisions, their belief that government cares what people 
think, and belief that government will respond to their demands. Reef and 
Knoke (1999: 414) define political efficacy as “an individual’s sense of 
personal competence in influencing the political system.” Political efficacy 
is adversely related to political alienation or political powerlessness, which 
refers to “a person’s perceived inability to influence governmental policy” 
(Ibid., 414). Some scholars found a link between low levels of efficacy and 
vote buying. In Benin, for instance, material rewards offered by parties 
during elections are seen as an expression of political alienation, in which 
vote sellers were more likely to feel powerless about government and per-
ceive politics as meaningless (Banegas, 1998: 78–79). Kerkvliet (1991: 
231) found a similar pattern in the Philippines, where villagers tend to 
receive material benefits as “practically their only opportunity to get any-
thing from people in government.” In this view, disempowered citizens 
view elections as a momentary opportunity to “stake a rightful claim to 
the resources of those higher up” (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007: 26).
A further political attitude dimension that potentially correlates with 
electoral clientelism is political information. Grossman and Helpman 
(1996) suggest that ‘uninformed voters’ will be the most likely targets of 
clientelist campaign strategies. Vicente and Wantchekon (2009: 302) 
come to a similar finding, arguing that informed voters are more likely to 
support politicians who run programmatic campaigns and will stay away 
from material, particularistic strategies.
The next potentially relevant component of political attitudes is politi-
cal interest, defined as “the degree to which politics arouses a citizen’s 
curiosity” (Van Deth, 1989: 278). Some scholars suggest that linkages 
may exist between such interest and exposure to clientelist exchanges (e.g. 
Carreras and Irepoglu, 2013). An interested citizen, according to this 
view, is likely motivated to participate in elections without material 
rewards. This psychological variable is therefore believed to have a nega-
tive relationship with clientelist mobilisation. Moreover, an interested citi-
zen is assumed to be efficacious and informed, linking political interest 
with other factors mentioned above. Generally, interested voters are 
expected to support parties or candidates who rely on public policy cam-
paigns, while uninterested voters are expected to respond to vote-buying 
exchanges.
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Another related component of political attitudes that has started to 
receive scholarly interest in clientelism is political trust (Manzetti and 
Wilson, 2009). Political trust is defined in the literature as a basic evalua-
tive orientation towards the political system (Citrin and Muste, 1999; 
Inglehart, 1999). While related to political efficacy, trust levels are more 
generally about the citizenry’s evaluation of existing political institutions. 
In short, political efficacy is an input, while trust in institutions is an out-
put of the political system (Almond and Verba, 1963). Manzetti and 
Wilson (2009) argue that clientelist politics and trust in political institu-
tions are strongly related. They found that in countries where political and 
government institutions are weak and patron-client relationships are 
strong, voters tend to support corrupt leaders or parties from whom they 
expect to receive material benefits. Accordingly, voters with lower levels of 
trust towards political institutions are believed to build transactional rela-
tions with political parties and ‘sell’ their votes to candidates providing 
private goods and favours.
Electoral participation is another political attitude dimension that has 
become a matter of debate in the literature on clientelism. There has been 
a growing discussion about whether vote buying increases or decreases 
voter participation in elections. Using a field experiment in West Africa, 
Vicente (2013) found strong evidence that vote buying increases partici-
pation. Similarly, Carreras and Irepoglu (2013: 616) suggest that the dis-
tribution of electoral rewards is effective in mobilising voters in Latin 
America. In Egypt, Blaydes (2011) concludes that voters exercised their 
right to vote because they expected benefits (to be sure, she was describing 
elections under Mubarak’s authoritarian rule). Nonetheless, other studies 
have produced contradictory findings. In Nigeria, Bratton (2008: 15), for 
instance, found that vote buying decreases individuals’ electoral participa-
tion, suggesting that along with electoral violence, clientelist exchanges 
trigger disillusionment among the electorate, leading them to exit the 
political process.
A final attitudinal variable that might interrelate with political clien-
telism is support for democracy. It is generally held among scholars that 
clientelist exchanges are inimical to democracy (Stokes, 2005; Keefer, 
2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Stokes (2005: 316) argues that 
vote buying is undemocratic because it involves ‘perverse accountability.’ 
Instead of politicians being accountable to voters, she explains, where vote 
buying happens, voters are held accountable for their vote. Hence, it 
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might be inferred that those who strongly support democracy would be 
less likely to engage in vote buying, and vice versa.
In sum, there are three broad conceptual frameworks that might affect 
the magnitude of vote buying: socio-economic factors, involvement in 
civic organisations, and political attitudes. In the next sections, I draw 
specific hypotheses from these three broad areas of inquiry and test them 
by analysing the dataset available to this study.
3.2  HyPotHeses
3.2.1  Vote Buying and Modernisation Theory
As noted above, many scholars believe that socio-economic factors, such 
as income level and education, shape how widespread vote buying (Brusco 
et al., 2004; Vicente, 2013) becomes. Poor voters are believed to be sig-
nificantly more vulnerable to such practices than wealthier ones. If this is 
true, then I expect to find that the poorer a voter, the more likely he or she is 
to experience vote buying. Another important aspect of modernisation that 
is believed to correlate with exchanges of material benefits for votes is 
education (Vicente, 2013). Indeed, variables of education and income are 
often highly correlated: people with lower education usually generate 
lower incomes than those with higher education, and vice versa. 
Consequently, less-educated individuals are expected to be more inten-
sively exposed to vote buying than well-educated people. The hypothesis 
is: the less educated a voter, the more likely he or she is to experience vote buy-
ing. Additionally, as we have seen, differences in voters’ geographical loca-
tion are also believed to influence the potential for electoral clientelism. 
Here, the hypothesis is: a voter who lives in a rural area is more likely to 
experience vote buying than a voter residing in an urban area.
3.2.2  Vote Buying and Civic Engagement
As explained above, networks of civic engagement are typically used by 
clientelist actors to distribute patronage resources (Callahan, 2005). 
Virtually everywhere in the world, vote buying isn’t legal. Therefore, poli-
ticians pursuing vote buying are forced to be discreet. However, it is dif-
ficult to engage large numbers of voters discreetly with vote-buying 
attempts (Hicken, 2007a, 2007b). Accordingly, they find ways to disguise 
their vote-buying attempts by, for instance, penetrating informal and formal 
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organisations and packaging their clientelist offers in religious or social 
assistance terms. Such patterns have led to claims that social organisa-
tions—and their members—are more likely to be targeted by vote buying 
than individual voters without such links. If this is correct, the more deeply 
involved a voter is in social organisations, the more likely he or she is to be 
offered vote buying.
3.2.3  Vote Buying and Political Attitudes
We have also seen that extant explanations for electoral clientelism also 
include political attitudes, comprising several components. Concerning 
party identification, some scholars believe that voters who don’t identify 
with a particular party (i.e. swing voters) tend to receive more material 
rewards. If this proposition is true, I expect to find that the more non- 
partisan a voter is, the more likely he or she is to accept vote buying. A nega-
tive finding with regard to this hypothesis would direct us towards the 
core-voter model. Another aspect of political attitudes is political efficacy. 
With respect to efficacy, much of the literature suggests that clientelist 
exchanges are an indication of lower efficacy or an expression of political 
alienation. The hypothesis for this study, then, is the lower efficacy a citizen 
has the more likely he or she is to engage in vote buying.
Similarly, some literature claims that uninformed voters are more likely 
to be targeted by vote buying. If this claim is correct, we must hypothesise 
that individuals with increased access to information are less likely to receive 
offers of vote buying. The literature also suggests that voters with low levels 
of political interest are more susceptible to clientelist offers. If so, the more 
uninterested a citizen is in politics, the more likely he or she will be experienc-
ing vote-buying attempts. With regard to political trust, there is an increas-
ing perception that low levels of trust in political institutions lead to higher 
levels of vote buying. If so, it is plausible to hypothesise that the lower a 
voter’s trust in political institutions, the more vulnerable she or he is to vote 
buying. In addition, much of the literature on clientelism also claims that 
participation in elections increases the likelihood of being targeted clien-
telist offers. If so, voters who participate in the election are more likely to 
experience vote buying. Finally, a widely held view among scholars is that 
clientelism runs counter to democratic principles, implying that those who 
strongly support democracy will stay away from such exchanges. Thus, I 




3.3  measures of modernisation tHeory, civic 
engagement, and Political attitudes
In order to test the hypotheses developed above, this section introduces 
the independent variables needed to calculate the validity of the claims. 
As presented in Chap. 2, the dependent variables of my post-election 
survey in April 2014 are an experience, that is, being targeted by vote buy-
ing used to determine factors that explain why some individuals were 
more likely than others to receive offers of vote buying. The central inde-
pendent variables, on the other hand, include socio-economic demo-
graphics, civic engagement, and a set of political attitudes, including party 
identification.
3.3.1  Modernisation Theory
I employ three common indicators of the modernisation argument: pov-
erty, urban-rural domicile, and education. First, in the dataset, I use a 
single 12-point scale item to measure an individuals’ income level. This 
measure asked: “On monthly average, how much is the gross income of 
your household?” Income is a continuous variable that reports the respon-
dent’s gross household income per month, coded on a scale from 1 to 12, 
where 1 indicates that the respondent’s income per month is under IDR 
200,000.00 (approximately US$17.60) and 12 indicates over IDR 
4,000,000.00 (approximately US$352).
Second, it also identifies respondents’ domicile based on a simple rural- 
urban dichotomy. This dichotomy, in turn, is drawn from an official rural- 
urban category developed by Indonesia’s Central Agency of Statistics 
(BPS, Badan Pusat Statistik). I measured rural-urban residence by con-
structing a dummy variable that indicates whether respondents live in a 
rural area (coded 1) or in an urban area (coded 0). Examining income 
level and urban/rural residence simultaneously is particularly important in 
Indonesia, since poverty is predominantly concentrated in rural areas; in 
the early 2010s, 16.6% of rural people were poor, compared with 9.9% of 
the urban population (Rural Poverty Portal, 2012). In my sample, which 
was based on the last census data from the government, 50.2% of respon-
dents lived in rural areas, while 49.6% lived in urban areas.
Third, my data source employs education as the final dimension of 
modernisation, asking respondents about the highest level of education 
they have completed. Education is coded 1–10, where 1 indicates that the 
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respondent never attended school and 10 indicates that the respondent 
held a bachelor’s or higher degree. A plurality of respondents (41.4%) 
reported that they only had primary education, hadn’t completed formal 
education, or had no formal education at all, while 21.1% reported finish-
ing junior high school, 26.3% reported finishing senior high school, and 
11.1% reported having higher education.
In addition, the dataset includes other demographic variables such as 
gender, age, ethnicity, and religion. First, it controls for the respondents’ 
gender to capture any possible relationship between vote buying and gen-
der. Gender is coded 1 if the respondent is a male and 0 if the respondent is 
a female. As described in Appendix A, the sample was constructed to include 
50% of males and 50% of females, mirroring the last census data in 2010. 
Second, the dataset controls the age of respondents to identify any bias in 
the tendency of vote buyers to particularly target young (or older) voters.1 
Age is a continuous variable that reports the respondent’s age in years, rang-
ing from the youngest to the oldest. Respondents who were aged 21 years 
old or less constituted only 4.3% of the sample, while 44.7% reported that 
ages ranging between 22 and 40 years. The percentage of those aged 41 to 
55 years accounted for 34.7%, and 16.3% were older than 55 years.
Another potentially relevant factor predicting vote buying is ethnic 
identity. Because the Javanese are the largest ethnic group in Indonesia 
(making up approximately 40% of the total population), ethnicity is there-
fore divided into two categories only: Javanese and others. Self- 
identification as Javanese was coded as 1, while others were coded 0. 
About 41% of respondents reported being of Javanese ethnicity. The rest 
of the respondents identified themselves as non-Javanese; rather, they 
were affiliated with a large number of small ethnic groups across the archi-
pelago. The last demographic variable is religion. Since other religions are 
small relative to Islam,2 religious affiliation is divided into two categories 
1 Some scholars found evidence of a link between age and voters’ susceptibility to vote 
buying (e.g. Brusco et al., 2004). In Argentina, the younger cohorts among low-income 
Peronists are more likely to receive vote-buying offers than older cohorts. The rationale is 
that these differences could reflect life-cycle effects, whereby older voters are more likely to 
be more partisan and have higher party identification levels than younger ones. Their find-
ings support the swing-voter argument, suggesting that political machines tend to target 
ideologically indifferent voters because they are more dependent on material rewards.
2 Around 202.9 million people identify themselves as Muslim, which represents 87.3% of 
Indonesia’s total population today. In my sample, 89.1% of respondents reported that they 
were Muslim, 8.4% were Christian/Catholic, and 2.4% others. See Appendix A.
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only: Islam and others. I constructed a dummy variable where respon-
dents who identify as Muslim were coded 1 and 0 if from a different reli-
gion. In the legislative dataset, given that the sample drawn from the 
majority of provinces in outer islands was small relative to provinces 
located in Java, the regional variable is divided into two categories: Java 
and others.
3.3.2  Civic Engagement
Putnam and Goss (2002: 10) postulated that networks of civic engage-
ment comprise informal as well as formal organisations. They suggested 
that such networks don’t only take the forms of civic associations but also 
manifest in informal social engagements such as dinners with friends, gath-
ering in a café, and so forth. Following Mujani (2003), this study examines 
the degree of civic involvement by establishing the level of respondent’s 
engagement in religious and non-religious organisations. The prompt was 
the following question: “Allow me to inquire about your participation in 
any of the following organisations or groups below. Are you an active 
member, inactive member or non-member of these organisations?”3 The 
available choices include religious organisations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU) and Muhammadiyah in the context of Islam or churches in the case 
of Christianity, or ‘secular’ associations, such as youth organisations and 
sport clubs; agricultural and fishermen’s groups; and labour unions, politi-
cal parties, youth community councils (karang taruna), regular social 
gatherings, cooperatives, art and cultural clubs, and others.
3.3.3  Political Attitudes
In the dataset, measures of political attitudes include party identification, 
efficacy, political interest, political information, political trust, political 
participation, and support for democracy. In the following sub-sections, I 
describe in detail the measures developed for each component in the 
broader area of political attitudes.
3 For coding and scaling purpose, each item of civic engagement comprises a three-point 
scale: non-member (0), non-active member (0.5), and active member (1). Scores for mem-
bership in the association are then added up and divided by 12 to create a three-point scale 
of networks of civic engagement.
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3.3.3.1  Party Identification
My post-parliamentary election dataset measures the degree of party iden-
tification by using two items. The first question regarding party attach-
ment was: “There are people who feel closer to a certain political party and 
some who aren’t. How about you, do you feel there are any political par-
ties who you feel closer to?” Those who responded affirmatively were 
asked to name the specific party they feel close to. They were also requested 
to rate  the strength of affiliation to their party  on  a three-point scale: 
“How close do you feel toward the party?” In the analysis, overall party 
identification is an additive scale from these items which is then normalised 
to a scale of between 1 and 4, in which 1 indicates respondents who don’t 
feel close at all to any party, 2 indicates those who feel somewhat close, 3 
reflects those who feel quite close, and 4 reflects those who feel very close.
3.3.3.2  Political Efficacy
The literature on political behaviour divides political efficacy into two 
forms: internal and external. The former refers to a citizen’s belief that he 
or she is able to understand politics and influence government decisions, 
while the latter deals with how a person feels the government will respond 
to his/her demands (Reef and Knoke, 1999: 414). For internal efficacy, I 
used responses to the items: (1) “People like me cannot influence deci-
sions by government” and (2) “In general, political issues are too com-
plex, so people like me cannot understand what is going on.”4 For external 
efficacy, I used a single item, asking whether it is true that “people like you 
aren’t heard by political leaders.” Each of these items is a four-point scale, 
with responses ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree.’ Since 
all three questions were negatively keyed, I recoded them with reversed 
Likert scales.5 By reverse-scoring all of the negatively keyed political 
4 For further discussion, see Niemi, Craig, and Mattei on “Measuring Internal Political 
Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study,” The American Political Science Review Vol. 
85, 4 (December 1991), pp. 1407–1413.
5 In statistical analysis, positively keyed items are understood as items that are worded so 
that an agreement with the item represents a relatively high level of the measured attribute. 
In contrast, negatively keyed items are defined as those that are worded so that an agreement 
with the item represents a relatively low level of the measured attribute. The objective of 
reverse-scoring is to make sure that all the items are consistent with each other—both the 
originally negatively keyed items and positively keyed items—with regard to the implications 




 efficacy items, I created consistency among the items. Adding the score of 
all three items and dividing the result by three produced a four-point scale 
of political efficacy, which ranged from not efficacious at all (1) to very 
efficacious (4).
3.3.3.3  Political Information
Political information is measured by responses to five questions. The first 
question was “How often do you follow the news on politics or govern-
ment?” with the provided responses ranging through ‘every day,’ to ‘sev-
eral times in a week,’ ‘once or twice in a week,’ ‘once or twice in a month,’ 
and ‘never.’ This question was followed by four additional items that 
inquired about the intensity with which the respondents followed political 
news via four different media outlets: TV, radio, newspaper, and the inter-
net. The overall score of measuring political information was drawn from 
initially reverse-scoring all five items and subsequently obtaining the mean 
of all of those items.
3.3.3.4  Political Interest
Political interest was measured through a four-point scale of interest in 
politics or governmental issues. I gauged the extent to which respondents 
were interested in politics or in governmental issues in general by employ-
ing two items. The first was: “How interested are you in politics or gov-
ernmental issues in general?” Following that, I also asked: “How often do 
you talk/discuss government issues with other people (family, neighbour, 
colleague, etc.)?” Because of the nature of these questions, I needed to 
reverse-score the two items. Finally, I added the score of the two items and 
divided the result by two, leading a four-point scale of political interest, 
ranging from not interested at all (1) to very interested (4).
3.3.3.5  Political Trust
To measure political trust in a comparable way, I used a four-point scale 
constructed from seven items that focused on respondents’ level of trust 
in seven key political institutions. The main question was: “We will men-
tion several institutions. Please rate your level of trust in these institutions: 
do you possess high trust, moderate trust, little trust, or no trust at all? For 
each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them: President, 
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), People’s Representative Council 
(DPR), judiciary, the armed forces, police, and General Electoral 
Commission (KPU).” Again, all seven items above were reverse-scored, 
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added up, and subsequently divided by seven, establishing a four-point 
scale of political trust, ranging from no trust at all (1) to high trust (4).
3.3.3.6  Political Participation
For this study, a scale of electoral participation was constructed from a pair 
of items that indicated whether or not (and if not, why) a citizen partici-
pated in the last two legislative elections. The first question was “Did you 
vote during the 2009 legislative election?” The second was “Did you vote 
during the legislative election on April 9, 2014?” Each of these two items 
provided a number of answer choices, varying from ‘Yes, I voted,’ ‘No, I 
didn’t vote,’ ‘couldn’t vote,’ to ‘refused to vote.’ I established turnout as 
a binary indicator, taking on a value of 1 if the individual voted in the 
2009 or 2014 elections, and 0 if the person didn’t vote in both elections. 
The overall political participation score is an additive 0–2 index, based on 
the two items described above.
3.3.3.7  Democratic Support
This study used a single standardised item, which was adopted from simi-
lar international measures on support for democracy. The question was: 
“Do you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with this fol-
lowing statement? Compared to other form of governments, democracy is 
the best form of government for our type of country.” As in the original 
variable, the result is measured on a four-point scale, varying from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (4).
3.4  results and discussion: tHe determinants 
of vote Buying: WHo gets targeted?
Having introduced key hypotheses and the measures to verify or falsify 
them, it is now time to analyse the results regarding the determinants of 
vote buying based on the post-legislative election survey in 2014. In 
order to assess the impact of covariates at the individual level, I first pres-
ent the results from the regression analysis, using individuals’ self-
reported experiences of vote buying. At the end of the section, I highlight 
the most  striking factor emerging from as being a significant determi-
nant in the targeting of vote buying: party identification. The summary 




Table 3.2 shows the regression results with respect to vote buying. The 
dependent variable is the vote-buying index based on responses to all 
components of this practice (see Chap. 2). I estimated the model using 
linear regression analysis.6 Model 1 of Table 3.2 allows us to assess the role 
of the modernisation hypothesis and other socio-demographic variables to 
6 To be accepted as a multiple linear regression model assumption, it is first necessary to 
test the classical assumption, which at least includes a normality test. Based on the results of 
the normality test I conducted, as can be seen in Appendix D, the residuals weren’t normally 
distributed. Accordingly, I needed to conduct a logistic regression because it doesn’t need 
many of the classic assumption tests (including a normality test) that are required in linear 
relationships between the dependent and independent variables. In the logistic model, the 
dependent variable is a dichotomous measure that takes a value of 1 if the respondent 
received offers of vote buying once/twice, several times, rarely, quite, or very often. The 
results from both the logistic and linear models are strikingly similar (see Appendix E), sug-
gesting that the linear regression in this case fits just as well as the logistic regression. In this 
chapter, I decided to report the linear regression model rather than the logistic model for 
two reasons. First, given that the linear and logistic regression analyses end up with indistin-
guishable results, the linear model is justifiable. Second, compared to the logistic regression, 
the linear estimates are easier to interpret (Hellevik, 2007).
Table 3.1 Descriptive dependent variables and covariates
Variables Mean Std. deviation Min Max N
Vote buying 0.22 0.27 0 1 1018
Gender (1 = male; 0 = female) 0.5 0.5 0 1 1212
Rural (1 = rural; 0 = urban) 0.5 0.5 0 1 1212
Age 42.29 13.13 16 86 1211
Education 4.94 2.47 1 10 1210
Income 6.61 3.52 1 12 1205
Javanese (1 = Javanese; 0 = otherwise) 0.41 0.49 0 1 1212
Religion (1 = Islam; 0 = otherwise) 0.89 0.31 0 1 1212
Region (Java) 0.58 0.49 0 1 1212
Civic engagement 0.1 0.12 0 0.63 1191
Party ID 1.29 0.73 1 4 1210
Efficacy 2.36 0.5 1 4 979
Political interest 4.13 1.34 2 8 1148
Political information 2.46 0.7 1 5 965
Political engagement 4.01 1.32 0.67 9.5 848
Political participation 1.81 0.45 0 2 1199
Political trust 2.73 0.53 1 4 1074
Democratic support 2.86 0.54 1 4 987















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































explain the likelihood that an individual is targeted for vote buying. 
Contrary to the assumptions of numerous scholars, indicators normally 
advanced to support modernisation arguments about clientelism generally 
fail to predict the probability that respondents reported being offered 
benefits in exchange for their votes during the 2014 legislative election. 
Individual differences in terms of level of income, education, and socio- 
geographical location didn’t make a difference in determining the likeli-
hood that a respondent would be targeted.
Model 1 of Table 3.2 clearly demonstrates that the estimates of these 
three important measures of modernisation theory (level of income, edu-
cation, and socio-geographical location) aren’t statistically significant in 
the strictest sense.7 When I introduced controls for civic engagement 
(Model 2) and for a set of political attitudes (Model 3), the magnitudes of 
these variables remained insignificant.
As indicated above, the insignificance of income and educational factors 
as well as socio-geographical location tends to contradict the claims of 
vote-buying scholars who use modernisation theory in their work. Scholars 
have long suggested that those with lower levels of education will more 
likely be engaged in quid pro quo exchanges before and during elections 
(e.g. Kitschelt, 2000; Brusco et  al., 2004; Çarkoglu and Aytac, 2015). 
Equally, it has been claimed that respondents with more education will be 
less vulnerable to such practices since “as education increases, the life pros-
pects for individuals also increase through better employment and higher 
incomes” (Sugiyama and Hunter, 2013: 51). Similarly, it is also proposed 
in the literature that voters who reside in rural areas are more likely to sell 
their votes (Hicken, 2007a; Jensen and Justesen, 2014; Finan and 
Schechter, 2012; Vicente, 2013). However, my survey results show that 
none of these arguments are supported in the case of Indonesia.
More unexpectedly, Model 1 of Table 3.2 also shows that among the 
socio-demographic variables included in the equation, three variables have 
a significant relationship with vote buying: gender (male), age, and reli-
gion (Muslim). When adding the control variable of civic engagement, as 
in Model 2 of Table 3.2, the coefficient of male loses statistical  significance. 
In contrast, the magnitude of the age coefficient increases in specification 
7 It must be noted that bivariate statistics reveal that vote buying has apparently a signifi-
cant association with the level of education. But this relationship is spurious given the non-
significance of the education variable when controlled by other variables. For further 
discussion on the bivariate results, see Appendix C.
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when civic engagement is put into the model. Meanwhile, the coefficient 
of ‘Muslim’ remains significant at about the same level of strength—and 
in the same direction—when the element of civic engagement is included. 
This confirms the bivariate model suggesting that younger citizens8 and 
Muslims reported statistically significant higher frequencies of vote-buy-
ing offers (see Appendix C). However, when I entered a full set of controls 
(as in the final column of Table 3.2), the only socio-demographic variable 
that remained statistically significant was that of being Muslim. This sig-
nificance was at the 0.05 levels. Put differently, being a Muslim signifi-
cantly predicts a greater probability that a respondent reported electoral 
handouts, even when a full set of controls was included.
The consistency of this relationship requires investigation. There are 
two possible explanations. First, there is ample evidence that Muslim can-
didates and recipients justified vote buying using religious reasoning. 
Many candidates, either from Islamic or non-Islamic parties, packaged 
their gifts in religious terms, for example, by describing them as alms 
(sedekah). Accordingly, the Muslim recipients might not feel that the cash 
handouts they received were a form of morally questionable ‘money poli-
tics’ but instead viewed them in terms of a ‘moral economy of gift giving’ 
(Aspinall et  al., 2017: 4). Second, vote buying appears to be endemic 
among Muslims because traditional patron-client networks—through 
which candidates’ benefits can be delivered—are more prominent in 
Muslim communities. In particular, many candidates used various deeply 
entrenched informal social institutions, such as Islamic boarding schools 
(pesantren), mosques, or religious gatherings (majelis taklim). Importantly, 
such loose informal networks don’t always constitute themselves through 
official membership and are thus outside of the civic engagement linkages 
that respondents reported when asked about their membership in social 
organisations.
While loose social interactions in Muslim society may have played a role 
in increasing their exposure to clientelistic practices, the overall effect of 
8 One potential explanation for this is that young adults are considered to be politically 
unsettled and thus have weaker political preferences and voting intentions. Opinion polls 
show, for example, that their intentions to show up at the polls aren’t as strong as those of 
the older voters. According to Indikator’s exit poll in the 2014 legislative elections, the pro-
portion of registered 26- to 40-year-olds who turned out to cast their ballot was lower than 
that of other age groups. These hesitant young voters may create a strong incentive for vote-




civic engagement on vote buying isn’t significant. The regression analysis, 
as shown in Model 2 of Table 3.2, confirms the bivariate statistics that the 
substantive effect of civic engagement—measured by membership in social 
organisations—is statistically insignificant in the strictest sense.9 As noted 
above, much of the literature on electoral clientelism suggests that net-
works of civic engagement explain the likelihood of being targeted with 
electoral incentives (Faughnan and Zechmeister, 2011; Callahan, 2005; 
Brusco et  al., 2004; Cruz, 2014). But my analysis suggests that civic 
engagement in Indonesia has little impact on the individual’s propensity 
to be so targeted. Individuals’ involvement in social organisations makes 
no difference in the probability of them being exposed to vote buying.
What about political attitudes? Three observations stand out in Model 
3 of Table 3.2. First, across all components of political attitudes, party 
identification has a statistically significant and positive relationship with 
vote buying. The multivariate analysis shows that this partisanship isn’t 
spurious and remains significant and relatively stable regardless of civic 
engagement, political attitudes, and demographic and socio-economic 
factors. The effect of party closeness is very large (p < 0.001). Extant lit-
erature suggests that party affiliation encourages citizens to become politi-
cally active. Dalton (2016: 8) found that in the US, people with higher 
party identification are more likely to persuade others, distribute propa-
ganda hats, shirts, and posters, participate in campaign events, or donate 
to a party’s candidate during campaigns. Electoral turnout, Dalton con-
tinues, was 26% higher among strong partisans than among independents. 
Verba and Nie (1972: 219–220) claim that partisan identification mobil-
ises political activity among lower-status citizens who might otherwise be 
inactive. The same holds true in other established democracies. Voters 
with strong party identification voted at a higher rate in the 2009 German 
Bundestag elections. In addition, they were several times more likely to 
get involved in campaign rallies and were about twice as likely to try to 
influence other voters (Dalton, 2016: 8). What stands out about party 
identification in Indonesia, by contrast, is its strong correlation with expe-
rience of vote buying. In crude terms, partisan voters in Indonesia tended 
to be ‘money grubbing’ and are significantly more likely to be recipients 
of material benefits.
Second, defying expectations, the model also shows that political inter-
est is found to be statistically very significant (p < 0.001) in explaining the 
9 For further discussion on the bivariate results, see Appendix C.
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propensity of being offered vote buying. The original relationship between 
political interest and vote buying remains substantial and significant, even 
when controlled by all variables in the model. Thus, instead of reducing 
the individual’s propensity to engage in clientelistic practices, political 
interest serves—in the Indonesian case—as a breeding ground for vote 
buying. The dominant view among political scientists is that a good citi-
zen in a democratic polity is a citizen interested in and well informed 
about politics, with strong and stable preferences (e.g. Van Deth, 1983, 
1989). The regression analyses of the Indonesian data, however, shows 
that political interest is positively correlated with a distinctly non- 
democratic practice, that is, vote buying.
There are two possible explanations for this rather counter-intuitive 
finding. First, it is plausible that in the Indonesian case, political interest is 
an indicator of political alienation. Arguably, those who are interested in 
politics actually desire to participate in a democratic manner, but that 
desire is undermined by their perception that the political process doesn’t 
operate justly. This perception, then, makes them increasingly pragmatic 
at election time (this interpretation is supported by the analysis of the 
efficacy measure below). Another possible explanation for the link between 
political interest and vote buying has been suggested by Guardado and 
Wantchekon (2014: 7). They propose that exposure to electoral handouts 
is endogenous to voters’ political interest. Based on their theory, if voters 
are highly interested in politics, they are likely to get involved in more 
political activities than others. This, in turn, increases their likelihood of 
being offered a reward by political operatives they come into contact with.
Finally, consistent with prior expectations (and as indicated above), 
regression results reveal that political efficacy stands out as a strong predic-
tor of vote buying. The variable of efficacy presents a negative coefficient 
and is in the expected direction, implying that less efficacious individuals 
are more likely to receive offers of vote buying. The reverse is also true: 
those with higher efficacy are less likely to engage in such practice. Of 
course, this finding is neither new nor surprising, given that the existing 
literature on clientelism has long suggested such a relationship (e.g. 
Banegas, 1998; Kerkvliet, 1991; Schaffer and Schedler, 2007). By con-
trast, other political attitudes have little effect in determining vote buying 
in Indonesia, including support for democracy or political (i.e. electoral) 
participation, which I had earlier hypothesised would show correlations 
with vote-buying experience. Indonesian respondents supporting democ-
racy aren’t more or less likely to engage in vote buying than those who 
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don’t, and electoral participation is no reliable predictor of such engage-
ment either.
Having established the regression results with respect to vote buying at 
the national legislative election, we now need to highlight the most salient 
issue found as being significant in such electoral setting. The finding is 
clear: party identification has a strong, consistent, direct, positive, and 
highly significant effect on an individual’s propensity to receive offers of 
vote buying. This effect remains significant, regardless of socio-economic 
factors, civic engagement, and political attitudes. In other words, a voter’s 
partisanship consistently and significantly predicts the likelihood of being 
offered vote buying in Indonesia. Other factors stand out as well—such as 
being Muslim—but in the largest Muslim nation on the globe, this isn’t a 
theoretically challenging finding.
On the other hand, the finding, that party loyalists are the primary tar-
gets of vote buying, obviously contrasts with the swing-voter model, 
which proposes that parties or candidates will not waste their vote-buying 
efforts on already locked-in partisans (see Chap. 1). As I will argue in the 
following chapter, the underlying logic behind candidates’ decision to tar-
get loyalists is that they are safe bets, or a good return on a limited invest-
ment. By contrast, from the candidates’ perspective, targeting non-partisans 
is a risky enterprise. Hence, investing in party loyalists is a function of 
candidates’ attempts to manage and mitigate electoral uncertainty. A 
widely held view among candidates and brokers is that because electoral 
competition has become increasingly competitive after the introduction of 
the open-list PR system, and in an environment where electoral participa-
tion is optional and the ballot is secret, it is important to target ‘loyal’ or 
‘base’ voters, and of course party loyalist form a large subset within 
this group.
3.5  conclusion
At the beginning of this chapter, I developed a number of hypotheses on 
who is most likely to be targeted by vote-buying efforts. These hypotheses 
were drawn from the main streams of the vote-buying literature. Let us 
now review systematically whether these hypotheses hold. It is clear that 
factors derived from modernisation theory have little effect in determining 
an individuals’ propensity to experience vote buying in the national 
 legislative election. One of the most common measures of modernisation 
theory is education. Some assume that better educated voters are less 
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likely to engage in vote buying, partly because they understand that the 
practice undermines democracy and partly because they are economically 
better off. But in the case of Indonesia, there are no significant differences 
by educational level in the receipt of electoral incentives.
Another surprising result is the insignificance of poverty. One of the 
strongest findings in prior research on clientelism is that poorer voters are 
more susceptible to vote buying because even small transfers are valuable 
to them. In Indonesia, however, vote buying has no significant relation-
ship with poverty. Similarly, vote buying in the country didn’t differ 
between rural and urban regions. Additionally, this study explored whether 
civic engagement can explain the likelihood of being offered vote buying 
in the run-up to the 2014 legislative election. This hypothesis, however, is 
mostly denied in the case of Indonesia. Involvement in social organisa-
tions didn’t make a difference in terms of whether citizens received offers 
of vote buying or not.
With respect to specific hypotheses relating to political attitudes, I 
expected, drawing from the swing-voter model, that party identification 
levels would be negatively associated with the likelihood of experiencing 
vote buying. In other words, I hypothesised that the more non-partisan 
voters were, the more likely they would be to receive vote-buying offers. 
In the case of Indonesia, however, the opposite turns out to be true: par-
tisan voters are proportionally more likely to receive vote-buying offers 
than non-partisans. In terms of political efficacy, I expected to find that 
feelings of political alienation increase the likelihood of exposure to clien-
telist exchanges (Reef and Knoke, 1999: 414). Using Indonesia’s 
2014  legislative election, I verified this hypothesis. Another element of 
political attitude dimension is political interest. I expected to find that the 
more uninterested a citizen in politics, the more vulnerable they would be 
to vote buying. Against expectations, instead of interest in politics predict-
ing less exposure to vote buying, it increased it. Interest in politics signifi-
cantly predicts the probability that someone would report vote buying. 
Another important political attitude is political trust. People with lower 
political trust are believed to be more unlikely to trust democratic institu-
tions, and they are therefore more likely to build transactional relation-
ships with political parties or candidates (as indicated above, this is similar 
to arguments surrounding efficacy, but political trust is a more abstract 
concept). If this claim is true, I expected to find that citizens with less trust 
in political institutions to be more likely to engage in vote buying. In the 
Indonesian case, this hypothesis isn’t falsified since the bivariate and mul-
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tivariate models found no evidence; there was simply no relationship to 
clientelism. Further, there is also no statistically significant relationship 
between vote buying and electoral participation, political information, and 
support for democracy.
Given the strong evidence for the importance of party identification in 
predicting the likelihood of a voter being targeted by vote buying, the 
remainder of this book focuses on how exactly such party-based partisan-
ship affects electoral patronage distribution. The finding that party affilia-
tion significantly attracts benefits raises further puzzles. First, why do 
parties and candidates disproportionately target party loyalists with their 
favours? As indicated, this finding runs counter to prior research done by 
advocates of the swing-voter argument, who suggest that such persons are 
already captive voters and will support their party no matter what. Second, 
if partisans are indeed the preferred vote-buying target, how feasible is it 
for candidates to win only by targeting such voters? How many partisan 
voters are there, and how does their number affect further efforts to theo-
rise vote-buying patterns in Indonesia? The next chapter addresses these 
questions.
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CHAPTER 4
Do Candidates Target Loyalists or Swing 
Voters? Beyond the Core- Versus Swing- 
Voter Debate
In the previous chapter, I have identified the typical characteristics of 
voters who were most likely to experience vote buying. Among a num-
ber of findings, the most consistent and intriguing was that a high level 
of party identification, that is, self-reported closeness to one of 
Indonesia’s political parties, is a significant predictor. In this chapter, I 
turn in more detail to the interplay between party identification and vote 
buying. This linkage clearly relates to the core- versus swing-voter debate 
that has been the primary concern of much of the comparative literature 
on vote buying. At the centre of this debate is one key question: given 
the budgetary constraints candidates face, how and, especially, to whom 
do they distribute gifts to optimise their electoral prospects? As I will 
show in the following pages, most candidates and brokers repeatedly 
claim that they target partisan, loyalist voters. And as indicated in the 
previous chapter, voters with high levels of party identification are 
indeed—in relative terms—more likely to be targets of vote buying. But 
as the discussion below reveals, the number of party loyalists in Indonesia 
is small, leading to a situation in which the vast majority of vote buy-
ing—in absolute terms—happens among non-partisan voters. Hence, the 
main task of this chapter is to unpack this complex interrelationship 
between party identification, broker and candidate strategies, and the 
observed practice of vote buying on the ground.
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Given the centrality of party identification in attracting benefits, this 
chapter begins with descriptive data about the level of mass partisanship 
and its distribution across political parties in Indonesia. Then I consider 
whether the substantial effect of partisanship on vote buying reflects a case 
of reverse causality: did such voters become the target of vote buying 
because they had professed greater ideological proximity to the party? Or, 
did electoral handouts come first and then predict likelihood of being 
close to the party? The next question I discuss is variation across parties, 
and whether support for any particular political party is most closely iden-
tified with vote buying. Next, I examine the core- versus swing-voter 
models, highlighting evidence from a survey of politicians and brokers as 
well as qualitative data that seem to point to a tendency towards core- 
voter strategies among election practitioners. The chapter then discusses 
the apparent paradox that although in relative terms party loyalists are 
more likely to be targeted, and politicians and brokers confirm that such 
voters are their primary targets, in absolute terms most vote buying occurs 
among non-partisans. This finding leads to further puzzles with regard to 
whether failed targeting took place or whether there are other factors that 
can explain this pattern. The chapter, therefore, ends by setting up the key 
questions for the following chapters to tackle.
4.1  Political Party PartisanshiP in indonesia
At the outset, it is essential to show the aggregate level of self-reported 
party identification in Indonesia based on my post-election survey of vot-
ers in April 2014. While there is much divergence of opinion on the nature 
and measurement of party closeness (Blais et al., 2001; Greene, 2002), 
this study measures the degree of partisanship regarding a political party 
by using the three items introduced in Chap. 3. Through the first mea-
sure, respondents were asked whether they feel close to any political party. 
In my post-2014 legislative election survey, only 14.9% (herein we round 
up to 15%) nationally reported having such closeness—a low figure by 
international standards. As discussed in Chap. 2, there were around 
187  million registered domestic voters in the 2014 legislative election. 
Hence, the 15% would mean an estimated 28 million voters nationwide 
felt close to a party.
For the purpose of this study, I categorised as ‘non-partisan’ those respon-
dents who either gave a straight negative response or couldn’t answer this 
question. Consequently, the number of non-partisans is—at 85%—extremely 
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high, constituting the vast majority of the electorate, or about 159 million vot-
ers. As will be further demonstrated in the following section, this pattern was 
confirmed in a series of nationwide surveys during the run-up to 2014 elections.
Those who answered the opening question with ‘yes’ were requested to 
name the specific party they feel close to. Figure 4.1 shows that mass par-
tisanship in Indonesia varies widely across party distribution. Of those 
expressing partisanship, a quarter felt some degree of attachment to PDI- 
P. Following PDI-P was Golkar with 21.8% and then Gerindra with 13.5%. 
Thus, among those identifying partisanship, more than 60% of respon-
dents felt close to one of the three largest parties. At the other extreme of 
the spectrum, we find parties with almost no partisans: PBB (0%) and 
PKPI (0.6%). To some extent, the distribution of party loyalty reflects the 
distribution of votes in the 2014 parliamentary elections. The big three of 
partisan identifiers, PDI-P, Golkar, and Gerindra, were placed in the top 
three spots and in the same order in the election results.1 However, it is 
1 In 2009, the order of these parties weren’t the same. In the February 2009 survey of LSI, 
among those reported being close to a party (19.7%), 18.2% felt close to the Democratic Party, 
followed by PDI-P (18.1%), and Golkar (17.3%). This further bolsters my argument as I will 
subtantiate later that even so-called ‘partisans’ may not be particularly loyal to their party.
Fig. 4.1 Distribution of partisanship across political parties (%). Source: My 
post-election survey, 22–26 April 2014
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important to note that the vote totals for all parties were several times 
larger than the number of voters who expressed allegiance to those parties.
In the third and final measure, those who reported being close to a 
party were asked to rate the strength of this affiliation on a three-point 
scale: “How close do you feel toward the party?” Those who said ‘very 
close’ to the party were classified as strong partisans. Those who replied 
‘quite or fairly close’ to the relevant party were categorised as moderate 
partisans, while those who reported ‘a little close’ to a party were classified 
as weak partisans. Among the 15% of the respondents who felt close to any 
party, moderate partisans were the largest subgroup (58%), with weak par-
tisans (23.1%) and strong partisans (17.4%) constituting much smaller 
segments. Note that those who reported having varying levels of closeness 
to a party are distributed across political parties.
The low scores of mass partisanship as discussed above leave a number 
of unanswered questions: if there are so few voters with clear and declared 
loyalty towards a particular party, why were candidates very keen to target 
such voters? In the same vein, considering the large proportion of non- 
partisans with a greater potential to change their voting decisions if given 
benefits (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; 
Stokes, 2005), as thoroughly discussed in Chap. 1, why did political 
machines profess that these voters were secondary to their vote-buying 
strategies? And finally, given that in total numbers more non-partisans 
than partisans experienced vote-buying attempts, does that mean that can-
didates and brokers misdirected their vote-buying operations? But first, I 
will discuss whether or not voters’ partisan closeness is entirely a result of 
their receiving electoral rewards.
4.2  is Party identification endogenous 
to Benefits?
The finding that party affiliation is a significant predictor of vote buying 
raises an important question about the potential of reverse causality. It 
may be argued, as Diaz-Cayeros and his collaborators (2012: 159) have 
done, that the linkage between partisanship and vote buying is a case of 
‘conditional partisan loyalty,’ that is, it is strongly influenced by distribu-
tion itself. They argue that the driving factor behind politicians’ tendency 
to funnel benefits to their own supporters is the endogeneity of partisan 
loyalties to material inducements (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012). Stokes and 
her colleagues (2013: 54) have indicated the same potential endogenous- 
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loyalty problem, aptly summarising the problem as follows: rather than 
voters’ political preferences attracting handouts, these electoral incentives 
may cause people to identify with and support the party that gives them.
We must discuss two important caveats when dealing with the probabil-
ity of an endogeneity problem (Stokes et al., 2013: 54–55). Since this study 
relies on survey data, the problem of reverse causality might be the result of 
a measurement error. To minimise this potential bias, I developed survey 
instruments for measuring political party partisanship based on those pro-
posed by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). These mea-
surements are plausibly proven to attract answers that aren’t caused by a 
respondent’s receiving particularistic rewards. Additionally, I put the ques-
tion about respondents’ feelings about parties at the beginning of the rel-
evant questionnaire section to avoid the possibility of being contaminated 
by later questions on whether they have received a gift or social benefits 
from a party or candidate. By doing so, this question order is expected to 
be statistically independent of respondents’ potential responses that could 
take the rewards they receive into account. Nonetheless, this methodologi-
cal survey approach doesn’t yet fully address the probability that respon-
dents could conceptualise party loyalty as conditional on the rewards they 
received, rather than fixed (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012: 23).
To test for endogeneity bias, this study presents very simple statistics. 
Figure  4.2 suggests that party loyalty in Indonesia isn’t conditional on 
receiving offers of vote buying. If party loyalty was endogenous to distribu-
tion of rewards, we might expect that partisan party alignment would 
increase parallel to the gradual intensification of vote buying as an election 
approaches. The tracking polls I conducted in the lead up to the 2014 elec-
tions allow us to examine whether this occurred. The square dotted line 
traces the percentage of respondents who feel close to political parties, and 
the long dashed line pinpoints the percentage of respondents who experi-
enced offers of electoral rewards. In order to detect potential reciprocal 
effects of vote-buying transactions on a recipient’s ‘closeness’ to the party, 
we need to track the two lines over time. The square dotted line shows that 
the percentage of people who reported being targeted with benefits started 
at a low point in January 2014 but increased over the course of the cam-
paign, from 4.3% in January to 8.1% in late February to early March, 10.7% 
in late March, and 25% in the few days leading up to the election in April.
If the endogenous loyalty thesis were correct, party identification levels 
should have risen in concert with the dramatic increase of vote-buying 
incidents in the weeks leading to the poll. However, the square dotted line 
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clearly indicates that partisan loyalties around the 2014 elections were 
relatively stable, ranging from 12.9% to 14.9%. Put simply, party identifi-
cation was virtually unaffected by short-term electoral incentives, provid-
ing evidence that the effect of voters’ partisanship on their individual 
probability of being targeted by vote buying isn’t endogenous, and that a 
voter’s party loyalties in Indonesia aren’t a function of his or her clientelist 
interactions with the party or its candidates. This finding is in line with the 
claims of early proponents of the concept of party identification, who 
defined party identification as a sense of personal, psychological attach-
ment (Campbell et al., 1960) and viewed party identification as more of 
an identity than an opinion (Larcinese et al., 2012: 3). Partisanship, there-
fore, is independent of short-term factors such as vote buying.
4.3  Variations in Party identification By Party 
and Vote Buying
Having ruled out the possibility of reverse causation, it is now important 
to examine whether partisanship towards any particular political parties is 
most closely identified with vote buying. Using data from my post- election 
survey in April 2014, it allows for a broader comparison across legislative, 
Fig. 4.2 Party identification and vote buying approaching the 2014 election (%). 
Source: The January, February–March, and late March 2014 data were taken from 
my pre-election surveys, while the April 2014 numbers were drawn from my post- 
election survey (see Appendix A)
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local, and presidential elections. I first recoded party identification into 
new variables consisting of partisan identities in each party. In every party- 
specific partisanship, I transformed an existing variable into four categories 
reflecting varying degrees of partisanship. For instance, the partisanship to 
NasDem variable (‘Nasdem partisan’) was recoded into four categories: 0 
refers to respondents who didn’t identify with NasDem, including those 
who were ideologically indifferent or opposed to the party; 1 represents 
weak partisans; 2 points to moderate partisans; and 3 indicates strong par-
tisans of NasDem. The same approach was used for other partisan vari-
ables in each political party. Afterwards, to measure the strength of a linear 
correlation between the two variables, each partisan identity was corre-
lated with vote buying.
Table 4.1 shows important variations among core constituents of all par-
ties. If we refer to the vote buying in legislative elections, partisans of the 
three big parties, PDI-P, Gerindra, and Democrats (as well as PKS), are more 
likely than others to be targeted for vote buying. Similarly, Golkar partisan 
affiliation has a markedly strong relationship with the overall vote- buying 
Table 4.1 Correlations (Pearson’s r) between party identification and vote 
buying
Vote buying in 
legislative elections







PKB partisan 0.046 0.023 0.055
PKS partisan 0.073* −0.037 0.036
PDI-P partisan 0.096** 0.011 0.080*







PAN partisan 0.059 −0.011 0.036




PBB partisan (a) (a) (a)
PKPI partisan (a) −0.012 (a)
(a) Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant (no cases)
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
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index. As discussed in Chap. 2, the vote-buying index is a composite statistic 
of vote buying in legislative elections and vote buying in presidential and local 
executive elections. In general, these statistical results correspond with find-
ings from a related but differently worded question already analysed in Chap. 
2: when asked which party or candidates offered goods or money, the most 
frequent answer was Golkar (32.2%). Following Golkar are PDI-P (26.5%), 
Gerindra (25%), and the Democratic Party (18.4%).
Alternatively, in order to examine partisanship with which party 
increases the likelihood of being offered benefits, I correlate the variables 
of party identification with clientelist exchanges in each political 
 constituency. I conducted such correlation because there are predictable 
variations in the level of party identification across political constituencies 
and people who voted for certain political party weren’t necessarily close 
to that party. The results, however, are generally similar to those produced 
by the first technique.
Table 4.2 reveals a clear positive correlation between party identifi-
cation and clientelism in some political constituencies. Party-based 
identification among those who voted for PDI-P, Golkar, and 
Democratic Party in the 2014 legislative election correlates with greater 
Table 4.2 Correlations (Pearson’s r) between party identification and vote buy-
ing in each group of political constituencies
Vote buying in 
legislative elections




Party identification in each group of political constituencies
NasDem 0.382* 0.109 0.345
PKB 0.162 0.118 0.180
PKS 0.339* −0.043 0.257
PDI-P 0.253*** 0.089 0.222**
Golkar 0.157* 0.096 0.154*




PAN 0.117 −0.033 0.072
PPP 0.394** 0.193 0.420**
Hanura 0.433** 0.706*** 0.620***
PBB −0.350 −0.252 −0.351
PKPI (a) (a) (a)




likelihood of engagement in vote buying, defined in this study based 
on a combination of responses to a battery of questions that inquired 
about respondents’ exposure to such practices in the legislative elec-
tions as well as national and local executive elections (see Chap. 2). As 
can be seen in the third column of Table 4.2, the magnitudes of the 
relationship are strong since their substantive effects reach the 0.05 
significance, or even more. Similar (but not entirely congruent) with 
the first model, when we restrict our analysis only to vote buying in 
legislative elections, partisan attachments among those who voted for 
PDI-P, Golkar, PKS, Hanura, NasDem, and PPP (thus more than half 
of all parties in the 2014–2019 parliament) are found to be signifi-
cantly correlated with vote buying.
Overall, despite persons expressing party loyalty attracting benefits, we 
must be especially attentive to variations. Such relatively consistent find-
ings between the two statistical techniques reinforce the notion that par-
tisanship towards some parties doesn’t automatically make such partisans 
a vote-buying target. Only where a positive, direct, and significant corre-
lation with such handouts exists can we tie particular party-based partisan-
ship to a higher likelihood of being targeted with clientelist techniques.
4.4  testing the Models of distriButiVe Politics
4.4.1  Evidence from Surveys of Local Politicians and Brokers
In the preceding sections, I discussed survey data on the interplay 
between party identification and clientelism and addressed a number of 
methodological problems in analysing this interplay. This has put me in a 
position to now further review the debate about core and swing voters 
against the background of findings on the influence of voters’ partisan 
predispositions.
So far, our examination about the conflicting strategies of core- or 
swing-voter targeting has only dealt with the demand side of vote buying, 
namely the voters. However, the supply side is equally important: how do 
candidates and brokers view the core- versus swing-voters dilemma? In 
order to take additional steps to explore whether candidates and brokers 
target core or swing voters in Indonesia, this section primarily draws from 
the survey of low-level politicians and brokers in four provinces (West 
Sumatra, Central Java, East Java, and North Sulawesi) I conducted in 
September and October 2014 and which was described in Chap. 1 and is 
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explained in greater detail in Appendix B. This survey asked respondents 
numerous direct questions about their clientelistic practices. The total 
sample was 1199 respondents consisting of 299 provincial and district 
legislators and 900 brokers (known locally as ‘success teams’) who worked 
for them in the 2014 elections.
Stokes and her colleagues (2013: 31) argue that, faced with limited 
budgets, political parties and their candidates don’t waste resources on 
targeting core voters with material inducements, assuming that they are 
likely to vote for them anyway. At the same time, however, rewarding vot-
ers who are ideologically distant from or opposed to the party or candi-
date is also considered wasteful (Stokes, 2005). Accordingly, candidates 
are assumed to reach out to swing voters in the middle of these two 
extremes, that is, uncommitted voters who will reciprocate with votes for 
any kind of gift. Reflecting these dynamics, political machines usually 
divide locales into three categories: party base, party opponent base, and 
locations of swing voters. It is important to note that the distinction 
between ‘party base’ and ‘individual candidate base’ is often blurred in the 
Indonesian context; I return to this point in Chap. 5. It is in this context 
that respondents in my survey addressed the question of whether they 
distributed largesse in party base, swing voter, or opponent base areas.
The possible overlap of party with personal networks notwithstand-
ing, the results of the survey show that politicians and electoral brokers 
claimed to have distributed more benefits in their party base areas than 
in other territories (Fig.  4.3). This finding is, of course, inconsistent 
with the expectation inherent in the swing-voter hypothesis, and instead 
seems to confirm the notion of core-voter targeting proposed by 
Nichter (2008) and others (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Diaz-Cayeros 
et al., 2012; Stokes et al., 2013). I didn’t find considerable heterogene-
ity by province. Compared to their operatives or brokers, candidates 
exhibited even greater inclinations to funnel resources to locations 
where their parties performed well in the past. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that in the context of an open-list system—as I will further discuss 
in Chap. 5—contenders win seats not only by defeating candidates from 
other parties. More importantly, they have to beat co-partisans from 
their own party—and this makes the party base a particularly contested 
field. Consequently, party nominees ‘individualise’ the party base by dis-
tributing more resources to party supporters in an effort to maximise their 
individual votes from them. The implication is clear: they need to outdo 
their internal rivals in terms of patronage distribution.
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The same trend emerged from a measure that explored the priorities of 
resource allocation to different broker teams. The wording of the question 
was as follows: “There are two different success teams working in two dif-
ferent areas. One area is known as party base area, while the other is known 
as the swing competitive area for political parties. Between these two suc-
cess teams, which one will get more money and logistical support from the 
party or candidate?” Figure 4.4 reveals that the majority of local MPs and 
brokers preferred to allocate more resources to campaign teams working 
in party strongholds than in swing areas. Again, the figure is strongly sug-
gestive that Indonesian candidates prioritise mobilising their own party 
supporters: what Nichter (2010) famously called ‘turnout buying,’ and 
Schaffer and Schedler (2007: 25) briefly refer to as ‘participation buying.’
In order to further consolidate the finding, I inserted an additional 
question on this matter in my broker survey: “If you distributed enve-
lopes/staple goods package, which type of voters did you prioritise?” 
Three choices were provided: (1) Voters who regularly vote for the party 
I support; (2) Voters who regularly vote for another party; and (3) Voters 
whose voting behaviour cannot be determined. Over 75% of brokers 
Fig. 4.3 Party base is the preferred target (%) (All sample here represents a com-
bination of local MPs and brokers. However, as indicated earlier, the proportion 
of brokers surveyed is much larger than the proportion of local politicians inter-
viewed. See Appendix B.). The survey question used is: “During the last 2014 
legislative election, how did you distribute largesse in order to get votes?” Source: 
My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, 30 September–25 October 2014
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admitted to targeting voters they thought of as being regular party sup-
porters. Only one-fifth favoured swing voters, while only 2% preferred the 
supporters of rivals. Asked in an open-ended question to specify the main 
reason for prioritising such partisan, loyalist voters, the most typical 
response was that these voters were relatively certain targets. However, I 
found a significant variation to this trend in West Sumatra (as previously 
noted, an area of relatively low vote buying), where non-partisan voters 
were disproportionately targeted for vote buying. This stood in contrast 
to Central Java, East Java, and North Sulawesi, where brokers favoured 
those perceived as party loyalists over ideologically indifferent voters.
In short, the evidence emerging from the various surveys suggests that 
in Indonesia, brokers and candidates tend to direct patronage distribution 
flows during elections towards voters with strong party-based loyalties. As 
I will discuss in the following section, the logic behind this inclination to 
prioritise loyalists over swing voters is largely to reduce risk. Core support-
ers are seen as less risky, more responsive, and predictable targets, which is, 
at first glance, consistent with the core-voter argument.
4.4.2  Reasons Behind the Tendency to Favour Core Voters
4.4.2.1  Double-Layered Risk Aversion
Having stated the favoured tendency among political actors, I now turn to 
delve more deeply into explanations for why candidates and brokers 
Fig. 4.4 Party base receives more resources (%). Source: My survey of low-level 
politicians and brokers, 30 September–25 October 2014
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 preferred to channel benefits to party loyalists rather than to uncommitted 
voters. In order to explain the logic behind their proclaimed core-voter 
strategies, I draw from the survey of local politicians and brokers and in- 
depth interviews with national politicians. After posing the hypothetical 
questions analysed above, I asked brokers and candidates for a spontane-
ous response to an open-ended question explaining their choice. As in 
Fig. 4.5, the respondents who reported expressing a strong desire to tar-
get loyalists (recall that this was the majority of politicians and brokers) did 
so due largely to reduce risk as core supporters are seen as less risky, more 
responsive, and predictable.
This finding was echoed by many candidates I interviewed during my 
13 months of fieldwork in Indonesia. Many stated that they were mostly 
concerned about the threat of opportunistic defection by voters when 
engaging in vote buying. In order to minimise uncertainty over whether 
or not the recipient would repay the supplied benefits with votes, risk- 
averse candidates tend to target their assumed core supporters whose sup-
port can—according to the expectations of campaign organisers—be 
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Fig. 4.5 Why do success team members target loyalists (left panel) or uncommit-
ted voters (right panel)? (%). Source: My survey of low-level politicians and bro-
kers, 30 September–25 October 2014
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core supporters reflects the search for certainty among both candidates 
and intermediaries. Thus, this study confirms propositions by early core- 
voter theorists (Cox and McCubbins, 1986: 379) who argued that  political 
actors are inherently risk-averse and are reluctant to shower benefits on 
swing voters because many such voters might defect.
This analysis is supported by my targeted interviews with national-level 
politicians. One prominent national politician from the traditionalist 
Muslim party PKB (National Awakening Party) which was founded by 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest traditionalist Muslim organ-
isation, admitted that most of his campaign benefits were distributed to 
his party’s bases. He explains:
I asked my teams to deploy more resources to traditionalist santri (devout 
Muslim) bases because they are the most reliable voters with the highest 
electoral potential. Those affiliated to NU, the traditionalist santri are my 
party’s real constituency. … For me, targeting NU followers that are closely 
connected historically as well as ideologically to PKB was more appealing 
and much more certain. (Interview, 18 April 2014)
A successful candidate from the Islamist party PPP (United Development 
Party) employed a portfolio of strategies that maximised his electoral sup-
port by investing in the loyalty of his own party and personal supporters. 
Asked why he predominantly distributed campaign benefits to loyal sup-
porters, the candidate, who was running in South Kalimantan, where 
Banjarese were the largest ethnic group, cited a local philosophy: 
“Jangankan haruan2 ganal, haruan halus haja bisa meluncat” (never 
mind a big fish, even a small fish can escape you). In other words, his view 
was that loyal supporters are like small fish, whose support is hard enough 
to secure, while targeting ‘big fish’ (in this case, swing voters) is much 
more difficult, needing a lot of effort and resources (Interview, 21 July 
2014). Similarly, a candidate from the modernist Islam party PAN explored 
how potential electoral return rises with an increase in risk. Though 
uncommitted voters make up a much higher proportion of the electorate, 
he argued, they are typically associated with high levels of uncertainty. 
“Pursuing swing voters isn’t only a difficult task, but it would also mean 
overlooking loyal supporters as a captive (pangsa pasar) vote,” he explained 
(Interview, 22 April 2014).
2 Haruan is a species of snakehead fish, an indigenous freshwater fish of Banjar and a com-
mon food item among the local populace.
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In many electoral territories, there are local equivalents to the Banjarese 
phrase cited above, and candidates often mentioned them in interviews 
with me. These phrases generally suggest that individuals operating under 
conditions of uncertainty should avoid risk,3 with many running along the 
lines of ‘take care of your own’ and ‘secure your possessions!’ (Holder, 
1975, cited in Cox and McCubbins, 1986: 383). For instance, a candidate 
from Hanura focused on turning out his (potential) masses in his electoral 
district in Central Java so his campaign largesse wasn’t wasted (Interview, 
14 May 2014). A prominent national leader of PKB, on the other hand, 
admitted that targeting unknown people was like making a bargain with 
an uncertain payoff—and costly as well (Interview, 20 April 2014). In 
emphasising the unreliability of such voters, many candidates character-
ised undecided voters as ‘tidak jelas’ (uncertain) or ‘tidak bisa dipegang’ 
(unreliable, lit. ‘cannot be held’). In contrast, they perceived loyal sup-
porters to have what Diaz-Cayeros and his colleagues (2016: 71) called “a 
high level of adherence” that makes them more responsive to quid pro 
quo exchanges. In summary, the important driver behind candidates’ pref-
erence for capturing loyalists was an operational rationalisation of their 
personal tendency towards risk aversion.
4.4.2.2  The Moral Economy of Vote Buying
In addition to being rationalised as the most effective and low-risk strat-
egy, some political operators justify and explain the targeting of party loy-
alists as an act of gift giving—a moral duty, even. As shown in the left panel 
of Fig. 4.5, when asked why they targeted loyal voters, many of the sur-
veyed candidates and brokers defended it as a reward, a sign of attention 
or reciprocal action for their supporters. In such cases, as argued by Walker 
(2014), vote buying isn’t defined in terms of economic market transac-
tions; rather, it is a function of complex social relations entangled in a 
traditional moral economy of exchanging votes for gifts (Aspinall 
et al., 2017: 4).
In the interpretation of cash handouts or small favours to voters as a 
ritual gift exchange rather than as an act of blatant vote buying, the recipi-
ents don’t object to the payment because it isn’t seen as a bribe for their 
3 To mention a few: There is a Javanese proverb “ojo mburu uceng neng kelangan deleg” 
(don’t chase small fish while losing more valuable goods), or the Sundanese phrase: “moro 
julang ngaleupaskeun peusing” (being tempted by other goods may cause us to overlook our 
belongings).
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votes (Walker, 2014). Instead, they might consider it as part of a moral 
economy closely associated with elections, or perceive it as signalling “the 
positive personal qualities of the giver, such as generosity, politeness, 
responsiveness, and respect…[that] lead citizens to believe that the candi-
date is good or worthy” (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007: 26). Accordingly, 
embedding vote buying within social norms of reciprocity helps generate 
a feeling of obligation on the part of beneficiaries to reciprocate with sup-
port (Schaffer, 2007: 193; Aspinall et al., 2017).
Around Asia, there are many terms to describe this phenomenon. The 
Indonesian trait of hutang budi (norm of reciprocity) is somewhat akin to 
utang na loob in the Philippines (Alejo et al., 1996: 84) or guanxi  in 
China (Wang, 2013: 4–5). In Indonesia, it is said that once a person has 
granted us a favour, we should do everything to pay that favour back to 
him/her, sometimes even at the expense of ourselves. Vote buying fits into 
this culture of mutual favours, in which candidates are happy to provide 
small gifts and voters are happy to give their vote. Many candidates 
typically describe gifts as uang saku (‘pocket money’). The standard justi-
fication is that the ‘gift’ is given to compensate loyal supporters for the 
time they lose by going to polling stations (Aspinall et al., 2017: 11). Edi 
Inrizal, an anthropologist from University of Andalas, Padang, West 
Sumatra, argued that Indonesians tend to favour indirect references and 
transactions over blunt treatments of realities. Thus, monetary exchanges 
need to be packaged in language of morality and generosity. In this con-
text, he mentioned a saying, ‘kanai pacak’ (splash out a little money), 
which is often applied to gift giving in elections. For ordinary people, 
political power is often equated with big resources and money, so those 
running for it should distribute small amounts of money to their voters as 
a cultural token of gratitude (Edi Inrizal, Interview 21 September 2014).
Such practices and the beliefs that legitimate them aren’t only limited 
to voting day, however. When visiting influential religious or other local 
leaders during the campaign, Hanif Dhakiri from PKB, for instance, didn’t 
come empty-handed, providing them with religiously symbolic goods 
such as peci (associated with Muslim men’s hats), sarongs, or even money 
(Interview, 26 August 2014). Many other candidates did the same thing. 
They often call these gifts as ‘buah tangan’ (keepsake) or ‘tanda mata’ 
(souvenir). Despite the cost that these items incur, there is a widely held 
view among politicians that allocating resources to loyal supporters isn’t as 
costly as giving to undecided voters. In an attempt to show that core 
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 voters are generally the cheapest target, a PAN candidate, running in one 
electoral district in East Java, explained that
Unlike swing or transactional voters, investing in loyal voters doesn’t cost a 
lot. For Javanese, providing money gifts to loyalists is regarded as bisyarah 
or a sign of love…. It isn’t peningset … something that binds. At Javanese 
weddings, the groom gives expensive presents to bind the bride (peningset). 
Instead of binding voters with expensive gifts or big money, bisyarah is sim-
ple and a cultural tradition. (Interview, 22 April 2014)
Another successful candidate from the Democratic Party, who was run-
ning in an electoral district in West Java, confirmed the notion that
Bisyarah parallels with cultural values. It isn’t only a Javanese, but an 
Indonesian tradition. If you are seeking people’s votes, you have to have 
good understandings. People who are going to vote for me would be unable 
to work on voting day. I compensate them for that. It isn’t expensive, just 
keepsakes to ‘tie’ them so they don’t run to cashed-up rivals. If you give 
your loyal supporters just IDR 10,000 each, that would be enough. Even if 
a competitor swamped them with big money, let’s say IDR 100,000, they 
would still deliver their votes to us. (Interview, 25 April 2014)
It is noteworthy that candidates and brokers often feel a high level 
of anxiety if they don’t comply with the social norm of gift giving. It 
has virtually become conventional wisdom among practitioners in 
Indonesia that voters who initially support one particular candidate but 
don’t receive gifts can end up voting for more cashed-up rivals. This is 
particularly so because although voters might be party loyalists, they 
still have to pick between several candidates from that party (see Chap. 
1). As shown in the left panel of Fig. 4.5 above, 11% of surveyed can-
didates and 14% of brokers showered their supporters with benefits to 
protect their bases from other (internal) competitors. Hajriyanto 
Thohari from the nationalist Golkar party was told by his success team 
members that they needed to make cash payments in order to secure 
their votes a few days before the election. Hajriyanto mentioned a term 
being used to describe this practice: tembakan terakhir or ‘final shot.’ 
He said: “I rejected their suggestion. They replied that they wouldn’t 
be responsible if I failed to get the seat. … I didn’t make it, despite the 
fact that I had been previously elected many times in this electoral dis-
trict” (Interview, 21 April 2014).
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Similarly, a prominent PKB politician admitted: “I distributed patronage 
or money to tie them to me. … just small sums of money. … These minor 
gifts… ensure that the voters I had been cultivating don’t switch to oppo-
nents” (Interview, 20 April 2014). As I will argue in more detail in Chap. 5, 
higher uncertainty as a result of the open ballot system and intense intra-
party competition drives candidates to—in a term they frequently used—
‘tie’ (mengikat) their loyalists with cash, so they wouldn’t turn their backs 
on them. These findings are somewhat similar to those of Dunning and 
Stokes (2008) in Mexico, where many initial supporters of the Party of the 
Institutionalised Revolution (PRI) finally voted for rivals because they didn’t 
get any electoral incentives. In Indonesia, however, things are even more 
complicated because although voters might remain loyal to a party, they still 
can vote for a different candidate within that party. When parties must dis-
tribute benefits to sustain partisan loyalty, Dunning and Stokes called the 
relevant voters’ attitude ‘conditional loyalty.’ Overall, despite the cultural 
norm of gift giving in Indonesia motivating candidates to cultivate their 
core supporters, the dominant discourse among candidates is that a signifi-
cant proportion of their so-called loyalists would change their votes if they 
didn’t receive assistance. Again, my findings from broker and candidate sur-
vey as well as qualitative interviews support the notion that partisan, loyalist 
voters are widely favoured as vote-buying targets among political actors.
4.4.3  Evidence from Nationwide Surveys
In this section, I return to analysing voter-level data in order to obtain 
more detailed information on who receives offers of material benefits, and 
when. By adding temporal dimensions these data (see Table 4.3 below) are 
again highly supportive of the party-loyalist strategy and explain in which 
period party loyalists receive the most offers of benefits. Non-party identi-
fiers were consistently less likely to be offered gifts across four surveys in 
2014 leading up to the election. Using the statistical analysis approach of 
relative risk or risk ratio (RR), the probability of self-proclaimed partisan 
voters experiencing vote buying was two or three times higher than that of 
non-identifiers. For example, in January 2014, 9.1% of the respondents 
with partisan closeness were being offered rewards, but only 3.5% of those 
with no partisanship were targeted—a proportional difference of 
(9.1 − 3.5)/3.5 or around 1.55 (or 155%). The same also held true in late 
February and early March 2014, about one and a half months before the 
election, with a proportional difference of 1.96 or 196%.
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As the election approached, the pace of vote buying accelerated as both 
party loyalists and uncommitted voters were increasingly targeted. In April 
2014, about 25% of respondents were exposed to such transactions. 
However, when restricting my analysis only to those with or without par-
tisanship, 43.1% of the party identifiers were offered rewards. By now, 
21.8% of the non-identifiers had been offered rewards too, a big jump 
from 3.5% in January, 6.5% in late February to early March, and 9.1% in 
the end of March. Once again, consider that this segment of non- identifiers 
constitutes 85% of the total electorate. Indeed, it appears that the machines 
were still taking care of core constituencies, with proportional differences 
of 1.18 (118%) and 0.98 (98%) in late March 2014 and April 2014, 
respectively. Relative to previous results, however, the overall percentage 
of investment in core voters slightly decreased, while that in non-partisan 
voters markedly increased. The statistical risk ratio of partisans being tar-
geted in January and February–March 2014 was two to three times more 
likely than that of non-identifiers, but this probability slightly decreased to 
only two times in the end of March and April 2014 (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3 Individual vote buying by some or no partisanship (%)
Reported having been the target of vote 
buying
Yes No Don’t know Total
January 2014 Some partisanship 9.1 90.1 0.8 100
No partisanship 3.5 94.3 2.1 100
Relative risk 2.6
Proportional difference 1.55 −0.04
February–March 2014 Some partisanship 19.2 75.9 4.9 100
No partisanship 6.5 90.2 3.3 100
Relative risk 3.0
Proportional difference 1.96 −0.16
Late March 2014 Some partisanship 19.9 76.8 3.3 100
No partisanship 9.1 86 4.8 100
Relative risk 2.2
Proportional difference 1.18 −0.11
April 2014 Some partisanship 43.1 55.8 1.1 100
No partisanship 21.8 75.2 3.0 100
Relative risk 2.0
Proportional difference 0.98 −0.26
Source: The January, February–March, and late March 2014 data were taken from my pre-election sur-
veys, while the April 2014 numbers were drawn from my post-election survey (see Appendix A)
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From the data above, it is evident that candidates simultaneously target 
party loyalists and non-partisan voters, and the proportion of the latter 
increases as election day nears (while partisans are still clearly preferred in rela-
tive terms). However, such interpretations contradict the results from my 
sample survey of low-level politicians and brokers, as well as my in- depth 
interviews with high-level politicians. These political operators repeatedly 
expressed a strong preference for targeting loyalists. They believed that invest-
ment in uncommitted voters might be wasted. If they showed such strong 
preference to capture core supporters in their  strategic thinking, why did they 
end up distributing so much cash and goods to so many non-partisan voters? 
This question is particularly relevant given that, it will be recalled, that in total 
numbers, non-party identifiers heavily outnumbered party identifiers, mean-
ing that more voters without partisan attachments received offers than those 
with such attachments. This is the puzzle I develop in the last sections of this 
chapter—a puzzle that the following chapters then try to resolve.
4.5  Mixed results
The puzzle described above is further illustrated in a last presentation of 
survey results comparing levels of vote buying in the 2014 and 2009 elec-
tions in relation to voters’ partisanship. As shown in Figs. 4.6 and 4.7, the 
incidence of vote buying increased from 2009 to 2014, but the pattern in 
regards to partisanship remained the same: in relative terms, partisan 
Fig. 4.6 Gift receipt by partisan effect: Direct vote buying (%). Source: My post- 
election survey, 22–26 April 2014
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 voters were more likely to be targeted, but in total numbers, uncommitted 
voters who received benefits outnumbered the core voters who did so.
If we use a purely percentage-based analysis, the analysis of the survey 
data, and of the Indonesian case, presented so far provides strong support 
for the core-voter model, according to which partisan orientation increases 
the likelihood of a person receiving benefits during an election. This is 
true for both direct (Fig. 4.6) and neighbourhood measures (Fig. 4.7), 
which consistently show that if a voter identified with a party, then he or 
she was more likely to receive offers of vote buying than someone who 
wasn’t a partisan.
If we rely on the absolute approach, by contrast, we come to a different 
conclusion—one that the swing-voter school of vote buying would prefer. 
As shown in Fig. 4.6, ‘only’ 22% of non-partisans received gifts during the 
2014 campaign. However, these are 22% of the vast majority of voters 
(85% of the total electorate). By contrast, the 43% of loyal, partisan voters 
who received gifts sounds large, but they only make up a tiny percentage 
of the electorate. Put in a different way, 22% of 85% is much larger than 
43% of 15%. Recall that there were approximately 187 million voters in the 
2014 election. This means there were almost 35  million non-partisan 
Fig. 4.7 Gift receipt by partisan effect: Neighbourhood vote buying (%). Source: 
My post-election survey, 22–26 April 2014
 DO CANDIDATES TARGET LOYALISTS OR SWING VOTERS?… 
130
 voters who received offers of vote buying but only 12 million partisan vot-
ers were exposed to such exchange. The numbers also bear out that vote 
buying increased faster among uncommitted voters than among party loy-
alists. It roughly tripled in the former category, while it only approximately 
doubled in the latter between 2009 and 2014 (based on the direct mea-
sure). Clearly, the voter survey data lead to differing—and, depending on 
the approach, even conflicting—interpretations on how to locate Indonesia 
in terms of the swing- versus loyalist-voter debate on vote-buying targets.
4.6  conclusion
This chapter has discussed—from a number of methodological, empirical, 
and statistical perspectives—the effect of partisanship on vote buying. For 
the purpose of this study, the finding that party identification levels in 
Indonesia are low is crucial—only 15% of the electorate feel close to a 
political party. In order to avoid vulnerability to endogeneity assumptions, 
I further demonstrated that partisanship—as measured by my surveys—
isn’t endogenous to electoral bribes. From this firmer methodological 
platform, I was able to show that there are variations in the effects of par-
tisanship across the party spectrum, and in terms of the receipt of vote- 
buying offer. Two different statistical analyses allowed us to assess that 
relative to other partisanships, those who are aligned with PDI-P, Golkar, 
and the Democratic Party (and other smaller parties depending on the 
measure) have a higher probability of being targeted with benefits than 
partisans of other parties. Roughly, the larger the party, the higher the 
chance a loyalist to that party has of being hit by vote buying.
But given that partisans are low in number and non-partisans consti-
tute the vast bulk of the electorate, how do political operators them-
selves explain how they direct their limited resources during campaigns? 
My novel dataset from low-level politicians and brokers found that they 
indeed professed that they targeted loyalists. This pattern was confirmed 
by in- depth interviews with high-level politicians. The rationales behind 
this preferred strategy were associated with risk aversion and the moral 
economy of vote buying. Yet additional individual-level data showed 
that while in relative terms, partisans were more likely to be targeted, in 
absolute terms, more swing voters received rewards. In essence, then, 
neither the core-voter nor the swing-voter model is fully applicable in 
Indonesia. Political operators claim to target loyalists, and they indeed 
reach a significant number of them with their vote-buying efforts. But 
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vote buying is so extensive and the number of partisans so small, that in 
reality much of the cash and gifts are absorbed by swing voters. Is this 
the result of failed targeting on the part of the operators? Or did candi-
dates and brokers misunderstand who exactly was a loyalist and who was 
a swing voter, leading them to believe they targeted the former but ulti-
mately hit the latter? Or were other mechanisms at work? The discussion 
above systematically set up this puzzle, which I address in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
How Targeting Goes Astray: Explaining 
the Gap Between Intentions and Outcomes
This chapter addresses puzzles that were identified in the previous chapter. 
First, if partisan voters have a higher probability of being targeted for vote 
buying, while mass partisanship in Indonesia is comparatively weak, how 
feasible is it for candidates to win only by targeting partisans? Second, how 
can we explain the gap between politicians’ insistence that they are pre-
dominantly targeting party loyalists and the reality that so much cash and 
goods end up in the hands of non-partisan voters? This second puzzle 
raises a further question about the criteria that politicians and brokers 
actually use when identifying the loyal voters they wish to target.
With respect to the first of these puzzles, I argue that given partisan 
voters are limited in number and fought over among multiple candidates 
from the same party, candidates first target the party constituencies they 
think will be likely to support them personally. However, to clinch victory, 
they need to seek support beyond their own traditional party bases, and 
they leverage personal connections in order to do so. This, in turn, has to 
do with the second puzzle: given they are so dependent on personal net-
works, candidates and brokers misrepresent personal connections as parti-
san leanings. They say they are targeting partisan voters, when in reality 
they are targeting voters who are connected to them, or to their brokers, 
by personal ties. By emphasising this point, I offer a contribution to the 
long-standing debate between advocates of core- versus swing-voter mod-
els of vote buying by integrating analysis of the core-voter strategy with an 
emphasis on personal networks. I argue that candidates and brokers’ 
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 targeting strategies are misdirected; they plan to target partisan voters, but 
in fact they distribute most benefits to voters embedded in personal net-
works, who they presume to be loyal (but in fact are quite often only 
weakly connected to them). Put simply, candidates and brokers misiden-
tify, or even exaggerate, the number of partisan voters because they typi-
cally blur the line between partisan and personal loyalties.
This interpretation, however, leaves a question unanswered: why should 
candidates get it so wrong? We know from comparative literature that 
brokers have an incentive to exaggerate the number of partisan, loyalist 
voters,1 even to deceive their candidates on this issue, so that they can 
engage in predation. But candidates don’t have any such incentive. In 
addition to the mistargeting story, this chapter accordingly argues that 
many of the people who are connected through personal networks are in 
fact not even loyal to the candidate. This is largely because candidates are 
targeting people through other networks in which brokers may lack close 
personal ties to them, leading to agency loss. Finally, I argue that much of 
what I observe in Indonesia is like neither the core-voter nor the swing- 
voter model. This is largely because literature proposing these models was 
developed in settings that differ significantly from Indonesia. As a result, 
the dynamics of vote buying, or at least the targeting of vote buying, are 
distinctive in Indonesia.
5.1  Contextual FaCtors
As discussed in Chap. 1, vote buying doesn’t occur in isolation. It is there-
fore important to take into account its institutional context. Our first chal-
lenge is to assess whether Indonesia’s context differs from those under 
which the swing versus loyalist debate arose. In shining a light on context, 
this chapter compares Indonesia to several Latin American countries on 
which the literature is based, in terms of five contextual factors: (1) organ-
isation of vote buying, (2) electoral system, (3) party base, (4) level of 
partisanship, and (5) voting systems.
1 In this study, the word ‘partisan’ is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘loyalist.’ 
However, I should stress that there is still a significant difference between the two. I define 
the first in party terms and the second in candidate terms. However, as I will argue later, 
given the nature of open-list PR which incentivises personal votes, candidates will ‘person-
alise’ those who are loyal to their party in the sense that they will try to convert, or combine, 




In terms of the structure of vote buying, much of the relevant literature 
is produced out of Latin America, which assumes party-based voting.2 In 
such cases, we should not only expect to see a high level of partisan voting, 
but the party machine will obviously be at the centre of political cam-
paigns. Indonesia is virtually the opposite. This is important because both 
the swing- and core-voter models arose in settings where party machines 
have the capacity to monitor recipients’ votes to ensure that bargains are 
kept. Political parties in Argentina are bottom-heavy organisations that 
embed themselves socially into communities, relying on an army of bro-
kers linked to their local party structure (Stokes, 2007: 82–83; Kramon, 
2013: 11). This organisation stems largely from the capacity of parties to 
control the distribution of state resources, enabling them to engage in 
deep interactions with voters (Auyero, 2001). The same holds true in 
other Latin American countries such as Mexico and Venezuela (Table 5.1). 
The assumption that typically underlies the literature on turnout buying 
(e.g. Nichter, 2008; Cox and McCubbins, 1986) is that parties are the 
only dominant actors in delivering benefits to their supporters. Even the 
norms of reciprocity model of Finan and Schechter (2012) require the 
existence of party operatives who can develop iterative relationships with 
voters and therefore channel rewards to reciprocal individuals. As Kramon 
(2013) pointed out, if political parties don’t possess such personalised 
relationships with voters, vote buying is unlikely to be effective in encour-
aging a sense of moral obligation on the part of voters.
2 Among others, Stokes (2005) provides evidence of this from Argentina. Enforcing vote-
buying bargains among swing or weakly opposed voters in Argentina, she argues, requires a 
well-organised party structure. Auyero (2001) and Levitsky (2003) also worked on 
Argentina, but focus on how party brokers function in everyday politics in the country. 
Similarly, in a later work, Stokes and her colleagues (2013) found evidence of the core-voter 
tendency in Argentina, Venezuela, and Mexico (as well as India), while emphasising the role 
of political parties as the main distributor of clientelist exchange. Similarly, Diaz-Cayeros and 
his colleagues (2012, 2016) found that political operatives in Mexico engage in more turn-
out buying (targeting passive loyalists to ensure they vote) rather than vote buying (favour-
ing swing voters to sway their vote). The rationale is to avoid envy and jealousy among core 
constituents who might defect if not given benefits. Gans-Morse et  al. (2014) generated 
valuable insights into the role of political context in Argentina and Brazil in shaping vote 
buying. In their model, given Brazil’s strictly enforced compulsory voting and low machine 
support, party machines predominantly targeted swing voters rather than passive supporters. 
The point is that this literature on organisation of vote buying in Latin American countries 
focuses on political parties.
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Scholars of Indonesia have come to the conclusion that most parties in 
Indonesia are less organised as political machines, and they generally lack 
the capacity and organisational structure to penetrate local communities 
(Tomsa and Ufen, 2012; Berenschot, 2015). Compared to many coun-
tries in South America, the mobilisational strength of Indonesian parties is 
generally weak, and they are hardly involved in any kind of constituency 
service. In the conventional literature on vote buying, constituency service 
plays a significant role in increasing interactions between parties and voters 
(e.g. Auyero, 2001; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). This is largely because, 
Berenschot (2015) argues, the distribution of state resources in Indonesia 
is largely not under the control of political parties, but instead in the 
bureaucracy, which has maintained significant discretionary power since 
the authoritarian period. As Berenschot (2015: 560) put it with regard to 
Latin America, “the degree of party control over the distribution of state 
resources seems to constitute an important contrast with Indonesia.” This 
helps explain why most Indonesian parties are largely invisible at the 
 grassroots and therefore lack the requisite capacity and organisational 
structure to engage with voters.
Put in a nutshell, the literature on the swing- and core-voter models 
arises in a context where party machines are both active in, and capable of, 
mobilising voters. Accordingly, the main organisational vehicle for vote 
buying in Latin America is parties. In Indonesia, by contrast, parties are 
largely inactive and inert, and it is individual candidates who run  grassroots 
campaigns, including clientelist mobilisations.
Another difference with a lot of the Latin American cases on which the 
literature is based is the electoral system. In many countries in that region, 
Table 5.1 The different contexts of Indonesia and Latin American countries
Countries Party 
organisation




Indonesia Weak Open-List PR No No
Argentina Strong Closed-List PR Yes Yes
Venezuela Strong Plurality + 
Closed-List PR
Yes No
Mexico Strong Plurality + 
Closed-List PR
No Yes
Brazil Weak Open-List PR No Yes
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MPs are elected through closed-list proportional representation and the 
remainder are elected by plurality rules (Table 5.1). Under the closed-list 
system, candidates rely primarily on party reputation, and competition pri-
marily occurs as disputes between parties (Mainwaring, 1991). It there-
fore makes sense to target partisan voters and geographically discrete base 
areas to mobilise turnout. In this context, as Gans-Morse and his col-
leagues (2014: 417) put it, because parties and candidates have different 
electoral bases, they “don’t directly compete to provide clientelist rewards 
to the same citizens” (italics in original).
Indonesia, by contrast, provides a completely different picture. 
Indonesia has adopted open-list elections. How does this difference make 
the logic of vote buying different in the Indonesian case? One obvious 
difference is that candidates need to rely on personal networks rather than 
the party. The open-list PR incentivises a personal vote and makes parties 
less relevant, which in turn lead elections to be more candidate-centric. 
Vote-seeking politicians wage highly personal campaigns, with little refer-
ence to their party platforms or policy positions. They also build personal 
campaign teams, independent of party structures. An overwhelming 
majority of candidates across the political spectrum, across distinct strata 
of legislative assemblies, rely on informal non-party organisations of bro-
kers—known as tim sukses (success teams)—to mobilise voters. Since party 
structures are contested among other individuals in the party list, candi-
dates cannot rely exclusively on them. This is obviously different from the 
context which has given rise to the dominant literature on vote buying or 
turnout buying in Latin American settings where political parties are well 
organised and socially embedded (e.g. Stokes, 2007; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 
2016). While the literature conventionally assumes that brokers are 
“agents of a political party” (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015: 1187), 
brokers in Indonesia are the soldiers of individual candidates. In Indonesia, 
candidates require their brokers to perform multiple tasks, ranging from 
constituency mobilisation, organising campaign rallies, distributing cam-
paign paraphernalia, and delivering cash to voters.
Moreover, rather than winning the majority or large plurality of the 
votes that parties or candidates pursue in various Latin American coun-
tries, in Indonesia’s open-list multi-member districts, a small proportion 
of the electorate can decide candidates’ electoral fate. As already discussed 
in Chap. 1, given this system allows voters to determine which among a 
party’s candidates are elected, it only requires candidates—provided they, 
their party, and their fellow party candidates have collectively won enough 
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votes to gain one seat—to win just enough voters to beat their co- partisans. 
The marginal value of each voter collected through vote-buying strategies 
can be high enough to clinch victory. Nurul Arifin of Golkar colourfully 
talked of “the 2014 elections [being] like the civil war in Syria. Brothers 
are battling each other. The sword used in the battle is money to kill their 
own brothers” (Merdeka.com, 28 April 2014). She pointed her finger on 
the open-list PR’s effect of making candidates of the same party fight each 
other. For Nurul, the only way to beat co-partisans is by outspending 
one’s internal party rival in terms of distributing cash to voters; she claimed 
not to participate in vote buying and attributed her defeat to that fact 
(Merdeka.com, 28 April 2014).
Having discussed the first two distinguishing features of Indonesia’s 
political environment relative to several Latin American countries, we now 
turn to reviewing the degree of partisan closeness in the two regions. 
Much of the debate on vote-buying strategies has arisen in contexts where 
levels of voter partisanship are higher than in Indonesia. Table 5.2 com-
pares the level of partisanship in Indonesia with other countries (excluding 
Western countries) that have more or less adopted the Comparative Study 
of Electoral Systems (CSES) questions on partisanship. The most recent 
measure of mass partisanship in Indonesia conducted by my polling insti-
tute Indikator in February 2019 is 10.1%, far below the average level (49%).
With regard to the level of mass partisanship, Indonesia is different to 
Venezuela, Mexico, and Argentina and others, from which comparative 
literature on turnout buying has been produced, where levels of partisan-
ship are relatively high. In such cases, the prospects of victory are much 
better for parties that simply target their partisan supporters with material 
inducements. This contrasts sharply with Indonesia where voters produce 
low scores on party identification.3 The country’s condition of low party 
identification is similar to Brazil, where the recipients of largesse are pre-
dominantly swing voters (Nichter, 2010; Gans-Morse et al., 2014).
Figure 5.1 reveals the total percentage of Indonesians who reported 
feeling close to any party from 1999 to 2015. The percentage between 
July 1999 and November 2004 exceeded 50%, reflecting the decline of the 
early enthusiasm that accompanied the transition to democracy and 
Indonesia’s first post-Suharto elections in June 1999, but there was a fur-
ther sharp decline in mass partisanship from December 2004 to December 
3 For further discussion on the aggregate level of mass partisanship in Indonesia, see Chap. 4.
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Table 5.2 Party closeness across the worlda
Country % N Country % N Country % N
Asia Ecuador 2013 32 1200 Benin 2012 38 1200
Indonesia 2014 15 1210 Nicaragua 2013 47 1000 Cote d’Ivoire 
2013
54 1200
Vietnam 2005 81 1200 Mexico 2013 34 1200 Botswana 2012 63 1200
India 2005 47 5178 Dominican Rep 
2013
59 1000 Burkina Faso 
2012
63 1200
Thailand 2006 28 1546 Panama 2013 43 1000 Burundi 2012 68 1199
Philippines 
2005
42 1200 Uruguay 2013 58 1200 Cameroon 2013 41 1200
Bangladesh 
2005
60 3176 Chile 2013 25 1200 Cape Verde 2011 60 1208
Japan 2007 75 992 Paraguay 2013 71 1200 Egypt 2013 22 1200
South Korea 
2006
61 1060 Honduras 2013 59 1000 Ghana 2012 59 2400
Taiwan 2006 61 1587 Africa Guinea 2013 57 1200
Mongolia 2006 90 1211 Uganda 2012 73 2400 Mozambique 
2012
71 2400
Pakistan 2005 31 2654 Tanzania 2012 84 2400 Namibia 2012 69 1200
Americas Zimbabwe 2012 64 2400 Niger 2013 80 1200
Argentina 2013 26 1200 Zambia 2012 49 1200 Nigeria 2012 45 2400
Bolivia 2013 23 1200 Kenya 2011 58 2399 Senegal 2013 60 1200





15 1000 Liberia 2012 68 1199 South Africa 
2011
60 2399
Brazil 2013 18 1204 Madagascar 2013 30 1200 Togo 2012 34 1200
Peru 2013 16 1500 Malawi 2012 60 2407 Algeria 2013 42 1206
Venezuela 2013 58 1200 Mali 2012 41 1200 Tunisia 2013 30 1200
El Salvador 
2013
39 1200 Mauritius 2012 26 1200
Costa Rica 
2013
28 1000 Morocco 2013 20 1200 Average 49
Sources: Data from South and Central American countries are taken from the Latinobarometer 2013 (see 
http://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp. Accessed 14 May 2016) while those from African coun-
tries are provided from the Afrobarometer Round 5 2011–2012 (see http://afrobarometer.org/
online-data-analysis/analyse-online. Accessed 14 May 2016). Data from some Asian countries are taken 
from the Asian Barometer 2 (2005–2008) (see http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyAnalisis.jsp?ES_
COL=101&Idioma=I&Seccion Col=06&ESID=503. Accessed 18 May 2016)
The question used in the Americas is “Is there any political party you feel closer to than others?” whereas 
in Africa it is: “Do you feel close to any particular political party?” The question used by the Asian 
Barometer is: “Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to?”
aOne important note is that partisanship in Vietnam which reached up to 84% clearly means something 
different under one-party rule than party identification in (multiparty) democracies
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2005, with the aggregate level of partisan allegiance decreasing signifi-
cantly to less than 30%. Data from 2006 to 2010 exhibit increasingly weak 
party identification, with the level of party allegiance shrinking to an aver-
age of 22.2%. Since 2011, the degree of partisan affiliation of the elector-
ate has fallen below 20%. This low level of partisanship isn’t superficial but 
is consistent.
One contextual factor that helps explain the level of partisan loyalty is 
the political party system. This is another difference between Latin 
American cases and Indonesia. Political scientists have long argued that 
party identification tends to be lower in multiparty systems (e.g. Thomassen 
and Rosema, 2009: 50). In two-dominant party systems, it tends to be 
higher. Countries like Argentina, Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent, 
Mexico, where much of the scholarly literature has identified turnout- 
buying strategies, have two (or three) dominant parties that have decades- 
old historical roots. Parties have strong ‘base areas’ in these countries. 
Take, for instance, working-class areas in Argentina that have been voting 
for Peronists for years, or the long-time rural voter base of the Party of the 
Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) in Mexico.
The Indonesia case, however, is completely different. There has been a 
highly fragmented political party system in the country during the periods 
of competitive democracy (1950s and post-1998). As a result, only a few 
political parties in Indonesia enjoy a strong tradition of having partisan 
voters. PDI-P is perhaps the strongest example because there are some 
areas, especially in Central Java and North Sumatra, where people have 
been voting for the party for years, and where they can go back further 
and trace a history of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) dominance 
in the 1950s. As thoroughly discussed in Chap. 1, PDI-P has taken root 
among less pious Muslims, middle-lower-income groups, and religious 
minorities. Another party that deserves to be mentioned is PKB, which 
has profited from close ties with the large socio-religious organisation, 
NU. It has consistently maintained its electoral base, especially within tra-
ditionalist communities in East Java. In general, however, most political 
parties in Indonesia don’t have large or long-standing partisan bases.
Finally, much of this literature occurs in settings where voting is com-
pulsory such as in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. Intuitively, compulsory 
voting increases the likelihood of parties targeting swing voters with pay-
ments, while the party loyalist strategy is more likely to develop in envi-
ronments where voting in elections is optional. In places where voting is 
compulsory, parties logically will not fear non-participation by their own 
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supporters because they may be subject to a penalty if they don’t cast their 
votes. In such places, uncommitted swing voters who are willing to sell 
their votes are also more likely to participate. Empirical evidence, however, 
shows mixed results. Where compulsory voting laws are weakly enforced, 
as in Argentina, we can see evidence of turnout buying. In contrast, strict 
enforcement of compulsory voting encourages machines to target swing 
voters in Brazil (Gans-Morse et al., 2014; Nichter, 2010). In Indonesia, 
voting isn’t compulsory. Under such circumstances, lukewarm supporters 
might not show up at the polls, if not given a benefit, making payments to 
such voters more likely. This gives rise to what Schaffer and Schedler 
(2007: 17–18) described as ‘participation buying.’
Targeting party loyalists may help reduce uncertainty on the part of 
candidates regarding the final electoral results, as suggested in the preced-
ing chapter. If a party loyalist bothers to turn out, the paying candidates 
can be reasonably sure that the voter will support them. However, it 
doesn’t make this uncertainty completely disappear because the voter may, 
of course, choose a different candidate from the same party. Even if the 
party loyalist strategy is plausible in the context of non-compulsory vot-
ing, the emphasis on the personal vote under the open-list systems adopted 
by Indonesia means that candidates from the same party have to compete 
against each other for the support of a limited pool of partisan voters.
Overall, much of the scholarly literature analyses vote buying in the 
context of well-organised parties. It was also developed in a context where 
political parties are more prominent in organising election campaigns. 
Equally, the existing literature arose to describe environments where par-
ties have some very strong ‘base areas.’ Indonesia, however, is different 
from these conditions. Vote-seeking politicians in Indonesia operate in a 
setting where the structure of vote buying is largely not party based, and 
political parties play, overall, a marginal role in election campaigns at the 
grassroots. The personalised nature of voting allows candidate to win only 
by gaining the support of a small slice of the electorate and in conditions 
where partisan ties are comparatively weak.
5.2  solving the Puzzles
Having explained the contextual factors that affect the strategies candi-
dates employ, we are now in a position to review the two puzzles stated at 
the outset of this chapter. In this section, I discuss the first puzzle about 
the feasibility for candidates to win by targeting only partisans, given their 
 B. MUHTADI
143
low absolute number and the strong intraparty competition among candi-
dates for the support of such voters.
In an attempt to answer the first puzzle, I propose an explanation for 
how vote buying works in Indonesia that is distinctive from the swing- and 
core-voter models. I do so by drawing on the core-voter model, which 
emphasises turnout buying targeting party loyalists, but combine this 
analysis with a strong emphasis on personal networks. I argue that in 
Indonesia candidates and brokers actually intend to target partisan voters, 
but in reality, they mostly distribute patronage to people who are  connected 
to them via personal networks. I call this combination of features a ‘per-
sonal loyalist strategy.’ Allowing a role for partisan voters, this strategy 
tries to personalise such voters by making them loyal not only to the party 
but also to the individual candidate within the party, as will be elabo-
rated below.
The personal loyalist strategy, which combines targeting personalised 
party constituents with reliance on personal networks, is best suited to the 
context of an open-list PR system like Indonesia which provides incentives 
to politicians to rely on personal networks rather than the party, and in 
settings where the loyalties involved are largely personalised. The approach 
is built upon three distinct but interrelated strategies that candidates typi-
cally use. First of all, when they can, candidates start by targeting areas 
they think of as being ‘party bases’ on the basis of previous election 
returns. They believe these areas will likely yield greatest success in terms 
of personal votes. But, given there are only a few party strongholds, and 
these are typically contested among co-partisans, every candidate, starting 
long before the election, seeks to personalise their campaign in order to 
maximise their individual votes. They do so by reaching down to voters 
within this party base as individuals, including via party operatives whom 
they treat as personal clients.
Second, having realised that their party loyalists are limited in number 
and vulnerable to competition from internal competitors, candidates seek 
to expand their electoral base by using whatever personal connections they 
can mobilise. They start by determining their ‘base’ not only on the basis 
of previous electoral patterns but also based on their birthplace, kinship, 
religious, or ethnic ties, as I elaborate in more detail in the next section. In 
addition, candidates also choose areas where they have network connec-
tions or where they have in the past provided patronage and constituency 
service (Aspinall et al. 2017: 13). This is typically not enough, though. If 
they rely solely on their personal networks, candidates would fail to gain 
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the votes they need to win. Recall that candidates running for national- 
level and provincial-level parliaments have to win hundreds of thousands 
of votes, depending on the density of the population.
Finally, in order to further enhance their electoral prospects, candidates 
seek to reach out to a greater number of voters through personal connec-
tions mediated by non-party brokers. These brokers expand beyond the 
party and the candidate’s personal electoral base by providing additional 
support on the basis of their own clientelist and other personal networks. 
As Aspinall and his colleagues (2017: 5) nicely put it, “brokerage networks 
were a method for scaling up a candidate’s personal patron-client net-
works to encompass a greater number of voters.” Therefore, I argue that 
what matters here isn’t the broker per se, but the size of the broker army 
who run vote-buying efforts on the basis of their heterogeneous networks. 
How large and strong the brokerage network a candidate has can deter-
mine whether that candidate wins more votes than his or her internal rivals.
At first sight, this personal loyalist strategy looks promising. With lim-
ited resources in hand and dealing with large constituencies, candidates 
strategically target only those they think will be most likely to support 
them personally. However, as presented in Chap. 7, most of the recipients 
simply take the money but vote according to their conscience. A senior 
journalist in Padang, West Sumatra, cited an analogy of hiring a person to 
climb coconut trees. He said giving money to voters is like when a coco-
nut picker takes the salary, but declines to pick the coconuts (Sukri Umar, 
Interview 23 September 2014).4 Notwithstanding candidates’ strong 
intentions to reward only people they think of as loyal supporters, this 
strategy cannot fully prevent ‘leakage’ or ‘slippage’ to people who don’t 
repay them with support.5 This is largely because many of those candidates 
depicted as ‘loyalists’ are likely to defect, as will be explained in more detail 
in the following pages. The distinction between ‘party base’ and ‘personal 
vote base’ is thus blurred, as Aspinall and his colleagues (2017: 13) explain:
4 This strategy isn’t only unique in the Indonesian context. Cardinal Sin, Archbishop of 
Manila, for instance, is widely known for his advice by giving a famous analogy: “take the 
bait, but not the hook” (Schaffer, 2005; Hicken et al., 2017).
5 It is striking that candidates keep thinking of such people as their ‘base,’ while they 
should know that a lot of them are only weakly connected to them. As I argue in Chap. 7, 
candidates actually understand that the targeting of vote buying is misdirected, but because 




Overall, when candidates used terms suggesting core versus swing voters, 
they thus typically understood such terms in personal terms, rather than in 
terms of voters’ identification with a party or program. They were talking 
about a clientele rather than a party core.
This brings us back to the seemingly paradoxical finding in my voter 
survey described in Chap. 4: while partisan voters are more likely to be 
targeted than non-partisans, in fact, most vote buying happens among 
uncommitted voters. This outcome, I argue, is a result of weaknesses of 
the strategy above that combines a party loyalist approach with reliance on 
personal networks. But why is the conceptual confusion? Why do candi-
dates keep insisting they are targeting loyal voters, while the facts show 
that much of their spending is wasted on uncommitted voters who receive 
benefits but don’t always reciprocate with their votes? Three preliminary 
explanations are offered at this stage: (1) candidates and brokers tend to 
exaggerate the number of partisan voters; (2) they exhibit confusion about 
the concept of ‘loyalty’; and (3) agency loss occurs, contributing to a large 
amount of targeting of uncommitted voters.
5.2.1  Exaggerating the Numbers of Partisan, Loyalist Voters
The first probable explanation for the gap is clear: many politicians across 
the political spectrum exaggerate the number of partisan voters in 
Indonesia. Many politicians find it hard to accept the reality that relatively 
few voters feel close to any political party in Indonesia today. As one of the 
leading public commentators on Indonesian political affairs, with regular 
national media exposure due in part to my position with the country’s 
pre- eminent opinion survey organisations, LSI and Indikator, many politi-
cal parties frequently invite me to discuss political trends and, especially, to 
explain survey data. When I present on the general decline in partisanship, 
party leaders often admit there is such a trend, but stubbornly reject the 
finding that as many as nine out of ten Indonesians express that they aren’t 
close to any political party. They typically claim that the level of partisan 
loyalty isn’t that low. Politicians not only express this denial in internal and 
closed discussions but also in public forums. In the lead-up to the 2014 
election, I appeared on a prime-time television political programme with a 
party leader from the Islamist party, PPP. He expressed his strong dis-
agreement with my survey findings, suggesting low scores on voters’ psy-
chological bonds with political parties. Similarly, in a confidential interview, 
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one elected candidate from the traditionalist Islam party PKB suspected 
that many pollsters have consistently underestimated how many people 
feel close to political parties, especially his own party, by arguing:
It is difficult to believe that people who self-describe as being PKB loyalists 
are much fewer than those of the PKS. My party is closely associated with 
the largest Islamic organisation and it can be traced back in the history of 
NU dominance in Java during the 1955 elections…. So weird. (Interview, 
12 May 2014)
The tendency to exaggerate the number of partisan voters might help 
increase politicians’ confidence in the context of competitive elections and 
ameliorate their anxiety about future election results, as discussed below. 
However, although many politicians exaggerate the number of partisan 
voters, overall, they typically agree that more Indonesians match the non- 
partisan profile than are partisans. They understand that many voters don’t 
have partisan attachments, but insist a significant proportion of the elec-
torate still feel close to a party.
Another powerful example of exaggeration is provided by a unique set 
of polling data from low-level politicians and brokers. As previously 
explained, from September to October 2014, I surveyed 299 candidates 
and 900 brokers in four provinces (Appendix B). Figure 5.2 shows that, 
overall, respondents tended to overestimate the number of partisan, 
loyalist voters. The prompt is: “We would like to inquire further about 
the characteristics of voters in your area. Out of ten people in your 
area,6 approximately how many people who always vote in every elec-
tion and would always vote for the party/candidate7 you support?” 
Hence, voter loyalty here is defined in terms of turnout propensities and 
partisan closeness or loyalty to the candidate. While responses to this 
question were quite scattered, the modal answer—from either the sur-
veyed candidates (featured in horizontal stripes within Fig. 5.2) or bro-
kers (highlighted in vertical stripes)—was ‘7 out of 10.’ No candidates 
said ‘none,’ whereas about 74% of candidates estimated the frequency 
of loyal voters in their regions at six out of ten or higher. Similarly, the 
overwhelming majority of brokers (74%) claimed that of ten people in 
6 In my questionnaire, I used undefined ‘wilayah’ (area) which didn’t specifically refer to 
electoral district or village or neighbourhood.
7 Having used the wording ‘the party/candidate,’ the question problematically conflated 
partisanship with a sense of loyalty to the candidate. Unfortunately, this part of the survey 
was designed before I decided to focus on the issue of partisanship in my follow-up research.
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their neighbourhoods, six to all could be categorised as certain loyal 
voters. Only 23% of brokers estimated the frequency of perceived loyal-
ists at one to five out of ten people in their neighbourhoods. This 
response is, of course, a huge exaggeration, though presumably some 
bravado was involved.
Before we move on, it is worth pausing to consider one more source of 
information to check whether candidates and brokers really are exaggerat-
ing the number of partisan voters (so far, I have only relied on self-reported 
levels of partisanship in surveys). One way to think about party loyalist 
voters is that they are those voters who faithfully return to their party at 
every election. Accordingly, I provide additional data by estimating the 
number of partisan voters based on those who supported a party in the 
2009 legislative election and voted for the same party in 2014.8 It must be 
8 The question reads: “Did you vote in the 2009 elections?” If the respondent responded 
affirmatively, we asked “Which party did you vote for?” The interviewer showed the list of 
political parties competing in the 2009 election. In the survey, we also asked: “Did you vote 
in the 2014 elections?” If yes, we asked “Which party did you vote for in the 2014 elec-
tions?” The interviewer showed the list of political parties competing in the 2014 election to 
the respondents.
Fig. 5.2 Political actors’ perceptions of the frequency of loyal voters (%). The 
question used is “In your region, out of ten typical voters how many people would 
who always vote in every election and would always vote for the party/candidate 
you support?” Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, 30 
September–25 October 2014
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noted, however, that the number of national parties competing in these 
elections didn’t remain the same (38 parties contested in 2009 compared 
with 12 parties in 2014). It means my estimate is only able to measure the 
loyalty of voters whose parties competed in both 2009 and 2014. This 
calculation cannot also exclude 2014 first-time voters who were, of course, 
ineligible to vote in 2009.
My strategy is simple: drawing from my post-election survey in 2014 
(see Appendix A), I ran cross-tabulation between those who reported 
their party choices in 2009 and 2014 to get the detailed percentages of 
party loyalists and non-loyalists in each party. As shown in Table 5.3 (look 
especially at the numbers without brackets), the proportion of party loyal-
ists, by this measure, varies considerably. Only 20.7% of voters who sup-
Table 5.3 Estimated numbers of party loyalists in Indonesia measured by voters 
who voted for the same party in two consecutive elections, 2009 and 2014
2009 election results (baseline) Having voted for the party in 
2009 did you vote for it again in 
2014?a
As percentage of total 
number of valid votes 
(%)
As percentage of 





PKB 4.9 3.0 48.5 [1.5] 51.5 [1.5]
PKS 7.9 4.8 49.1 [2.4] 50.9 [2.4]
PDI-P 14 8.5 59.6 [5.1] 40.4 [3.4]
Golkar 14.4 8.8 52.6 [4.6] 47.4 [4.2]
Gerindra 4.5 2.7 53.3 [1.4] 46.7 [1.3]
Democratic 
Party
20.8 12.7 20.7 [2.6] 79.3 [10]
PAN 6 3.7 42.5 [1.6] 57.5 [2.1]
PPP 5.3 3.2 44.4 [1.4] 55.6 [1.8]
Hanura 3.8 2.3 69.2 [1.6] 30.8 [0.7]
PBB 1.8 1.1 8.3 [0.1] 91.7 [1.0]
PKPI 0.9 0.5 0 [0] 100 [0.5]
Others 15.6 9.5 0 [0] 100 [9.5]
Total 100 60.8 36.6 [22.2] 63.4 [38.5]
Source: The data on those who supported a party in the 2009 legislative election and voted for the same 
party in 2014 are collected from my post-election survey, 22–26 April 2014, while the data on the 2009 
election results are taken from the Indonesia’s Electoral Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU)
aThe first figure in each of the last two columns is an estimate based on the total number of valid votes; 
the second number is based on the DPT
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ported the Democratic Party in 2009 voted for the party again in 2014. 
This is largely because the party’s popularity dropped significantly in 2014, 
following a series of party corruption scandals (Aspinall et  al., 2015). 
Parties that were relatively successful at maintaining their voters’ loyalty 
were Hanura, PDI-P, Gerindra, and Golkar. Note that the sampling frame 
of my voter-level data isn’t only limited to the total number of valid votes 
casted in the election but all registered voters including those who didn’t 
turn out on voting day. Accordingly, to produce an estimate of the 
 proportion of eligible voters who are loyal to a particular party, I also con-
vert these percentages of party loyalists and non-loyalists in each party into 
percentages of the fixed voter list or Daftar Pemilih Tetap—DPT (look for 
the number in brackets). I prefer to divide by the DPT rather than by the 
total number of valid votes because these data are based on the post- 
election survey whose target population weren’t only those who cast their 
votes on election day but also those who didn’t turn out.
Though using this rather weak measure of party loyalty (voting for the 
same party in two consecutive elections), the conclusion still holds that the 
number of party loyalists in Indonesia is relatively low. Only 22.2% of the 
total electorate voted in 2014 for the same party they had supported in 
2009. Of votes cast, 36.6% were cast by people voting for the party they 
had supported in 2009. There isn’t a huge difference between these fig-
ures, especially the first one, and the number of voters who reported 
themselves as being close to a party (15%) shortly after the 2014 election 
isn’t significant, implying that the estimated proportion of party loyalists 
in Indonesia lay somewhere between 15% and 22% at that time. If we 
could compile data about voter loyalty based on those who faithfully 
return to their party in every election (i.e. 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014), 
I suspect the percentage of party loyalists would be significantly lower 
than 22.2%. In short, a range of between 15% and 22% of party loyalists 
provides strong evidence that politicians and brokers make exaggerated 
claims about the number of such voters.
5.2.2  The Amorphous Concept of Loyalty
A second reasonable explanation for why so much cash ends up in the 
hands of voters who aren’t especially attached to any particular party, 
despite strong desires of politicians and brokers to target loyal voters, is 
the obscurity of the concepts of voter loyalty and base areas in the 
Indonesian context. Though they make bold claims about how many vot-
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ers are loyal, in fact, many politicians and brokers use amorphous criteria 
in defining loyal and non-loyal voters.
Using a hypothetical scenario which is developed from Stokes and her 
collaborators (2013), this study asked the surveyed candidates and brokers 
about the effect of voter types (defined by turnout propensities, partisan 
affiliation, and loyalty to the candidate) on attracting benefits. The sum of 
their responses to this question is then classified based on their political 
parties. Table 5.4 shows that I found surprisingly little variation across 
Table 5.4 Variations across political parties in targeting strategies
Party 
affiliations
Which group will the success 








NasDem Loyal voters 93.86 3.68 81.35 98.17
Swing voters 5.16 3.41 1.37 17.61
PKB Loyal voters 86.96 4.51 75.33 93.57
Swing voters 12.42 4.48 5.94 24.14
PKS Loyal voters 82.76 9.65 56.00 94.77
Swing voters 7.63 5.50 1.76 27.63
PDI-P Loyal voters 63.69 5.56 52.25 73.76
Swing voters 29.28 5.24 20.12 40.49
Golkar Loyal voters 77.13 5.92 63.58 86.70
Swing voters 20.97 5.74 11.86 34.36
Gerindra Loyal voters 79.30 7.46 61.08 90.34
Swing voters 19.16 7.42 8.47 37.77
Democratic 
Party
Loyal voters 87.94 5.33 73.11 95.14
Swing voters 5.18 2.90 1.69 14.82
PAN Loyal voters 69.38 9.71 48.03 84.75
Swing voters 21.11 8.34 9.11 41.69
PPP Loyal voters 82.36 13.50 42.97 96.66
Swing voters 17.04 13.51 3.05 57.29
Hanura Loyal voters 78.91 11.81 48.15 93.78
Swing voters 16.04 9.75 4.41 44.18
PBB Loyal voters 92.25 6.30 67.85 98.53
Swing voters 7.75 6.30 1.47 32.15
PKPI Loyal voters 49.24 34.98 5.86 93.80
Swing voters 50.76 34.98 6.20 94.14
Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, 30 September–25 October 2014
The question used is: “Imagine this situation. There is a candidate together with his/her campaign team 
who offered 10 social assistance packages to mobilise voters. In reality, the candidate’s success team mem-
ber had 40 neighbours in need of social assistance. According to you, which group of voters will the 
campaign team direct more assistance to?”
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political parties in the targeting strategies. Almost all candidates from dif-
ferent political parties, except PKPI, said they would prioritise ‘loyal vot-
ers.’ In fact, more than 80% of respondents said this in most cases.
But one interesting point is that the figure for the PDI-P isn’t that 
high, despite that party actually having a strong party base. This corre-
sponds with the narrative from PDI-P candidates that their support base is 
truly loyal and solid so they don’t need to seduce them with payments to 
attend polling places. Ahmad Basarah, a successful PDI-P candidate, for 
instance, claimed that he didn’t distribute money within his own party 
base and only paid for snacks, drinks, and cigarettes for the many informal 
meetings he held with his loyalists (Interview, 21 April 2014). This claim, 
however, contradicts what we found from voter surveys. As discussed in 
Chap. 4, those who felt close to PDI-P were significantly more likely than 
the average voter to be exposed to vote buying. However, the general rule 
remains the same: candidates and brokers tended to say they focus on 
mobilising their own party bases. This is particularly the case when they 
were asked about their strategies in the 2014 election. When we divided 
locales into three categories: party base, opposition base, and swing dis-
tricts, their first priority was consistently to exploit the ‘party base’ 
(Table 5.5).
Table 5.5 In 2014, where did you distribute largess to get votes? (%)
In area which 
always support 
my party (party 
base)
In swing area where 
the voting behaviour 
cannot be determined
In area which always 






NasDem 52.54 9.60 0.20 37.66
PKB 64.63 14.54 3.42 17.41
PKS 27.23 18.24 7.97 46.56
PDI-P 39.69 24.21 3.45 32.64
Golkar 65.86 20.80 3.07 10.26
Gerindra 69.72 6.79 9.48 14.01
Democratic 
Party
67.19 24.78 0.04 7.99
PAN 66.04 13.84 3.48 16.64
PPP 88.13 0.83 11.04
Hanura 78.71 4.50 3.87 12.92
PBB 86.76 2.91 10.32
PKPI 49.24 49.24 1.51
Don’t know 10.69 89.31
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As shown in Table 5.5, candidates from PKS and NasDem and their 
political operatives tended to be more reluctant to report their targeting 
strategies in 2014. The same holds true in the case of PDI-P candidates, 
showing that ‘only’ 39.69% of the respondents from the party’s candidates 
and their brokers reported targeting their own base, while around a third 
of them were unwilling to respond to the question. However, the big 
 picture is consistent: the so-called party base is the preferred target.9 Most 
politicians and their brokers prioritised their party bases because they 
thought their potential vote was higher there.
This is quite a striking result, not least because Tables 5.4 and 5.5 high-
light evidence of targeting partisan voters in parties that don’t really have 
a tradition of having partisan loyalist voters. As noted earlier, Indonesia 
has very few political parties which have enjoyed consistent political sup-
port across several elections. It is especially striking that candidates from 
NasDem claimed to be targeting their own loyal supporters, while in fact 
the party had just been officially launched in 2011 and was running for the 
first time in 2014. Hanura and Gerindra were quite similar. They com-
peted for the first time in 2009 and their shares of the vote were quite 
minimal at the time. Accordingly, these three parties must have had only 
very small numbers of truly ‘loyal’ partisan voters.
Note that in the lead-up to the 2014 election, partisan voters consti-
tuted only 15% of the total electorate (see Chap. 4). Even if we use 
another criterion of voter loyalty based on those who voted for the same 
party in 2014 and 2009, we have only around 22% of the total elector-
ate. These small numbers of party loyalists, to be sure, are highly con-
tested, with internal party rivals competing for their support in the 
context of an open- list PR system which intensifies intense intra-
party contests.
There is a widely held assumption that candidates who are placed high 
on party lists tend to rely on party members in their success teams because 
they are usually heads of party branches or close to key party leaders. 
Intuitively, these candidates will also tend to target party loyalists more 
than they target unattached voters. Table 5.6 confirms this practitioner’s 
9 Interestingly, candidates and brokers from Central Java and North Sulawesi were more 
likely to target party loyalists than those from West Sumatra and East Java. This is perhaps 
related to the evidence that partisan voters are more likely to be found in Central Java and 
North Sulawesi (see Chaps. 1 and 4).
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rule of thumb. The bivariate test with Pearson’s chi-square shows that the 
relationship between candidates’ position on the party list and targeting 
strategies reaches the 0.05 level of statistical significance.
5.2.3  Agency Loss
In addition to the two above factors, the problem of targeting gets worse 
as a result of agency loss. As discussed earlier, candidates and brokers tend 
to inflate the number of partisan voters because they actually conflate 
those who are loyal to the party and those who are perceived to be person-
ally loyal to the candidate. However, this isn’t the only problem. Brokers 
clearly have an interest to overstate their capacity to sway people to sup-
port their party/candidate. Brokers frequently try to convince their candi-
dates they have leverage in a particular subdistrict or village, within an 
ethnic organisation, or inside some other social network (Warburton, 
2016: 343), but in fact their claims are often baseless. That is similar to the 
point made by Stokes et al. (2013), who argue that brokers have an incen-
tive in exaggerating their followers in order to extract rents. They argue 
that party leaders tend to favour targeting swing voters, but they are 
unable to control their party brokers who instead direct benefits to core 
supporters for rent extraction purposes. Such difficulty in controlling and 
Table 5.6 Candidates’ position on the party list and targeting strategies (%)
Party 
list
In area which always 
support my party 
(party base)
In swing area where the 
voting behaviour cannot be 
determined
In area which always 
support other parties (party 
opponent base)
1 74.63 21.95 3.43







>7 73.47 26.49 0.03
Chi-square tests
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson chi-square 27.444 8 0.001
Note: The ‘refuse to answer’ and ‘don’t know’ options were excluded from the analysis
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monitoring brokers can be a source of substantial ‘leakages’ which can 
help explain why many supposedly ‘loyal’ voters targeted by machines in 
fact don’t reciprocate with their votes: in the context of an overall turnout- 
buying strategy brokers might (reversing the story suggested by Stokes 
et  al., 2013) exaggerate the number of loyal voters to ensure a greater 
amount of money and goods flow through their hands.
But why do candidates also exaggerate? It is reasonable to assume that 
candidates cannot be easily fooled by their brokers. As we shall see, there 
is plenty of evidence that candidates do know that a lot of people who are 
identified through personal networks, including those who are provided 
by their brokers, are only weakly connected to them. They also fear that 
such voters aren’t immune to approaches by brokers for rival candidates, 
and they generally also worry that their brokers might trick them for rent 
extraction purposes. Even so, vote buying remains an attractive invest-
ment for most candidates. We shall see in Chap. 7 that part of the explana-
tion is that they still believe that there are a sufficient proportion of the 
electorate whose voting decisions are largely influenced by handouts, and 
this is more than enough to constitute narrow winning margins. Given the 
ballot secrecy that is strongly enforced in Indonesia (see Chap. 6), many 
candidates, especially those who won a seat, seemed to be lenient if their 
brokers didn’t deliver all the votes they promised as long as they were suc-
cessful in securing enough personal votes to win. Most candidates are still 
convinced that among those being targeted by their brokers, a proportion 
of recipients will reciprocate with votes. One prominent national politician 
from PKB, for instance, was quite relaxed about his broker performance. 
Despite handing out a large sum of money in 450,000 envelopes  containing 
cash, he yielded ‘only’ around 123,000 votes and still got elected. He 
explained:
There is a consensus among candidates: If you only get a third of the total 
envelopes you distribute, that’s a good result. First, set your target. If you 
want to receive 100,000 votes to get elected, you must distribute envelopes 
tripling that. That’s the rule. (Interview, 20 April 2014)
Needless to say, many losing candidates still get quite upset if their 
brokers fall far short of their targets. Regardless of the outcome, most 
candidates actually realise that in the context of open-list PR systems, 
they rely heavily on brokers to reach out voters in search of personal 
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votes and so “stand out in a crowded field of co-partisans” (Shugart, 
2001: 183). As discussed in Chap. 6, when candidates started to exhaust 
the supply of partisans or those who have close personal ties to them, 
they often rely on their brokers to determine which voters should be 
targeted. These people who are selected through personal networks are 
loosely connected to ideological proximity to the party and may lack 
personal relationships with the candidate. Accordingly, the potential 
for leakage—defined as those who receive payment yet don’t recipro-
cate with votes—is great. However, in a context of competitive elec-
tions like Indonesia where minor changes in voter support can make a 
difference to the outcome (see Chap. 7) and multiple candidates engage 
in vote buying, anxious candidates have little option but to rely on 
brokers to win the election. They need these brokers to expand their 
voter base.
In addition, candidates typically acknowledge that it is almost impossi-
ble to fully eliminate broker predation and to enforce voter compliance. 
Candidates are generally aware that to make vote-buying work, they need 
skilled and reliable brokers to distribute rewards to the voters they believe 
most likely to support them in return. In general terms, to do so, candi-
dates would require a double-layered control mechanism to monitor both 
brokers and voters. The first layer of the mechanism aims primarily to 
discipline brokers in order to make vote buying more efficient and reduce 
incentives for broker predation. The second layer is devoted to dealing 
with the problem of voter compliance. In order to help detect who has 
kept with the bargain and enforced the deal, politicians require what 
Stokes (2005: 322) called “tentacle like organisational structures.” Yet, in 
practice, most candidates in Indonesia fail to build impressive monitoring 
structures (Chap. 6). Equally, brokers have weak mechanisms to monitor 
their voters to ensure that they vote for the candidate. Accordingly, despite 
such a strong desire among candidates and brokers to appeal to constitu-
ents who they think will reciprocate, they mostly end up distributing 
resources to uncommitted voters. As the quotation from the PKB politi-
cian above suggests, they learn to live with considerable mistargeting 
and wastage.
To sum up the discussion, political machines plausibly exaggerate the 
proportion of loyalist voters. This is partly because the concept of loyal 
voters in the Indonesian context is ambiguous and obscure. When candi-
dates and brokers routinely talk about targeting loyalist voters, they not 
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only refer to fixed party loyalties but also judge loyalty in terms of personal 
networks.10 This confusion leads to misdirection of targeting strategies. 
Instead of directing campaign resources towards constituents who are 
truly loyal, most brokers end up being distributed to unattached voters, 
who don’t necessarily reciprocate with support. Moreover, agency loss 
also produces the unreliability of voters who are identified through per-
sonal networks. These factors in combination—exaggerated claims about 
the number of loyalists, confusion of personal connections with loyalty, 
and poor voter compliance with clientelist deals—contribute to the large 
amount of targeting of uncommitted voters.
5.3  Dimensions oF Personal networks
Having understood the reasons why targeting goes astray, the subsequent 
question is: what sort of person does get targeted for the payments? What 
criteria are used in targeting those whom the candidates and brokers claim 
to be ‘loyalists’? In seeking an answer, one quickly gets bogged down in a 
classic anthropological conundrum: the responses candidates and brokers 
provide in survey interviews may not be honest answers, or at least not 
responses that satisfy the observer (Eder, 1991: 153). But we can seek a 
satisfactory explanation from qualitative research. From my field inter-
views, it was obvious that when candidates claimed to be targeting ‘loyal-
ists,’ they typically referred to more personalised rather than strictly 
party-based relationships.
As discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, context really matters 
in explaining this ambiguity. Given the nature of the non-party organisa-
tion of vote buying in Indonesia, candidates and brokers appear to extend 
the definition of loyal voters to include persons who are ‘close’ to them by 
virtue of brokerage networks, kinship, and patronage loyalties and other 
informal connections. In interviews, candidates and brokers always talked 
10 The point that, in practice, partisan and personal networks might be overlapping can be 
evident when political parties often recruit their supporters through personal or familial 
relationships. When a PDI-P candidate recruits a broker, this broker is likely to be from simi-
lar ideological and organisational networks as the candidate. Similarly, a PKB candidate typi-
cally mobilises brokers from the ‘traditionalist’ Islamic community in which the party was 
rooted. Then, the brokers are expected to target voters on the basis of nearness to their own 
personal networks. In other words, despite the salience of candidates’ personal networks, to 
some extent, these networks should be situated within ideological, social-cultural, and reli-
gious milieus linked to their parties.
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about targeting ‘loyal voters’ and ‘base areas,’ superficially sounding as 
though they were concerned with partisan loyalty and past voting pat-
terns. However, when I pushed them and asked them what their ‘basis’ 
really was, it generally turned out to be about clientelism.11 For example, 
having a strong brokerage network in a particular village makes that area 
part of the ‘base’ of that candidate (Aspinall et al., 2017: 13). This is why, 
despite candidates and brokers claiming to be targeting loyal voters and 
base areas, they aren’t truly pursuing a core-voter strategy as typically 
understood by scholars writing on other countries. Put differently, when 
candidates asked their brokers to exploit ‘base areas,’ they typically under-
stand this phrase in personal rather than partisan terms (Aspinall et  al., 
2017: 13–14).
This is the main argument in the personal loyalist strategic logic I out-
line above. Candidates tend to be confused, and they wrongly think of 
personal loyalists as party partisans. The confusion over the definition of 
loyal voters provides suggestive evidence of the plausibility of my argu-
ment. Given the significance of personal connections in explaining target-
ing strategies, it is essential to better understand the various dimensions of 
personal networks in the Indonesian context.
One important foundation of personal networks in Indonesian elec-
toral politics is areas where a candidate has close personal or familial con-
nections. This typically includes the location of a candidate’s birthplace, or 
where they grew up or lived, but can include other areas where they have 
family or marriage ties (e.g. a spouse’s home village/subdistrict) (see 
Aspinall et al., 2017). When deciding on where to focus their campaign 
strategies, candidates generally draw in not only their immediate family 
but also to the greater family by using “bilateral kinship links from both 
parental lines and following the various branches of the family tree as far 
as they went” (Sumampouw, 2016: 326). For instance, Anton Miharjo 
who worked for Lathifah Shohib (a PKB candidate) told me a story. 
Lathifah is a distant cousin of the late Abdurrahman Wahid the former 
President of Indonesia and the grandson of the founder of NU, KH 
Hasyim Asy’ari. Lathifah who lived in Malang was a simple teacher and 
unable to mobilise a large campaign because of her limited finances. To 
11 Aspinall and his colleagues (2017) also had similar experiences when inquiring about 
candidates’ targeting strategies. As Aspinall et al. (2017: 12) put it, most candidates claimed 
“they prioritized voters they considered to be their basis … believing this would yield greater 
return on their efforts.”
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attract loyalty from PKB and NU cadres, she hired a number of buses to 
travel to Wahid’s tomb in Jombang and asked those who accompanied her 
from Malang to take the baiat or oath of allegiance to help win her cam-
paign. Indeed, she finally got elected. Her campaign team organiser said 
to me, “Aside from the living, we also make use of the dead” (Interview, 
Anton Miharjo, 2 May 2014).
In ethnically and religiously divided areas, personal bases and networks 
can be also created on the basis of primordial affiliations. Ethnic associa-
tions in North Sumatra, for instance, played an important role in mobilis-
ing electoral support for candidates. Religious networks are equally 
important for many candidates. Candidates from the Batak ethnic group, 
for example, usually take advantage of marga (clan) networks to reach vot-
ers from the same clan (Interview, Firman Jaya Daeli, 21 July 2014). The 
same holds true in the case of many parts of eastern Indonesia where fam, 
derived from the Dutch familienaam, and equivalent to marga, is used to 
mobilise personal loyalty for candidates who share family connections 
(Sumampouw, 2016: 325). Further, in North Sulawesi, Christian candi-
dates mostly targeted the Gereja Masehi Injili di Minahasa (GMIM, 
Christian Evangelical Church in Minahasa), the largest Protestant denom-
ination in the province, and built personal associations with reli-
gious networks.
Personal networks can also refer to a group of voters having been previ-
ously targeted for patronage or constituency services. Viva Yoga Mauladi, 
a successful candidate from PAN, for instance, targeted what he called 
base areas where he had distributed patronage in the past (see also Aspinall 
et al., 2017). As a part of the leadership of a parliamentary commission for 
agriculture, plantations, forestry and maritime affairs, and fisheries and 
food affairs, he mostly funnelled his pork-barrel projects to villages or 
community groups in his electoral district where he had personal or 
 network connections. Such practices weren’t limited only to incumbent 
candidates who could access regular slush funds allocated to their con-
stituents but were also practiced by non-incumbent yet well-resourced 
candidates who were widely known for their generosity in particular vil-
lages. Accordingly, as suggested by Aspinall and his colleagues (2017: 13), 
most candidates viewed loyal supporters in terms of networks rather than 
partisan and geographic terms. Viva Yoga, for example, who regularly dis-
tributed small-scale infrastructure to local farmer associations, plantation 
workers, or fishermen groups that were closely related to his portfolio, 
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claimed that the members of the groups were his core constituencies 
(Interview, 22 April 2014).
Overall, the relationships between politicians, brokers, and voters have 
increasingly been less ideological and more about personal connections 
and trust. This helps explain why party switching or political turncoatism 
is pervasive in Indonesia, especially at the constituency level. Some district 
candidates in a number of regions in South Sumatra move to other parties 
before an election, but still get elected (Hilmin, interview, 20 November 
2014).12 It is often the case that when they switch to a new party, they 
bring their brokerage networks with them. Most brokers simply follow 
their bosses because they are strongly motivated by personal ties with, and 
zeal regarding, the candidate rather than party links. If such a shift occurs, 
the brokers ask their voters to follow as well (Hilmin, interview, 20 
November 2014). This couldn’t occur were those brokers and their fol-
lowers strongly tied to their parties. As previously discussed, the nature of 
vote buying in Indonesia is non-party based, so that brokers’ commitment 
to the candidate and brokers’ relationships with voters isn’t a matter of 
ideological conviction about the candidate’s party. Rather, it involves a 
clientelist relationship and personalised networks between candidates and 
brokers, and between brokers and voters.
5.4  maintaining ‘loyalty’
The discussion thus far has argued that personal networks matter most in 
explaining targeting strategies. This doesn’t mean that candidates ignore 
areas which have traditionally been viewed as their party bases. As noted 
above, the personalised nature of voting under the open-list system 
encourages candidates to personalise party strongholds when pursuing 
personal votes against co-partisans. But in order to win, they also try to 
expand their electoral support by targeting areas where they potentially 
have personal bases mediated by their brokers. In this section, we will 
explore the next stage, which is when candidates start building intimate 
social relations with their so-called loyal supporters, trying to lock in their 
relationship through the provision benefits.
Hence, in order to build and maintain voter loyalty, patronage plays a 
crucial role as political glue that links voters to candidates and secures their 
12 For more discussion about party switching in the case of Indonesia, see Nathan Allen 
(2012).
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votes. In fact, given the significance of patronage in binding voter loyalty, 
it is sometimes difficult to disentangle patronage from other dimensions of 
personal networks when explaining electoral outcomes (Warburton, 2016: 
351). The surveyed candidates and brokers believed that 51% of their sup-
posedly loyal voters had received ‘a lot’ or ‘quite a lot’ of assistance, 
including money or gifts or construction of roads, houses of worship, 
insurance, and the like, from the candidate. Meanwhile, only 21% believed 
their ‘loyalists’ hadn’t received any inducements. This distribution of 
material benefits not only occurred during campaigns, most incumbent 
candidates poured rewards into their voter bases long before the elec-
tion.13 Most candidates I encountered used a variety of terms for this prac-
tice, such as ‘menyantuni’ or ‘melayani’ (serve or provide services).14 A 
commonly shared view among candidates is that they distributed largesse 
to their constituents because these were the masses of whom they were 
sure rather than being indifferent groups whose voting behaviour couldn’t 
be determined (see Chap. 4).
By targeting voters whom they suspected to be leaning to them, candi-
dates could minimise potential wastage of their resources. Although tar-
geting such voters wouldn’t guarantee that such offers would always be 
reciprocated, at least candidates would feel more confident that their 
investments would be translated into more votes than if they distributed 
to those outside their personal networks of relationships. For instance, one 
campaign manager, affiliated with a Jakarta-based political consultancy 
firm, gave me an image of a truck filled with Muslim prayer clothing 
 transported to a group of voters in one district in East Java, because they 
had committed to support a candidate he was working for (Interview, 2 
May 2014). In sum, candidates and brokers preferentially target those 
who they think will be loyal and reward them with benefits.
But how sure were the candidates and brokers of the loyalty of these 
allegedly loyal voters? Figure 5.3 suggests that they actually believed the 
so-called loyal voters also operated according to a ‘transactional’ logic and 
were concerned about concrete benefits and immediate rewards. The 
modal answer to the question about the percentage of ‘loyal’ voters who 
13 Such ongoing relationships that involve reiterated exchanges largely happen among seri-
ous candidates—especially incumbents who had been cultivating their constituents long 
before the election. Many candidates—especially first-timers, however, have no opportunity 
to build ongoing relationships with voters partly because of their limited access to state 
patronage.
14 Also, see Eve Warburton on the case in Southeast Sulawesi (2016: 358–359).
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would change their vote if they stopped receiving campaign largesse was 
‘quite a lot,’ while about 39% of the sample saying ‘a lot’ or ‘not a lot.’ It 
is especially striking that—in the respondents’ view—only 12% of respon-
dents believed that all of their ‘loyal’ voters would remain loyal and would 
be willing to turn out to vote for them, even if they didn’t receive 
any benefit.
Again, contextual factors really matter in explaining this finding. In 
particular, Indonesia’s highly competitive electoral settings drive candi-
dates to ensure that voters they cultivate will not betray them and switch 
to cashed-up rivals. The majority of political actors surveyed thought that 
a significant fraction of their so-called loyal supporters would change their 
loyalties if not given benefits. As I will discuss in Chap. 7, the high degree 
of uncertainty induced by zero-sum competition inside party lists encour-
ages candidates to be more responsive to voter demands (Hobolt and 
Klemmensen, 2008). My finding confirms ethnographic work by Aspinall 
and his colleagues (2017) who found deep anxiety among politicians 
regarding their chances of winning and widespread doubt about the alle-
giance of perceived loyalists who weren’t given payments. This is particu-
larly the case when multiple candidates engage in vote buying, and they 





















A lot Quite a lot Not a lot None at all Don't know/no
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All sample Elected Candidates Brokers
Fig. 5.3 Loyalists who would change their vote if they stopped receiving assis-
tance (%). Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, 30 September–25 
October 2014
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date—‘to secure’ (mengamankan) their voter base (Interview, 21 
April 2014).
This finding might raise doubts about causation. Do candidate consider 
these people to be loyal voters merely because they have received benefits 
from them? Or, does their loyalty come first, but need to be ‘locked in’ by 
gifts? Although the answer may not be quite clear-cut, I would argue that, 
at first, candidates map out areas or groups of voters whom they think of 
as sympathetic, or of having the potential to support them, on the basis of 
personal relationships, social networks, or past personal patronage. My 
field observations suggest that candidates then don’t take the loyalty of 
such perceived supporters for granted, with the exception of those who 
have relational networks or a high degree of personal closeness to the can-
didates. Instead they use material benefits to lock in their ‘loyalty.’ The 
result is that it seems that a lot of what candidates and brokers mean by 
their ‘loyal’ voters is simply people or community groups they have pro-
vided with benefits. However, as suggested by Aristo Munandar, a Golkar 
candidate running for a provincial seat legislature in West Sumatra, these 
benefits don’t always come from candidates’ own purse, but they can be 
accessed from state resources. Aristo was proud to claim that, when he was 
the head of Agam district, he frequently made visits to his constituents, 
providing them benefits from state funds, often in the form of projects 
that allowed him to generate loyalty among recipients (Interview, 23 
September 2014). Incumbent candidates often rely on public resources 
and direct them to their base areas as a means of building and maintaining 
voter loyalty. Then, it is almost as if there is an underlying cultural assump-
tion: “I have helped you, so I can expect your help in return.”
The next interesting question is this: if the loyalty of the core support-
ers depends so much on benefits being offered, what sort of language 
accompanies such transactions? In most cases, candidates draw upon the 
language of gift giving, labelling their gifts in religious terminology such 
as alms (sedekah), or other forms of charitable donations in Islam when 
attempting to engage the support of their constituents. At the point of 
exchange with all groups of the electorate, whether loyal or undecided 
voters, as observed closely by Aspinall and his collaborators (2017: 5) in 
Java, “candidates and brokers downplayed the significance of their cash 
gifts and emphasised their emotional bonds with recipients, in line with 
what we might expect from the anthropological literature.”
However, I found a slight difference during my observations. When 
dealing especially with so-called uncommitted voters, whom political 
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machines usually called the ‘floating masses’ (massa mengambang), candi-
dates frequently used economic terms such as ‘electoral investment,’ ‘elec-
toral market price,’ and so on. Needless to say, these conversations about 
the transactional character of floating masses take place behind the backs of 
the voters. To be fair, the negative characterisation isn’t exclusively directed 
at such voters, suggesting that supposedly loyal voters are occasionally asso-
ciated with a transnational logic too, if not secured with a gift. But candi-
dates and brokers appeared to be more lenient or benevolent if the payments 
were directed to the so-called loyalists rather than uncommitted voters.
This qualitative finding corresponds with the results from my broker 
survey. As shown in Fig. 5.4, when asked what motivated candidates to 
engage in vote buying,15 while responses were quite scattered, a significant 
proportion of the sample said ‘as a form of kickback to voters’ (39%) and 
‘as compensation in lieu of wages lost because the voter had to leave work 
to come to the polls’ (38%). About 26% of the respondents viewed the 
offer as ‘a sign of gratitude or reciprocation from candidates.’ Interestingly, 
when I ran cross-tabulation tables, brokers who targeted undecided voters 
were more likely to consider the gifts as ‘a form of kickback to voters.’ In 
15 The question reads: “According to you, what is the motivation of the candidate who 





































All sample Provincial DPRD brokers District DPRD brokers
Fig. 5.4 Payments as a binding transaction or gift? Source: My survey of brokers, 
30 September–25 October 2014
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contrast, those brokers who were targeting loyal supporters were more 
likely to view the payment ‘in lieu of income lost because voters had to 
leave work,’ or ‘as a sign of gratitude from the candidate,’ or ‘as a sign that 
the candidate is socially minded.’ There are indications that intermediaries 
can tolerate such compensation for ‘loyal’ voters partly because they view 
such voters as being more reciprocal than undecided voters. Regardless of 
the fact that some perceived loyalists can end up voting for rivals, they 
were seen to be more reliable in delivering support to the distributing 
candidate.
Having presented the results of my study, one might question the 
meaning of the very concept of ‘loyal voters’ in the Indonesian context. If 
these voters are truly loyal, as claimed by candidates and brokers, why do 
they need to be given rewards at all? If they are genuine loyalists, they 
should turn out of their own accord and vote for their own party or can-
didate without being enticed with a benefit (Stokes et  al., 2013: 111). 
This widely held assumption, however, isn’t supported by the facts in the 
Indonesian case. As alluded to earlier, detailed studies of grassroots elec-
tioneering for the 2014 elections by Aspinall and his colleagues (2017: 2), 
for example, capture candidates’ “deep anxiety about the reliability of even 
supposedly loyal voters, suggesting that their votes were vulnerable if not 
secured with a payment.” Hence, the loyalty of the so-called loyal voters 
cannot be taken for granted since their allegiance to the candidate tends to 
be affected by short-term electoral incentives. In short, candidates face 
two related but distinct risks from targeting swing voters. First, that swing 
voters might take the money but not vote for them. Second, that a core 
voter who doesn’t get funds will defect. The latter seems the bigger risk 
for candidates, which calls into question whether it is appropriate to call a 
group of voters that candidates target as a ‘core.’
It is worth noting that my finding in Indonesia differs from those in the 
study of Diaz-Cayeros and his colleagues (2012) in the case of Mexico. 
They found that political parties favoured their partisan voters as an arte-
fact of endogenous party loyalty. Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2012: 23) argue that 
“if swing voters are constantly targeted with benefits, core voters will no 
longer tolerate it, and will soon become open to mobilisation by other 
political parties, behaving much like swing voters in future elections.” In 
their theoretical framework, party loyalty is conditional, or endogenous, 
rather than fixed. The Indonesian case is different. The driving factor 
behind candidates’ insistence on giving cash to their ‘loyal’ supporters is 
suspicion of the allegiance of their perceived loyalists in the context of 
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increasing electoral uncertainty induced by intense intraparty competi-
tion. In addition, as noted above, voter loyalty in Indonesia isn’t framed in 
terms of partisan convictions, as the literature (including Diaz-Cayeros 
et al., 2012) conventionally assumes. Given that beneficiaries are in prac-
tice largely selected in terms of personal network relationships, we wit-
nessed why the targeting of so much vote buying ends up in the hands of 
undecided voters who don’t always reciprocate with votes.
5.5  ConClusion
So, how do politicians in Indonesia determine which voters to target? 
When it comes to the targeting strategies, the existing literature offers two 
conflicting schools. As we have seen, one school of thought holds that in 
terms of distributing cash payments, political machines favour their core 
supporters over ideologically indifferent voters (e.g. Nichter, 2008; Diaz- 
Cayeros et al., 2012; Stokes et al., 2013). Another school claims that par-
ties will not squander their limited budgets on core supporters, but instead 
expend them on swing voters in an attempt to convince them to support 
the giver (e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; 
Stokes, 2005).
At first, my findings seem to show that candidates and intermediaries 
tend to target constituents who they think of as being truly loyal, strongly 
evocative of core-voter strategy. Moreover, the logic of various elements of 
Indonesia’s institutional framework, such as optional voting, open-list PR, 
and ballot secrecy, provides strong incentives for political machines to 
favour party loyalists because such voters are thought of as being more 
reciprocal, and as a more predictable source of votes. Yet, theoretically, the 
model is built on the assumption that voters can be categorised ‘loyalist’ 
as long as they are proximate to a party in ideological or partisan terms 
(Stokes et al., 2013: 45). However, the number of partisan voters is lim-
ited in Indonesia, and this small segment of voters is highly contested 
among co-partisans in the context of open-list PR which incentivises zero- 
sum, intraparty competition.
If candidates and broker really favour only their loyal party supporters, 
as sometimes seems suggested by how they describe their strategies, how 
could they expect to win, given the limited number of such voters? In an 
attempt to address this puzzle, this chapter offers an alternative explana-
tion to the literature by highlighting the importance of personal networks 
in explaining clientelist strategies in Indonesia. My argument works for a 
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context where partisan ties are relatively weak, where the electoral system 
is candidate-centric, where the organisation of vote buying isn’t party- 
based, and where personalised loyalties matter far more. Given the party’s 
captives are both limited and contested among internal rivals, candidates 
skilfully use their personal networks as the major tool of voter mobilisa-
tion. These personal networks have multiple dimensions ranging from kin-
ship, ethnic, and religious ties, to patronage to brokerage networks. In 
short, the empirical evidence paints a picture largely consistent with the 
personal loyalist (i.e. people who were selected through personal net-
works) strategy I highlight.
The reliance on such networks, however, makes the personal loyalist 
strategy vulnerable to the problems of targeting and principal-agent break-
down that arise in the relations between candidates, brokers, and voters. 
In particular, this chapter has identified a pattern in the allocation of vote 
buying where, despite politicians’ and brokers’ strongly expressed prefer-
ence for targeting loyalists, they end up distributing to voters who are in 
fact not loyal to the candidates. I have discussed three major difficulties 
associated with the personal loyalist strategy: first, candidates and brokers 
misidentify the number of loyal voters because they tend to mix up parti-
san and personal loyalties. Second, the loyalty concept in Indonesia is 
ambiguous and has multiple dimensions relying on a more personalised 
rather than strictly party-based relationships. Unsurprisingly, when it 
comes to determining who gets targeted for vote buying, candidates 
depend on personal networks rather than judging their targets in terms of 
partisan and ideological leanings. Third, agency loss also explains why the 
targeting of vote buying ends up with voters who don’t reciprocate. 
Candidates obviously know that brokers have an interest in exaggerating 
their influence. They are also aware that voters whom brokers classify as 
loyal are often typically contested by brokers working for rival candidates 
and often receive multiple payments. Even so, precisely because political 
actors aren’t really confident about the ‘loyalty’ of their so-called loyal vot-
ers, they typically fear many such voters will not vote for them unless they 
receive gifts.
In conclusion, the targeting strategy in Indonesia must be seen as a 
distinctive type that functions like neither the core-voter nor the swing- 
voter model. Much of the literature on core- and swing-voter models is 
framed by a context different from that in Indonesia. The existing litera-
ture relies on the underlying assumption that party machines are both 
engaged with voters and capable of mobilising them. This sort of analysis 
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doesn’t fit the Indonesian context, where elections have been largely 
driven by candidate-centred politics in which a lot of the connections with 
voters aren’t mediated by parties, but instead by informal brokerage net-
works. The differences in context make the dynamics of vote buying, at 
least the targeting, very distinctive.
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CHAPTER 6
Vote Brokerage, Personal Networks, 
and Agency Loss
In the previous chapter, I showed that the targeting strategy used by 
Indonesian legislative candidates that combines the party loyalist strategy 
and personal networks makes vote buying tremendously inefficient. 
Candidates and brokers plan to target party loyalists, but in reality, most 
vote buying happens among uncommitted voters. In this chapter, I argue 
that such vote-buying efforts not only suffer from inefficiency of delivery, 
but are also undermined by a substantial amount of ‘leakage,’ given the 
intrinsic principal-agent problems that arise in the relations between can-
didates and brokers. I show that most candidates lack mechanisms to sys-
tematically monitor or discipline their brokers, making vote-buying 
attempts vulnerable to broker predation. I also provide empirical evidence 
of rent-seeking behaviours by brokers, drawing on a unique survey 
of brokers.
But if vote brokerage is subject to rent-extraction, this doesn’t mean 
that all brokers are equally untrustworthy and unreliable. The available 
body of research on electoral clientelism in Indonesia clearly demonstrates 
that vote brokerage—which relies on personal networks—remains critical 
to electoral success, given brokers’ significance in expanding candidates’ 
electoral base and distributing material inducements. Overall, I argue that 
despite the inherent weaknesses of vote buying using personal networks, 
these networks really matter in shaping how vote buying works, which 
brokers are recruited, and how targeting occurs. This chapter accordingly 
aims to explore brokerage networks—who the brokers are and what drives 
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them to join a candidate’s success team. It also discusses the logistics of 
vote buying, such as how candidates recruit and monitor brokers and how 
brokers determine what, when, and how much money to give. It seeks to 
answer these and related questions through an examination of my field 
research findings and data produced by my broker and candidate surveys, 
as well as voter surveys from Indonesia’s 2014 elections.
6.1  How Many Brokers are THere in indonesia?
My unique survey of a probability sample of vote brokers provides infor-
mation about the estimated population of brokers in West Sumatra, East 
Java, Central Java, and North Sulawesi. As I explain in Chap. 1, the selec-
tion of these four provinces was primarily guided by the fit of cases with 
the statistical findings of large-scale surveys in 73 out of 77 electoral dis-
tricts across Indonesia. I then selected these four provinces to reflect varia-
tions in levels of mass partisanship and vote buying across Indonesia.
Table 6.1 illustrates that relative to other provinces, Central Java is 
slightly wealthier and has slightly better life expectancy and human devel-
opment scores than the average, but in terms of literacy rates and number 
of school years completed, it is below the national average. In East Java, 
the patterns are broadly similar to Central Java, with the exception in 
terms of life expectancy; East Java is marginally behind the national aver-
age. Although much of North Sulawesi and West Sumatra do relatively 

















70.8 91.6 7.7 644.2 73.3
East Java 68.8 90 7.7 643.7 71.9
North 
Sulawesi
71.7 99.4 8.7 631.2 75.4
West 
Sumatra
69.2 97.7 8.8 635 73.9
Indonesia 68.9 92.3 8 630.3 71.7
Source: http://data.go.id/dataset/ipm-dan-komponennya-per-kabupaten
Note: All data from 2012
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well in terms of life expectancy, literacy, number of school years com-
pleted, and human development scores, both score badly on average 
monthly per capita expenditure. In socio-cultural and political terms, 
Central Java is widely known as the secular PDI-P’s primary stronghold 
with a mixed population of abangan, socio-economically lower-class nom-
inal Muslims, as well as more pious santri Muslims with traditionalist 
Islamic backgrounds (Geertz, 1960). While East Java is a centre of 
NU-style traditional Islam, it also has a large concentration of abangan in 
the southern part of the province. West Sumatra is the home of Islamic 
modernists, who adhere to orthodox Islam while accepting modern ideas, 
and it provides the strongest support outside Java to the biggest modern-
ist organisation, Muhammadiyah. North Sulawesi is predominantly 
Protestant with a sizeable Catholic minority and is recognised as a strong-
hold of both PDI-P and Golkar. In terms of political alignments, by con-
trast, East Java and West Sumatra are categorised as ‘swing’ regions with 
no single party dominating.
As already explained in Chap. 1, my research began with a face-to-face 
survey of a probability sample of 299 elected candidates for provincial and 
regent/district DPRD electoral districts in four provinces. Then, for every 
randomly selected DPRD member, three of their brokers who helped them 
during the 2014 election were also randomly selected, making about 900 
brokers in total interviewed. The population of brokers in each region was, 
of course, unknown because brokerage teams are informal and unregis-
tered. To determine the broker population, I made an estimate based on 
the average number of brokers mentioned by local MP respondents. Hence, 
the sample in four provinces reached a total of 1199 respondents consisting 
of 100 provincial DPRD members, 300 brokers of provincial DPRD candi-
dates, 199 Regent/City DPRD candidates, and 600 brokers of Regent/
City DPRD candidates  (one sampled district DPRD member cannot be 
interviewed within the field duration, but his brokers were given permission 
to participate in this survey). I personally administered these unique, repre-
sentative surveys of elected candidates and brokers from September 
to October 2014 (for more information about these surveys, see Appendix 
B). To my knowledge, mine is the largest and most detailed survey of can-
didates and brokers undertaken to date anywhere in clientelism research.1
1 For comparison, Stokes and her collaborators conducted a survey in 2009 of about 800 
councillors and non-elected brokers in four Argentine regions—the provinces of Cordoba, 
Misiones, San Luis, and the Greater Buenos Aires (see Stokes et al., 2013).
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Table 6.2 presents the survey results, showing the average number of bro-
kers by province. There is considerable variation. In each province, the aver-
age number of brokers for provincial legislature (DPRD I) candidates is 
greater than the average number for district legislature (DPRD II) candi-
dates. This gap is largely because the electoral districts at the provincial level 
are larger and their populations are greater, which in turn necessitates a larger 
number of brokers. It is important to note that in Java, the boundaries of the 
national and provincial electoral districts coincide (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 
2016: 15). Broker armies in both Central Java and East Java were large, and 
vote-buying strategies were extensively pursued in both provinces. This find-
ing contrasts with the normal expectation. Previous works argued that the 
greater the size of the electoral constituency, the lower the likelihood of clien-
telist strategies being pursued (Stokes, 2007; Hicken, 2007). However, my 
survey findings pointing to large brokerage networks in Central and East Java 
correspond with general findings from my pre-election surveys in all electoral 
districts of these two provinces, which suggests that voters in these provinces 
were more likely to view vote buying as a normal practice (see Chap. 1).
Consistent with prior expectations, the brokerage networks in West 
Sumatra were much simpler relative to other regions. Instead of utilising 
large networks of brokers for grassroots campaigning, most elected candi-
dates in the province instead drew on traditional leadership structures, 
known locally as tungku tigo sajarangan (the three stoves at the hearth), 
that comprises three pillars: adat or clan elders (ninik-mamak), religious 
leaders (alim-ulama), and cadiak pandai (enlightened intellectuals). 
Where they could, candidates approached and recruited these people into 
their personal teams (Edi Inrizal, Interview, 21 September 2014). This 
qualitative evidence parallels my voter survey results in West Sumatra, 
indicating that the level of vote buying in the province was much lower 
than in other regions in Indonesia, presumably largely because candidates 
were instead relying partly on the informal influence exercised by these 
community leaders.
Table 6.2 The average number of brokers per candidate
Province DPRD I DPRD II
West Sumatra 44.3 22.8
Central Java 416.5 126.5
East Java 339.3 195.3
North Sulawesi 426.7 97.7
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To estimate the broker population, the average number of brokers per 
legislator is multiplied by the total number of legislative seats in the prov-
ince concerned. For example, Table 6.3 shows that the average number of 
brokers for each provincial legislator in West Sumatra was 44.3 people. I 
then multiplied these with the total seats so the estimated broker popula-
tion in the province was 2880. In four provinces, it is estimated that there 
were around 97,657 brokers working for successful provincial legislative 
candidates in the 2014 elections, and 576,922 brokers for successful can-
didates in district legislatures. Note that this is only a calculation that 
includes the successful candidates. Brokers who worked for candidates 
who didn’t get elected aren’t included. Hence, in fact, the total number of 
brokers must have been much higher.











Wijk  =  Weighting variable for provincial data i, DPRD level j, broker 
category k
Nijk = Population amount for province i, DPRD level j, broker category k
nijk = Sample amount for province i, DPRD level j, broker category k
N = Total population
n = Total sample
i = West Sumatra, Central Java, East Java, North Sulawesi
j = DPRD I, DPRD II
k = Legislators, brokers
Table 6.3 Estimated broker population in four provinces
Province DPRD I DPRD II Total
Legislators Brokers Legislators Brokers
West Sumatra 65 2880 575 13,118 16,638
Central Java 100 41,647 1570 198,622 241,940
East Java 100 33,927 1675 327,098 362,801
North Sulawesi 45 19,203 390 38,084 57,721
Total 310 97,657 4210 576,922 679,099
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To determine statistical significance, a standard error value is needed. 
In this study, the standard error is calculated by assuming stratified ran-
dom sampling: population grouped by province, office level (i.e. DPRD I 
and DPRD II), and respondent category (i.e. candidates and brokers), 
and then the sample in each stratum is selected by simple random sam-
pling. However, the standard error of these surveys could have been larger 
than estimated. This is largely because, in practice, the sampling is con-
ducted with a more complex procedure. All these sampling and statistical 
procedures are described further in Appendix B. Based on the available 
data, it can be concluded that the total number of brokers working for 
successful provincial and district legislative candidates in four provinces in 
2014 was quite large (674,579 people). In the 2014 legislative election, 
there were 62,994,652 registered voters in these provinces. Hence, a 
broker- to-voting-eligible-population ratio in the four provinces was 
around 1 broker to 93 voters. Of course, if we include those who worked 
in other provinces, including those who helped unsuccessful candidates, 
the estimate would have been much bigger.
6.2  wHo are THe Brokers?
My survey of a probability sample of brokers offers insight into the char-
acteristics of brokers. In terms of gender composition, Table 6.4 clearly 
shows that political brokerage is a male-dominated field. Most of the bro-
kers interviewed in four provinces are male, with higher percentages in 
Central Java and East Java at 92.7% and 91.4%, respectively. The majority 
of the surveyed brokers were aged between 41 years and 55 years. The 
average age of brokers was 44 years (the youngest broker was 17 and the 
oldest 76). Candidates presumably tended to recruit middle-aged men 
because the middle-age period is associated with the greatest indepen-
dence, esteem, prestige, and social involvement; therefore, these brokers 
can demand respect from both the young and the elderly in the commu-
nity (Martel, 1968: 56)—a necessary condition of successful brokerage 
activity. The majority of the interviewed brokers (77.6%) were Javanese 
due to the fact that one-half of the survey interviews were conducted in 
East Java and Central Java. Brokers were mostly Muslim (91%), with only 
9% of the respondents being Christian.
How do the findings place brokers with respect to the general popula-
tion? To provide an apple-to-apple comparison, I use voter survey data 
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order to increase the sample size, I utilise three nationally representative 
voter surveys that were held simultaneously just before the broker survey 
was conducted (September–October 2014). In terms of socio-economic 
status (SES factors), my survey results reveal that, compared with voters in 
four provinces, brokers tended to be more educated and slightly wealthier. 
Table 6.4 also shows that most voters were employed in blue-collar jobs 
(82%) such as farmers, fishermen, small street-stall sellers, and so on, com-
pared with 63.8% of the sampled brokers whose jobs can be grouped as 
blue-collar employment. In terms of monthly earnings, surveyed brokers 
weren’t as a group poor by Indonesian standards, though they were also 
not wealthy. The modal respondent earned between IDR 1 million and 
less than IDR 2 million per month (38.4%), though 36.6% of brokers said 
their monthly income was more than IDR 2 million per month. In con-
trast, almost half of the voters reported monthly earnings of below IDR 1 
million. Brokers were also more educated than the general population. 
The modal respondent in my brokers’ survey was a senior high school 
graduate (45.8%), though 19.9% of brokers said they were college gradu-
ates. Almost half of the sampled voters had a maximum of primary educa-
tion or no education at all.
When asked whether politics was the brokers’ main source of income, 
almost all respondents (99%) said that politics wasn’t their main profes-
sion. The largest main occupation mentioned was farmer/animal breeder/
fisherman (26%), followed by private employee/self-employed and blue- 
collar worker/maid with 10% and 9%, respectively. A significant number of 
brokers described themselves as entrepreneurs/businessmen (8%), street- 
stall sellers (7%), and teachers/lecturers (5%). Some brokers derived 
income from automotive services (4%) and wholesale trade (3%), were 
retirees (3%), or village bureaucrats (2%). The remaining brokers were 
professionals (lawyers/doctors/etc.), drivers, security personnel, freelanc-
ers, or civil servants (pegawai negeri sipil, PNS).
Clearly, most of the surveyed brokers weren’t full-time professional 
brokers; instead, brokerage was simply a temporary or part-time job at 
election time. This finding contrasts sharply with Zarazaga’s description 
(2014) of everyday political mediation in Argentina, which indicates that 
brokers perform a wide range of roles to help their party, including per-
forming constituency service and performing basic governmental tasks. In 
Indonesia, brokers are generally not multitasked in this way, but instead 
focus on helping their bosses to win an election. Their challenge is to 
combine this job with their everyday occupation.
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In terms of social involvement, the mean of the brokers’ responses to 
questions asking about their involvement in various forms of associational 
life was 17.94 with a standard deviation of 3.68. Overall, brokers were 
highly socially engaged people compared with the general population. For 
instance, 50% of the brokers described themselves as being active members 
of local religious community groups (majelis taklim), which was the larg-
est civic association mentioned, compared with 23% of the voters reported 
being active members of such group.2 Note that each respondent was 
allowed to provide multiple answers. The next most important association 
was rotating credit groups (arisan), with 34% of the brokers reported 
being active members, compared with 25% of respondents who said so in 
my voters’ survey. Brokers were also more actively engaged than voters in 
some organisations such as NU, youth community councils, agricultural 
groups, or industrial unions and cooperatives.
To further compare the characteristics of brokers with the general pop-
ulation, I conducted a case-control study by combining data from my 
unique dataset of brokers and voter surveys (Table 6.5). In doing so, peo-
ple with the outcome of interest (i.e. brokers) are compared and matched 
2 This is based on my post-election survey of voters in 2014.








Number of organisations 0.25** 0.04
Muslim −0.05 0.25
Javanese 0.15 0.13




Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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with a control group (i.e. general voters).3 The assumption here is that our 
respondents in the voter opinion surveys weren’t brokers. The results sug-
gest that, compared with voters based on data from my polling institute’s 
voter surveys, brokers were older, much more likely to be male, had more 
education, and enjoyed higher median household incomes than the typical 
Indonesian, and they tended to be more active in social organisations. In 
determining the number of selected matching variables, the region vari-
able (North Sulawesi and otherwise) is set as a control. So this is not pos-
sible determinant of becoming a broker, given we have selected the variable 
from the beginning. We included the variable of region in the equation to 
control the variable of religion because North Sulawesi is feared to be 
biased for non-Muslims, while West Sumatra, East Java, and Central Java 
are potentially biased for Islam.
6.3  How do CandidaTes reCruiT Brokers?
Most candidates saw broker recruitment as critical to their strategies. As 
one candidate of the Islamist party PPP, who ran for re-election in 2014, 
explained: “The last elections were all about a distribution strategy. 
Therefore, how we selected success team members was a key to success in 
securing victory” (Interview, 21 April 2014).
But what sorts of persons did candidates recruit? Generally, individuals 
recruited into campaign teams could be divided into two groups: party 
functionaries (either at the sub-district or at the village/precinct level) and 
non-party members (Kadir Karding, interview, 18 April 2014). Candidates 
felt they must involve local party functionaries in a success team, not only 
for practical reasons but also to avoid offending their fellow party mem-
bers. Since party structures were contested by competing candidates on 
the party list, however, candidates couldn’t rely exclusively on party cad-
res. Some candidates accused party functionaries of operating as ‘double 
agents’ (main dua kaki) or ‘money grubbers’ (mata duitan).4
In terms of non-party brokers, my broker survey provides a complete 
picture of how the process of recruitment works. Figure 6.1 reveals that 
brokerage structures take advantage of relational networks (Aspinall et al., 
2015). Asked about their relationship with the person who asked them to 
join the campaign team, 79% of brokers were recruited by those they cat-
3 For further discussion on case-control study, see Alan Agresti (2007).




egorised as family and friends. Respondents were allowed to give multiple 
responses, but this figure clearly indicates that candidates rarely recruited 
people they didn’t already know well as core team members, who in turn 
recruited close associates, and so on down the campaign team structure. 
The most frequent explanation candidates gave for prioritising relational 
networks was that brokers with whom they were personally close were 
more loyal and less likely to shirk (Aspinall et al., 2015). Also, recruiting 
through personal networks helped to reduce the costs of maintaining a 
network of brokers because members would be willing to work hard on the 
campaign even without payment, or for lower payments than otherwise. In 
contrast, a modest portion of brokers were recruited by their party leaders. 
Interestingly, when it came to broker recruitment, candidates were more 
likely to favour neighbours over organisational networks, confirming that 
brokers were genuinely recruited on the basis of personal connections.
Consistent with earlier works, we also found evidence that most 
candidate- broker relationships in Indonesia were highly personalised. 
About 61% of brokers were asked to join by the candidate directly. This 
figure more than tripled the findings of a survey conducted in in Central 
Java III constituency by Aspinall and his collaborators (2015). Note, how-
ever, that the population of my survey was brokers who worked for candi-
dates who were elected at provincial and regent/mayoral levels. It may be 
Fig. 6.1 Brokers’ relationship with the person who invited them to join the team 
(%). Source: My survey of brokers, 30 September–25 October 2014
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that candidates who constructed success teams on the basis of intimate 
relationships were more likely to win their seats.
Meanwhile, only 38% of respondents were asked to join the success 
team by other, more senior brokers. These respondents were asked to 
specify the position in the campaign team structure of those who had 
approached them to join. The modal answer to this question was “village 
coordinator” (34%), followed by “sub-district coordinator” (30%) and 
“base-level brokers” (22%). The remainder identified “regency/city coor-
dinator” or “provincial coordinator.” This parallels prior research that 
when candidates exhaust their supply of close friends and family members 
when forming a success team, they typically turn to campaign coordina-
tors to recruit the rest. Unavoidably, among those recruited in this way, a 
considerable portion have connections that are more transactional than 
personal (Aspinall, 2014; Aspinall et al., 2015).
In short, the pattern of relationship between candidates and brokers 
reflects a centrality of personal networks and, by extension, relatively mar-
ginal role of political parties, in grassroots campaigns in legislative elec-
tions. Asked whether they knew anything in advance about the candidate 
they supported, 71% of brokers knew the candidate personally and were 
close to him/her. Around 19% knew the candidate personally but weren’t 
particularly close before becoming part of the campaign team. Only 4% 
had heard about the candidate but never met him/her; 5% had never 
heard of the candidate before. Again, recall that the sampled brokers were 
those working for elected candidates. Prior contacts between candidates 
and brokers partly mediate electoral success. Many candidates failed to be 
elected presumably because they used a much looser method of selecting 
brokers without ensuring whether or not they were truly commit-
ted to them.
Such prior contacts, however, don’t necessarily imply long-term clien-
telist interactions. Some brokers might have personal affective ties to the 
candidate, without clientelist exchanges. Respondents were asked to name 
whether they had had prior assistance from a number of actors such as the 
candidate, success team village coordinators, sub-district coordinators, 
district coordinators, and party leaders. Although 71% of brokers knew the 
candidate personally prior to becoming a member of his/her success 
teams, the left panel of Fig.  6.2 shows that only 37% had previously 
received assistance from the candidate or team members. As a follow-up, 
these 37% of brokers were requested to specify the forms of assistance they 
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had received. As shown in the right panel of Fig. 6.2, the modal answer 
was ‘project access’ (66%), such as constituent funds for the construction 
of roads, bridges, and so on.
Clearly, distribution of such patronage helps create networks for the 
candidate (see Chap. 5). It gives incumbent candidates a comparative 
advantage in getting re-elected since they have had the opportunity to 
form patronage-based networks since at least the preceding election and 
have greater access to pork-barrel projects and other state resources while 
sitting in the legislature. Numerous brokers had also received educational 
help (15%), job offers (12%), health-related assistance (9%), and help in 
government paperwork (9%). The proportion of those who said they had 
received other forms of help, such as money, goods, or protection, was 
also numerically significant (19%). Meanwhile, 63% of brokers hadn’t 
received help from the candidate. These respondents mostly were located 
at the ground level and didn’t work directly with the candidate. They 
interacted directly with voters instead. I call them ‘extended success 
teams’—people who are recruited by the senior brokers who usually enjoy 
Fig. 6.2 Prior mutually beneficial exchanges involving brokers (%). The question 
in the left panel reads: “Before becoming a success team member, have you ever 
received assistance (e.g. in government paperwork, job assistance, project access, 
schools, health care treatment for you or family members), from the following par-
ties?” If “Yes,” the interviewer asked a follow-up question: “In what forms? (Can 
be more than one answer).” The responses to this question are then shown in the 
right panel. Source: My survey of brokers, 30 September–25 October 2014
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direct access to the candidate. As explored in the following section, these 
extended success teams are a source of rent-seeking because brokers at this 
level often have transactional rather than personal commitments to the 
candidate.
However, an important point is that the left panel of Fig. 6.2 demon-
strates that brokers seem to be more tightly bound to candidates than with 
other actors when it comes to clientelist exchanges. Only a tiny fraction of 
brokers had had prior clientelist interactions with more senior brokers. Of 
those, only an insignificant number had benefited from party leaders, con-
firming that the relationship between candidates and brokers is more per-
sonal than partisan. The results show evidence of the weakness of clientelist 
ties between party structures and brokers. Likewise, very few respondents 
mentioned their prior exchanges with campaign coordinators at the dis-
trict level (1%), sub-district level (1%), and village level (4%). All of this 
suggests that the nature of the relationship between ground-level brokers 
and coordinators at district or sub-district level is generally one-off, non- 
iterative, and short term. The relationships between candidates and at least 
senior brokers, however, tend to be more personal and long lasting.
6.4  wHaT are Brokers Looking for in a CandidaTe?
The dominant literature on clientelism suggests that an individual’s motiva-
tion to join a broker network is primarily driven by partisan orientations 
(e.g. Auyero, 2001; Zarazaga, 2014). The scholarly focus on the role of 
political parties and party brokers has left the function of individual candi-
dates and their non-party brokerage networks relatively understudied. But 
in a context like Indonesia, where parties play a minor role in grassroots 
campaigning, and where under the open-list PR system co-partisans com-
pete against each other, why should a broker end up working with one 
candidate rather than another? One answer is that brokers vary by types 
depending on the differing commitment and the degree of personal close-
ness to the candidate. Some are “pragmatists,” in Szwarcberg’s (2015: 2) 
term, or “opportunists” in Aspinall’s (2014: 545) categorisation who seek 
immediate payoffs during the course of a campaign, and will thus gravitate 
towards whichever candidate offers the best material payoffs. Others are 
“clientelist brokers,” in Aspinall’s term, who intend to have durable rela-
tions with the candidate in the hope of receiving future benefits (2014: 545).
My own findings suggest, first and foremost, that a candidate’s personal 
reputation is important in attracting brokers to a success team. Figure 6.3 
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illustrates the main reason respondents gave for joining a success team—
with the important caveat that the sampled brokers here all worked with 
successful candidates. Few depicted themselves as pragmatist brokers 
whose materialistic motivations are typically blamed for the failures of suc-
cess teams to reach expected vote targets. Only an insignificant number 
were primarily motivated by ethnic and religious factors. The primary 
motivations success team members gave were the ‘candidate’s ketokohan’ 
(personality or personal qualities) and the ‘candidate’s programmes.’ 
These responses point to the significance of personal reputation in gener-
ating electoral support independent of the party. This finding corresponds 
with the dominant discourse among candidates and brokers in interviews 
during my 13-month fieldwork in Indonesia. They sometimes used the 
word figur, which is more or less synonymous with ketokohan, to illustrate 
that it was the candidate’s individual qualities that really mattered under 
the open-list PR system.
Virtually all brokers admitted that a candidate’s personal reputation 
helped increase his or her vote share. My very large dataset surveys of vot-
ers in 73 electoral districts across Indonesia also reveal that, when asked to 
name the personal qualities they think are most important in a candidate, 
Fig. 6.3 Reasons for joining a candidate’s success team (%). Source: My survey 
of brokers, 30 September–25 October 2014
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the majority of respondents named “honest/trustworthy” and “cares for 
the people.” In Indonesian politics, caring for the people connotes having 
a track record of having delivered benefits or patronage to voters. Similarly, 
the term ‘programme’ as in Fig.  6.3, has a specific meaning in the 
Indonesian context, as Aspinall et al. (2015: 12) explain:
It refers not to a collection of policies or ideas the candidate supports—what 
we might elsewhere call a candidate’s platform—but to what a candidate has 
done for the village/voters/constituency. In other words, “program” refers 
to how adept or generous the candidate has been in providing the area with 
pork, patronage, and club goods.
Candidates who are able to meet those desirable criteria come to be 
viewed as having higher prospects of victory. Other things being equal, 
brokers prefer “to work for a candidate who was likely to win rather than 
one who was personally wealthy but had poorer prospects of victory” 
(Aspinall et al., 2015: 12). This statement nicely parallels my interviews 
with brokers: when they decided to work for a candidate, it had little to do 
with whether the candidate was using a vote-buying strategy, and much 
more to do with the candidate’s reputation, since a strong reputation 
would maximise chances of victory. This isn’t to say, of course, that per-
sonal reputation is itself sufficient to obviate the need to distribute cash to 
voters; even many candidates with strong records of patronage delivery 
and personal popularity in their electoral districts felt that they still needed 
to use vote-buying strategies in order to lock in the support of their voters.
6.5  wHoM do Brokers TargeT and How?
What structures do politicians construct to engage in vote buying? The 
typical organisations of brokers, which are known locally as tim sukses (suc-
cess teams), work within a pyramidal and territorial structure. At the apex 
of a typical success team for a DPR member is an inner circle of two or 
three people who help build and control the network. As observed by 
Aspinall (2014), the bulk of the structure consists of a territorially organ-
ised network, stretching down to the village and, often, hamlet or even 
polling booth level, where local brokers are recruited to directly influence 
voters (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). Hence, the majority of success team 
members consist of base-level brokers—what I called the extended success 
team—whose local networks allow them to collect votes on the candidate’s 
behalf. These base-level brokers play a critical role since they have to pro-
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vide lists of voters willing to vote for the candidate, deliver the payments to 
them, and then monitor the recipients to ensure they show up on voting day.
In terms of targeting strategies, it is clear that when it comes to deter-
mining who gets targeted for vote buying, brokers predominantly rely on 
personal networks or simply on personal closeness to brokerage networks. 
As shown in Fig. 6.4, brokers usually target people among their family 
members, neighbours, friends, and relatives in the village. Although bro-
kers have an incentive to expand electoral support beyond their personal 
networks, they tend to favour easy targets to increase the effectiveness of 
vote buying and reduce the cost. When asked to name multiple targets, a 
modest portion of brokers also mentioned those who were active in their 
professional and religious community groups. When asked to specify 
where their vote targets lived, most of them said they resided in the same 
neighbourhood or village  (Fig. 6.5). There was little variation between 
provinces, indicating that the targeting strategy based on brokers’ per-
sonal networks is likely common across Indonesia.
Fig. 6.4 Who did brokers ask to vote for the candidate they support? (%). Source: 
My survey of brokers, 30 September–25 October 2014
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A parallel discourse emerged from my qualitative findings, suggesting 
that most brokers chose to prioritise voters whom they know and who know 
them. However, the number of such voters was limited. Recall that when 
brokers often talked about family, they didn’t only refer to their immediate 
kin but much wider ties, linked to them via kinship or common ancestors, 
marriage connections, emotional relationships, and place of birth or resi-
dence (Alamsyah, 2016: 108). In my interviews with many brokers, I asked 
why they favoured such a personal strategy. The most frequent answer was 
that such persons were the most reliable voters. By directing benefits to 
their personal networks, they believed their offers wouldn’t go to waste. In 
fact, as long as the personal connections between brokers and voters were 
strong, the payment was simply often just a courtesy. There is a shame effect 
if the targeted family members and close associates accept the offer but 
don’t reciprocate with votes. One broker working for a candidate running 
in an electoral district in East Java said, “The point isn’t how much money 
did you give but who gave the money to voters. Voters in the villages don’t 
care about politics,” (Interview, 30 September 2014). Another broker, 
whose wife was running for a district parliament seat in South Tangerang, 
put it, “They even don’t know which candidate I support” (Syafrani, 
Interview, 5 December 2014). The broker wasn’t only an influential leader 
in the district but also one of the leading commentators on law and politics, 
appearing on prime-time television programmes several times a week.
Fig. 6.5 Where do the people targeted by brokers live? (%). Source: My survey 
of brokers, 30 September–25 October 2014
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All of this suggests that it isn’t the message but the messenger that mat-
ters. As one broker put it, “The more brokers a candidate has, and the 
greater family and friendship networks a broker has, the bigger chance for 
a candidate to win” (Interview, 4 October 2014). My low-level politician 
survey found that the number of brokers working for the sampled candi-
dates, who were successfully (re)-elected in 2014, varied in size, including 
one extreme outlier—one candidate reported working with 3000 brokers. 
But the mean number of brokers was 149.44 with a standard deviation of 
299.1, suggesting that team sizes were quite large. Faizin, a successful 
candidate from the Islamist party PPP who ran in 2014 for a district par-
liamentary seat in Batang, Central Java, explains:
For the candidates, rather than assigning brokers to collect a significant 
number of votes … beyond their limits, it is better to have a bigger army of 
brokers but ask every one of them to chase fairly modest vote targets. If you 
burden your brokers with impractical tasks, they will certainly fall short of 
expectations. (Interview, 23 January 2017)
In other words, if the target is set too high, it will be difficult for bro-
kers to reach it due to the limits in the number of family-and-friend votes 
they can access. But since most candidates need to chase a large number of 
votes, brokers in fact often do exhaust the support of those with close 
personal connections to them. Inevitably, they must reach out to those 
with whom they lack close personal ties, increasing the risk of wastage and 
slippage. The longer the list a broker collected, the more likely it would 
include voters beyond his/her immediate circle, which then increases the 
prospect of a higher failure rate.
6.6  How do Brokers deTerMine wHaT, wHen, 
and How MuCH To give?
It is technically difficult to distribute benefits to a large number of voters 
when time is running short, as it inevitably does towards the end of a cam-
paign period. Part of the solution is that candidates favoured distributing 
cash over staple foods because it is extremely difficult to procure and dis-
tribute food in a context where vote buying is illegal. The results from the 
brokers’ survey show that they were three times more likely to report 
handing out cash (16%) than foodstuffs (5%), which is consistent with our 
voter survey results. Designed as a multiple choice question, the most 
common item offered to those who self-reported vote-buying attempts 
(25.1%) was money (75.5% of 25.1% = 18.7%); foodstuffs (12.8%) such as 
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rice, sugar, or noodles; and household items such as kitchenware or crock-
ery, or religious clothes like headscarves, prayer robes, or mats (11.4%). 
Some respondents also mentioned other items such as clothing, cigarettes, 
health and death insurance, medicine, and so on.
This study did find substantial heterogeneity by province where the 
proportion of brokers reporting engagement in distributing cash was 22% 
in Central Java, 14% in East Java, 8% in North Sulawesi, and only 4% in 
West Sumatra. This closely mirrors the data from my voters’ surveys sug-
gesting that vote buying has become an endemic problem in Central and 
East Java but is much less common, especially, in West Sumatra. We must 
also assume a significant social desirability bias, leading to some under- 
reporting of engagement in vote buying, in each province.
The literature on clientelism has long stated the effect of constituency 
size on the relative costs and effectiveness of vote buying. Scholars argue 
that a small constituency size may increase the likelihood of vote buying 
(Stokes, 2007: 86–87; Hicken, 2007: 56–57). However, my broker sur-
vey shows that constituency size doesn’t seem to have much effect5; in 
fact, 24% of provincial brokers reported they engaged in vote buying, 
while only 20% of district brokers said so, though this difference wasn’t 
statistically significant. At least this suggests that vote-buying efforts didn’t 
only take place in small electorates but also happened in larger electorates. 
When it comes to the amounts of money distributed, there was significant 
variation, including inter-regional variations. For instance, candidates 
spent lesser sums per voter in Java than in the two outer island provinces. 
In many instances, it is more expensive to ‘buy’ urban dwellers than rural 
residents. To some extent, there are also inter-candidate variations. In 
some areas, wealthy candidates set the price of a vote much higher than 
the market price (harga pasaran) of a vote (Aspinall et al., 2017: 5).
Overall, however, when it comes to the amount of cash distributed to 
voters, the effect of constituency size really mattered. Figure 6.6 illustrates 
the pattern. Brokers working with provincial candidates usually distrib-
uted smaller sums of money (typically below IDR 25,000 per voter) than 
district-level brokers. It shows those who gave out larger sums, from IDR 
30,000 to IDR 50,000 to be exact, were more likely to be district- 
5 This finding isn’t necessarily inconsistent with the constituency size argument, however. 
It isn’t the number of voters that matters, but rather, votes/seats, or the number of votes 
needed to win. If the number of seats grows as the number of voters grows, then there is no 
change in the size of the constituency.
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candidate brokers than provincial brokers. Through interviews with can-
didates running for the DPR, I ascertained that they mostly gave out even 
smaller payments than did candidates for the provincial DPRD I seats. 
Albeit with significant variations in the amounts paid, they generally dis-
tributed smaller cash handouts that ranged between IDR 10,000 and IDR 
15,000 per voter. The reason is simple: candidates running for  national- level 
seats had to collect many more votes than did candidates for the provin-
cial-level parliaments.6 Candidates contesting for national DPR seats had 
to win hundreds of thousands of votes to secure victory, while those run-
ning for provincial DPRDs usually had to secure tens of thousands of 
votes. Similarly, candidates for district-level legislature had to provide 
much larger payments because they had to secure only 2000–10,000 votes.
In sum, the total expenditure on vote buying of national and provincial 
candidates was still more costly than that of district candidates. A success-
ful national candidate from the traditionalist Islamic party running from 
one constituency in Central Java admitted distributing 450,000 envelopes 
containing sums of between IDR 10,000 and IDR 20,000 each (Interview, 
6 However, this is not the case in Java where the boundaries of the national and provincial 



















































































































































Fig. 6.6 How much money did brokers distribute to voters? (%). Source: My 
survey of brokers, 30 September–25 October 2014
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20 April 2014). If the average price of the vote was IDR 15,000, the can-
didate spent IDR 6.75  billion on vote buying. A re-elected candidate, 
from PAN, admitted that running in the 2014 elections was extremely 
expensive. He said, “I ran three times in the elections, but the 2014 cam-
paign was the most ‘brutal’ one” (Interview, 22 April 2014). He was vis-
ibly emotional and appeared to tear up when recalling his brother’s crying 
during his campaign because he felt guilty for his inability to help support 
him financially, instead assisting him only through his prayers.
Given there are overlapping constituencies in Indonesian legislative 
elections, politicians reduce the costs associated with the larger electorates 
by coordinating their efforts through cooperative deals, which are usually 
called ‘tandem arrangements’ with other candidates. My unique survey of 
candidates shows that provincial candidates were more likely to run in a 
tandem pair with a DPR candidate than with district candidates. About 
55% of the sampled district candidates reported collaborating in a tandem 
with provincial candidates, while 73% of the surveyed provincial candi-
dates ran in a tandem pair with district candidates. The data show that 
provincial candidates were more likely to have such cooperation than dis-
trict candidates. Almost all of these tandem arrangements occurred within 
a single party. In terms of vote-buying expenses, DPR candidates usually 
shared funding with lower-level candidates who were more responsible for 
providing personnel to conduct the transactions on behalf of either lower- 
level themselves or the DPR candidate. In my interviews with DPR candi-
dates, they were concerned about the reliability of their local counterparts 
in handing out cash on their behalf. It was often the case that tandem 
arrangements benefitted only the local candidates, who used the extra 
money that came to them from the DPR candidate to increase the amounts 
distributed to each voter without acknowledging their higher-level 
counterpart.
Figure 6.7 provides insights into the timing of cash distribution. Using 
a disguised technique to reduce social desirability bias, I asked the respon-
dent to observe how many brokers from the same village as him/her dis-
tributed cash to voters. As the top panel of Fig. 6.7 shows, a plurality of 
provincial brokers said that payments were made in the final 24  hours 
leading up to the vote. In contrast, district brokers seem to have no spe-
cific time frame in mind for handing out cash (bottom panel), suggesting 
that vote buying can occur at any time even before the ‘quiet period’ that 
begins three days before the vote when no campaigning is permitted. The 

















































































































































































































Fig. 6.7 When did provincial brokers (top panel) and district brokers (bottom 
panel) hand out cash to voters? (%). Source: My survey of brokers, 30 September–25 
October 2014
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the conventional wisdom, but this option only had a razor-thin lead. It is 
a widely held view among candidates and brokers that voters will often 
vote for the candidate who distributes payment closest to the vote, as the 
final payment is considered to have a greater impact in voters’ memories (a 
point I return to in a moment). But why was this not the case for district 
candidates?
Because they occur in smaller constituencies, the intensity of vote buying 
is greater in the district-level DPRD contests, where candidates can secure 
a seat with only a few thousand votes. The smaller constituency size allows 
candidates and their political operatives to gain knowledge about their 
rivals’ tactics. When they learn that rival teams have begun distributing 
cash, they are typically provoked to follow suit. As argued in Chap. 5, can-
didates often feel anxious that their supporters will desert them in favour of 
cashed up rivals, if their loyalty isn’t secured by way of a payment. In con-
trast, in the larger provincial constituencies, it is more difficult to keep tabs 
on competitors. Overall, however, the big picture remains unchanged: as 
the elections draw near, the probability of vote buying increases, as I will 
elaborate in a more detail in Chap. 7. Interestingly, as shown in both the 
top panel and bottom panel of Fig. 6.7, post-electoral payoffs aren’t com-
mon in Indonesian elections. This corresponds with the widespread percep-
tion among brokers who believed that the majority of voters would vote for 
the candidate who distribute cash last—just before polling stations are 
open, so that distributing handouts after the election is wasteful.
6.7  How do Brokers exTraCT renTs?
From the outset, I have stated that my explanation of vote-buying patterns 
in Indonesia, which integrates attention to a party-loyalist strategy with 
emphasis on personal networks, points to a style of vote buying that is 
prone to rent-seeking behaviour. My study is consistent with the growing 
interest in the literature on the issues of broker predation and defection 
(e.g. Aspinall, 2014; Stokes et  al., 2013). In my interviews and FGDs 
with candidates, they raised deep concerns about the unreliability of bro-
kers, especially those who didn’t enjoy prior relationships with them. 
Confronted by the risk of embezzlement and defection by their brokers, 
candidates therefore constructed their personal campaigns on the basis of 
relational and personal networks in order to minimise brokers’ misbehav-
iour. As noted earlier in the chapter, however, due to the limited availabil-
ity of  brokers who have personal ties to the candidate, most ended up 
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 building ‘extended success teams’ involving at least some persons with no 
direct personal relationships with the candidate. Drawing from my unique 
dataset of brokers and candidates and close analysis of campaigns during 
the 2014 elections, I find at least five pieces of empirical evidence pointing 
towards agency loss7—which implies that brokers can extract rents from 
candidates—and broker unreliability.
First, this study found significant evidence of brokers’ misbehaviour, 
especially defection, or at least the potential for it. Overall, 28% of brokers 
in my survey admitted they were asked to support multiple candidates 
during the 2014 election. Provincial brokers were more likely to be 
approached by multiple candidates, especially from the same party. Among 
those being targeted by multiple candidates, 39% were approached by can-
didates coming from a different party. Interestingly, district brokers were 
more likely to be asked by multiple candidates from different parties. The 
survey also asked: “Were those candidates competing at the same legisla-
tive level (DPR RI, DPRD I, DPRD II) or a different level?” The modal 
answer is “different legislative level” (61%), which potentially suggests 
that even if they ended up working for more than one candidate, they may 
not have been in direct competition for the same votes. However, 29% of 
brokers were asked by multiple candidates who competed at the same 
legislative level and in the same electoral district and were therefore in 
direct competition. The remaining 8% were at the same legislative level 
but in different electoral districts. Evidently, district brokers were more 
likely to be targeted for defection than provincial brokers. There were 
hundreds of thousands of candidates running for seats in district-level leg-
islatures, simultaneously trying to draw on the same supply of brokers, 
creating incentives for opportunistic brokers to defect or to split their 
efforts between more than one candidate.
Second, as implied by the territorially pyramidal structure of success 
teams used by most candidates (Aspinall, 2014), it is possible that “some 
of the money they were distributing would go missing, as it had to be 
passed through several sets of hands… before it reached the voter” 
(Rohman, 2016: 243). While considering social desirability that might 
lead brokers to underestimate rent-seeking, this study used an obtrusive 
measure: “Did you receive any envelopes/cash to distribute to voters from 
7 Chap. 5 conceptually discusses agency problems in the relationships between candidates 
and brokers and the interactions between brokers and voters in which both problems bring 
costs to candidates.
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the candidate or campaign coordinator?” About 16% said yes; of those, 
12% reported diverting resources for their personal benefit. Only 5% of 
brokers reported receiving staple goods to be distributed to voters; of 
those, 11% expropriated these in-kind goods. The actual cases may well 
exceed those figures, but these figures show that the widely held assump-
tion that many brokers engage in extracting rents is well founded.8
Third, I did find a consistent pattern in the dataset showing that bro-
kers have an interest in exaggerating the number of supposedly base voters 
and even in deceiving their candidates on this issue (see Chap. 5). The 
survey asked: “In your opinion, are you certain that your neighbours’ 
swinging voting intention can be directed according to campaign team’s 
persuasion if given assistance (envelope/money/gifts, construction of 
houses of worship, irrigation, roads, etc.)?” Nearly 70% of brokers claimed 
that they were “very” or “quite certain” they could influence their neigh-
bours’ voting decisions by giving them material inducements. However, 
this response might not simply be a measure of the susceptibility of voters 
to patronage but also a reflection of rent-seeking behaviour on the part of 
brokers. When brokers provide high estimates of the effectiveness of their 
gifts, the more cash they will have to distribute, and the more they can 
engage in predation. By promoting this expectation, brokers are sending a 
message to candidates to provide more benefits for them to distribute.
The issue here is that though brokers express confidence in their ability 
to sway voters with gifts, research on voters themselves provides little evi-
dence to support this view. Recall that in my post-election survey of vot-
ers, respondents were asked to assess whether vote buying was acceptable 
or unacceptable. Among those who thought it was acceptable (40%), a 
follow-up question was provided: “Will you accept those money or gifts?” 
The modal answer was that they would take the money but vote based 
upon their conscience (57.7%), while some answered they would ‘not 
accept.’ This evidence confirms the classic problem of vote buying being 
an uncertain business. Funneling benefits to uncommitted voters is a risky 
bet because they can behave opportunistically (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012: 
77). Asked what they would do with voters who received payments but 
8 Indeed, we found quite a small number of brokers admitting rent-seeking behaviours. 
Note that the population of my survey was brokers who worked for successful candidates 
who, as discussed above, mostly had had clientelist interactions with them. While acknowl-
edging social desirability bias, it may be that candidates who built success teams on the basis 
of personal and long-lasting relationships were more likely to win because their brokers were 
less likely to extract rents.
 B. MUHTADI
199
didn’t come to the voting booth, 73% of brokers said they wouldn’t do 
anything. Why, then, did brokers insist on directing benefits to such voters 
when they couldn’t guarantee that the recipients would reciprocate on 
voting day? By urging their candidates to distribute money or gifts to 
uncommitted voters, brokers had greater opportunities to extract rents.
Fourth, another common example of shirking was that the candidates’ 
claims that most brokers worked on the basis of systematic voter lists 
proved to be unfounded. Most candidates say that they instruct ground- 
level brokers to draw up lists of potential voters willing to support them, a 
process known locally by the English-language term, ‘by name, by address.’ 
Some candidates I encountered even showed me a stack of their brokers’ 
voter lists. However, it turns out that success team members who com-
piled voter lists weren’t as numerous as candidates expected. Only 47% of 
provincial brokers admitted that they drew up voter lists and 52% of dis-
trict brokers did so. If it is the case that most candidates had these lists, 
why did only about half the brokers reportedly produce them? A candidate 
from PAN admitted that many candidates were tricked by their brokers, 
who provided them with fake voter lists. Accordingly, he always quality 
controlled the lists by conducting spot-checking, hiring a polling firm for 
this task, and finding that some people whose names were on the lists were 
already dead (Interview, 22 April 2014). It is also plausible that some bro-
kers worked for multiple candidates at the same time, giving them exactly 
the same voter lists (Triantini, 2016: 258).
Even among those who provided voter lists, not all of the names on the 
lists ended up voting for the candidate a broker supported. Some oppor-
tunistic brokers intentionally filled their lists with names of individuals 
whose voting behaviour couldn’t be determined, simply as a way to gener-
ate profits. Recall that most candidates rely on these lists as a basis for 
delivering cash payments. According to Triantini (2016: 250), in the case 
of Blora, Central Java, base-level brokers locally called sabet “used rather 
slipshod methods in drawing up the lists, writing down people’s names 
without knowing anything about their preferences, or without inquiring 
about which among them had been contacted by other teams.” My bro-
kers’ survey found similar evidence. About 22% of brokers reported put-
ting some or most of the names on their list without first consulting 
the voters.
Therefore, candidates expect that there will be a gap between the num-
ber of the names on the list to whom they distribute payments and the 
final number of votes they receive. They typically use a term derived from 
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English, ‘margin error,’ (sic.) for describing this discrepancy, blaming 
‘extended brokers,’ whose primary motivations are largely the pursuit of 
material rewards rather than long-term personal relationships with them. 
In my interviews, when candidates talked about this ‘margin error’ they 
typically referred to two sources of failure: (1) unreliability of voters who 
receive cash but who don’t feel bound to repay with their votes and (2) 
failings of brokers, either due to rent-extraction by brokers or lack of 
capacity to identify and distribute benefits to voters who would recipro-
cate with votes. For their part, brokers typically point their finger at the 
transactional nature of voters who might vote for more ‘generous’ rivals.
Confronted by pervasive broker predation, some candidates claim to 
keep a tight rein on their success team members by doing multiple checks 
of the names on the lists. Realizing that the determinant of electoral suc-
cess is the strength and reliability of brokerage networks, Saan Musthafa of 
the Democratic Party hired a Jakarta-based polling organisation to survey 
the effectiveness of his teams including by randomly sampling the people 
on the lists to check whether brokers had really talked to them (Interview, 
25 April 2014). As I elaborate in more detail later in the chapter, however, 
candidates in general had very few instruments to monitor their brokers. 
Having seen that they were mostly unable to build tight and strong moni-
toring of their teams, candidates were responding by trying to pick bro-
kers on the basis of intimate and personal contacts. However, due to the 
limited number of those who were emotionally and personally close to 
candidates, it was hard to avoid recruiting at least some brokers who 
lacked such ties.
Lastly, aside from the rent-seeking behaviour, another form of principal- 
agency problems between candidates and brokers arose because some bro-
kers actually didn’t know their supposed clients well. My argument here is 
different from what Stokes and her colleagues’ (2013) concluded—that 
brokers are necessary for clientelist exchange because they know their cli-
ents intimately. They argue (2013: 96) that “brokers are indeed involved 
in long-lived interactions with their neighbours and clients, interactions 
which—in the brokers’ view—give them privileged information about the 
preferences and behaviours of individual voters.” They offer detailed evi-
dence from their broker survey in Argentina suggesting that nearly 80% of 
brokers claimed they would know when their neighbours, with whom 
they have a lot of dealings, voted against the candidate they were ‘sup-
posed’ to support. Although this measure is likely to be distorted by social 
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desirability bias, it is a simple measure of brokers’ confidence in their abil-
ity to observe their clients’ political preferences and actions.
Using a similarly worded question, my survey found a somewhat differ-
ent picture in Indonesia. Indeed, 57% of brokers claimed to be able to 
infer whether their neighbours voted against their candidate.9 But the pro-
portion of those who said they couldn’t ascertain their clients’ preferences 
was more than double the figure Stokes and her colleagues found in 
Argentina. As a follow-up, my broker survey asked those ground-level 
operatives, who claimed to know when a neighbour voted against a candi-
date they supported, how they did so? How could they work this out? The 
most frequent answer was derived from their day-to-day interactions with 
clients, enabling them to ‘draw inferences from attitudes or affect’ (37%) 
such as being socially awkward, or through mannerisms or change of atti-
tude, a look or gesture, or trying to avoid them. Others said they found 
out by ‘asking around through direct communications about how a neigh-
bour discusses any particular party/candidate’ (31%), whereas, others said 
that they had been simply informed by their neighbour (5%), or based on 
information provided by other neighbours who stayed loyal (5%), or 
through closely monitoring their data collection or internal surveys (3%), 
or through the display of campaign posters or propaganda tools for 
another candidate in the voter’s home (3%).
But the key point is that in Indonesia there are widespread perceptions 
of ballot secrecy as evidenced in the relatively large number of brokers 
who recognise the difficulties they have in inferring their neighbours’ vote 
choices. These findings are consistent with a widespread, almost ‘doctri-
nal’ belief that the country’s elections must be ‘direct, general, free, and 
confidential’ (luber) that runs deep among voters. In my post-election 
survey of voters, we asked respondents whether, despite the principle that 
elections are confidential, influential people could discover how they 
voted. Only 19.7% responded that this was “somewhat likely” or “very 
likely.” The majority of respondents confirm the conventional wisdom 
that the secrecy of the ballot is difficult to violate, and even powerful per-
sons in the neighbourhood wouldn’t be able to find out how an indi-
vidual voted.
In sum, brokers have both strong incentives and opportunities to shirk. 
The problems of predation and defection are especially severe in the case 
9 The question reads: “If you had a good relationship with your neighbours, when they 
voted for the candidate/party you didn’t support, would you know about it?”
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of extended success teams whose commitments to the candidate are more 
transactional and whose members lack prior contacts with the candidate. 
As I explore in more detail in the following pages, many candidates pour 
out cash handouts en masse, but they ironically invest little effort in moni-
toring and disciplining brokers.
6.8  How sTringenT was CandidaTes’ MoniToring 
of Brokers and voTers?
As alluded earlier, candidates’ capacity to monitor broker performance is 
weak. Surprisingly, my broker survey reveals that only 10% of the sampled 
brokers admitted that their actions were often monitored by their superiors 
in the team or campaign coordinators; 18% acknowledged that their cam-
paign work was sometimes being monitored and a large majority felt they 
weren’t monitored at all. Candidates are also vulnerable to rent- seeking 
behaviour by brokers because there are few punishment mechanisms for bro-
kers who don’t meet their target numbers of votes. A total of 56% of brokers 
admitted to failing to meet their targets. When asked a hypothetical question 
about the consequence if a broker fell far short of his or her target,10 only 7% 
of respondents said the failing broker would receive any negative treatment 
from the campaign coordinator or  candidate. Among those who responded 
affirmatively, a follow-up question was asked about the form of negative 
treatment: the answers were that the failing broker would be subjected to 
verbal abuse (30%), not invited to join success teams in the future (28%), cut 
out of future pork-barrel projects (20%), or not receive the money or goods 
that had been promised (9%). All of this suggests that most candidates are 
unable to build stringent mechanisms to monitor or discipline their brokers.
Not only did candidates have few instruments to enforce discipline on 
their brokers, the brokers themselves had even fewer mechanisms for 
monitoring their voters to ensure that they kept their bargain to vote for 
the candidate. Asked what they could do when voters received gifts but 
voted for another candidate, the overwhelming majority of brokers said 
they couldn’t do anything. Similarly, brokers couldn’t do anything with 
voters who took the money but didn’t even attend the polling station 
10 The question reads: “If there is a broker who didn’t meet the target (for example, he/
she promised to generate 20 votes, but the candidate finally got only 2 votes at the polling 
station/village), did the broker receive certain negative treatments from the campaign coor-
dinator or candidates concerned?”
 B. MUHTADI
203
(Table 6.6). Only a few brokers reported they would scold or threaten 
those who just took the money but voted for other candidates.
Why did brokers seem to be pessimistic about enforcing their deal with 
voters? The answer primarily lies in the fact, already touched upon earlier 
in the chapter, that elections are free, and that ballot secrecy is strongly 
enforced in Indonesia, incentivising voters to behave opportunistically. 
My voters’ survey reports very minimal rates of intimidation or violence 
from political campaigns, suggesting that both brokers and voters who 
were unable to comply with the bargain would rarely be targets of vio-
lence. An overwhelming majority (84%) considered the 2014 election as 
‘fair and free’ based on the exit polls run by Indikator, to which I am affili-
ated in which 1928 respondents were interviewed face to face immediately 
after casting their votes.11 There is widespread confidence that vote choices 
can be kept secret from politicians and their success teams. My post- 
election survey of voters asked respondents whether politicians could 
guess how they voted. A total of 74.8% of the sample responded this was 
“not at all likely” or “not very likely,” while only 13.2% said it was “some-
what likely” or “very likely.”
Likewise, when asked to name who else might be aware of how they 
voted, though they were allowed to provide multiple responses, only 2.3% 
of the sample responded that party or a candidate brokers could find out 
how they voted (Fig. 6.8). The modal answer is husband or wife (58.8%) 
then followed by relatives (14%), suggesting that many voters don’t dis-
cuss their electoral choices with outsiders or, sometimes, even within the 
11 Available at http://indikator.co.id/uploads/20140411204045.Hasil_EP_Pileg_2014_
Update.pdf. Accessed 5 October 2016.
Table 6.6 What would you do when a recipient didn’t come to the voting 
booth?
Response %
Nothing, I couldn’t do anything 73
Ending the voter’s chance to ask for help to the candidates 8
Not give the vote money/goods again in the next election 7
Ask for the money/goods to be returned 3
Reprimand them 7
Threaten them 2
Source: My survey of brokers, 30 September–25 October 2014
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family. One senior PKB politician colourfully recounted a story of his 
neighbour from his hometown in Central Java who, despite receiving a lot 
of benefits from him, shamelessly requested additional compensation in 
return for his vote; the politician ironically noted, “Still, which candidate 
he finally cast his vote for was a mystery to me” (Interview, 20 April 2014). 
With echoes of earlier work by Aspinall and his collaborators (2015), 
much of what I see in Indonesia provides little support for Stokes’ (2005) 
theory of “perverse accountability.” She argues that instead of politicians 
being accountable to voters, where vote-buying transactions occur, voters 
are held accountable for their vote through direct and indirect coercion. 
This wasn’t the case in Indonesia. Even those who take rewards don’t lose 
their power to hold politicians accountable because political machines are 
unable to infer voters’ behaviours; voters can still take money from a can-
didate and vote against him or her.
6.9  ConCLusion
In this chapter, I have outlined that, unlike the comparative literature on 
vote buying which conventionally assumes that political parties play a cen-
tral role in the distribution of material inducements, political parties in 
Indonesia have a relatively marginal role in electoral campaigns. Under 
Indonesia’s open-list PR system, the influence of party organisation is lim-
Fig. 6.8 Who else do you think is aware of how you voted? (%). Source: My 
post-election survey, 22–26 April 2014
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ited, and it is individual candidates who have more prominence in elec-
tioneering. Additionally, in settings like Indonesia where partisan ties are 
weak and where the personalised nature of voting requires co-partisans to 
compete against each other, candidates rely on more personalised rather 
than strictly party-based relationships. As a result, personal networks and 
non-party brokers play the critical role in grassroots campaigning.
At the outset of the chapter, I demonstrated that personal networks not 
only structured vote buying but also had significant impacts on (1) broker 
recruitment, (2) success team structures, and (3) targeting strategies. 
Personal networks shape how candidates recruit success team members 
and determine the structure of vote brokerage. More than two-thirds of 
sampled brokers knew the candidate personally prior to joining his/her 
success team. There are two logics underpinning this strategy. First is to 
minimise the problem of broker loyalty. Those who have personal connec-
tions with candidates are less likely to shirk. Second, from a purely strate-
gic perspective, such brokers are more likely to campaign on the candidate’s 
track record. The centrality of personal networks was also visible in target-
ing strategies. Brokers prioritised household members, close friends, and 
neighbours when collecting votes. When candidates and brokers started to 
exhaust the supply of voters who have personal connections to them, they 
move further afield in the search for both brokers and voters. Accordingly, 
a substantial amount of leakage—which occurs when people receive pay-
ment yet don’t reciprocate with votes—occurred. Given that many 
 beneficiaries were selected on the basis of personal networks, which were 
loosely connected to ideological proximity to the party or candidate, the 
potential for such slippage was great.
It is increasingly clear that buying votes was a risky game for candidates. 
Given their lack of mechanisms to monitor their brokers and the reality 
that many of them used ‘extended success teams,’ relying on at least some 
brokers with whom they lacked direct personal connections and who were 
more concerned with material payoffs, their vote-buying attempts were 
vulnerable to rent extraction by brokers. Fine-grained evidence from my 
unique broker survey combined with qualitative work demonstrates that 
rent-seeking behaviours among brokers were common in the 2014 legisla-
tive election. Nonetheless, candidates were quite relaxed about their bro-
kers failing to meet vote targets, at least if they were successful in securing 
enough personal votes to win. Having realised that such rent-seeking 
behaviours are unavoidable and there are so many difficulties in enforcing 
the vote-buying contracts, candidates are tolerant if their brokers fall 
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short, as long as they produce victory in the context of Indonesia’s highly 
competitive electoral landscape. Finally, despite the personal networks 
helping to provide a mechanism to structure vote buying in Indonesia, 
they cannot escape from the problem of agency loss between candidates 
and brokers that is integral to electoral clientelism in many contexts.
There remains one major puzzle, however. If vote-buying efforts are so 
vulnerable to broker predation, as shown in this chapter, and the targeting 
is so misdirected, as already discussed in Chap. 5, why do candidates invest 
so heavily in it? The next chapter provides an answer to this question.
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CHAPTER 7
Does Vote Buying Affect Voting Behaviour? 
Chasing Winning Margins and the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma
Making vote buying work is extraordinarily difficult, especially in the pres-
ence of ballot secrecy. Yet vote buying is extremely widespread in 
Indonesian electoral politics. Furthermore, vote-buying efforts face seri-
ous problems in their targeting: as we have seen, political actors try to 
‘buy’ the votes of those who look like their loyal supporters, yet in practice 
end up giving most payments to other voters. The problems get worse as 
a result of rent-seeking behaviours by brokers, which increase the ineffi-
ciency of vote buying. All this leads to an obvious puzzle: if such electoral 
handouts are so misdirected and create strong incentives for brokers to 
extract rents, why do candidates invest so much money and goods in 
them? The answer must be found at least partly in the effect of vote buying 
on electoral behaviour. How effective is vote buying in actually winning 
votes? Surely it must have some effect in order for candidates to pursue it?
Little research has been conducted in Indonesia to measure the influ-
ence of vote buying on voting behaviour. In the beginning part of this 
chapter, I endeavour to quantify the impact of vote buying on voter turn-
out and the vote shares won by candidates. I find that handouts actually 
produce a sizeable turnout or higher vote share for the distributing can-
didate. However, I also find payments influences decisively the votes of 
‘only’ about 10% of people who receive them. In this seemingly low 
number lies the key to the attractiveness of a vote-buying strategy. The 
proportion of recipients who admit their choice is influenced by material 
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inducements is more than enough to constitute a small margin of victory 
for most candidates.
However, chasing small margins isn’t the whole answer for why candi-
dates buy votes. There are many countries and elections where the vote 
margins are small, and still candidates don’t engage in vote buying. 
Accordingly, I would argue that even if the returns are so poor, and even 
if candidates aren’t running in a close battle, they still engage in buying 
votes in the presence of rampant handout distribution by their competi-
tors towards the responsive voters in the run-up to the election. Even so, 
it is widely assumed among political machines that although vote buying 
may be an objectively inefficient strategy for generating votes, it is still 
more efficient than all other viable alternatives.
7.1  EffEct on VotEr turnout
As its name implies, vote buying is often defined in the literature as a direct 
market transaction where voters provide their vote in return for money or 
gifts (Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014). Brusco and her collaborators 
(2004: 67), for instance, define vote buying “as the proffering to voters of 
cash or (more commonly) minor consumption goods by political parties, 
in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient’s vote.” In a similar 
vein, Finan and Schechter (2012: 864) view vote buying as “[offered] 
goods to specific individuals before an election in exchange for their votes.” 
Given that vote buyers often don’t explicitly demand a vote in exchange for 
their payment, Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016: 20) slightly modify the defi-
nition as “the systematic distribution of cash payments and/or goods to 
voters in the few days leading up to the election with the implicit expecta-
tion that recipients will repay with their vote.” Similarly, Kramon (2009: 4) 
defines vote buying as “the distribution of particularistic or private material 
benefits with the expectation of political support.” All of these definitions 
assume that paying boosts voter turnout and/or the vote share of the pay-
ing candidate or party (Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014: 2).
In practice, however, vote buying is an uncertain business. How do 
vote buyers ensure that the vote that is being sold is actually provided, 
especially in the presence of ballot secrecy? As previously presented in 
Chap. 6, most electoral payoffs in Indonesia are provided before the elec-
tions. If this is the case, it is possible for the recipients to behave opportu-
nistically: to take the money and run. But if a candidate was to promise to 
provide cash only after the election, voters would likely suspect that the 
candidate would break his/her promise and not deliver (Baldwin, 2016: 67). 
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If vote buying instead takes place before the election, with voters accept-
ing payment but still being allowed to vote based upon their conscience, 
as Kramon (2009: 2) has questioned, why might vote buying have an 
influence on voting behaviour?
The effectiveness of vote buying clearly relates to the party loyalist ver-
sus swing targeting debate in the literature. If we stick with the party loyal-
ist argument, which views vote buying as turnout buying in which parties 
or candidates target voters who are already inclined to support them, the 
payment looks more like the mobilisation of passive supporters to come to 
the voting booth rather than ‘buying’ the vote of an indifferent voter. In 
contrast, the swing-voter hypothesis implies that the payment really does 
act to purchase the support of an uncommitted voter. In this case, moni-
toring whether recipients turn out at the polls is less of an issue for the 
distributing party than is monitoring vote choice (Nichter, 2008). In the 
turnout-buying model, if a passive supporter bothers to turn out, the giv-
ers can be confident that the voter will choose them. This sharply contrasts 
with the model presented by the swing-voter school,1 under which even if 
the recipient shows up at the polls, the vote buyer will still have no guar-
antee whether that person votes for the buyer or some other candidate.
Regardless of such challenges, I argue that politicians still have incen-
tives to pursue vote buying because the evidence suggests it seems to influ-
ence voting behaviour in Indonesia. Let us first discuss its impact on voter 
turnout. My survey of voters conducted immediately after the 2014 par-
liamentary election allows me to examine the effect of vote buying on 
turnout. While the measure of vote buying has been already discussed in 
Chap. 2, the wording for the question on turnout was: “When discussing 
the election with others, we found many people couldn’t vote because 
they were far from home, sick, or didn’t have the time or other reasons. 
What about you? Did you vote during the last legislative election on April 
9, 2014?” Given that social desirability bias might induce the respondents 
to overstate their voting histories, I weighted the reported turnout by 
using the official turnout rate according to Indonesia’s General Election 
Commission (KPU). The commission reported that national turnout for 
the 2014 legislative election was about 75% (Table 7.1).2
To test how voter turnout is affected by electoral handouts, I ran a 
cross-tabulation followed by chi-square to determine whether or not a null 
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hypothesis can be rejected. The ‘don’t know’ or ‘refuse to answer’ options 
weren’t included in the analysis. My primary interest was to examine the 
hypothesis that respondents who were exposed to vote buying were more 
likely to participate in the 2014 elections. The cross-tabs seem to support 
the notion that electoral handouts are quite effective at producing a higher 
turnout. About 81% of the respondents who received a pre-electoral ben-
efit showed up at the polls, compared to 74% of those who didn’t receive 
offers of vote buying. Turning to the measures of strength and signifi-
cance, the Pearson chi-squared value is 0.017, meaning that it is below the 
p-level of 0.05, thus making it significant. Although vote buying and voter 
turnout do have a statistically significant association, it is also reasonable to 
argue that vote buyers were targeting voters they believed or knew were 
more likely to vote. As argued in Chap. 2, this notion is in line with the 
evidence that candidates and brokers tend to target more heavily that 
group of voters for whom vote buying is an acceptable practice, which in 
turn increases their likelihood to vote if given rewards.
Overall, the findings provide initial suggestive evidence that vote buy-
ing may have a significant impact on turnout, but we cannot be sure about 
the direction of causation: it may be that success teams target for payment 
voters who they identify as being more likely to turn out.
7.2  EffEct on VotE choicE
Having reviewed the effect of vote buying on voter turnout, we are now 
in a position to test its influence on voting choice. I return to data from 
my large nationally representative survey conducted immediately after the 
Table 7.1 Cross-tabulation of a respondent’s reported turnout and their likeli-
hood of being offered vote buying (%)




Receiving offers of vote buying in the 
2014 legislative elections
No 26.0 74.0 100
Yes 19.0 81.0 100
Total 24.3 75.7 100
Pearson chi-square (Value/df/significance) 5.675/1/0.017
Source: My post-election survey, 22–26 April 2014
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2014 legislative election. The data allow me to quantify the effects of 
vote buying.
Table 7.2 provides a sense of comparison between reported vote buy-
ing and its effects on vote choice3 in the 2009 and 2014 legislative elec-
tions based on the direct individual questions. Recall that the question 
about the influence of vote buying was only asked to those who admitted 
being offered a reward. Of those subjects (25%) who reported being tar-
geted in 2014, around 41.8% admitted that the handouts were effective at 
influencing their vote. Overall, then, my study finds evidence that vote 
buying produces electoral support for the distributing party or candidate. 
However, its effect seemed to be ‘limited,’ amounting to ‘only’ 10.2% of 
the total electorate.
7.3  chasing a Margin of Victory
At first glance, the estimate I have come up with for the effect of vote buy-
ing may appear small, since the data showed that only a relatively small 
proportion of recipients of payments reciprocate with votes. These results 
present a puzzle. If this is true that vote buying yields minor results, why 
do politicians do it? If the votes of only a small proportion of those to 
whom they deliver payments are swayed, why do they persist? Note that 
vote buying isn’t an easy task. The problems of broker predation and mis-
directed targeting already make vote buying tremendously inefficient, as 
discussed in earlier chapters. Yet on top of these problems, it is also, over-
all, ineffective at influencing vote choices. Under such circumstances, why 
do candidates invest large amounts in gifts to voters?
The answer is found in the high electoral uncertainty regarding candi-
dates’ personal prospects of victory. Although, the effect of vote buying 
3 If a respondent gave an affirmative reply when asked about vote-buying offers, I asked a 
follow-up question: “Did the gifts have an influence on your vote?”
Table 7.2 Relative influence of vote buying between 2009 and 2014 (%)
Measure Baseline Influence Total score
Direct individual vote buying in 2014 25 41.8 10.2
Direct individual vote buying in 2009 10.1 49.6 4.9
Source: My post-election survey, 22–26 April 2014
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on electoral outcomes looks insignificant, a minor shift in votes can make 
a huge difference for a candidate. It can be the difference between win-
ning and losing in a competitive election. Candidates have reason to 
invest in vote buying because they are usually chasing a narrow win-
ning margin.
7.3.1  Open-List PR and Electoral Competitiveness
In order to substantiate this argument, I first establish the extent to which 
electoral competitiveness affects candidate behaviour. As discussed in 
Chap. 1, since the introduction of a fully open-list system in 2009, legisla-
tive elections have been extremely competitive. Note that in 
Indonesia’s 2014 legislative elections, there were 6608 candidates distrib-
uted across 12 national parties running for the 560 seats in the House of 
Representatives. Therefore, the average level of competitiveness was 11.8 
candidates per seat. As discussed in Chap. 1, in order to determine the 
winning candidate according to the open-list system, each party that suc-
cessfully secures a seat (or seats) must allocate it (or them) to whichever of 
its candidates obtained the most votes. If there is only one seat for the 
party, the winner takes all. The open-list system has thus produced a pat-
tern of ‘ground war’ electioneering in which candidates from the same 
party engage in intense campaigning for personal votes (Aspinall et  al., 
2017: 12). PDI-P’s Richard Sualang, for instance, recalled that during the 
2014 campaigns one candidate from a different party approached him to 
release his voter lists (the lists which, as we have seen, many candidates use 
to determine to whom they will deliver cash payments). If he was willing 
to hand over the lists, this external rival promised he would use them to 
ensure that he wasn’t targeting Sualang’s base voters, and to ensure that 
he was instead distributing resources to his own constituents in order to 
outspend his co-partisans (Interview, 26 April 2014).
As a result of this situation, legislative elections in Indonesia have 
become zero-sum games. One striking example is a close battle for a seat 
in the provincial legislature in the electoral district 5, Special Region of 
Yogyakarta. PDI-P was declared to be the winner and received two seats. 
Koeswanto won the first seat by a comfortable margin. However, there 
was great uncertainty about which candidate would secure the second seat 
because the results were so close. With 99% of the vote counted, it was still 
unclear who would win. Eventually, the final count gave incumbent candi-
date Gimmy Rusdin victory by a single vote, meaning that the vote margin 
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was essentially zero. He won the race dramatically with a total of 9417 
votes, while his internal rival, Listiani Warih Wulandari, secured 9416 votes.4
Under open ballot systems, candidates have clear incentives to compete 
against internal party rivals rather than focusing their competition against 
candidates from other parties. Whether based on past voting records or a 
strong belief that each party has its own constituency, they are usually able 
to predict how many seats each party will win in a given electoral district 
(Ibrahim, 2016), or at least there is relatively little uncertainty regarding 
the distribution of seats among parties. But they suffer from a high degree 
of uncertainty regarding which individual candidate will win. This is par-
ticularly the case when there is no candidate who is widely favoured to win 
in a particular district. Even the presence of a very popular candidate 
doesn’t necessarily lower the level of uncertainty. In the electoral district 
Central Java V, it is almost impossible for PDI-P candidates to defeat the 
incumbent, Puan Maharani, the daughter of party matriarch Megawati 
Soekarnoputri. But although Puan regularly wins one seat, other candi-
dates from the same party still have a chance of getting elected to the 
additional seats in the constituency.
The dominant narrative among candidates is that open-list PR systems 
offer a degree of hope of electoral success to all candidates as individuals, 
and that their electoral fate therefore depends heavily on their own efforts. 
Note that in order to gain a seat, candidates first need to make sure their 
party reaches the 2014 national threshold for parliamentary representa-
tion (3.5% of the national vote) and reaches the quota required to gain at 
least one seat in their electoral district (this is the total number of valid 
votes cast in the electoral district divided by the total number of seats). 
The total vote for the party and its individual candidates is therefore 
important. Assuming a party gains one seat in a district, since that seat 
goes to the candidate on the party list who obtains the most personal 
votes, most elected candidates are helped by voters who vote either for the 
party only or for other candidates from the party. In short, the main chal-
lenge for candidates is to be ranked above their co-partisans. Hence, most 
candidates approach an election feeling they need to figure out how many 
personal votes they need to win, how close the race will be, who their main 
internal rivals are, their relative areas of strength, and so on.
4 E-Parlemen DPRD DIY, “Daftar Caleg Terpilih DPRD DIY Periode 2014–2019,” 25 
April 2014.
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The literature on electoral mobilisation shows that politicians act stra-
tegically. If they have little chance of getting elected, they don’t invest 
large amounts of resources in personal campaigns. Likewise, if they have a 
reasonable chance of winning a seat, they will make more of an effort to 
compete (Milazzo and Karp, 2013). Selb and Lutz’s important study 
(2015) found that the level of competitiveness isn’t only determined by 
actual election results but also by candidates’ self-perceived competitive-
ness. Candidates facing a narrow loss or narrow victory are likely to spend 
heavily in search of personal votes to outdo co-partisans, generating a 
cycle of competition which results in even more competitive elections.
This setting is clearly relevant to my inquiry into vote buying. The great 
uncertainty surrounding electoral outcomes in places like Indonesia cre-
ates incentives for candidates to pursue vote buying to maximise the 
chances of winning (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; van de Walle, 2007). 
The literature has long stated that vote buying tends to be higher in con-
stituencies where elections are highly contested.5 The rationale is simple: 
in an environment in which a relatively small percentage of the votes can 
change candidates’ electoral fortune, their propensity to engage in vote 
buying increases. In this regard, vote buying is a means of reducing elec-
toral uncertainty (Jensen and Justesen, 2014). Electoral uncertainty is in 
fact the defining feature of electoral competitiveness (Przeworski, 1986; 
Schedler, 2013). The more uncertain the outcome of an election, the 
more competitive it is (Blais and Lago, 2009: 95; Franklin, 2004: 56–57). 
It follows that under an electoral system which creates competition for 
personal votes, candidates’ uncertainty regarding the probability of win-
ning will make them consider vote buying as a way to chase even a narrow 
margin of victory.
In this study, electoral competitiveness is measured at the national level 
and is operationalised as margin of victory. Using official election statistics, 
this chapter presents two different measures of the margin of victory—one 
taken as a percentage of overall valid votes in the electoral district and one 
as a percentage of the valid votes per party in the district. Note that this 
may be problematic when comparing to the effectiveness of vote buying: 
a single vote buyer doesn’t distribute payments either to all voters in the 
electoral district, or even to all who support his or her party, but to a sig-
5 Indeed, there is an issue of reverse causation here, which I will address in the final part of 
this chapter, whether candidates are more inclined to buy votes in more competitive districts 
or whether more vote buying makes districts more competitive.
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nificantly lower number. But, at least, the latter (i.e. a percentage of valid 
votes cast for a party in an electoral district) is a better measure for assess-
ing the margins needed by individual candidates to win by distributing 
cash (remembering that no candidate will distribute cash to all the party’s 
voters in an electoral district, let alone to all voters). Hence, my analytical 
focus is on victory margin as a percentage of the valid votes cast for each 
party in the district.
In this section, however, I start determining average margin of victory 
as a percentage of all valid votes cast in the constituency, simply to provide 
a broader picture of how competitive parliamentary elections in 2014 
were in each constituency. However, given that under open ballot systems 
electoral competition takes the form of intraparty competition, and con-
sidering that under the system, the primary focus of candidates (the main 
vote buyers) is getting themselves a seat before their intraparty competi-
tors, the level of competitiveness should be closely examined within politi-
cal parties. Accordingly, after establishing the difference between the vote 
share of the lowest-placed winner and the highest-placed losing candidate 
from the same party in any electoral district, I will discuss the primary 
interest of this study: margin of victory as percentage of votes cast for a 
particular party in the constituency in the following section. Then, as I 
elaborate later in this chapter, in order to test the relationship between 
vote buying and such electoral competitiveness—measured as the margin 
of victory—I merge the actual election results with pre-electoral district 
surveys to gain ex-ante information on the ubiquity of vote buying at the 
constituency level.
Before proceeding, I present descriptive findings about the closeness of 
electoral results in each electoral district using victory margins of individ-
ual candidates over their party-list rivals as the primary measure of elec-
toral competitiveness, with those victory margins calculated as a percentage 
of the total valid votes cast in the constituency. Figure 7.1 showing the 
average margins of victory in each national parliamentary constituency is 
simple: the larger they are, the less competitive is the electoral district. 
Because the quota—determined by population size—varies considerably 
across electoral districts, the average margin of victory in each district is 
then divided by the total number of valid votes cast in that constituency to 
produce the percentages in Fig. 7.1. To make it simple, I categorise the 
results into four broad groups. The first group is ultra-close contests—
those with a victory margin of less than one-half of 1%. In 2014, the small-
est margins were seen in West Java XI and East Java III—its precise margin 
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was actually 0.47%, rounded up to 0.5% as appeared in Fig. 7.1. The sec-
ond is very close races, those with victory margins of between a half of 1% 
and 2%.6 The majority of constituencies (48 out of 77 electoral districts 
across Indonesia) belong to this group, confirming the hypothesis that the 
general pattern has been extremely competitive under open-list PR sys-
tem. It is also worth noticing that in the above graph, most of those very 
close contests were located in the densely populated islands of Java and 
Sumatra with some of them decided by even less than 1% of the total 
polled votes.
The third group is close contests—decided by an average margin of 
between 2.1% and 4% in 2014. As shown in Fig. 7.1, 17 electoral districts 
are in this category. A last category is uncompetitive electoral districts 
which had an average winning margin of over 4%. Interestingly, only a 
handful of constituencies were decided by big margins. The least competi-
tive constituency in 2014 was Gorontalo, where winning candidates had 
an average 11.8% margin of victory, followed by Bangka Belitung which 
had a fairly high margin of 6.9% and Riau Islands and West Papua which 
equally had a margin of 6.6%. These uncompetitive races all occurred in 
electoral districts with low magnitude with only three seats available in 
each constituency. This finding parallels Carey and Shugart’s (1995: 431) 
argument that where district magnitude is higher, incentives to cultivate 
personal votes increase. Under open ballot systems, the higher a district 
magnitude, the more co-partisan competitors enter the race, resulting in 
more competitive elections as a result of increasing intraparty competition. 
The reverse is also true.
Overall, 69 out of 77 constituencies were decided by slim margins of 
less than 4%, calculated as a proportion of all votes cast in the electoral 
district, suggesting that the level of competitiveness in the constituencies 
was extremely high. As noted above, such constituency-level campaigns 
were systematically associated with intraparty competition in which candi-
dates from the same party were busy fighting against their co-partisans. 
Such fierce competition between individual candidates for personal votes 
helps explain why candidates pursue vote buying, despite its seemingly 
small effects on vote choice. Recall that the effect of vote buying on vot-
ing decisions was up to 10% of the electorate. There were around 187 mil-
lion voters in Indonesia’s 2014 legislative election. Even if we use such an 
estimate, the 10.2% effect would mean an estimated 19  million voters 
6 I adapt the first two categories from Ray Christensen and Kyle Colvin (2007).
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nationwide admitted that receiving money and gifts can be a crucial factor 
influencing their voting decisions.
Note that the estimates of vote-buying effectiveness are calculated as a 
percentage of those who received money from a candidate rather than the 
electorate. Given that ‘only’ 25% of respondents were exposed to vote 
buying (based on the direct measure), and 41.8% of the recipients were 
influenced, in total numbers, vote buying had an influence on 10.2%. The 
effect would likely have been higher if the candidates were able to distrib-
ute payments to more than a quarter of the electorate. Given that among 
those being targeted, 41.8% admitted that the handouts were effective at 
influencing their vote, it can be inferred the more the number of enve-
lopes candidates distribute, the more likely they are to generate higher 
vote share. Let’s say that an electoral district has 1,000,000 valid votes, 
and an average margin of victory of 4%—4% is 40,000 votes. If a candidate 
gave cash to 100,000 voters, he/she would generate 41,800 votes (41.8% 
of the 100,000 recipients), assuming he/she is the only candidate who 
engages in a vote-buying operation. This amount would be more than 
enough to explain the victory.
It is more complicated in practice, though. As I will explain in the next 
section, given that there are multiple candidates competing to purchase 
the votes, or even avidly bidding up the price of votes to defeat rivals 
(Aspinall et al., 2017), and the evidence that a significant number of the 
electorate received multiple payments, it would be difficult for candidates 
to assess how successful their vote-buying efforts was in generating votes. 
Therefore, many wealthy, serious candidates often double their efforts at 
vote buying in the hope of reducing uncertainty with regard to the elec-
tion outcomes and maximising their individual chances of success.
This helps to solve the above puzzle of why politicians insist on spend-
ing money on vote buying in legislative elections, despite the fact that it is 
a strategy that would seem to fail to yield full effects. Despite vote buying 
being vulnerable to broker predation and the recipients not always  repaying 
with votes, politicians believe that minor changes in voter support—
whether by buying votes or other electoral strategies—can make a differ-
ence to the outcome.7 Overall, this is in line with previous works (e.g. 
Jensen and Justesen, 2014), suggesting that vote buying is a key instru-
ment for parties or candidates to create winning margins.
7 For further discussion on the impact of competitive electoral settings where minor shifts 
in vote shares can change electoral results, see Milazzo and Karp (2013).
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7.3.2  Intense Intraparty Competition
Having established the average margin of victory in each constituency, we 
are now in a position to provide the average victory margin in each politi-
cal party. As noted above, due to Indonesia’s open-list PR system, which 
incentivises intraparty competition, this measure is a better indicator for 
assessing the competitiveness that candidates care most about. To arrive at 
the figure, the average margin of victory is calculated as the lowest win-
ner’s votes minus the losing runner-up’s votes from the same party divided 
by the total number of valid votes polled for that party in the electoral 
district. Overall, the size of the winning candidate’s victory within a politi-
cal party varies significantly. For instance, the winning party in 2014, PDI- 
P, won 109 of the 560 seats in the national legislature, with the victory 
margins of these candidates over their nearest-placed PDI-P competitors 
ranging from 0.1% to 67.2%. At the high end, PDI-P’s Jimmy Demianus 
Ijie of West Papua defeated his nearest co-partisan by the widest margin. 
At the low end, PDI-P’s Wiryanti Sukamdani of Jakarta I seat scraped 
through with a small margin of 441 votes or equal to 0.1%, the lowest 
margin among all PDI-P winning candidates. A President Director and 
CEO of PT Sahid International Hotel, and a daughter of one of the rich-
est men in Indonesia, Wiryanti not only defeated her nearest party rival 
Abadi Hutagalung, she also successfully unseated the incumbent candi-
date Adang Ruchiatna. As alluded to above, PDI-P candidates also fought 
in a close race to compete for the third seat in one of the party strongholds 
in Central Java V. The promising young professional Darmawan Prasodjo 
lost to Rahmad Handoyo by a margin of 485 votes or 0.1%. Among elec-
toral districts won by PDI-P, 27 constituencies witnessed victory with a 
margin of less than 4%. Among others, East Nusa Tenggara I saw the clos-
est fight as Honing Sanny, who polled 49,287 votes, beat an intellectual- 
turned- politician widely known as Megawati’s surrogate Andreas Pareira, 
who received 49,089 votes; West Java VII was among the most closely 
contested constituencies where four PDI-P candidates had a close fight to 
compete an additional seat received by the party.
Similarly, politicians from Golkar, the second-placed party in the 2014 
legislative election, were forced to compete in very tight races against co- 
partisan rivals in many electoral districts across Indonesia. Of the 91 seats 
the party won, 26 seats were close victories in which the winning candi-
dates needed a margin of less than 4% to topple their internal competitor. 
In West Java XI, four candidates from Golkar initially had a chance of 
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winning an additional seat. Ultimately, Zacky Siradj took home the prize 
by the lowest margin of 0.2%. Likewise, in Central Java IV, Endang Maria 
Astuti, who occupied a low rank on the party list unexpectedly defeated—
with a victory margin of 0.3%—high-profile names from her own party, 
including the sitting candidate Hajriyanto Thohari, former Deputy 
Chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), who ended in 
the third position. Golkar politicians from the outer islands also witnessed 
tight wins, including Indro Hananto who defeated his nearest party rival 
by a 0.3% victory margin in South Kalimantan I, Syamsul Bachri who won 
with a 0.6% margin in South Sulawesi II, and M. Lutfi who retained his 
constituency in West Nusa Tenggara, defeating his nearest rival by a mar-
gin of 0.9%.
The third-placed party in 2014, Gerindra, also experienced high- 
intensity campaigns among its candidates. Fourteen out of the 73 seats 
Prabowo’s party won were decided by a margin of less than 4%, with some 
won with a margin of less than 1%. The striking example was Martin 
Hutabarat, who almost lost his seat in North Sumatra III to his party rival 
Sortaman Saragih. Only 27 votes separated the winning Martin from the 
losing candidate, meaning that the margin was basically zero. This was the 
lowest victory margin not only in that electoral district but also among all 
Gerindra winning candidates. Likewise, Gerindra’s Dairul suffered defeat 
at the hands of his internal party competitor, H. Anda in Banten I con-
stituency with a small margin of 332 votes. In West Kalimantan, Katherine 
Oendoen defeated her party rivals by a slim margin of 0.3%, including 
Deputy Party Leader Arief Poyuono.
In a similar vein, a high degree of intraparty competition happened 
among the Democratic Party’s candidates in 2014. A series of high-profile 
corruption scandals implicating its party executives (Aspinall et al., 2015a) 
forced its candidates not to rely on party branding but instead on their 
individual efforts, intensifying intraparty competition. Almost half of the 
61 seats the party won in 2014 were decided by a margin of less than 5%. 
Dramatically, among these lowest-margin wins, two seats saw victory with 
winner-loser differences of almost 0%. Salim Mengga retained his constit-
uency in West Sulawesi with a small margin of 25 votes after defeating the 
closest rival, Sulfia Suhardi. This was the lowest winning margin across 
national DPR constituencies in Indonesia and across the winning candi-
dates in all political parties. Similarly, Ikhsan Modjo, an economist-turned 
politician and party leader’s ally, was surprisingly defeated by a notorious 
local politician Ayub Khan with a margin of 57 votes in East Java IV.
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Smaller parties also deserve to be mentioned. In Papua, the internal 
political race within NasDem was heated as several high-profile candidates 
clashed with each other. Three candidates had a chance of winning, but 
Sulaiman Hamzah ultimately won the seat, defeating former two-term 
governor of Papua, Barnabas Suebu, with a small margin of 1%. In gen-
eral, at least a quarter of NasDem’s victories in 2014 were closely con-
tested within the party list. A high degree of uncertainty and intense 
intraparty competitions can produce what Christensen and Colvin (2007) 
termed ‘election-night corruption’ in which one candidate ends up engi-
neering sufficient votes to defeat the nearest rival by a slim margin. For 
instance, Hanura’s top-ranked politician Erik Wardhana was first 
announced to hold a narrow lead over his co-partisan rival Djoni 
Rolindrawan in West Java III. The initial vote tallies showed that the sit-
ting candidate Erik would retain his constituency by a margin of 0.9%. 
Djoni refused to concede, however, and reported Erik to the Elections 
Supervisory Agency (BAWASLU) and The Election Organisation Ethics 
Council (DKPP) for allegedly manufacturing votes to win the election. 
Having proved such fraud, both bodies recommended the General 
Election Commission (KPU) revise the vote tallies, and Djoni was then 
declared the winner (see DKPP’s Putusan No 30 Tahun 2014; Media 
Indonesia, 22 September 2015).
Zero-sum intraparty campaigns also appeared among candidates run-
ning with Islamic political parties. Among the victories with the smallest 
margins in PKS, for instance, three seats had a margin of less than 1%. Of 
the three, West Java V witnessed the closest fight as PKS’ Soemandjaja 
won by a margin of 0.5% against his nearest party rival; Central Java III’s 
Gamari and DKI Jakarta III’s Adang Daradjatun were two of the candi-
dates with 0.7% and 0.8% victory margins, respectively. Though not so 
tight compared to other political parties, intense campaigning among PPP 
candidates occurred in some electoral districts. Among others, Anas 
Thahir and Zaini Rahman were neck and neck in East Java III, with the 
latter trailing by just a 0.4% margin. The level of competitiveness among 
PKB’s candidates seems to be higher than PPP. Around 11 of 43 seats 
received by this moderate Islamic party had a margin of between 0.1% and 
3.4% compared to PPP that had less hotly contested battleground con-
stituencies. Among others, PKB’s Siti Masrifah won Banten III constitu-
ency, defeating her party rivals, including a well-known actor Tommy 
Kurniawan. The same is also true for candidates running with the Islam 
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modernist party PAN. Almost one-quarter of its total 47 seats in 2014 
were decided by a margin of less than 7%.
Overall, the average difference between the vote share of the lowest 
winner and the losing runner-up’s votes from the same party in a given 
electoral district was 31,801 votes. Table  7.3 shows that the absolute 
number of votes in the margin of victory in each political party varied 
slightly from 22,125 votes (Democratic Party) to 39,263 (PAN). In gen-
eral, these absolute margins of victory in each party are relatively small if 
we divide by the total number of valid votes cast for all political parties in 
all electoral districts (77 constituencies). Column 3 of Table 7.3 shows 
that the average number of valid votes polled in each district was 
1,584,463.9 votes.
The results are largely self-explanatory: all political parties suffer from a 
high degree of competitive intraparty contests measured by a small margin 
of between 1.40% and 2.48%. The pattern of intraparty competition 
among Democrats’ candidates was highest, perhaps due to the decreasing 
popularity of the party, which forced its candidates to rely on their per-
sonal reputations, as discussed earlier. Meanwhile, though still competitive 
by any standard, candidates running with PAN witnessed victory with the 
highest margin compared to other parties. Overall, however, candidate- 
level competition in seeking personal votes in Indonesia is comparatively 
high since it only needs a margin of 1.65% of votes cast for that party on 
Table 7.3 Average margins of victory by political party
Political 
parties
Average margin of victory  
in each political party
Average number of valid  
votes per electoral district
Percentage
NasDem 35,516.7 1,584,462.9 2.24
PKB 30,180.2 1,584,462.9 1.90
PKS 28,500.4 1,584,462.9 1.80
PDI-P 23,080.2 1,584,462.9 1.46
Golkar 23,387.1 1,584,462.9 1.48




PAN 39,263.1 1,584,462.9 2.48
PPP 35,049.7 1,584,462.9 2.21
Hanura 23,247.6 1,584,462.9 1.47




average for a candidate to win the final seat won on their party list. This 
finding is compatible with previous works (e.g. Christensen and Colvin, 
2007), suggesting that the level of between-candidate competition in 
multi-seat districts is likely to be more competitive since the vote share of 
the lowest winner and the losing runner-up will be much closer to each 
other compared to elections in single-seat districts.8
7.3.3  Electoral Competitiveness and Vote Buying
Having discussed the zero-sum nature of intraparty competition, we now 
turn to examine the relationship between variations in electoral 
 competitiveness and vote buying. Accordingly, I need reliable data on the 
level of vote-buying incidents at the electoral district level. Pre-election 
surveys conducted by my polling organisation Indikator before the 
national legislative election in 2014 are a good source of data for that 
purpose. In these surveys, multistage random sampling was used to pro-
duce a sample that enables us to make inferences and generalisations about 
the target population. I use 13 surveys with a total number of respondents 
of 9344, with the numbers per electoral district varying considerably from 
410 to 2387 respondents.
Table 7.4 illustrates vote-buying incidence and the average margin of 
victory in 13 electoral districts.9 The wording used to measure vote buying 
in these surveys was: “During the run-up to the April 9th 2014 election, 
did you observe candidates or success team members offering you money, 
food, household items, and/or other goods (excluding propaganda hats, 
shirts, and posters)?” Unfortunately, the district surveys were conducted 
about two months prior to the elections, while vote buying typically takes 
place or accelerates during the last few days leading up to the polls. We can 
therefore assume that such practices aren’t fully captured by these surveys. 
8 Again, regarding the electoral effect of vote buying that stood at 10.2% of the electorate, 
what candidates care most about is how to win the election by a margin that fell within 10.2% 
of their own personal vote. Recall that it isn’t the total party vote that really counts, but the 
number of voters a candidate distributed money to.
9 My polling institute Indikator, along with SMRC, together actually conducted electoral 
district surveys in 73 out of 77 constituencies. Unfortunately, the wording used wasn’t the 
most explicit version possible to uncover vote buying behaviour. The question was only 
intended to measure how acceptable vote buying was according to respondents, which of 
course doesn’t allow us to measure whether voters actually accepted electoral bribes or even 
received vote buying offers.
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But though the available data likely seriously underestimate levels of vote 
buying, they do allow comparison across a number of electoral districts 
and therefore help us examine whether a high degree of competition actu-
ally drives candidates to engage in vote buying. If this is true, it should be 
reflected not only in a few days before an election but also some months 
before the voting day.
To test the impact of electoral closeness on vote buying, I examine the 
relationship between individual-candidates-level competition and vote 
buying as a better measure for determining the level of competitiveness in 
settings like Indonesia where under open-list electoral system, every indi-
vidual candidate fights for personal votes. Electoral competitiveness in 
each district should be put in the context of candidate competition within 
parties and between parties. This is to gauge the extent to which the level 
of intra- and interparty competition within districts shapes vote buying. 
Given each electoral district had multiple seats being contested, I include 
the average margin of all winning candidates across political parties.
In Fig. 7.2, each dot is one candidate gaining the final seat won by his/
her political party. In 2014, of the races for which I have relevant survey 
data available, there were 92 seats available in 13 electoral districts. At the 
top of centre point is NasDem’s Hasan Aminuddin of East Java II, who 
won by a large margin in a district whose respondents reported receiving 
attempts at vote buying at a roughly average rate. At top right is West Java 
Table 7.4 Vote buying and winning margins in 13 electoral districts (%)
Electoral districts Vote buying (y) Winning margin (x)
West Sumatra-II 3.80 2.72
West Java-VII 12.77 0.75
West Java-XI 7.73 0.44
Central Java-III 5.20 1.98
Central Java-V 6.17 0.90
Central Java-VI 3.66 1.77
Central Java-VIII 6.48 0.61
East Java-II 6.93 2.84
East Java-V 5.36 1.26
East Java-VIII 7.14 1.38
East Java-IX 8.46 1.79
East Java-XI 4.60 3.01
Southeast Sulawesi 7.98 2.45
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VII, home of PPP’s Wardatul Asriah who won by a fairly high margin in 
the constituency, where respondents reported the highest rate of vote buy-
ing. At bottom left is PPP’s Muhammad Iqbal of West Sumatra II, who 
won by a slim margin in a district where its residents were less likely to be 
exposed to vote buying.
Fig. 7.2 Correlations (Pearson’s r) between competitiveness and vote buying 
within electoral districts (%)
Vote buying
N Correlation Sign.
Vote margin 92 −0.218* 0.036
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The dashed line in Fig. 7.2 demonstrates the overall trend. The line falls 
to the right, again showing that the correlation is in the expected direc-
tion, implying that the relationship between competitiveness of elec-
tions—marked by smaller winning margins—and vote buying really exists. 
The Pearson’s correlation test returned a significance level of 0.036, prov-
ing that the two variables do have a statistically significant relationship. We 
can be reasonably sure that, as electoral contests grow more competitive, 
average levels of vote buying increase. It is worth noticing, though, not-
withstanding a clear correlation between competitiveness and vote buying, 
there is a causal issue. This study is unable to assess whether more com-
petitive electoral districts make candidates to buy votes or whether the 
opposite is true: more vote buying generates more competitive elections.
To sum up, regardless of such chicken and egg problem, the analysis 
confirms much of the existing literature that states electoral systems shape 
politicians’ strategies and behaviour. When the election of candidates 
within party lists is dependent upon securing a personal vote, they will 
respond to such competition by building personal appeals rather than rely-
ing on party reputation (Chang, 2005; Carey and Shugart, 1995). Under 
these circumstances, what matters most in the open-list campaigns is intra-
party competition rather than interparty competition. As I have argued, it 
is the competition between candidates within a party list that makes them 
engage in more intense personal campaigning (Selb and Lutz, 2015). 
Given that seats are taken by candidates who obtain the most votes from 
each list, intraparty competition under the open-list system increases can-
didates’ electoral uncertainty. The dominant narrative among candidates is 
that they were all dubious about their chances of getting elected—not 
only rank-and-file candidates placed low on their party list but also party 
leaders who were placed high.
The link to vote buying is therefore doubly clear: first, when candidates 
are forced to compete against co-partisans, they can no longer rely on 
their party label to take them into parliament, and they have clear incen-
tives to differentiate themselves in other ways (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 
2016: 13); second, when elections become highly contested, and a rela-
tively small proportion of the overall votes cast can make a difference, 
strategic investment in vote buying can be expected to alter the outcome 
of the election. Because the open ballot system only requires candidates to 
provide a small slice of the vote to beat their co-partisans, the value of each 
vote increases. Therefore, while vote buying gains a seemingly small per-
centage of the overall vote, this can be more than enough to help a 
 B. MUHTADI
229
 candidate win in a narrow race. My finding clearly shows that vote buying 
is an integral part of highly competitive elections. Given the significance of 
vote buying in determining the final results, my finding slightly differs 
from previous work by Aspinall and his collaborators (2015b), which sug-
gests that cash handouts in Indonesia are more about meeting an ‘entry-
ticket’ expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout. I would 
argue that it seems to play a deceptively small, but in fact very consequen-
tial role in determining electoral outcomes.
7.4  two altErnatiVE thEoriEs
I have endeavoured to answer one of important puzzles underlying this 
book that revolves around the question of why candidates engage in vote 
buying while these monetary incentives appear to influence ‘only’ a lim-
ited number of people. As noted above, in closely contested elections such 
as those in Indonesia, even if vote buying is proven to produce very low 
returns (due to the problem of voter compliance and broker predation), 
such a strategy can make a real difference to election outcomes. This 
explanation, however, leaves a question unanswered: if it were, then we 
would expect candidates in very close races to spend much more on vote 
buying, and candidates who expect to win comfortably, to spend less. This 
leads me to propose two alternative explanations for why candidates might 
still prefer vote buying, even when the returns are so poor, and even if they 
aren’t in a particularly close race: (1) candidates are trapped in prisoner’s 
dilemma types of situation and (2) vote buying may be an objectively inef-
ficient strategy for mobilising votes, but still be relatively more efficient 
than all the viable alternatives.
7.4.1  The Prisoner’s Dilemma
As previously discussed in Chap. 4, as the election drew nearer, the mag-
nitude of vote-buying efforts increased significantly. In January 2014, 
only 4.3% of voters were exposed to vote buying. As the election period 
was approaching, however, those who reported being targeted with ben-
efits experienced a sixfold increase with about 25% of voters reporting 
such exchanges. Not only did the percentage of those being targeted by 
vote buying rise dramatically but also the incidence of multiple payments 
increased. Using extensive survey data, I found a consistent pattern in 
which, as the election drew nearer, it became more likely that a voter had 
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received payments from more than one party. During the run-up to the 
legislative elections, I held monthly nationwide surveys asking the respon-
dents, using exactly the same wording, whether they had been targeted for 
vote buying. A follow-up question asked those who responded affirma-
tively: “Which party or candidate or success team from which party offered 
you those goods/gifts?” (Fig. 7.3)
Given that respondents were allowed to give multiple answers, I then 
recoded the responses to this question to show vote buying by multiple 
parties. Recall that due to the nature of question and options provided, 
this exercise can only capture interparty duplication of vote buying efforts, 
not whether multiple candidates within the same party were providing 
payments, which was also quite possible due to the open-list PR system. 
Apparently, candidates believed that a final push could make the difference 
between winning and losing (candidate from PDI-P, informal communi-
cation, 20 April 2014).
The proximity of the election boosts vote-buying incidence largely 
because of a popular belief among candidates that voters will often vote for 
the candidate who gave the payment the last and because that candidate 
will be fresh in the memory. The prisoner’s dilemma offers a potential 
Fig. 7.3 How massive were multiple payments in Indonesia? (% of those saying 
they had been targeted for vote buying). Source: The January, February–March, 
and late March 2014 data were taken from my pre-election surveys, while the April 
2014 numbers were drawn from my post-election survey (see Appendix A)
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answer for the breadth of this last-minute panic. Candidates might stand 
to gain more financially if all of them didn’t engage in vote buying. But 
the risk of being trumped for an individual who doesn’t participate when 
others do so, means that such people might feel they have little choice. 
Applying the prisoner’s dilemma to candidates’ behaviours when the elec-
tions draw near, a candidate will be keen to pursue vote buying if other 
candidates are using the same strategy. They often see distributing gifts as 
their best chance of stopping other candidates from winning votes 
(Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014). For example, a successful candidate 
from Indonesia’s biggest Islamic party admitted to pouring money into 
the electorate on voting day up until 9 am, having seen an opponent dis-
tributing cash just before the polling stations were opened. He defended 
his actions:
It isn’t only a ‘dawn attack’ [a universally recognised term that reflects the 
fact that payments are sometimes distributed just after the dawn prayer]. It 
is also a ‘serangan duha’ (dhuha attack) [referring to Dhuha or mid-morning 
prayer time, which is performed immediately after sunrise when the sun has 
risen to a certain height]. (Interview, 20 April 2014)
The prisoner’s dilemma can be best explained in a context of high com-
petitiveness where uncertainty is great regarding the electoral outcome. 
Under open ballot systems dominated by personal votes, the personal 
incentive to win is high, leading candidates to use all available means in 
their campaigns, including making payments to voters, especially if they 
see multiple candidates doing it. In the prisoner’s dilemma, Takeuchi 
(2013: 78) points out, “each player’s rational strategy to maximise his or 
her individual payoff ends up with a worse outcome than some other pos-
sible outcome that may be better for both players.” In the face of closely 
contested races, the probability of each candidate engaging in vote buying 
increases, given that small changes in support can be expected to alter the 
outcome of the election.
In the context of such competitive elections, candidates’ strategies are 
often determined by their competitors’ actions. They claim that participat-
ing in buying votes, including providing multiple payments to voters, is 
the best way to tie voters so they didn’t turn to cashed-up rivals. As dis-
cussed in Chap. 4, candidates and brokers who do this are trying to 
‘secure’ their vote from ‘dawn attacks’ carried out by other teams. The 
results from my broker survey confirmed that, when asked to observe 
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other success teams, 28% of the respondents claimed a significant number 
of other teams delivered cash more than once. As discussed in Chap. 4, 
many surveyed brokers used the verbs ‘to tie’ (mengikat) or ‘to secure’ 
(mengamankan) when describing the function of the second payments, 
which is consistent with my qualitative and in-depth interviews with high- 
level politicians. Brokers often told candidates to make follow-up cash 
payments in response to late manoeuvres by rivals. The sense of last- 
minute panic is evident where the majority of brokers heard that during 
the cash envelope distribution phase, other success teams were doing the 
same thing in the same village, but with larger sums of money  (see 
Fig. 7.4). This exactly mirrors the prisoner’s dilemma, as discussed above.
Candidates might end up playing the prisoner’s dilemma against each 
other not only because of the presence multiple gift givers but also as a 
response of voters’ expectations of monetary rewards. Such voters were 
accused of being merely driven by money and choosing to vote for rival 
candidates who paid more. Indeed, there is some anecdotal evidence that 
voters simply auction their votes off to the highest bidder. One excellent 
study by Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016) asserts that voters were increas-
ingly ruled by a pragmatic and transactional logic and political actors tried 
to meet such expectations. Ahmad Muzani of Gerindra told me that a vast 
majority of voters in his electoral constituency in Lampung I were basically 
Fig. 7.4 Other teams also distribute cash envelopes (%). Source: My survey of 
brokers, 30 September–25 October 2014
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materialistic voters, and that there were numerous reports of locals receiv-
ing five to eight envelopes from several brokers. “What can I say? It’s the 
time for them to harvest money (panen uang) during election season” 
(Interview, 13 April 2014). Tubagus Ace Hasan of Golkar reported 
another colourful story. In his constituency in Banten I, a night before the 
voting day, the consumption of catfish increased because locals usually 
hold dinner parties with catfish recipes while waiting for cash envelopes 
from brokers (Interview, 14 April 2014).
While acknowledging vote buying is a highly uncertain business, and its 
effectiveness in driving votes is relatively weak, candidates felt insecure 
about their electoral prospects if they didn’t bid on such purely materialis-
tic voters in the midst of rampant handout distribution by other rival can-
didates. Despite its feeble effectiveness in ensuring victory based on 
empirical data analysis outlined above, not engaging vote-buying strate-
gies are too great a risk to contemplate as it is widely assumed to be a path 
to electoral collapse. In this regard, the rationale behind such strategies 
aren’t to ‘buy’ votes per se, but instead it is widely employed as a counter- 
measure to neutralise or minimise the electoral gains by their rivals in the 
context of a highly competitive zero-sum electoral competition.  That’s 
why candidates insist on pursuing vote buying, despite such strategy hav-
ing not always produced the vote that was hoped for, and despite its vul-
nerability to the problem of broker predation and voter compliance.
7.4.2  Relatively More Efficient Strategy
The second plausible interpretation on why candidates still choose to buy 
votes is that this electoral strategy may be fairly inefficient, yielding low 
returns on investment, although it is still relatively more efficient than all 
the other feasible alternatives. The fact that Indonesia’s candidate-centred 
election system provides strong incentives for using personal campaigns 
doesn’t automatically imply that money politics will be the only or favoured 
tactic for pursuing those strategies (Hicken, 2007: 53). In an attempt to 
win office, candidates might use a variety of means and methods to gener-
ate personal votes, including club goods,10 vote coercion, or using media 
advertising to increase individual popularity. Another personal strategy 
includes those candidates who have access to state resources in targeting 
their constituencies. Note that these strategies can interact or occur 
together at some point in time when implemented in the field (Hicken, 
10 Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016: 23) define club goods as “patronage that is provided for 
the collective benefit of bounded social groups rather than for individuals.”
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2007). In Indonesia, for instance, club good provision tends to be com-
bined with other forms of patronage politics, especially vote buying.
I argue that compared with all the viable alternatives, vote buying still 
emerges as being relatively efficient in driving votes, despite weak moni-
toring and limited direct yields. Much of the literature on club goods in 
Indonesia, for instance, shows that such collective patronage, typically 
consisting of small-scale infrastructure projects or donations to certain 
associations, is a less reliable strategy in winning votes (Aspinall and 
Sukmajati, 2016: 23). This corresponds with the popular narrative among 
candidates that spending money on club goods is a wasteful strategy since 
they have no guarantees that neighbourhood or community associations 
that received the benefits will repay the favours with their vote. The provi-
sion of club goods is prone to the individual behaviour and perception risk 
akin to general phenomenon found in the utilisation of common goods 
called ‘tragedy of the commons.’ This is basically a situation in a shared 
resource distributive system where individual voters who receive some 
benefits as a member of a collective have a perverse tendency to percep-
tively view the club goods as common collective goods, hence their indi-
vidual votes tend to be directed elsewhere as they wish or even allowing 
them not to vote at all since the burden of voting has been shifted to the 
common or collective efforts. A candidate from PAN, also shared this 
view, arguing that the provision of club goods was wasteful, in part, 
because it was ineffective in swaying voters’ choices. In his own words:
Many incumbent candidates, long before the elections, had in fact distrib-
uted a lot of social assistance to voters, renovated mosques, paid for road 
repairs, and so on and so forth. But, ironically, they lost to candidates who 
launched ‘dawn attacks’ by simply distributing small payments to voters just 
before the election. Caring for the needs of community is of course impor-
tant, but it wouldn’t be enough. They (the voters) expect to receive con-
crete, immediate payments. (Interview, 22 April 2014)
Similarly, voter intimidation isn’t also a preferred strategy for most can-
didates in Indonesia because it is simply too risky and costly. That is why, 
in 2014 election, only a very few people experienced any intimidation 
from a particular candidate’s supporters or campaign team members. My 
post-election survey of voters found that only 1.7% of respondents 
 admitted being a victim of such coercion. From the perspective of candi-
dates, voter intimidation faces restrictive constraints in terms of money, 
human resources, and networks (Hicken, 2007). This strategy also has 
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sketchy records in ensuring comfortable victory margin in an electoral 
contest. Moreover, the use of threat of violence generally carries greater 
risks compared to relatively safer vote-buying strategy. As already explained 
in Chap. 2, vote buying has become a common feature in Indonesia’s 
electoral politics, partly due to the problem of law enforcement mecha-
nisms to proceed with such electoral fraud.
Candidates may prefer vote buying instead of or in addition to the use of 
mass media or social media in supporting individual campaigns. As previ-
ously discussed, in the context of candidate-centred elections, the individual 
popularity is a key determinant electoral success for candidates. Therefore, 
candidates are expected to use the media campaign to reach out to a vast 
majority of voters, without completely ignoring the importance of conven-
tional means of campaigning such as direct contact with voters, outdoor 
campaigns, and other personal strategies such as vote buying. Utilising from 
a large dataset of voters’ surveys in 73 out of 77 electoral districts across 
Indonesia, I find that the use of mass media in supporting individual cam-
paigns was apparent, but the scale was much less than many observers have 
expected (i.e. Ufen, 2006), as I will demonstrate in the following pages.
In order to provide a sense of comparison between various methods 
used especially by incumbent candidates to win personal votes, and to 
explain the significance of vote buying for candidates to win the seat, I 
first conduct cross-sectional analysis, that is, comparison among incum-
bent candidates according to their electoral outcomes (i.e. between the 
successful and losing incumbent types). In doing so, we are allowed to 
assess what sort of personal appeals did candidates choose to make in 2014 
and voters had most often seen in their neighbourhood? My next strategy 
is to make a comparison of victorious versus losing incumbents based on 
individuals’ responses towards a variety of means and methods employed 
by candidates. In my massive surveys in 73 out of 77 electoral districts 
across Indonesia during the run-up to the 2014 legislative elections, 
respondents were asked to name which of the following candidates in their 
respective electoral districts they had most often seen in direct campaign, 
seen on TV, read in the newspapers, heard on the radio, seen or read on 
the Internet/twitter/SMS/Facebook called social media campaign, or 
seen on the banners or posters called outdoor campaign.11 In addition, 
11 This can be done only for incumbent candidates who possess all variables being tested. 
Accordingly, there were 339 incumbent candidates who can be analysed for purpose of this 
study, accounting for about 68% of 502 incumbents seeking for another term in office in 
2014. Admittedly, this study lacks representation from the incumbents competing in Eastern 
part of Indonesia.
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these massive surveys measure vote-buying acceptability by asking the 
respondents: “As an effort to win the legislative election, certain candi-
dates or campaign team members gave money or gifts for people to influ-
ence their votes. In your opinion, does the money/gift can be considered 
as something acceptable or unacceptable?” While the wording doesn’t 
allow us to measure whether incumbents actually distributed cash hand-
outs and voters subsequently accepted, it does allow us to measure how 
prevalent voters’ expectation of vote buying is in one’s electoral district.
Table 7.5 displays mean scores of individuals’ responses about what 
sort of personal strategies that winning and losing incumbents made and 
had been most observed by voters. In general, successful incumbents evi-
dently reached out to more voters through various strategies than the 
losers. Their campaign materials had greater visibility (i.e. through direct 
contact, mass media, and social media exposure) than that of the losers, 
suggesting that they were clearly losing the ground-war campaign. All of 
this suggests that relative to the victorious incumbents, the losers were 
evidently having difficulties in reaching voters, a fact which may help 
explain why they were unsuccessful. Overall, the use of media advertising 
to cultivate personal appeals wasn’t a popular strategy for candidates. The 
pattern prevails, however, in which the victorious incumbents were likely 
to gain more exposure than the losers. They even gained more exposure 
in social media, although the Internet use was still limited in Indonesia.
Overall, however, my study found that most incumbent candidates still 
resort primarily to the traditional means of campaigning such as direct and 
outdoor campaigning (i.e. publicly visible posters and banners). Table  7.5 
Table 7.5 Descriptive statistics (mean scores) of a variety of methods employed 


















Mean 2.15 3.93 2.14 1.09 0.78 9.69 46.93
N 219 158 160 141 198 221 182
Std. 
Deviation
2.29 6.52 2.89 1.6 1 8.5 11.93
Losing
Mean 1 1.91 1.41 0.6 0.48 5.46 43.87
N 208 158 148 131 176 222 200
Std. 
Deviation
1.07 3.71 1.87 0.63 0.59 5.62 10.25
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demonstrates that people were more likely to be exposed by outdoor cam-
paigns than other means of campaigning. There were two reasons behind the 
incumbents’ preference to traditional methods of campaigning than the use of 
media campaigns. First, this study found that the regular access to the print 
media, radio, and social media is still limited in most electoral districts in 
Indonesia. Out of the already limited readership figures for newspapers and 
small numbers of people who tuned in to the radio broadcast, adding to it 
those who have Internet access, most of them were not drawn into political 
news in the first place. This study suggests that investing large sums of money 
in expensive media campaigns may be wasteful for incumbents. Second, plac-
ing advertisements in television is still more beneficial as it has extensive cover-
age area of up to 90% of the population in Indonesia, although the cost is very 
expensive. Moreover, television exposure isn’t suitable for candidates running 
in a particular electoral district because they don’t need to penetrate wider 
audiences. Therefore, it is an unsurprising fact when the majority of candidates 
don’t rely on the media as a major means of campaigning, but instead relying 
simply on placing campaign banners and posters as well as face-to-face meetings.
Interestingly, we see a marked difference too in mean scores of individuals 
who professed that vote buying is acceptable between the winning and losing 
incumbents’ constituencies. The winning incumbents were more likely to 
run in areas where voters are actually more accepting of vote buying than the 
losers. The finding provides suggestive evidence that successful incumbents 
were found to run disproportionately in places where voters perceive vote 
buying as a normal occurrence during elections. The analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) analysis further confirms the finding that successful and unsuc-
cessful incumbents generally have significant different characteristics in terms 
of the level of vote-buying acceptability in their respective districts. Using a 
logistic regression model (see Appendix F), vote buying—defined as incum-
bents’ electoral districts whose voters have no problems accepting cash or a 
gift—stands out as a key determinant of electoral success for their re-election 
bid. Its substantive effect reaches statistical significance at the 95% level, and 
it is independent from the influence of other factors included in the equation 
(i.e. gender, position on party list, name recognition, running in the same 
electoral district, and district magnitude). A one-unit increase in the level of 
vote-buying acceptability in the incumbents’ districts resulted in an increase 
of about 2–3 percentage estimate point in the likelihood of being re-elected.
The results from these massive electoral district surveys of voters are 
consistent with the candidate narrative. In my winning candidate survey, 
almost 70% of respondents opined that the voters in their constituencies 
were increasingly pragmatic at election time, expecting monetary incen-
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tives in return for their votes. As argued by Hicken (2007), such cultural 
norms of gift giving not only create a social atmosphere conducive to vote 
buying but also make this strategy a more appealing avenue for candidates 
relative to other personal strategies. Although there is accumulating evi-
dence that electoral handouts are oftentimes not quite an effective strategy 
due to the mistargeting story and brokers’ rent-seeking behaviour (see 
Chap. 5), but nevertheless, relative to other personal strategies, vote buy-
ing remains to be the more effective one in securing votes and actually 
help politicians win.
7.5  conclusion
This chapter has endeavoured to show the effect of vote buying on voting 
behaviour in Indonesia. It began with the puzzle about misdirected tar-
geting of vote buying and brokers’ rent extraction that might undermine 
its impact on vote choice. If such a strategy is largely ineffective, why 
would candidates invest scarce resources in it? But, if vote buying is truly 
effective, how big or small is the effect and what does it mean and for 
whom? I have shown in this chapter that vote buying is indeed effective in 
producing both greater turnout and greater vote share, but the effect is 
limited to a small minority of voters. In terms of the effect of vote buying 
on turnout, I have shown that exposure to clientelism has a positive effect 
on the likelihood of turning out to vote. Rates of electoral participation 
are significantly higher among those who received cash handouts than 
those among who didn’t (81% vs. 74%).
Regarding the effect of vote buying on voting choice, I have demon-
strated that the estimated effect of such practice lies at 10.2%. Note that 
the 10.2% effect of vote buying is estimated based on those who  experienced 
vote buying compared by the total electorate. If we specifically focus on 
the effect of vote buying among those who received payments from candi-
dates (25% based on a direct survey item), its impact on vote choice was 
up to 41.8% of the recipients. Hence, in fact, the percentage of the total 
number of those whose votes can be bought must have been higher if 
machines are capable of handing out money to voters to more than a quar-
ter of the whole electorate. But, in total numbers, the electoral effect of 
vote buying in legislative elections was ‘only’ 10.2% of the whole electorate.
My results answer a critically important question: if it is true that vote 
buying has a relatively trivial effect—in the sense that it only affects the 
voter choice of about 10.2% of voters—why do politicians insist on pursu-
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ing such a strategy? I showed in Chap. 2 that vote buying has become an 
increasingly prominent electoral strategy. But judging the effect of such 
vote buying without contextualising it within the context of the electoral 
system where candidates compete and interact can be difficult. What we 
really want to know isn’t ‘how significant is the effect of vote buying,’ but 
‘is it significant enough to achieve a desired outcome?’
Therefore, I have demonstrated at length in this chapter that the seem-
ingly trivial effect of vote buying on voting choice in fact is quite large 
enough to frequently determine the outcome of electoral races in 
Indonesia. In an environment where elections are shaped by intraparty 
competition like Indonesia, candidates depend on personal votes to defeat 
co-partisans. Under such circumstances, electoral uncertainty regarding 
the electoral outcomes increases. To measure this, I use victory margins to 
assess how competitive parliamentary elections in 2014 were in each polit-
ical party. The empirical evidence reviewed in this chapter reveals that the 
average margin of victory within political parties—by which winning can-
didates defeated their internal party rivals—was only 1.65%. Here lies the 
key to why vote buying remains an attractive investment and has been 
widely practised in Indonesia. While the effect of vote buying on voter 
turnout and vote choice may appear small, in Indonesia’s highly competi-
tive election settings, that 10.2% matters significantly. The marginal value 
of each voter collected through buying votes is high enough to constitute 
narrow winning margins, which helps explain why candidates pursue vote 
buying, despite its seemingly small effects on voting behaviour.
However, the margin argument raises a further question: why there are 
still many competitive polities where the vote margins are small, candi-
dates don’t engage in vote buying? I have argued that candidates might 
still prefer vote buying, even when such practice is proven to produce low 
returns, in the midst of massive money politics distributed by other rival 
candidates. In a context where multiple candidates were engaged in vote 
buying, anxious candidates poured money into handout-responsive vot-
ers. As such, candidates’ decisions to intensify vote-buying efforts were 
often like last-minute panic buying. What matters isn’t whether candidates 
actually buy a vote, rather that vote buying is a counter-instrument to 
neutralise their opponents’ strategies. In addition to being trapped in a 
prisoner’s dilemma, candidates insist to buy votes because this strategy—
although proved ineffective in yielding significant votes—but, neverthe-
less, relative to other personal strategies, vote buying still produces votes 
that may be more than enough to secure a victory.
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With the rise of democratic regimes in many parts of the world over 
recent decades, scholarly attention has increasingly turned to assessing 
the quality of democracy (Kramon, 2013: 252). One of the important 
measures of the quality of democracy is free and competitive elections. A 
widely held view among scholars is that electoral clientelism has become 
a major impediment to such democratic elections. Indonesia is a perfect 
example. It has made important advances towards democratic consolida-
tion with four consecutive national elections since 1999 and thousands of 
local elections since 2005. In reality, however, the development of democ-
racy in Indonesia has been burdened by pervasive forms of patronage 
distribution, especially vote buying. This is especially the case since the 
introduction of the open-list proportional voting system that has opened 
a Pandora box of massive money politics within the democratic system. 
Consequently, the ill-suited design of electoral system has aggravated the 
accountability of democratic institutions and policy representation in 
Indonesia.
As a former student activist who took to the streets along with thou-
sands of protesters demanding democratic reforms in 1998—which ended 
in the birth of a newly democratic regime—in making this study I have 
been in part motivated by normative concerns about the impact of vote 
buying on the quality of democracy in my country. More importantly, this 
study has also been driven by the strong impression I received when I was 
conducting 13 months’ fieldwork in Indonesia. I increasingly felt that the 
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dominant literature on vote buying and turnout buying, which were 
developed in other settings, was simply insufficient to explain the ubiquity 
of vote buying in Indonesia. Much of the scholarship on vote buying is 
based on the Latin American experience. As a consequence, theories of 
vote buying assume that parties determine how money is distributed. In 
Indonesia, by contrast, individual candidates do the vote buying. In 
Indonesia’s open-list ballot system, intraparty competition is fierce, and 
candidates see party peers as their most proximate threat. Under these 
conditions, candidates are compelled to rely heavily on personal networks 
rather than party machines. Intense competition between a large number 
of candidates also means they only need a small share of the popular vote 
in order to win office. This differs from the situation in Latin America, 
where candidates and parties tend to pursue majorities or large constituen-
cies. For all of these reasons, the established theories can offer only limited 
insight into the machinations of vote buying in Indonesia.
Under such different conditions, and in a context where candidates in 
Indonesia are largely insecure about their prospects of victory, I have 
argued in this book that candidates have clear incentives to use vote buy-
ing as a means of chasing a small margin of victory. In settings where elec-
tions are shaped by intraparty competition as a result of the open-list 
system, candidates busy themselves fighting on the ground against their 
internal party rivals in the hunt for personal votes. The desire to defeat 
their co-partisans makes them risk averse when selecting targets for their 
material rewards. As a result, most politicians and brokers say that their 
preferred targets are partisan, loyalist voters, which is strongly evocative of 
the core-voter strategy that has been devised in the Latin American context.
Yet, as I explained in Chap. 4, my voter survey showed that while such 
partisan voters are more likely to be targeted than non-partisan voters, in 
reality the vast majority of vote buying—in absolute terms—happens 
among undecided voters. This is particularly the case because the aggre-
gate level of mass partisanship in Indonesia is relatively small. Only 15% of 
Indonesians feel close to a party. This limited number of partisans is also 
highly contested among internal rivals. Accordingly, my findings show 
that although politicians tending to target constituents who they think are 
truly loyal, most brokers end up distributing to voters who receive benefits 
but don’t reciprocate with votes. For various reasons, therefore, we cannot 




In order to explain this combination of features, in Chap. 5, I offered 
an additional account to the scholarly literature on vote buying by 
 combining the party loyalist model with a role for personal networks. I 
argued that in Indonesia, candidates and brokers actually intend to target 
partisan voters, but in reality they mostly distribute patronage to people 
who are connected to personal networks. Though they think of these peo-
ple as ‘loyalists,’ in fact, they might lack any sense of loyalty to the candi-
date. I call this mixture a ‘personal loyalist’ approach. Though it 
acknowledges that candidates largely depend on personal networks to 
identify voters to target with vote buying, this approach doesn’t rule out 
the importance of party loyalists, seeing also a significant role for person-
alised partisan voters (i.e. those who possess a sense of loyalty to both the 
party and individual candidate within the party).
The personal loyalist approach is best explained in the context of open- 
list systems, as indicated earlier. Under such circumstances, the pressure to 
collect personal votes is intense. Candidates seek to personalise party con-
stituents to defeat their internal party rivals. However, given only a tiny 
proportion of Indonesians are aligned with parties, such intraparty com-
petition pushes candidates not to depend solely on party loyalists to win 
elections. To be sure, despite their limited numbers, such voters are also 
fought over among multiple candidates from the same party, but their 
numbers are limited. Accordingly, having personalised their party constit-
uents, politicians seek to expand their electoral base and extend their vote- 
buying reach through personal connections mediated by non-party 
brokers. In the process, candidates frequently confuse personal loyalists as 
partisans, and misconstrue people with personal connections to their bro-
kers as loyalists, too. At the same time, expanding electoral bases in this 
way can make vote buying susceptible to broker predation. Agency loss 
produces massive rent-seeking behaviours by brokers, making the prob-
lems of vote-buying distribution severe (see Chap. 6). It is often the case 
that brokers exaggerate the number of loyalists, even deceive their candi-
dates on this issue, so that they can engage in predation. As a result, many 
of the people who are identified through personal networks mediated by 
brokers are in fact not even loyal to the candidate. These two factors in 
combination—confusion of personal connections with loyalty and agency 
loss—contribute to the large amount of targeting of uncommitted voters 
revealed by my study.
Interestingly, notwithstanding these factors, candidates still insist 
on spending a large amount of money on vote buying to pursue such 
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spuriously loyalist voters. Recall that as many as a third of voters 
nationwide are exposed to the practice, making the aggregate level of 
vote buying in Indonesia the third highest in the world (Chap. 2), as 
indicated by voter surveys taken over the last decade. Yet these prob-
lems, plus other factors, clearly undermine the effect of vote buying on 
electoral behaviour. Offers of money ‘only’ influenced the vote choice 
of roughly 10% of the total electorate (see Chap. 7). Here lies the key 
to why vote buying remains so important: while this effect may appear 
small, in Indonesia’s highly competitive electoral landscape, that 10% 
matters immensely. Across the country, the average margin of victory 
by which winning candidates defeated their co-partisans was only 
1.65% (with the winning margin here defined as the percentage of 
votes cast for a party in a constituency which separated the lowest-
placed winner from the highest-placed loser on a party list). The 10% 
swayed by cash are more than enough to make a difference to electoral 
outcomes, both in the aggregate and in the case of many individual 
races. Most politicians, therefore, feel vote buying can play a decisive 
role in determining the electoral outcome that counts: whether or not 
they win a seat in the legislature. As a result, many pursued this strat-
egy with enthusiasm.
Chasing a narrow margin victory, however, isn’t the only possible 
answer for why candidates still engage in vote buying, despite high levels 
of leakage. The prisoner’s dilemma offers a potential answer for the wide-
spread practice of vote buying in Indonesia, even if such strategy is proven 
to produce low returns, and even if they aren’t in a close battle. Fearing 
that their opponents will distribute handouts, candidates might still find it 
in their interest to engage in vote buying (see Chap. 7). Every candidate 
might be better if no one bought votes, but if just one person defects and 
buys votes, then everyone else loses. When the fate of candidates relies on 
the others’ actions, vote buying is often seen as their best chance of stop-
ping other candidates from winning votes, despite its inefficiency of deliv-
ery and wastage. This corresponds with the narrative among candidates 
and brokers that despite vote buying often appears to be objectively ineffi-
cient, such tactics still be relatively more efficient than other electoral 
strategies (Chap. 7). These three explanations—vote buying as a function 
of narrow victory margins, politicians end up facing a prisoner’s dilemma, 
and the perceived significance of vote buying in driving votes, relative to 
other electoral strategies—in combination contribute to explain how and 
why vote buying is so prevalent in Indonesia.
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8.1  TheoreTical implicaTions
I have argued that the personal loyalist strategy helps to explain patterns 
of vote buying in Indonesia. What are the primary theoretical implications 
of this personal loyalist approach and how do they contrast with predic-
tions of existing theories? Table 8.1 provides a stylised summary of five 
major models of vote buying: my own personal loyalist model, plus the 
following four models: swing-voter model, core-voter model, informa-
tional model, and norms of reciprocity model.1
The swing-voter logic predicts that uncommitted voters or weakly 
opposed voters would be the preferred target of campaign largesse in 
order to persuade them to vote for the benefactor party or candidate and 
change the game (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 
1996; Stokes, 2005). This is based on the underlying assumption that a 
loyal voter is already captive. In contrast, the core-voter hypothesis argues 
that parties and candidates tend to target their own party supporters 
because such voters are the most predictable source of votes. The ratio-
nales behind the ‘core-voter’ model vary, ranging from risk aversion on 
the part of candidates (Cox and McCubbins, 1986), mobilising lukewarm 
supporters for turnout (Nichter, 2008), the endogeneity of partisan loyal-
ties to electoral handouts (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012) to broker predation 
(Stokes et al., 2013). Unlike the swing- and core-voter models whose key 
parameter in distributing benefits largely depends on voters’ partisan 
proximity to the machine or to its opponents, the norms of reciprocity 
model doesn’t require voters to have strong ideological attachments. 
Instead, according to this model, clientelistic practices produce a sense of 
moral obligation or indebtedness on the part of beneficiaries to vote for 
the distributing candidate in exchange for the reward (Finan and Schechter, 
2012). Finally, drawing from much of the African elections, Kramon 
(2013) developed the informational model of vote buying, arguing that 
vote buying is a mechanism for politicians to establish credibility with vot-
ers regarding the distribution of patronage and private goods in the future. 
It serves primarily to convey information to voters that candidates are 
credible and able to provide future rewards.2
1 For comparison, see Kramon (2013: 65–69), who also made some comparisons between 
his own informational model and other three major approaches to the study of vote buying: 
the swing-voter model, the core-voter model, and the norms of reciprocity models. In some 
ways, I also adapt from Kramon’s comparisons. 
2 In addition to Kramon (2013), the informational argument can also be found in the 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Each line of Table 8.1 shows what theoretical preconditions or out-
comes are to be expected by each of these models. The first group of 
‘Contextual Factors’ sets out the features of electoral competition under 
which the model is assumed to be applicable. The second, ‘Nature of Vote 
Buying’ summarises what form vote buying takes in each model. Finally, 
the table summarises effects of vote buying in terms of both vote choice 
and turnout.
For simplicity’s sake, let’s focus here only the aspects of my personal 
loyalist approach that have the most notable theoretical implications. The 
first distinctive feature of my model concerns the political context, specifi-
cally the role of political parties. I have demonstrated from the outset that 
the existing theories of vote buying have emerged in contexts different 
from that in Indonesia. Table 8.1 makes these differences visible in a num-
ber of fields, such as party organisation, electoral system, party base, parti-
sanship, and voting system. In particular, much of the extant literature on 
the swing- and core-voter models relies on the underlying assumption that 
party machines have the capacity to enforce vote-buying agreements, and 
that they engage in ongoing constituency service (Stokes, 2005; Kramon, 
2013). In contrast, the other three models (i.e. the norms of reciprocity 
and informational models as well as my personal loyalist model) don’t 
require well-organised party organisations. In Kenya, as in many African 
countries where the informational theory was produced, the main propo-
nent of the approach Eric Kramon (2013) shows that socially embedded 
and well-organised parties don’t exist. Similarly, the reciprocating model is 
built on the assumption that political parties are weak. Drawing from an 
excellent study conducted in Paraguay, the key theorists of the model 
Frederico Finan and Laura Schechter (2012) demonstrate that political 
parties in the country are weakly organised, not strongly ideologically ori-
ented, and less embedded in society. Accordingly, Paraguayan politics tend 
to be extremely personalised (Rizova, 2007). My personal loyalist model 
arises in a similar setting. Vote buying in Indonesia, therefore, doesn’t rely 
upon strong party organisations but can also be mediated through a vari-
ety of informal networks. This study has provided evidence that institu-
tional factors matter. The non-party organisation of vote buying in 
Indonesia is largely a product of the open-list system, which incentivises 
intraparty competition and prompts candidates to invest in building cam-
paign teams that rely on personalised networks.
Still with regard to the role of parties, much of the literature on swing- 
and core-voter models broadly assumes that only one machine has the 
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ability to engage in clientelist exchange (Nichter, 2010). This assumption 
may be justified in the context of contemporary Latin America, where 
mostly only one party can take advantage of the state resources and social 
networks required for clientelism (Stokes, 2009: 12; Nichter, 2010: 97). 
This, however, doesn’t really fit in Indonesia where there is cartelised 
party system, so that no party is locked out of state resources (Slater, 2004; 
Ambardi, 2009). Note that all parliamentarians independent of party affil-
iation have opportunities to access resources allocated for their constitu-
encies (Farhan, 2016). More importantly, the expectation of the personal 
loyalist strategy is that multiple candidates from the same party or other 
parties compete against one another even in the same neighbourhoods or 
households. This runs contrary to the existing literature on vote buying, 
which assumes that each machine tends to cultivate separate networks with 
distinct constituencies (Stokes, 2005: 324; Gans-Morse et al., 2014: 17). 
In Indonesia, by contrast, as Aspinall and his collaborators (2017: 2) put 
it, “competing network machines often overlap within the same geo-
graphical locations and social milieus.” Many areas, especially in Java, had 
become free-for-all battlegrounds in which multiple candidates fight for 
personal votes in every village, neighbourhood, and laneway (Aspinall 
et al., 2017: 12). Multiple candidates from multiple parties also compete 
against each other to recruit brokers and determine their base areas. In 
sum, borrowing Stokes’ (2005: 324) words, these ‘duelling machines’ not 
only compete to purchase votes, but they also avidly bid up the price of 
votes to outbid rivals (see Chap. 6; also, Aspinall et al., 2017).
A second distinctive feature of the personal loyalist model concerns the 
purpose of the vote-buying transaction. The swing-voter model assumes 
that vote buying is an exchange of a reward for a vote choice: a voter 
receives money and in return votes for the giver. Conversely, according to 
the core-voter school, the payment isn’t to ‘buy’ a vote, but rather to 
mobilise supporters to turn out. In the norms of reciprocity model, the 
expectation is that such exchange serves either in a model of vote buying 
(persuading swing voters) or turnout buying (mobilising core voters). The 
informational theory views the transaction as a mechanism to convey a 
signal of candidate credibility with respect to future performance (Kramon, 
2013). The personal loyalist strategy offers a slightly different story. In 
Indonesia’s extremely competitive election settings, where only the win-
ner takes home the prize of office, vote buying serves as a means of pro-
viding a small margin of victory. Minor shifts in support whether as a 
result of buying lukewarm supporters for turnout (core-voter model), or 
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purchasing the support of uncommitted voters (swing-voter model) can 
make a difference in the electoral outcome. Most politicians in Indonesia 
realise that vote buying doesn’t ensure victory in an election, but they do 
believe that it increases their chance of winning in a closely contested elec-
tion. The dominant narrative among politicians is that if they don’t engage 
in vote buying and others do, they will certainly lose. Hence, although 
vote buying doesn’t always produce the vote that was hoped for, candi-
dates still have incentives to pursue vote buying because in the context of 
fierce campaigns like Indonesia the value of each vote collected through 
such exchange can potentially make the difference between winning 
and losing.
A third point where my thesis about the personal loyalist strategy differs 
from other approaches is with regard to targeting strategies. Given that 
the primary purpose of vote buying under the swing-voter model is more 
to sway voters’ decisions than increase their turnout, the theory therefore 
predicts that politicians tend to target voters who are ideologically unat-
tached or weakly opposed supporters. In contrast, the core-voter theory 
observes that politicians will try to target lukewarm supporters to per-
suade them to turn out on voting day. While the swing- and core-voter 
models employ an ideological test to explain who is or isn’t targeted by 
clientelist parties, the reciprocity model predicts that political machines 
target voters who are intrinsically reciprocal. According to this line of rea-
soning, machines will not distribute their largesse randomly across the 
electorate but will look at whether voters feel indebted to reward those 
who have helped them in the past (Greene and Lawson, 2012). By con-
trast, the informational model argues that the targeting of handouts will 
be relatively diffuse. Given that under such a model vote buying is a mech-
anism to signal credibility with respect to future rewards, cash distribution 
is therefore less targeted at specific types of voters (Kramon, 2013). In 
Kenya, where the literature on the informational model is based, distribu-
tion of cash and gifts can take place in public and one voter can receive 
multiple payments from multiple candidates, a strong indication that vote 
buying is distributed in a diffuse manner. An expectation of my own 
approach is that politicians and brokers express strong intentions to target 
constituents they think are truly loyal, but in reality, they mostly target 
uncommitted voters who will not always reciprocate with support. This is 
largely because the concept of loyalty in Indonesia is ambiguous and has 
multiple dimensions ranging from kinship, ethnic and religious ties, receipt 
of patronage to connection via brokerage networks. When candidates and 
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brokers claim to be targeting partisan, loyalist voters, they don’t only rely 
exclusively on partisan loyalties but also judge the target in terms of per-
sonal networks. As a result, they misidentify non-partisans as partisans 
because they assume personal connections are partisan leanings. But the 
key is that they target persons who are connected by personal networks to 
their brokers, even if some of these persons, in fact, lack even a sense of 
personal loyalty to the candidate.
As with the informational model, my approach contrasts with the 
assumptions that underlie the two dominant theories of vote buying, 
which suggest that politicians distribute particularistic rewards in a 
highly targeted way to specific types of voters guided by the partisan 
preferences of the recipients to the machine or to its opponents (Diaz-
Cayeros et  al., 2012). Furthermore, both the swing- and core-voter 
models require ideological parties and ideological voters (Amick, 2016). 
In contrast, it is extremely difficult in Indonesia to target individuals 
based on their political preferences, not only because the population is 
becoming less attached to parties, with only one in every ten people in 
the country who feel close to a political party (see Chap. 4) but also 
because parties are becoming less ideological and are weakly rooted in 
society (see Chap. 1). Tomsa (2010) claims that most Indonesian parties 
are now presidentialist in essence and no longer represent sharply defined 
ideological constituencies. The current models of vote buying were 
developed in a setting where some parties possess very strong ‘base 
areas’—for example, working class areas in Argentina that have been vot-
ing for Peronists for decades, or the long- time rural voter base of the 
Party of the Institutionalised Revolution (PRI) in Mexico (see Chap. 5). 
A few parties in Indonesia, like PDI-P and PKB, have quite a strong 
tradition of having partisan voters; most don’t. All of this distinguishes 
Indonesia from the Latin American cases on which the literature is based 
and therefore explains why the targeting of vote buying is distinctive in 
Indonesia.
Finally, existing theories also differ with regard to the impact of vote 
buying on voting behaviour. Most existing models predict that the 
exchange will influence vote choice; only the core-voter approach differs 
in this regard, instead focusing on mobilising the turnout of passive loy-
alists. Although the dominant theories of vote buying admit the 
 effectiveness of such a practice on vote choice, they have no consensus in 
the answer to why vote buying sways individual’s vote decision (Kramon, 
2013: 68). The expectation of the swing-voter model is that despite tar-
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geting those who are ideologically unattached, machines are able to 
detect who has kept with the vote-buying bargain and enforce the deal 
(Stokes, 2005: 322). As noted above, in this view, parties have the capac-
ity to monitor the recipients and ensure they reciprocate with votes 
because they are bottom-heavy and socially embedded in local communi-
ties (Stokes, 2005). In the reciprocity model, vote buying is effective 
because it is a moment of retrospective evaluations of candidates, when 
voters feel a moral obligation to vote only for those who have provided 
them with rewards (Kramon, 2013;  Greene and Lawson, 2012) and 
because of their hopes of maintaining close social relations and receiving 
future rewards (Finan and Schechter, 2012). Meanwhile, the informa-
tional model has little to do with retrospective evaluations (Kramon, 
2013). Instead, the framework largely depends on prospective expecta-
tions of politicians, where voters expect to receive patronage goods in 
the future.
Overall, the dominant models assume that cash handouts will affect 
vote choice and motivate the recipients to turn out on voting day. Though 
my study doesn’t directly address this debate, it does take up one issue 
which has been largely neglected by the scholars who have engaged in it. 
Thus, scholars proposing these approaches have largely neglected the 
critical issue of the magnitude of the effect on vote choice and turnout: 
how big is the effect of cash gifts on both vote choice and turnout and 
how should we interpret it? The conventional literature on vote buying 
generally fails to quantify the effect, assuming that vote buying will auto-
matically result in higher turnout or vote share. The expectation of the 
personal loyalist strategy is that the impact of vote-buying exchanges may 
appear insignificant in numerical terms but could still be influential in 
determining electoral outcomes. Recall that the meaning of the effect of 
vote buying, whether small, medium, or large, varies by context. A 10% 
effect on voting decisions might be small in some contexts, but this num-
ber will be sufficiently high to clinch a victory by a vote buyer in many 
highly competitive election settings, as in Indonesia. This is similar to 
how advertisements work. They might be unable to make all viewers buy 
the product being advertised, but at least some people get interested, 
translating into increased sales. Likewise, vote buying may be ‘ineffective’ 
in yielding significant votes to the extent anticipated by the buyer, but 




8.2  policy implicaTions
Having discussed some theoretical dimensions of this study, we are now in 
a position to review the policy implications. This book clearly has implica-
tions for democratic accountability, in general, and reform of electoral 
institutions, in particular. In Chap. 1, we began the research by delving 
into an explanation of institutional arrangements in the post-Suharto era, 
seeing these as shaping the supply side of vote buying. Changing electoral 
rules clearly shapes the propensity of candidates to engage in vote buying. 
Therefore, it is appropriate for this study also to offer ‘supply-side’ reme-
dies to discourage parties or candidates from adopting vote-buying 
strategies.
This study found that patronage distribution has been central to elec-
tion campaigns in Indonesia. The results demonstrate that most candi-
dates pursue vote buying because they see this strategy as affecting the 
outcomes of many competitive elections, where small changes in the vot-
ing calculus can alter the final results. An obvious conclusion is that the 
open-list system, in which a small number of personal votes are expensive 
yet critical for politicians, has been responsible for the growing promi-
nence of cash handouts during political campaigns in Indonesia. As dis-
cussed in Chap. 1, vote buying was unheard of in Indonesia’s first free 
election after the fall of Suharto in 1999 when Indonesia adopted a fully 
closed-list system (where voters can only vote for parties and don’t have 
power over the order in which party candidates are elected). The practice 
of vote buying began to flourish in the 2009 election, after the introduc-
tion of a fully open-list system in that election. The fact that each candi-
date not only competes with candidates from other parties but also with 
other candidates from his or her own party has exacerbated the practice.
Although this list isn’t exhaustive, we can speculate that the open-list 
system has three far-reaching implications for Indonesia’s political system 
as a whole. First, the open-list system obviously makes elections more 
candidate-centric because they create incentives for the cultivation of a 
personal vote. The results in Chap. 1 show that official statistics of parlia-
mentary elections over the period of 2004–2014 exhibit a clear linear 
trend towards an increase in the share of personal votes cast and a decline 
of party votes. The finding from a series of voter surveys conducted by my 
polling institute, the Indikator, in 56 electoral districts in February 2014 
with a total of 43,510 respondents also shows that candidates have become 
more important. Likewise, a voter survey conducted by LSI and La Trobe 
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University in North Sulawesi and Maluku in October 2012 suggested that 
voters were more likely to vote based on specific candidate attributes than 
on the party affiliation of the candidates.3 This corresponds with the 
results as presented in Chap. 6 that the candidate’s qualities and personal 
reputation are far more important than the programme of the party for 
which the candidate runs. The increasing role of candidates should be read 
in the context of the open-list PR system with its emphasis on intraparty 
competition (see Chap. 7). Under such circumstances, candidates are 
forced to compete against each other and differentiate themselves from 
their internal party rivals, including by vote buying. Accordingly, they 
need to run well-structured but expensive success teams and expend 
money on cash payments, club goods, and other handouts.
Second, it follows that given that the open-list elections create incen-
tives for candidates to pursue clientelist strategies, money has become the 
most important foundation of political success. Indeed, more money 
doesn’t guarantee victory, but it does increase the chance of it (Aspinall 
et  al., 2015). This was very evident during the 2014 campaign, which 
most candidates dubbed as the most ‘brutal’ election in Indonesian his-
tory. Zuhairi Misrawi, a DPR candidate from PDI-P with NU background 
jokingly put it, “there is a new Islamic jurisprudential maxim in politics: 
‘Al-fulus tuhyin nufus, ma fi fulus manfus’ (money will extend your life. 
If you don‘t have money you will die politically)” (Informal 
Communication, 2 July 2016). As Indonesia has moved away from party-
centred to candidate- centred campaigns, candidates themselves have had 
to engage in costly mobilisation efforts, including running advertise-
ments, commissioning surveys, building campaigns, mobilising constitu-
encies, and buying votes. The popular view is that given such massive 
costs, only better-resourced candidates can do well in elections. These 
expensive electoral processes, coupled with the fact that most parties are 
less ideological, mean that parties are open to nominating candidates 
from outside the ranks of their own cadres. The Forum of Citizens 
Concerned about the Indonesian Legislature (FORMAPPI) revealed that 
in the 2014 election, only 33% of the candidates could be classified as 
party cadres. Almost half of the total candidates (3241 out of 6607) run-
ning for national parliamentary seats had business backgrounds, with 
3 The candidate-centred campaigns have been particularly strong in Eastern Indonesia 
partly because the party systems in the region tend to be less patterned and less institution-
alised than those in the western part of the country (Tomsa, 2014: 250).
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many joining the parties just a few months before the election 
(FORMAPPI, 2013).4 The entry of such business people has come at the 
expense of candidates with backgrounds in political and social activism, 
who are considered to be unable to fund their own campaigns (Budiman 
Sudjatmiko, Interview, 29 April 2014). Such findings correspond with 
those of a study from Centre of Political Studies, University of Indonesia 
(PUSKAPOL UI) that documented two important aspects of the back-
grounds of those elected in 2014. About 58.86% of MPs had backgrounds 
in business or the private sector, or they were entrepreneurs or 
professionals,5 suggesting that money is important for winning elections. 
PUSKAPOL also revealed that 77 out of 560 elected candidates came 
from wealthy political dynasties (Republika, 9 October 2014). Around 
seven out of them were among the top ten candidates receiving the big-
gest share of votes in 2014.
Third, by contributing to more candidate-centred elections, the open- 
list system has also jeopardised the relationship between voters and parties, 
making party cues less important and directing voters towards the short- 
term appeal of candidates. This electoral system has also contributed to 
the rapid decline of party loyalty (Chap. 5) and diminution of the image 
of parties in the public eye (Chap. 6). Survey data show that the number 
of Indonesians who feel close to a political party has declined significantly 
from 86% in 1999 to a mere 10.1% in February 2019. This number is 
comparatively low, making Indonesia a country with one of the lowest 
partisanship levels in the world. Interestingly, the level of party identifica-
tion started collapsing in 2004 (see Chap. 4), when the country intro-
duced the semi-open proportional system, and for the first time, ballot 
papers featured candidate names as well as party logos, allowing voters to 
vote for a particular candidate rather than just for a party. This parallel 
development of declining party loyalty and the adoption of candidate- 
centred elections has made it difficult for parties to mobilise voters on the 
basis of programmatic campaigns and policy positions.
Accordingly, this study recommends changes in institutional design, 
law enforcement, and voters’ education in order to reduce the practice of 
vote buying:
4 Forum of Citizens Concerned about the Indonesian Legislature (FORMAPPI), “Anatomi 
Caleg Pemilu 2014,” 3 October 2013.
5 Republika, “Ini Dia Profil Anggota Legislatif 2014–2019,” 9 October 2014.
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 1. Changes in the electoral system from open-list proportional system 
to closed-list proportional system. In order to reduce vote buying 
and move towards more programmatic politics, Indonesia needs to 
also move towards a more party-based system of electoral competi-
tion. This can be made possible by revising the current electoral 
system and returning to closed-list proportional representation. 
Shifting the arena of competition from intraparty competition 
between individual candidates, to interparty contests, should reduce 
the need to generate personal votes through vote buying. More 
importantly, in closed-list multimember districts, voters choose 
among parties, and the rank order of the candidates in the party list 
is determined by the party. Given that citizens aren’t allowed to 
express a preference for any particular candidate within each list, this 
type of electoral system tends to produce party-centric elections. In 
such a system, voters should increasingly turn their attention to 
party policies rather than personalities, enhancing party cohesion, 
reducing internal disputes, and centralising party leadership 
(Suwarso, 2016). As Norris (2006: 105) argues, closed-list elections 
“encourage politicians to offer programmatic benefits, focused on 
the collective record and program of their party, and to strengthen 
cohesive and disciplined parliamentary parties.” In an environment 
where voters have less choice to determine the fate of individual 
candidates, and where campaigns are more focused on party plat-
forms than on personal reputations and connections, we can expect 
a reduction in the importance of money in determining elec-
toral outcomes.
Timor-Leste is an interesting example of how the closed propor-
tional system reduces the incentives of parties or candidates to use 
bribery tactics in elections. Although Timor-Leste’s voter-side 
demand for vote buying is high, where 32.7% of citizens consider 
such strategies are acceptable in the 2017 legislative elections, the 
incidence of vote buying in that country was considered as very rare 
occurrences. Only 4% of voters claimed to be targeted by money 
politics.6 This happened because the closed proportional system 
used in Timor-Leste has made political parties the main players dur-
ing the election. As a result, the supply side of vote buying is limited 
6 The Timor-Leste Survey Institute and LSI, “Exit Poll: Eleisaun Parlamentar Timor-
Leste,” 22 July 2017.
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by design. Of course, the closed proportional system isn’t without 
its flaws. In the 1999 elections in Indonesia, this system was proven 
to encourage elite oligarchs. Additionally, there were numerous 
reports of wealthy candidates purchasing winnable slots on party 
lists by bribing party leaders. But even accounting for this weakness, 
the diminished incentive for widespread vote buying in a closed-list 
system makes it preferable to the easily exploitable status quo. The 
closed proportional system is, at least, able to isolate and confine the 
incidence of vote buying at the party elite level instead of at the 
grassroots voter level, increasing the role of the party in electoral 
battles which ultimately leads to increase in the institutionalisation 
of political parties. In order to reduce elite oligarchs, a closed pro-
portional system can be accompanied by primary elections or con-
ventions within the party to screen the respective legislative 
candidates.
 2. The single-member district electoral system can also be considered 
as an option. Studies have shown that these single-member districts 
would encourage political accountability to larger constituencies 
and are proven to reduce the practices of vote buying and pork- 
barrel politics (e.g. Maisrikrod, 2002: 196). This happens because 
only one representative is elected in one electoral district so that 
incentives to do vote buying are greatly diminished. The district 
system would also involve the winner takes all electoral dynamic 
where the candidate who gets the most votes represents the electoral 
district without taking into account the difference in vote tallies. 
Because in the district system only one representative is elected in 
one electoral district, the incentive for candidates to use money poli-
tics, which commonly materialised within multimember constitu-
ency system, would be highly reduced.
 3. If an open proportional system is maintained, then it is necessary to 
have an electoral redesign that allows this system to become a disin-
centive for candidates to buy votes. One of them is by reducing the 
district magnitude. In an electoral district where district magnitude 
is high, candidates need only few votes to be entitled to get a seat, 
and they can therefore engage in vote buying and win (Carey and 
Shugart, 1995; Chang, 2005). In contrast, the fewer the seats that 
are contested, the less incentive there is for candidates to buy votes. 
The reason is because there will be more votes needed to secure a 
seat and less number of political actors who would battle for the 
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remaining seats in higher magnitude electoral districts due to the 
shrinking district magnitude.
 4. Whatever reform is undertaken, vote-buying strategies will run ram-
pant if there is no law enforcement. Based on the dozens of DPR 
(national legislature)-level candidates I interviewed, most of them 
stated that this practice was rife because they believed there were no 
strict sanctions for the perpetrators. Thus, strict and severe sanctions 
are required as a deterrent effect to the perpetrators and also to give 
a signal to the candidates that they will face serious repercussion 
when conducting money politics.
 5. Given the high level of voter-side demand for vote buying, it is nec-
essary to systematically educate voters so that citizens are much less 
tolerant of this practice. KPU (Election Commission Agency), 
BAWASLU (Election Supervisory Body), mass media, and NGOs 
must work together to carry out voter education about the dangers 
of vote buying, especially the potential for perverse accountability 
(Stokes, 2005). In democracy, people have the right to hold politi-
cians accountable. But if politicians have purchased their votes, then 
the voters are actually held accountable because they have exchanged 
their democratic mandates at cheap value.
Overall, this book has argued persuasively that electoral systems matter 
in explaining the ubiquity of vote buying. I have shown that Indonesia’s 
open-list voting system is creating a situation where one-third of the elec-
torate engages in vote buying. Accordingly, in the context of transition 
stages towards a mature democracy, one has to cautiously attend the party 
and electoral system. Especially within new democratic countries, the 
political parties are still in a generally weak and vulnerable state. If there is 
some incongruous predicament between the party or electoral system and 
the current condition, it would only result in long-term damage towards 
the political system, that is, sluggish transition and feeble party institution-
alisation, as well as unbridled money politics.
8.3  concluding remarks
In the last part of this book, I highlight my contribution to the study of 
vote buying and how it might make a difference. Overall, this study makes 
four contributions to the comparative literature on vote buying. First, in 
terms of methodology, this study has used multiple methodologies by 
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combining quantitative and qualitative approaches to determine the pat-
terns of vote buying in Indonesia. Most previous works on clientelist 
exchanges are either purely ethnographic or they rely heavily on survey 
data (Kramon, 2013: 253). Focusing solely on one type of approach is 
susceptible to methodological problems. The general challenge of the for-
mer is to establish the extent of clientelism in a population and to deter-
mine causal inferences. The methodological problem of the latter is in 
understanding a phenomenon or the context in which the data are col-
lected. Mixed methods of the sort I used in this study can offset these 
weaknesses and have allowed me to develop a broader perspective of vote 
buying in Indonesia. My surveys and qualitative research allow me to 
determine the scope of vote buying, trace its causal mechanisms, test novel 
hypotheses, provide interpretations in a meaningful way, and adjudicate 
between claims and debates in the existing literature. In particular, by rely-
ing on voter surveys, my study has demonstrated that the level of vote 
buying in Indonesia is high by international standards, and such practice is 
effective in producing slightly—but electorally consequential—higher 
rates of turnout and vote share that are enough for most candidates to 
secure victory. No other methodological approach can so systematically 
establish the extent and the effectiveness of vote buying. In addition, sup-
ported by a list-experiment, my study has also showed that direct survey 
items about vote buying in Indonesia aren’t subject to response bias. 
Moreover, unlike much of the literature on vote buying which largely 
relies on voter surveys, my analysis isn’t based solely on the demand side 
of vote buying. By utilising broker and politician surveys, my study also 
puts emphasis on the supply side in order to understand vote buying from 
the perspective of the actors who orchestrate it.
Second, by embedding my quantitative findings in rich empirical find-
ings drawn from my qualitative fieldwork, I have been able to demonstrate 
that investigating the political context in which vote buying operates is 
crucial to really understanding how the mechanism work in practice. 
Much scholarly theorising on vote buying is based on empirical observa-
tions drawn from several Latin American countries. In these countries, as 
already noted above, the organisation of vote buying is party-based, and 
political parties aren’t only socially embedded, but they are also well 
organised. The Indonesian case, however, is very different. This study has 
explained the prevalence of vote buying in the Indonesian setting where—
partly as a result of the personalised electoral system and intense intraparty 
competition that occurs there—candidates rely on personal networks 
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rather than their party, where partisan ties are weak, and where person-
alised loyalties matter far more. I have showed that the meaning of ‘parti-
sanship’ in the framework of the Indonesian context—where a lot of 
connections between voters and candidates aren’t mediated by political 
parties but by informal brokerage networks—is far more nuanced than we 
might expect. One may relate the findings from Indonesia to neighbour-
ing countries such as the Philippines and Thailand, where much of the 
literature suggests that political parties are generally weak and where vote- 
buying practices are prevalent. Julio Teehankee, for instance, shows that 
after the Second World War and long period of dictatorship under 
Ferdinand Marcos, political parties in the Philippines “suffered from weak 
internal organisation, structure, and discipline, which resulted in weak 
party loyalties and constant party-swiching” (2012: 190). Schaffer (2007: 
3) also shows that in the Philippines, clientelist practices have also become 
a central feature of electoral politics. However, one major point of diver-
gence is that constituency service in the Philippines plays a greater role in 
the interplay between parties and voters at the grassroots than in Indonesia 
(Berenschot, 2015: 560). Additionally, Filipino voters were more likely to 
be attached to parties with 42% feeling close to political parties in 2005, 
compared to Indonesian with only 15% of the electorate who did so in 
2014  (see Chap. 5). Similarly, despite sharing a lot of similarities with 
Indonesia with regard to the widespread occurrence of vote buying 
(Hicken, 2002; Callahan, 2005), weak party organisation, and the use of 
personal campaign strategies (Hicken, 2002), political parties in Thailand 
are more likely to engage in constituency service than their counterparts 
from Indonesia. In her excellent ethnographic research in Thailand, 
Bjarnegård (2009: 123) shows that although they show little interest in 
promoting party policy, parties in the country actively arrange drainage, 
roads, electricity, and admission in school for their party supporters, sug-
gesting that parties largely take care of the needs of community which 
typically happens beyond elections (Berenschot, 2015). In Indonesia, by 
contrast, individual candidates present themselves as caring for the inter-
ests of the community and offer ‘concrete’ benefits to their constituents, 
especially during election time. This greater role of individual candidates 
makes vote buying in Indonesia more personal (i.e. non-party-based) and 
might distinguish it from the existing literature, especially that which 
stems from Latin American cases.
Third, the fine-grained analysis of this study also contributes a more 
detailed understanding of how targeting of vote buying in Indonesia 
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works, arguing that empirical evidence reviewed in this project fits differ-
ently to the pathway of the lively debate in the literature between propo-
nents of the core- and swing-voter models. My research design, which 
primarily relies on tracking individual voter surveys, allows us to conclude 
that although there is a greater likelihood of party loyalists being targeted, 
the absolute majority of vote buying happens among non-partisans, given 
the relatively small number of party loyalists in Indonesia. In fact, my rich 
probability sample of low-level politicians and brokers, and in-depth inter-
views with national politicians, provide evidence strongly evocative of the 
core-voter argument. I have highlighted three pieces of empirical evi-
dences explaining the gap between the politicians’ intentions to focus on 
party loyalists and the fact that in total numbers, swing voters are more 
targeted than loyal supporters. First, candidates and brokers tend to exag-
gerate the number of partisan voters. Second, loyalty is an amorphous 
concept and has multiple dimensions in Indonesia. Third, agency loss 
results in both unreliable brokers and unreliable voters, confirming the 
classic problem of vote buying as an uncertain business. These are the 
points for departure for the personal loyalist approach I put forward. 
Despite candidates and brokers’ claims that they were targeting loyal vot-
ers, it turned out that they were often providing benefits to basically 
uncommitted voters.
Lastly, my study has endeavoured to advance our understanding of the 
logic and motivations behind candidates’ insistence on pursuing vote buy-
ing, regardless of the fact that the targeting of vote buying is so misdi-
rected, and there are principal-agent problems among politicians and 
brokers, and between brokers and their voters. I have shown throughout 
this study that despite such intrinsic problems of clientelist exchange, vote 
buying remains an attractive investment and has been widely practised in 
Indonesia. This is largely because candidates believe that the voting deci-
sions of a sufficient proportion of voters can be swayed by rewards. Even 
if the overall number of such voters is small, it is often more than enough 
to provide a vote buyer with a narrow winning margin. In addition, apply-
ing the prisoner’s dilemma to interactions between voters and party 
machines, the presence of other candidates doing vote buying to win elec-
tions may explain why they insist to distribute handouts, even if these 
actually don’t purchase vote. Further, much of the emerging conventional 
wisdom among candidates is that vote buying is a more reliable strategy in 
winning votes, relative to other mobilisation tactics. By emphasising the 
role of vote buying as a mechanism to provide a small margin of victory, 
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and by understanding the electoral motives behind candidates’ distribu-
tion of rewards, we can better understand how and why vote buying has 
become so rampant in Indonesia.
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As discussed in Chap. 1, the data used in this study are largely based on a 
national public opinion survey I conducted immediately after Indonesia’s 
legislative election in 2014. Given the centrality of this survey, I explain 
here its methodology, notably its sample size, sampling scheme, pre-sur-
vey preparation, data collecting, quality control, data entry, and data anal-
ysis. Note that because I have been involved with the Indonesian Survey 
Institute (LSI) and Indonesian Political Indicator (Indikator), I, here, 
simply describe standard survey methods that have been used regularly by 
my polling institutes; the survey in question followed these standard 
methods. In addition, this study incorporates trend data from three pre-
election surveys conducted by my polling institute, Indikator. However, 
since these pre-election surveys were done by the same survey institute 
and followed Indikator and LSI’s standard sampling methodology and 
operating procedures, I simply describe their sample sizes, timing of data 
collection, margins of errors, and numbers of original and substitute 
respondents.1
1 In addition to the nationally representative public opinion surveys, this study is also 
enriched by a series of electoral district surveys and local election polls conducted by 
Indonesia Survey Institute (LSI), Indikator, and Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting 
(SMRC), especially when dealing with the issue of vote buying. These three non-partisan 
research institutes generally use the standard methodology of surveying Indonesians over the 
age of 17. Importantly, I have explained already the sampling methodology of those surveys, 
most notably in Chaps. 1 and 2.
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the April 2014 post-election nAtionAl surVey
My original survey took place from 22 to 26 April 2014, around two 
weeks after the 2014 legislative election. This timing provided citizens 
with a recent reference point for a variety of questions, including whether 
they had been targeted for clientelist exchanges during the campaign. The 
population of this survey was all Indonesian citizens who had the right to 
vote in elections: those who were 17 years old and above or already mar-
ried when the survey was conducted. The planned sample size was 1220 
voting-age adults, but one primary sampling unit (consisting ten respon-
dents) was considered to consist of defective interviews. Overall, the sam-
ple size was thus 1210, selected with multistage random sampling, 
proportionally distributed over the 34 provinces. Based on this sample 
size, the estimated margin of error is ±2.9% at 95% confidence level, assum-
ing a simple random sampling design. The margin of error is at its highest 
when the true proportion being estimated is close to 50%. Nonetheless, 
somewhat higher error margins should be expected because of the use of 
multistage cluster sampling in this survey. It is worth noting that the design 
effect isn’t easily calculated using established statistical software.
With regard to the sampling scheme, the administrative system in 
Indonesia is divided into provinces (provinsi), districts/cities 
(kabupaten/kota), sub-districts (kecamatan), urban/rural villages (kelura-
han/desa), neighbourhoods (rukun warga—RW), and subneighbour-
hoods (rukun tetangga—RT). Since this survey unit was designed to be 
nationally representative, the demographic composition of the sample—
gender proportion, province, and rural-urban residence—should reflect 
the voting-age adults of the Indonesian population based on the 2010 
Census (https://sp2010.bps.go.id/). As Indonesia is divided into 34 
provinces, the sample was drawn proportionally in each province using 
random selection of the samples according to the following procedures.
The population was initially grouped based on the population of each 
province across Indonesia; in this way, we can produce proportional sam-
ples in each of the provinces. The second stratification was conducted on 
the population proportion based on gender. According to the 2010 
Census, the sex ratio for Indonesia is 101, which means that for every 100 
females, there are 101 males (https://sp2010.bps.go.id/). In this study, 
the ratio was therefore rounded to 100, and therefore the gender propor-
tion in the sample was equal: 50% male and 50% female. The third 
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and rural. Following the 2010 Census, the proportion was 49.79% urban 
and 50.21% rural (https://sp2010.bps.go.id/).
It must be noted, however, that the rural-urban proportion varies by 
province. Accordingly, the number of rural-urban respondents was selected 
in proportion to the size of population in each province based on the pri-
mary sampling unit, that is, the desa (rural villages—the smallest adminis-
trative unit) or kelurahan (urban villages, wards). Systematic random 
sampling was done on the villages (urban or rural), selected in each prov-
ince according to its proportion of population. From each of these pri-
mary sampling units, ten respondents were chosen. Our research teams 
then went to the office of the selected rural or urban villages, and asked for 
the list of Rukun Tetangga (RT, the smallest neighbourhood units or 
hamlets). All RTs were listed, and then five RTs were selected at random. 
Our interviewers then met with the RT officials and asked them to provide 
the list of households (Kepala Keluarga, KK) in the selected RTs. Having 
listed all of the households in each selected RT, two households were then 
selected at random. In each of the randomly selected families, all of the 
household members with the right to vote were listed—those who were 
17  years and older or married—and one person, male or female, was 
selected to be a respondent. If the first household member chosen was a 
female respondent, then the next household member would be male, and 
vice versa. The interviews were conducted face to face.
With 1220 respondents initially planned, this survey selected 122 pri-
mary sampling units (PSUs), in which each PSU consists of ten respon-
dents/interviewees. Hence, one enumerator was assigned to do the 
interviews in one PSU, so that the numbers of enumerators were 122 
persons. In total, I deployed 157 people during the data collecting, includ-
ing 30 area coordinators and their field assistants and 5 national supervi-
sors. I assigned one field manager to monitor the survey full-time. As I 
have been working in the Indikator and LSI for several years, I used my 
institutes’ resources, including a pool of experienced enumerators located 
in every province of Indonesia. Most of them were university students and 
part-time employees who have been working with my survey organisations 
for some time on a project basis. They come from various educational 
backgrounds, such as humanities, social sciences, engineering, and natural 
sciences. From this pool of enumerators, we selected the interviewers for 
this survey. Important criteria we usually use for selecting the interviewers 
are competence, integrity, trustworthiness, independence, and ability to 
work in a team.
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Simultaneously, I developed the questionnaire of this survey. For pur-
poses of generalisation and international comparability, this survey used a 
number of questions that are partially derived from and comparable to 
similar questions that have been asked elsewhere. Nonetheless, I had also 
my own particular questions to adjust to the aspects of the Indonesian 
situation I was most interested in. Some measures of vote buying employed 
in this study were generated from the project ‘Money Politics in Southeast 
Asia.’ I would like to acknowledge Prof. Edward Aspinall and other prin-
cipal investigators of this project, who in the spirit of advancing academic 
research on this topic, generously provided me with some additional fund-
ing for conducting this post-election survey and, more importantly, 
allowed me to employ their measures and share the results for the pur-
poses of this study. The definitive language version of the questionnaire 
was Indonesian, and if necessary, it was translated into local languages by 
my interviewers. Given that some questions were taken from a larger proj-
ect of a four-country study of money politics as noted above, and were 
written in English, it took a few days to translate them. Pre-testing the 
questionnaire was undertaken on about 25 adults from different socio- 
economic backgrounds in order to (1) decide the length of the survey 
interview; (2) improve the question wording, if necessary; (3) correct and 
improve translation; (4) delete unnecessary questions or add new ones, as 
required; (5) test the order of questions and identify bases; (6) check accu-
racy and adequacy of the questionnaire instructions; (7) catch any items 
which were conceptually vague; and (8) determine whether the questions 
were clear.
Workshops for area coordinators and field interviewers were conducted 
in strategic locations based on the sample spots that were generated. 
Workshop activity mainly consisted of one day of office training to learn 
the basics of the project. In the training, my research teams were presented 
with several guidelines. In particular, they were asked not to provide 
options ‘don’t know’ or ‘refuse to answer’ to the respondents. These 
options were only for the enumerator to fill in privately if the respondents 
truly could or wouldn’t respond with an answer. Importantly, during the 
workshop, enumerators were clearly instructed to conduct interviews in 
respondents’ homes or other private and suitable places rather than to 
recruit them in public venues such as village offices or ward buildings. It 
was stated that there should be no village officials or heads of RT sitting in 
or listening when the interview took place. Given the unit of analysis of 
this study is an individual, other persons including household members 
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were also not permitted to intervene when the interview was being 
conducted.
Having conducted the workshops, the data were then gathered through 
face-to-face interviews with randomly selected respondents. The area 
coordinators were responsible for obtaining necessary permission from 
local governments. Anchors reported to the field manager and observed 
interviewers, followed up, and did surprise checks on the field interview-
ers. We also ensured that logistics for field research were received quickly 
and administered correctly. One primary sampling unit (ten respondents) 
in Lhokseumawe, Aceh, was judged invalid for analysis because it con-
tained fake interviews. In addition, it is important to note the number of 
calls and substitutions. If the field surveyors found selected respondents 
who couldn’t be contacted during the first attempt, they were asked to 
visit a second time. My research teams successfully interviewed 1032 of 
the original respondents (85.3% of the total). A total of 178 respondents 
(14.7%) were unavailable to be contacted for various reasons, namely ‘not 
accessible within the agreed upon field duration’ (59.5%) (i.e. working out 
of the area or going to school outside the region); ‘refused to be inter-
viewed’ (31.5%); ‘being too old’ (3.4%); ‘very sick’ (3.9%); and ‘others’ 
(1.7%). In these cases, we decided to substitute original respondents with 
others taken from another household beyond the covered intervals in the 
sample precinct.
More importantly, to make sure that the survey interview was actually 
carried out by the trained field researcher, we conducted layered spot- 
checks as quality control. The initial spot-checks were conducted ran-
domly on 20% of the total sample by the persons in charge at the provincial 
level who returned to the selected respondents. The next level of spot- 
checks was done by national supervisors from the Jakarta office in the vil-
lages already checked by the area or provincial coordinators. In the quality 
control process, however, no significant error was found.
With regard to field editing, after each interview, the field researchers 
were asked to check their own work and check for consistency. All accom-
plished interview schedules were submitted to the assigned field anchor 
who, in turn, edited every interview. Once an incomplete or inconsistent 
answer was spotted in the questionnaire, the field interviewers were asked 
to revisit the respondent’s house re-asking the question for verification. For 
purposes of the data processing, office editors checked for final  consistency 
on all interviews before coding. A data entry computer program also veri-
fied the consistency of the encoded data before data tables and figures were 
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generated. Having cleaned the questionnaires, 1210 (99%) of the post-
election survey were judged valid for analysis. As noted above, although 
178 out of 1210 respondents were substitutes, they possessed the same 
qualities (in terms of gender, age bracket, and socio-economic classes) as 
the original respondents. I was personally involved in all stages of the sur-
vey, from designing the survey, developing the survey instrument, training 
of field coordinators, and interviewers, pre-tests, spot- checks, cleaning, 
coding, and data entry.
To prove that my national public opinion survey was representative, we 
need to compare the demographic composition of the sample with the 
Indonesian population based on the most recent census (Table A.1). In 
terms of gender composition and urban-rural domicile, the sample of the 
survey was almost identical to the Indonesian population (see the left 
panel of Table A.1). This is largely because the population was initially 
stratified based on gender and based on area of residence. Interestingly, 
although the categories of religion and ethnic groups weren’t determined 
from the outset, as shown in the right panel of Table A.1, the demo-
graphic samples based on these two important categories were similar to 
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the Indonesian population, confirming that the survey is representative of 
the country as a whole.
In addition, Table A.2 shows that survey sample demographics by prov-
ince also reflect the Indonesian population. Since this survey unit is nation-
wide, the samples were drawn in proportion to the size of population of 
Table A.2 Sample demographics by province in comparison with the 2010 cen-
sus (%)
Province Sample Population
NAD (Aceh) 1.8 1.8
North Sumatera 5.2 5.2
West Sumatera 2.0 2.0
Riau 2.2 2.2
Jambi 1.3 1.3
South Sumatera 3.1 3.1
Bengkulu 0.7 0.7
Lampung 3.2 3.2
Bangka Belitung 0.5 0.5
Riau islands 0.7 0.7
DKI Jakarta 3.8 3.8
West Java 17.5 17.5
Central Java 14.6 14.6
DI Yogyakarta 1.5 1.5
East Java 16.4 16.4
Banten 4.2 4.2
Bali 1.6 1.6
West Nusa Tenggara 1.9 1.9
East Nusa Tenggara 1.7 1.7
West Kalimantan 1.9 1.9
Central Kalimantan 1.0 1.0
South Kalimantan 1.5 1.5
East Kalimantan 1.5 1.5
North Sulawesi 1.0 1.0
Central Sulawesi 1.0 1.0
South Sulawesi 3.4 3.4
Southeast Sulawesi 1.0 1.0
Gorontalo 0.4 0.4
West Sulawesi 0.5 0.5
Maluku 0.6 0.6
North Maluku 0.4 0.4
Papua 1.7 1.7
West Papua 0.4 0.4
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each province. This is largely because each province has a different density 
of population. The higher population a province has, the more samples 
were generated. For instance, 17.5% of the sample was taken from the 
most densely populated province, West Java, compared to West Papua, 
accounting for only 0.4% of the total sample.
pre-election surVeys in JAnuAry, FebruAry–MArch, 
And lAte MArch 2014
In order to capture the level of intensification of vote buying efforts dur-
ing the run-up to the 2014 election, I inserted a number of questions 
relating to this practice and other related issues into several Indikator 
national opinion surveys conducted in January, February–March, and late 
March 2014. All of these surveys applied standard survey methodology 
and procedures similar to those used for the post-election survey described 
above. They also implemented similar layers of quality control, from inten-
sive workshops of interviewers to spot-checking, supervision, and data 
entry. Accordingly, this appendix simply describes the most important 
aspects of the survey methods, assuming that all steps involved in these 
projects were similar to what was already thoroughly explained in the pre-
ceding section.
First, face-to-face interviews were conducted during 18–30 January 
2014. Multistage random sampling was used to produce a probability 
sample of 2039 voting-age adults drawn from all provinces in Indonesia 
and including an oversample from the Jakarta province. Based on this 
2039-person sample, the overall margin of error reaches ±2.4% at 95% 
confidence level. There were 1678 original respondents (82.3%), while 
the substitute respondents were 261 people. Among those who couldn’t 
be interviewed, 51% ‘couldn’t be contacted for various reasons’ (i.e. work-
ing out of the area or at school outside the region), 14% ‘weren’t willing 
to be interviewed,’ 4% was ‘too old,’ 2% was ‘sick,’ and so on. Quality 
control of the interview results was conducted randomly on 20% of the 
total sample by the supervisors who returned to the selected respondents. 
There were no significant errors found in this survey.
The second pre-election survey was conducted from 26 February to 6 
March 2014. The sample size of 2050 is representative of the country as a 
whole. Based on the sample size, the estimated margin of error is ±2.2% at 
95% confidence level. Selected respondents were interviewed through 
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face-to-face interviews by trained interviewers. Of the 2050 cases in this 
survey, 1705 (83.2%) were original respondents, 345 cases involved 
respondent substitution. The third pre-election survey was conducted 
during 19–24 March 2014. The number of samples is 1220 voting-age 
adults who were selected with multistage random sampling proportionally 
distributed over the 34 provinces. The margin of error is around ±2.9% at 
95% significance level. Of the 1220 cases in this survey, there were 1046 
(85.6%) original respondents and 174 substitute respondents. Again, the 
modal answer to the question why original respondents couldn’t be inter-
viewed was ‘inaccessible within the field duration’ (57% and 51% in the 
February–March and the late March surveys, respectively). Notwithstanding 
there were around 15–16% of substitution, these substitute respondents 
generally had similar profiles to the original cases. In these surveys, quality 
control of the results was also carried out randomly on 20% of the total 
samples with strict supervision by the Indikator headquarter. No signifi-
cant errors were found in either pre-election survey.
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In addition to relying on general population surveys, I also wanted to 
analyse the attitudes and experiences of both elected representatives and 
vote brokers with regard to vote buying. However, in conducting a survey 
which captured both groups, there were significant challenges, especially 
in designing a sample frame to select brokers. This is one of the biggest 
methodological problems I encountered: there is no ready-made sam-
pling frame of vote brokers in Indonesia. Recent scholarship on vote bro-
kers in Indonesia has greatly contributed to providing valuable insights 
into the underexplored nature of political brokerage (e.g. Aspinall, 2014a; 
Triantini, 2016), notably regarding its structure, networks, and varying 
modus operandi in distributing electoral handouts. However, little is 
known about the extent to which results from these convenience samples 
can be reliably projected to the whole population of vote brokers (Stokes 
et al., 2013: 261–262).
In order to address the problem of the absence of a sampling frame of 
brokers, and in an attempt to produce a sample that allows for a scientifi-
cally sound portrayal of the targeted population, this study generates a 
probability sample of brokers in a way inspired by Susan Stokes and her 
colleagues (2013), who collected information from randomly selected city 
councillors in Argentina. However, unlike Stokes and her colleagues, who 
considered the councillors as ‘elected brokers,’ my study doesn’t refer to 
local parliament members—an entry point to provide the sampling 
frame—as political brokers. In addition, my study slightly contrasts with 
 Appendix b: surVey oF brokers 
And cAndidAtes
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Stokes and her collaborators in terms of selection of non-elected brokers, 
as will be described below.
Given that I funded the construction of this unique dataset of brokers 
out of my own pocket, I was only able to draw a representative sample in 
four provinces. In order to determine the locations for the probability 
sample of brokers, unlike Stokes et al. (2013) who purposively selected 
four Argentine provinces from which to pick brokers, I was instead guided 
primarily by the fit of cases with the statistical evidence from a large dataset 
of electoral district surveys conducted by Indikator and SMRC during the 
run-up to the 2014 election. Using results from individual-level data, I 
measure the relationship between partisanship and vote buying as the 
determinant for case selection for both my MP and broker surveys (Fig. 
1.2 in Chap. 1). In short, our massive dataset of pre-election surveys in 73 
out of 77 electoral districts across Indonesia results in the following four 
provinces from which to sample MPs and brokers: Central Java, East Java, 
North Sulawesi, and West Sumatra. These areas not only reflect variations 
across the level of partisan closeness and vote buying but also vary with 
respect to socio-economic and political profiles, the topography of power, 
and the level of competitiveness (see Chap. 6 for more details).
The population of this survey is all DPRD (local parliament) members 
at both the provincial and district levels and their brokers, locally known as 
success team members, in four provinces (West Sumatra, Central Java, East 
Java, and North Sulawesi). Hence, it is worth noting that our data on can-
didates’ behaviours and strategies in this study refer to newly elected local 
candidates (though of course some of them may have served previously in 
the DPRD). This is because when this unique, face-to-face survey was 
conducted from 30 September to 25 October 2014, these low-level politi-
cians had been just elected in the April legislative elections and had been 
officially inaugurated as local MPs in August 2014. The sample was deter-
mined with multistage random sampling method. The size of the sample 
in each province was set at 300 respondents, so the sample in four prov-
inces in total was expected to reach 1200 respondents (100 Provincial 
DPRD members, 300 campaign team members of Provincial DPRD mem-
bers, 200 Regent/City DPRD members, and 600 success team members 
of Regent/City DPRD members). It is no exaggeration to say that our 
data are the largest research sample of political operatives in any region.1
1 For comparative perspective, Stokes and her colleagues’ survey in 2009 ‘only’ generated 
a probability sample of 800 elected city councillors and non-elected brokers in four provinces 
in Argentina (Stokes et al., 2013).
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First of all, I demonstrate the population of Provincial and District 
DPRD members in the four provinces from which the sample was drawn 
and then discuss the procedure of sample selection in a systematic way. As 
shown in Table B.1, in the four provinces, in total, there are 310 members 
in provincial legislatures (DPRD I) and 4210 members in district legisla-
tures (DPRD II). Given that the number of district DPRD members is 
much greater than that of provincial DPRD members, and given this study 
is intended to capture intense lower-level campaigns, I decided to draw a 
larger sample of district DPRD members and their brokers than their 
counterparts from provincial legislatures.
Let’s start with the sampling procedure for drawing representative sam-
ples of Provincial DPRD members and their brokers (Table B.2). First, the 
population in each province was grouped (stratified) according to its 
Provincial DPRD electoral districts. Second, in each Provincial DPRD 
electoral district, a sample of Provincial DPRD members was randomly 
selected based on proportion. Then, for every selected Provincial DPRD 
member, three of their brokers, who helped them during the last legisla-
tive election, were also randomly selected.2 As noted above, the popula-
tion of number of brokers in each region was unknown. Accordingly, to 
determine the broker population, as already discussed in Chap. 6, and to 
draw a probability sample of brokers, I needed to collect the relevant data 
based on information mentioned by provincial MP respondents when the 
interviews were conducted.
2 As I describe in the following pages, I divided the brokers into two categories: core team 
and base-level brokers. Hence, for every surveyed local Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah 
(DPRD) member, we then sampled one core team member and two base-level brokers.
Table B.1 Population of local MPs in four provinces
Provincial DPRD District DPRD Total
West Sumatera 65 575 640
Central Java 100 1570 1670
East Java 100 1675 1775
North Sulawesi 45 390 435
Total 310 4210 4520
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In order to give a broader sense of this random selection, I will elabo-
rate this detailed, complex procedure as follows. When the interview with 
each Provincial DPRD member was approaching the end, we asked:
How many brokers [tim sukses, tim relawan, tim kampanye pemenangan3]—
from the top level or core team [tim inti] to lowest-level member who deal 
directly with voters [door-to-door]—worked for you during the 2014 legis-
lative election?
My field researchers then recorded this number. Note that district 
DPRD members were also presented with this question. Among those 
who responded to this question, the mean number of brokers working 
for provincial and district DPRD members was 149.44 with a standard 
deviation of 299.1. As already shown in Chap. 6, the number of brokers 
working for the sampled successful candidates varies across the province 
and varies in size, including one extreme outlier—one candidate who 
3 I used these three words for brokers in the survey instrument. As discussed in Chap. 6, a 
frequently mentioned expression for informal networks of vote brokers is ‘success teams’ 
(tim sukses). However, in some cases, people used a variety of names to call brokers, such as 
a less pejorative term, tim relawan whose closest English equivalent is ‘volunteer team’; 
another neutral term is tim kampanye pemenangan (winning campaign team). In the 
Indonesian context, the word ‘broker’ has, in fact, been Indonesianised, but this word is 
considered by many as a more pejorative term than the often-used, neutral term tim sukses.
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10 100 25 75 100
East Java 11 100 25 75 100
North 
Sulawesi
6 45 25 75 100
Total 310 100 300 400
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reported working with 3000 core and ground-level brokers. As previ-
ously detected by Stokes and her colleagues (2013: 267), low-level politi-
cians are likely to inflate the number of brokers, but they may not be able 
to provide the names of their brokers. To address this problem, I first 
distinguish non- elected brokers into two categories: ‘core team’ (tim 
inti) and ‘lowest- level brokers’ or ‘ground-level brokers,’ whose main 
tasks were swaying voters in favour of the candidate they support. As 
Aspinall and his colleagues (2017: 10) explain, in Indonesia, this type of 
broker was known by a variety of terms, such as kader (or cadre) or sabet 
or gapit (Javanese terms meaning ‘whip’). What concerned Stokes and 
her colleagues about the overestimating tendency above corresponds 
with my questionnaire pre-testing findings. The results from the pre-test 
on about five politicians and ten senior brokers show that my politician 
respondents often found it difficult to name their base-level brokers. 
They were able to answer how many brokers worked for them, but when 
asked to provide a list of names of their grassroots brokers, they typically 
said that it was their core campaign team (tim inti) who had the list. Then, 
we asked tim inti “how many base-level brokers did you have who were 
charged with influencing voters.” The objective is clear: (1) to evaluate or 
match the numbers of the broker army given by each local MP member in 
the previous question. We found that most surveyed low-level politicians 
accurately reported the number of brokers who worked for them in 2014. 
(2) Given most tim inti had a complete list that contained the names and 
addresses of grassroots brokers, it was then instrumental to assess the prob-
able number of brokers who worked in direct contact with voters.
In order to draw a representative sample of the core team, the sampled 
Provincial DPRD members were read the following prompt at the end of 
the interview:
We greatly appreciate your participation. The success of this study depends 
on your cooperation. We also need your help to choose some of your cam-
paign team members for interviews. To ensure that we would interview a 
representative group of people, these people should be selected at random. 
Can you mention the names of the core campaign team who have helped 
you in the 2014 legislative election?
Interestingly, all the surveyed Provincial DPRD members were hap-
pily willing to accept the request and provided a bunch of names of their 
core teams, including their contact information. This is also the case for 
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the sampled district MP members, as will be explained below. My 
researchers were then instructed to enter the list of names of tim inti in 
alphabetical order to select one respondent from the category of the 
core campaign team with simple random sampling. As noted above, the 
same procedure was done to determine the respondent category of the 
base-level brokers. When the interview with the sampled core team 
members was approaching the end, our research teams read the follow-
ing prompt:
We greatly appreciate your participation. The success of this study depends 
on your cooperation. We also need your help choose the names of the cam-
paign volunteer team [tim relawan or tim sukses] who worked at the very 
bottom level or in direct contact with the voters (door-to-door) for inter-
views. To ensure that we interviewed a representative group, these people 
should be selected at random.
Interestingly, most of the core team members handed over a printed list 
of their base-level brokers. Similarly, my field researchers then entered a 
list of names of the grassroots brokers provided by the surveyed core team 
member to the random sheet alphabetically to determine two respondents 
from the category of the base-level brokers who worked in direct contact 
with the voters. The sample in this stratum was selected by simple ran-
dom sampling.
Having discussed the random selection of the sample of Provincial 
DPRD members and their brokers, I am now in a position to describe the 
sampling procedure for determining district local MP members and their 
political operatives. It was carried out in a generally similar fashion, but 
with a slightly different procedure: first, the population in each province 
was grouped (stratified) based on four different zones. Each zone was a 
combination of provincial electoral districts. I used specific criteria to 
establish such zones which vary depending on the geographical proximity, 
history, and conditions of a particular region. Second, in each zone, a 
regency/city (kabupaten/kota) was picked randomly as a sample by pro-
portion. In total, ten regencies/cities were selected. Third, in each selected 
regency/city, five regency/city DPRD members were randomly selected 
as respondents (see Table B.3). Finally, for every surveyed district DPRD 
member, we sampled one core team member (tim inti) and two grassroots 
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brokers, using simple random sampling with the same procedure as 
explained above.
The survey instrument was written and administered in Indonesian. 
Because my study was exclusively conducted in Indonesia, it is difficult to 
make global comparisons. Accordingly, for international comparability, I 
used a number of questions that have been used elsewhere, including a 
2009 broker survey by Stokes and her collaborators (2013). I also incor-
porated their innovative survey experiment in my brokers’ survey (see 
Chap. 4).4 Needless to say, I also had my own particular questions related 
to the aspects of the Indonesian situation with which I was primarily con-
cerned. Overall, as outlined in Chap. 1, with respect to the local politi-
cians’ survey, my survey instrument sought to collect information on 
targeting strategies, broker recruitment, the structure of their personal 
campaign team, voter pragmatism, the level of competitiveness, and bro-
ker monitoring. Regarding the brokers’ survey, I asked a battery of ques-
tions about the mechanisms of vote buying (who is targeted and when, 
how, and why they are targeted), prior personal contact with candidates, 
rent-seeking behaviours, and so forth (see Chap. 6). As indicated above, 
4 One of the authors, Thad Dunning, posted the survey instrument in its entirety at 
http://thaddunning.com/data/brokers. Since the questionnaire was written in Spanish, I 
hired a trusted translator to translate it into Indonesian.
Table B.3 Population and sample sizes of district DPRD members and their 
brokers





















10 50 150 200
Central 
Java
35 1570 10 50 150 200
East 
Java
38 1675 10 50 150 200
North 
Sulawesi
15 390 10 50 150 200
Total 40 200 600 800
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my survey instrument was piloted in late August 2014, three weeks prior 
to field implementation.
With the proposed 1200 respondents from provincial and district 
DPRD members and their brokers, this survey required at least 100 expe-
rienced, skilful interviewers. One field interviewer was assigned to inter-
view one selected Provincial DPRD member, two selected District DPRD 
members, three provincial brokers, and six district brokers. In addition, I 
was helped by four area coordinators and their assistants, along with five 
national supervisors. I personally monitored the survey full-time. However, 
since the nature of this survey was completely different compared to voter 
surveys, I was first looking for not only competent but also experienced 
field researchers who had the ability to approach politicians in a way that 
would ensure they were willing to be interviewed. I personally recruited 
them based on input and discussion with my provincial coordinators. 
Most of them were senior researchers, had been working with my survey 
firm for a long time, and having Master’s degrees, mostly in political and 
social sciences.
More importantly, prior to going to the field, intensive training of field 
researchers was conducted in four capitals of the provinces. I went to 
Padang (West Sumatra), Surabaya (East Java), Manado (North Sulawesi), 
and Semarang (Central Java) to directly train them in how to conduct 
face-to-face interviews with middle-level elites. One to two days of inten-
sive workshops were conducted in each of these capitals to teach the basics 
and the raison d’être of the project and to understand the sampling proce-
dure for determining a representative sample of local DPRD members and 
their brokers. The workshop was also intended to provide participants 
with appropriate communication skills to approach respondents and make 
them understand each question well before answering it.
To increase the response rate, I set a field period that would be lengthy 
enough for the field researchers to interview all the respondents assigned 
to them. Note that it isn’t always easy to convince party elites to accept an 
interview request on sensitive questions like vote buying and its targeting 
strategies. Despite this practice being less likely to be stigmatised than in 
the past (see Chap. 2), it is still illegal in Indonesia. In some cases, espe-
cially when selected respondents were difficult to reach, I personally made 
a call to them, asking them politely on behalf of my interviewers to accept 
the interview request. On some occasions, I also accompanied members of 
my research teams to interview the respondents. Simultaneously, we also 
carried out layered spot-checks as quality control. The initial spot-checks 
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were conducted by area coordinators in each province on 20% of the 
respondents under their supervision. The next level of spot-checks was 
carried out by national supervisors with 50% of the respondents already 
checked by provincial supervisors. We also used the telephone for call- 
back and spot-checking: once we got the respondents’ contact informa-
tion from the survey form, my national supervisors rang them and 
cross-checked the information gathered during the interview. No signifi-
cant errors were found.
Interestingly, notwithstanding the complexities of the sampling proce-
dure and the nature of the survey, we got relatively high response rates. 
One sampled District DPRD member in one regency in East Java couldn’t 
be interviewed within the agreed-upon field duration. Among 1199 
respondents who participated in the survey, 1071 (89.3%) of the respon-
dents were from our original selection. Only 128 (10.7%) were substi-
tuted. Reasons for respondent replacement varied: 46 out of 128 
respondents (35.9%) were unwilling to be interviewed; 44 respondents 
(34.4%) were out of town; 34 respondents (26.6%) couldn’t be contacted 
at all, or had an unclear address; and 1 respondent (0.8%) moved. We also 
decided to replace three respondents from West Sumatra because they 
claimed they didn’t have base-level brokers. Because these substitute 
respondents generally had similar profiles to the original selections and the 
respondent substitution followed the procedure, I decided to include 
them in the analysis. Having cleaned the questionnaire, 1199 cases were 
judged valid for analysis. As indicated earlier, I was personally and directly 
involved in all steps of the project, from recruiting and training of the 
provincial coordinators and field researchers, pre-tests, spot-checks, clean-
ing, coding, and data input.
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 Appendix c: correlAtion between VAriAbles 
(peArson’s r)
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 Appendix d: norMAlity test oF the lineAr 
regression AnAlysis oF the deterMinAnts 
oF Vote buying
Based on the results of the normality test below, the empirical distribution 
of the data (the histogram) in Model 1 isn’t bell-shaped. Similarly, the 
histograms in both Model 2 and Model 3 don’t resemble the normal dis-
tribution, suggesting that the residuals weren’t normally distributed.
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The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure that takes a value of 1 
if the respondent received vote buying once/twice, several times, rarely, 
quite, or very often.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Socio-demographics And civic 
engagement
And political attitudes
b S.E. b S.E. b S.E.
Socio-demographics
Gender 0.266* 0.129 0.236 0.130 0.103 0.170
Rural 0.032 0.146 0.001 0.149 0.331 0.194
Age −0.012* 0.005 −0.013* 0.005 −0.010 0.007
Education 0.069* 0.031 0.052 0.032 0.059 0.042
Income 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.023 −0.035 0.030
Religion (Islam) 0.555* 0.225 0.592** 0.228 0.88** 0.288
Ethnic (Javanese) 0.071 0.144 0.052 0.146 0.192 0.188
Region (Java) 0.044 0.152 0.004 0.154 −0.058 0.197
Civic engagement
Civic engagement 0.293 0.568 −0.689 0.714
Political attitudes
Party identification 0.392** 0.123
Efficacy −0.424* 0.193
Political interest 0.290*** 0.077
Political information 0.082 0.144
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Socio-demographics And civic 
engagement
And political attitudes
b S.E. b S.E. b S.E.
Political participation 0.097 0.196
Political trust 0.126 0.177
Democratic support −0.205 0.178
Constant −0.573 0.406 −0.476 0.409 −1.115 1.103
Pseudo R2 0.030 0.027 0.080
Valid N 1014 995 671
b = Unstandardised coefficients
Note: *p <0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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This regression model designates all parties that participated in the previ-
ous elections—thereby having incumbent candidates running in 2014—
and achieved parliamentary threshold in 2014 as the reference category: 
PKB, PKS, PDI-P, Golkar, Gerindra, Democrat, PAN, PPP, and Hanura.1 
Each category in this variable has a value of 1 for its category and a 0 for 
all others. For example, in the first model (PKB), 1 = those who run from 
this party; 0 = otherwise. This is also true for other models.
1 Therefore, I excluded candidates from NasDem because the party just ran for the first 
time in the 2014 elections.
 Appendix F: MultiVAriAte AnAlyses 
oF the deterMinAnts oF winning 
And losing incuMbents
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